

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THE

HISTORY

OF

GREECE,

FROM THE

ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER OF MACEDON,

TILL ITS

FINAL SUBJECTION TO THE ROMAN POWER;

IN EIGHT BOOKS.

By JOHN GAST, D. D.

ARCHDEACON OF GLANDELAGH.

VOL. II.

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BOOK V. Sect. I. The laſt Philip aſcends the throne of Macedon:

PHILIP aſcended the throne [1] with the general applauſe of all Macedon [2]. The extraordinary care beſtowed on his education, the inſtructions he was

[1] OLYMP. CXXXIX. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 216.
[2] See Polyb. Caſaub. Oct. p 1375 de virt. & vitiis.

BOOK V. Sect. 1.

known to have received from the late king, the opportunity he had enjoyed of obſerving the virtues of that excellent prince, together with the high expectations which his own natural endowments had taught his ſubjects to form of him, induced them to hope, that in him Antigonus would be revived; and, though only in his ſeventeenth year at the time of his acceſſion, his manner of entering on the government ſtrengthened theſe expectations: intelligent, affable, munificent, attentive to the ſeveral duties of the royal ſtation, he appeared to have no other end in view but the happineſs of Macedon, and to have every qualification neceſſary to accompliſh that great object.

his character.

Macedon, at the ſame time, had never been in a more flouriſhing condition. The wiſe policy of the laſt reign had reſtored induſtry and opulence; her cities were populous; her lands cultivated, and covered with inhabitants; and her armies high in reputation for diſcipline and courage. The barbarian borderers had been lately humbled; and even that ſpirit of hoſtility, which for ages had animated the councils of Greece againſt Macedon, had almoſt died away. Who could have thought, that theſe were the times, and this the prince, deſtined to humble this ancient kingdom, and to prepare the way for it's final ruin!

Proſperous ſtate of Macedon at his acceſſion.

The Aetolians [1] were the firſt people to diſturb the peace of Greece. The jealouſy, which they had long entertained of the Achaean ſtates, was much increaſed

The Aetolians invade Achaia.

[1] Polyb. L. iv. c. 3. & ſeq. Plut. in Arato.

by that importance which Achaia had assumed from her alliance with Macedon; and no sooner were they relieved from the dread of Antigonus, than the Aetolian bands poured again into Peloponnesus. They landed on the Achaean coast, which after ravaging, they proceeded to a strong hold they possessed on the Messenian frontier; from whence they made severe depredations on all the country around. These, however, were said to have been only private adventurers, who went forth merely for the sake of plunder, without the authority, and, as it was pretended, even without the knowledge of the Aetolian government.

Aratus marches against them.

Timoxenus, then general of Achaia, whose term of office was nearly expired, declining to march against them, Aratus, general-elect, assumed the command, and taking the field, required them instantly to leave Peloponnesus. They promised they would: but Aratus, although he had already dismissed a part of his force, suspecting the sincerity of their intentions, and finding, as he thought, a favorable opportunity of chastising these unprovoked plunderers, attacked them on their march near Caphyae, a town of Arcadia; but meeting with an unexpected and vigorous resistance, he was entirely defeated.

and is defeated,

partly by his own fault,

The blame of this discomfiture fell wholly on Aratus. He had presumed to act, though not in office; he had weakened his army, whilst the enemy was yet in the field; and he had exposed his troops to slaughter by his rashness and the ill-digested orders he had given. To answer to these articles of charge, he was summoned before the convention of the

BOOK V. Sect. 1.

Achaean ſtates; and he had probably been condemned, had not an open confeſſion of his error deprecated the reſentment of his judges. The fault, nevertheleſs, was not altogether to be imputed to him. It appears, that the Achaean troops had been deficient in diſcipline and in courage. The pernicious effects of their having called in the aid of foreign arms, both Polybius [a] and Plutarch [b] inform us, began already to be felt. And the Achaeans, who thought no enterpriſe too arduous, whilſt left to the exertion of their own vigor; thoſe men, who with ſuch glory to themſelves had eſtabliſhed the liberties of Achaia, now repoſing themſelves on the power of Macedon, had ſunk inſenſibly into ſloth, timidity, and weakneſs.

and partly by the fault of the Achaeans.

Aratus applies to Philip for aid.

The evil was not at preſent to be remedied. And nothing remained to the Achaeans but the alternative of making friends of the Aetolians, by admitting them to a ſhare in the adminiſtration of Grecian affairs (an object which the Aetolians ſeem long to have had in view) or to implore the aſſiſtance of the Macedonian king. The former muſt have been a meaſure of wiſer policy; as the ſtrength of Greece would then have been collected into one formidable confederacy; and the different ſtates, by purſuing ſeparate intereſts, had not haſtened the ruin of their common liberties. But the pride of Aratus led him to a more pernicious choice. He could not bear that Achaia ſhould yield up, or even divide a ſovereignty, which however was now little more than nominal;

[a] See Polyb. L. iv. c. 7. [b] Plutarch. in Arato.

and ſtill leſs that ſhe ſhould receive orders from thoſe to whom ſhe had been accuſtomed to preſcribe them. Aratus, beſides, had been the firſt perſon to call in the Macedonians to the ſupport of the Achaean body; and he would not ſeem to condemn a meaſure, which had originated from himſelf. Unfortunately for Greece, the counſels of Aratus prevailed.

Philip's pride gratified by this application:

Philip received the application with pleaſure. To ſee himſelf, at the opening of his reign, the acknowledged arbiter of Greece, and to have the firſt of the Peloponneſian ſtates taking ſhelter under his protection, were circumſtances too flattering for a young prince, to be conſidered with indifference; whilſt his compliance with the requeſt of the Achaeans gave him an opportunity, at the ſame time, of ſhowing his regard to the injunctions of the late king, who had charged him to cultivate the friendſhip of Aratus, and to pay particular attention to the counſels of that experienced ſtateſman.

he promiſes to co operate with Achaia.

He accordingly promiſed, as ſoon as he had ſettled the affairs of his own kingdom, to repair to Corinth, in order to meet the convention of the ſtates in alliance with Achaia; and in conjunction with them to ſettle their plan of future operations.

The Aetolians ſack Cynaetha

During theſe tranſactions, the Aetolians had committed a freſh act of violence, far more outrageous, as their enemies affected to repreſent it, than any thing they had yet been guilty of*. Making a new inroad into Peloponneſus, they had ſacked Cynaetha, a city of Arcadia, putting to the ſword moſt of the

* See Polyb. L. iv. c. 17.

BOOK V. Sect. I.

inhabitants, and laying the place in ruins. The inhabitants of Cynaetha had, it ſeems, been long noted for fierce and barbarous manners. Some time before the preſent period, one party of them had riſen againſt another, whom they drove into baniſhment; but the exiles, on certain conditions, having obtained their recal, contrived to betray the city to the Aetolians, who, without diſtinction of friend or foe, exterminated the whole inhabitants. How far the wickedneſs of the Cynaetheans might afford an apology for this inhuman proceeding, it is now difficult to ſay. So exceedingly great, it certainly appears, was their profligacy, that they were held in ſuch abhorrence by the reſt of the Arcadians, that into ſome of their cities it was even deemed a defilement to admit them. What makes this profligacy the more worthy of hiſtorical notice, is the extraordinary manner in which ancient writers account for it.

The neglect of muſic the cauſe of its misfortunes:

They aſcribe it [7] to a neglect of the ſtudy of muſic. The Arcadians, ſay they, being accuſtomed, from the unkindly ſoil they had to cultivate, to a rough and hardy life, and breathing an air keen and inclement, required ſome gentler relaxation to ſoften and humanize their minds, which might otherwiſe have contracted an aſperity ſimilar to that of the country they inhabited; and this alteration, experience taught them, muſic had the power of effecting in a greater degree than any other ſpecies of amuſement. Muſic was accordingly, with them, the great national

[7] See Polyb. L. iv. c. 20, 21. & Athen. Deipnos. L. xiv.

object. Their children, from the time they firſt began to ſpeak, were inſtructed to ſing hymns to the gods, and to chant the praiſes of their ancient chieftains; and this ſtudy they were, by the laws of Arcadia, to continue until the age of thirty, no other amuſement being allowed among them, nor any other art held in equal eſtimation. At their ſacred feſtivals, the boys and men were obliged to make trial of their ſkill, and to celebrate the ſolemnity with melody, ſong, and dance. And even at their convivial meetings, every perſon was in his turn to raiſe ſome inſtructive ſong; which to be incapable of doing, was ignominious in the higheſt degree. But the Cynaetheans, hiſtory tells us, having departed from the inſtitutions of their anceſtors, had degenerated into ſavage ferocity, delighting in cruelty, perfidy, and every vicious habit which debaſes the nature of man.

accounted for.

The fact, however ſtrange it may be eſteemed in our preſent ſtate of cold and artificial manners, is far from being incredible. The muſic here ſpoken of, Polybius expreſsly tells us, conſiſted of hymns and paeans in honor of their deities and ancient heroes [a], and was altogether of the moral claſs, conveying to the mind whatever was awful and effecting in their religion, their policy, or national events. So that ſongs ſuch as theſe, aided beſides by that power of melody [b], in which, if there is truth in the records

[a] Ὕμνους καὶ παιᾶνας, εἰς ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ἡρῴους καὶ θεοὺς ὑμνοῦσι. See Polyb. L. iv. c. 20.

[b] Dr. Brown (Union of Poetry and Muſic, ſect. 5.) inſiſts that the boaſted efficacy of ancient muſic among the Greek

BOOK V. Sect. I.

of ancient days, the Grecian artiſts avowedly excelled, could not fail, eſpecially when operating on young and uncorrupted minds, to inſpire exalted ſentiments, and to make the heart beat high in the

tribes was chiefly owing to the powerful and affecting ſong, which, according to him, derived but little aid from the muſical accompaniment, their melody being exceedingly ſimple and inartificial. And he criticiſes Dacier and Monteſquieu, for aſcribing too much to the manual execution in theſe early ages. But "their muſic being ſimple and inartificial" is one of the very reaſons why it was ſo amazingly powerful, "ſimplicity in melody" being a neceſſary requiſite, as an ingenious writer confeſſes, (ſee Dr. Gregory's *Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with thoſe of the Animal World*) "in all muſic intended to reach the heart, "or even greatly to delight the ear." And thence in part it is, that muſic has always been of more conſequence among the leſs cultivated, than among what are called highly-civilized nations; the latter, by refining their muſic, and rendering it more complex, have leſſened, if not deſtroyed, it's power of affecting. We may therefore venture to ſuppoſe, and the teſtimony of the moſt reſpectable of the ancients juſtifies the conjecture, that, ſimple as their inſtrumental muſic may have been, and however unacquainted with that concentual harmony, probably the invention of later ages (ſee Sir John Hawkins's *Hiſtory of Muſic*, B. iii. c. 2, 3.) it was nevertheleſs in ſtrength of expreſſion and deep pathetic force far beyond any thing known amongſt us. So that, with all the energy that poetry, generous affection, and tender ſentiment, can give (for to theſe heart-ennobling ſubjects was the ancient Grecian ſong altogether ſacred) (ſee Plutarch. de Muſica) the ſongs of Greece had alſo every advantage that genuine and inſpirited melody can beſtow. When ſuch a combination took place, among a people of quick and ſtrong perception, and who had not yet attained the art of ſuppreſſing their feelings, is it ſtrange that every paſſion, as we are told was often

cauſe of virtue [*]. No wonder, therefore, that the Cynaetheans, by proſcribing ſo important a part of education, ſhould have ſuffered in the way we are told; as the effacing of every religious impreſſion,

the caſe, ſhould have confeſſed it's controlling power? — See Hawkins's *Hiſtory of Muſic*, prel. diſc. p. 12. B. ii c. 2. p. 166, 167. & B. iii. c. 1. p. 251. See alſo Harris on *Muſic, Painting*, and *Poetry*; and De Guy *Voyage en Greece*, Lettre 36.

[*] It will readily be acknowledged, that ſeveral of the effects aſcribed by the writers of Greece to their ancient muſic (ſuch as, ſtimulating or controlling the paſſions; the relieving from bodily pain or infirmity, &c. &c.) are to be underſtood allegorically, or to be conſidered as the enthuſiaſtic flights of a yet rude, and therefore wondering people. Nevertheleſs, when we ſee the legiſlator ſeriouſly employing himſelf in regulating the muſic to be permitted within the ſtate, on account of *the influence* which, he tells us, *it had on the public manners*, it is impoſſible not to perceive, that their muſic muſt have had a power, which, whether the cauſe is in our manners or our muſical expreſſion, we now ſeek for in vain. Ecprepes, a Spartan Ephore, Plutarch (in Agide) informs us, cut off two of the nine ſtrings from the inſtrument of Phrynis the muſician, in order to check the voluptuouſneſs of the muſic which this artiſt was introducing, and *which might deſtroy the harmony of the ſtate.* And ſome years after, Timotheus was proſecuted and baniſhed from Sparta, for having attempted the like innovation in the ſtrings of the lyre, *to the corruption of the Spartan youth.* The decree Boethius has preſerved to us —

"Whereas Timotheus the Mileſian, coming to our city, "has deformed the ancient muſic, and, laying aſide the uſe "of the ſeven-ſtringed lyre, and introducing a multiplicity "of notes, endeavours *to corrupt the ears of our youth*, "by means of theſe his novel and complicated conceits, "which he calls *chromatic*, by him employed in the room

BOOK V.

and a total depravation of manners, muſt evidently have followed.

Sect. 1. But how great ſoever the contempt in which the Cynaetheans were held, the deſtruction of their city by the Aetolians excited much indignation throughout Peloponneſus; and the Achaean confederates being now met at Corinth, it was urged before them, as a new inſtance of that ſpirit of violence, of which the Aetolians ſtood accuſed. In ſuch an aſſembly, convened under the influence of Aratus and his friends, in which the king of Macedon himſelf preſided, every charge againſt the Aetolians was readily admitted. The whole convention, with joint ſuffrages, agreed, that the Aetolians were guilty; that reparation ſhould be demanded; and that, unleſs it was obtained, war ſhould forthwith be declared againſt them; and the direction of it committed to the Macedonian king.

" of our *eſtabliſhed*, *orderly*, and *ſimple* muſic — It " therefore ſeemeth good to us, the King and Ephori, after " having cut off the ſuperfluous ſtrings of his lyre, and " leaving only ſeven thereon, to baniſh the ſaid Timotheus " out of our dominions, that every one beholding the " wholeſome ſeverity of this city, may be deterred from " bringing in amongſt us any *unbecoming* cuſtoms." — See Hawkins's Hiſtory of Muſic, B. ii. c. 7. and Principles and Power of Harmony. See alſo Boethius de Muſicâ; & Decretum Lacedaemon. contra Timotheum miles. E. Codd. Miſſis. Oxonienſibus, Oxon. 1777.

Compare what this curious monument ſays, and what likewiſe Polybius and other ancient writers relate concerning the Arcadian muſic, with the utmoſt that can be ſaid of our muſic, conſidered as an inſtrument of national virtue; and how ſtriking muſt our inferiority appear!

Such was the beginning of the *ſocial war* [11], ſo called from the aſſociation entered into by the ſeveral ſtates engaged againſt Aetolia. It commenced the firſt year of the 140th Olympiad, the ſame in which Hannibal laid ſiege to Saguntum, and continued for the ſpace of three years after. Though this war was not attended with any overthrow of ſtates, nor remarkable revolution of power, it was nevertheleſs in two reſpects of pernicious conſequence to Greece; it gave to Philip an aſcendant in the Grecian councils, of which a fatal uſe was afterwards made by that ambitious prince; and it aggravated that animoſity and deep-rankling hatred, which had long ſubſiſted between ſtate and ſtate, and which ended at laſt in the utter ſubverſion of them all.

Social war.

Philip began his operations in a manner that afforded little benefit to his Achaean allies. The Aetolians, by their frequent inroads into the countries that lay between them and the Macedonian frontiers, were become the terror of all the nations of thoſe parts. The Epirots in particular, no longer the reſpectable people they once had been, were now fallen under a kind of ſubjection to the Aetolians; and, though diſpoſed to follow the Macedonian banners, they were with-held by a dread of the Aetolian power. Philip formed the plan of reſtraining theſe incurſions, which, whilſt Greece appeared as the oſtenſible object of his care, tended at the ſame time to the ſecurity of his own kingdom. He accordingly laid ſiege to Ambracos [12], an important fortreſs, com-

Philip lays ſiege to Ambracos, and takes it.

[11] Πόλεμος συμμαχικός. — See Polyb. L. ii. c. 36.

[12] See Polyb. L. iv. c. 7. 61. & Palmerii Græc. Ant. L. ii. c. 7.

BOOK V. Sect. I.

manding Ambracia and the country adjacent, which properly belonged to Epire, but was now in the hands of the Aetolians. Having reduced this fortreſs, he put the Epirots in poſſeſſion of it, and prepared to carry the war into the heart of Aetolia.

the Aetolians invade Macedon.

The fierceneſs of the Aetolian ſpirit was in no ſhape humbled by this loſs; on the contrary, whilſt the enemy was thus at their gates, they detached a large body of forces, to invade Macedon; who, after committing great devaſtation wherever they appeared, puſhed on as far as Dium [11], a place of note near the Thermaic gulph, famed for its ſumptuous temples, which were enriched by valuable offerings, and adorned with the monuments and ſtatues of the Macedonian kings. This city the Aetolians laid in ruins; they ſpared not even the ſacred edifices; and they carried off immenſe ſpoils.

and make incurſions into Achaia:

About the ſame time, another Aetolian band had paſſed over into Achaia [12], and nearly ſurpriſed Aegium, one of the cities of the Achaean league; whilſt a third army, in conjunction with the Eleans, had fallen on that part of Achaia which bordered on Elis, ravaged the territory of Dymé, Pharae, and Tritaea, and taken Teichos, a ſtrong caſtle in that neighbourhood, by which they kept in awe all the country around.

diſtreſs of the Achaeans:

Meanwhile, every reſource ſeemed to fail the Achaeans. They had ſent to Philip to haſten to their aſſiſtance; but the ravages of the Aetolians, joined to the hoſtile movements of the Dardanians,

[11] Polyb. L. iv. c. 62. [12] Polyb. L. iv. c. 57.

had already made his own dominions the firſt and moſt neceſſary object of his attention. Aratus, the general of Achaia, judged it imprudent to riſk a battle, to which he knew himſelf unequal, as the mercenaries in the Achaean ſervice had mutinied for want of pay; and the native Achaeans alone were not to be depended on. Their Peloponneſian confederates were all, at the ſame time, either ſpiritleſs or diſaffected. Even the Meſſenians [15], in whoſe cauſe chiefly Achaia had at the beginning taken up arms, were unwilling and afraid to act againſt the Aetolians, who kept a formidable garriſon at Phialea [16] on their frontiers, from whence they could at any time lay Meſſenia waſte. Whilſt the Spartans, though under no ſuch apprehenſions, and notwithſtanding their having, at the late convention, pledged themſelves to Achaia, had now maſſacred or baniſhed [17] all their own citizens who were ſuppoſed to be in the intereſt of the Achaeans, and had openly declared againſt them.

the Spartans renounce their alliance.

It will be neceſſary to explain the cauſes of this ſudden revolution in the Spartan councils; and from them we ſhall be inſtructed what was the condition of Sparta at this period.

[15] See Polyb. L. iv. c. 31.

[16] Polybius (L. iv. c. 3, 6. & 31.) makes mention of Phigalea, a ſtrong-hold on the Meſſenian borders; and (L. iv. c. 79.) of the Φιαλῆς or people of Phialea, a ſtrong-hold likewiſe on the borders of Meſſenia. From ſeveral circumſtances it is probable, that it is the ſame ſtrong-hold which is ſpoken of in all theſe places.

[17] Polyb. L. iv. c. 34 & ſeq.

BOOK V.

Sect. 1. from what cauſes.

Since the battle of Selaſia, where, as already related, Cleomenes was defeated by Antigonus Doſon king of Macedon, the Spartans, amidſt their greateſt humiliation, had ever been impatient of the domination of Achaia; to which the haughtineſs of that republic had in all probability very much contributed. When the Aetolians, after the death of Antigonus, firſt invaded Peloponneſus, they had been diſpoſed to join them; but the Ephori then in office could not agree about the expediency of the meaſure; two of them being ſtrenuous in the cauſe of Achaia, the other three on the ſide of the Aetolians; upon which an inſurrection having enſued, the Ephori in the intereſt of the Achaeans were ſlain. The arrival of Philip at Corinth, and the aſſociation of the Peloponneſian ſtates againſt Aetolia, checked for a time this turbulence of ſpirit; and though moſt of the Spartans were ſecretly friends to the Aetolians, they found it adviſeable to diſguiſe their ſentiments, and to appear well affected to the Achaean confederacy.

The following year encouraged other views. The Achaeans, haraſſed by the Aetolians, and unſupported by the king of Macedon, became leſs conſiderable; and the Aetolians openly ſolicited the alliance of the Spartan people. Their party was powerful; and the propoſal had, without doubt, been accepted, had not the Ephori, who were then all devoted to the intereſts of Achaia, vigorouſly oppoſed it. This oppoſition proved fatal to theſe magiſtrates. They were ſhortly after maſſacred in the temple of Minerva, whilſt they were employed

in the performance of certain ſacred rites; and other Ephori, of whoſe compliance the friends of Aetolia were well aſſured, were appointed in their room. In conſequence of theſe tranſactions, the Spartans renounced all connexion with the Achaean ſtates, and declared the Aetolians their allies.

Cleomenes dies in Egypt.

Such was the ſituation of affairs at Sparta, when tidings arrived, that Cleomenes, of whoſe return they ſtill cheriſhed hopes, had died in Egypt. The Ephori laid hold on this occaſion; and, under the appearance of zeal for the ancient Spartan polity, propoſed, even at the expenſe of their own power, that the regal government ſhould be reſtored. The nomination they made explained fully their purpoſe. On the throne of the elder branch they placed an infant, named Ageſipolis, of the royal line, and grandſon to that Cleombrotus, who had been advanced to the regal dignity upon the expulſion of Leonidas. The other throne they filled with Lycurgus, an ambitious partiſan of their own party, although he had not the leaſt right by inheritance, and ſeveral princes of the younger branch were ſtill alive; but Polybius [11] tells us, that Lycurgus had bought the ſuffrages of the Ephori, at the rate of a talent to each.

Intereſted conduct of the Ephori:

they ſell the Spartan throne to Lycurgus,

By theſe arrangements, amongſt other favorite objects, the Ephori effectually ſecured the political union of Sparta with the Aetolians; Lycurgus ratifying all the ſtipulations they had made, and commencing immediate hoſtilities againſt the Achaean confederates.

who confirms all their acts.

[11] L. iv. c. 35.

BOOK V. Sect. 1.

Above a year had elapſed, ſince the alliance had been formed againſt Achaia; during which time, Philip had performed but little of what he had promiſed. The Dardanians, however, who had threatened the Macedonian borders, having, upon his approach, retired homeward, he now found himſelf at leiſure to attend to the diſtreſſed ſituation of his Peloponneſian friends; and, though in the depth of winter, he ſet out [19] with the utmoſt ſecrecy for Corinth, where a part of his forces lay.

Philip marches into Peloponneſus;

The Aetolians, and the ſtates in their alliance, had not the leaſt ſuſpicion of his having left Macedon: they had entertained an early contempt of Philip, on account of his youth; and the ſucceſs, with which they had carried on their depredations, had confirmed them in an opinion, that they had nothing of conſequence to fear from him. They ſoon found themſelves to be miſtaken. Philip having adviſed the Achaeans of his arrival, and ſummoned them to join his ſtandard, ſurpriſed a party of Eleans, who, lulled into ſecurity, had gone forth to ravage the Sicyonian territories, and cut to pieces or took priſoners almoſt the whole body; out of two thouſand five hundred men, ſcarcely one hundred eſcaping. From thence, notwithſtanding the rugged precipices and deep ſnows in his march, he advanced to Pſophis, a remarkable ſtrong-hold within the confines of Arcadia, of which the Eleans had got poſſeſſion. The ſituation of this place, together with the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, ſeemed to render

ſurpriſes a party of Eleans;

lays ſiege to Pſophis,

[19] Polyb. L. iv, c. 67 & ſeq.

any

any attempt againſt it impracticable. It was a ſquare fortification, ſurrounded with ſtrong walls. On three ſides the approaches to it were defended either by the Erymanthus, a deep and impetuous river, or by rapid torrents, all of them ſwollen high with the winter-floods; and on the fourth ſide, it was covered by a hill difficult of aſcent and well fortified. Philip, nevertheleſs, ſurmounted all theſe obſtructions; he brought his ſcaling ladders to bear againſt it; and he puſhed on the aſſault with ſo much vigor, and in ſo many different parts at once, that he ſoon made himſelf maſter of it. Laſion and Stratum, two other cities in that neighbourhood, the Eleans had alſo ſurpriſed; but, terrified at the fate of Pſophis, they immediately abandoned them. BOOK V. Sect. 1. and takes it;

Elis, one of the fineſt regions of Greece in point of cultivation, and rich in every ſpecies of rural wealth, was now open to Philip. Through this country he ſpread devaſtation; purſuing the Eleans even to their mountains, and carrying off cattle and other plunder to an immenſe amount. He next entered Tryphalia, a diſtrict of Peloponneſus to the ſouthward of Elis, which had ſome towns capable of defence, garriſoned by the Eleans and Aetolians; but in ſix days he reduced them all. ravages Elis, reduces Tryphalia,

The reduction of theſe places brought about alſo that of Phialea, on the Meſſenian borders. Phialea had for ſome years been under the domination of the Aetolians; who, as we have already obſerved, on all occaſions infeſted from thence the Meſſenian territories, controlling the councils of that people, and frees the Meſſenians from the Aetolian yoke:

BOOK V. Sect. I.

and permitting them to have neither friend nor foe, but in common with themſelves: but now, deriving courage from the ſucceſs of Philip's arms, and the report of his advancing to their aſſiſtance, the inhabitants roſe upon the Aetolians, and forced them to evacuate their city. This event had important conſequences; the Meſſenian ſtates recovered their independence, and, no longer intimidated by their Aetolian oppreſſors, declared immediately on the ſide of Macedon.

the temperate uſe he makes of his victories:

The capacity and vigor ſhown by Philip in the courſe of this expedition, which he had completed in the ſhort ſpace of a few weeks, during the ſeverity of the winter-ſeaſon, received an additional luſtre from the temperate uſe he made of his victories. He granted peace to all who ſued for it. Of the places which he had reduced, he retained few in his own poſſeſſion. In ſome, content with having expelled the Aetolian garriſons, he re-eſtabliſhed the former inhabitants, and reſtored to them their ancient polity. Other cities he beſtowed on his Peloponneſian confederates: the Achaean ſtates, in particular, he had gratified with Pſophis, the moſt important ſtrong-hold in this part of Greece; and which to them was an acquiſition of great importance, as it ſtrengthened their frontier towards that quarter. His whole conduct, indeed, ſeemed to proceed on the ſame generous plan which Antigonus had formerly adopted. The friend of liberty, and the enemy of oppreſſion, his martial exploits carried with them no appearance of ſelfiſh ambition; but ſeemed only to have in view the advantage of his

allies, and the defence of Peloponnesus against the encroachments of Aetolian usurpation. BOOK V.

But amidst all these fair appearances, a strange alteration [20] began to discover itself in the character of Philip, who had now retired to Argos, and there kept his court. Some time before the death of Antigonus, that excellent prince, sensible of his declining health, and apprehensive of the consequences which the intrigues of faction might occasion under a minority, had appointed the different persons to whom the principal administration of affairs was, upon his demise, to be intrusted. At the head of the council of regency he had placed Apelles, whom he also appointed tutor to the young king; a man versed in affairs of state, and supposed to be of strict integrity; but all was artful fallacy and deception. Under a plausible outside, he concealed the greatest duplicity of heart, the imperiousness of a tyrant, and an insatiable lust of power. Leontius, with the title of captain of the cuirassiers, Antigonus had named to the command of the army; Megaleas was appointed secretary of state; Taurion to be king's lieutenant in Peloponnesus; and Alexander to be captain of the life-guard. These dispositions had been implicitly acquiesced in by Philip: and Apelles was at this time prime minister, and the royal favorite. Of the other chief-officers of the crown, Megaleas and Leontius were the creatures of the minister, and paid an implicit obedience to his instructions. Apelles, who in Macedon

Sect. 1.

adopts other principles:

character of his ministers;

their pride,

[20] Polyb. L. iv. c. 76. 82. & seq. Plutarch. in Arato.

BOOK V. Sect. 1.

acted without control, was ſoon diſguſted at the rigid firmneſs and unpliable character of the republican Greeks; who frequently preſumed to diſpute his orders, and to talk of laws and privileges, which they would not ſuffer to be infringed. He therefore reſolved to humble them: and, ſo early as the late expedition into Elis, he had given directions to the ſeveral Macedonian officers, to take every opportunity of treating them with contempt and injuſtice, particularly in the diviſion of the plunder, and in the diſtribution of quarters; with ſtrict injunctions, ſhould they preſume to complain, to charge them with mutiny, and to puniſh them accordingly. The Macedonians, Polybius obſerves [21], had, by a ſimilar policy, eſtabliſhed their dominion over the nations of Theſſaly, who had now only the ſhadow of liberty remaining; and Apelles expected, that he ſhould with as little difficulty effect the ſame in Peloponneſus. But the Achaeans were not ſo eaſily to be ſubdued. They applied directly to Aratus, who, with a becoming ſpirit, remonſtrated to Philip againſt the conduct of his miniſters. Philip ſaw that matters were not yet ripe for the execution of the intended project: he therefore temporized; and, affecting to throw the blame on his ſervants, commanded them to deſiſt from giving offence to his Achaean allies.

and duplicity;

they are oppoſed by Aratus,

whom they endeavour to ſupplant:

Some other method of accompliſhing their deſigns was now to be employed. Aratus, at this time, had the lead in the Achaean councils, and the perſon

[21] L. iv. c. 76.

who was supported by his recommendation, was always sure to succeed to the appointment of General of Achaia. That it might not, therefore, be in his power again to obstruct the views of Macedon, Apelles laid his plan to withdraw from this statesman the confidence of the Achaeans, by throwing the administration of affairs into other hands; and he accordingly advised Philip to attach himself to the party in opposition to Aratus [22]. Philip entered readily into the views of his minister, and immediately set out for Achaia, in order, by his presence, to influence, if possible, the approaching election of General. The most eminent and the worthiest of the Achaeans were all the friends of Aratus; but to be the friend of Aratus was now a crime. Philip supported, therefore, the election of Eperatus, whose only merit was his enmity to this great man; yet, without abilities, and without personal weight, Eperatus, by dint of the intrigues, the threatenings, and the bribes, which Philip and his ministers employed, defeated the united opposition of Aratus and every honest Achaean. He was elected. To counterbalance, however, this unpopular measure, and to strengthen himself in the affections of the Achaean people, Philip laid siege to Teichos [23], the fortress of which the Aetolians had possessed themselves the preceding year, took it, and restored it to the Achaeans of Dymé, to whom it belonged; and, having made an inroad into Elis, he presented

[22] Polyb. L. iv. c. 23. Plutarch in Arato.

[23] Polyb. L. iv. c. 84.

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the Dymeans, and the cities in that neighbourhood, with all the plunder he had carried off.

Philip was now, in his own imagination, maſter of Achaia; the adminiſtration was devoted to him; and the wealth and vigor of that republic, he fancied abſolutely at his diſpoſal; but he ſoon found what an empty phantom he had been purſuing. The ſeaſon for action approached; proviſions were neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of the army, and funds were wanted for their pay. The new general was applied to upon this occaſion; but no magazines had been provided; and the treaſury was exhauſted; Eperatus had neither credit nor invention for immediate reſource; and the king had to ſuffer the mortification of courting the intereſt of Aratus, in order to obtain ſupplies of money and ſtores; to apologize for the affront he had caſt upon him; and to confeſs himſelf indebted to him, even for the means of carrying on the war.

are diſappointed:

Apelles, however, ſtill perſiſted. Nothing leſs than the deſtruction of Aratus was now his object. He accuſed him of holding a treaſonable correſpondence with the enemy. Philip had ſent overtures of peace, with large offers of protection, to the Eleans, on condition of their renouncing the friendſhip of Aetolia: and the Eleans had rejected the propoſal. Apelles[24] pretended to have proof, that the obſtinacy of the Elean people was owing to ſecret inſtructions they had received from Aratus; and with this he had the inſolence, in the preſence of the king, to

invent an accuſation againſt him:

[24] Polyb. ubi ſup.

charge both Aratus and his ſon; in the moſt ſolemn manner averring the truth of what he had alledged againſt them. But this charge failed alſo of its effect. Aratus found means fully to prove his innocence; and Philip, from this time, either aſhamed of the mean practices he had been induced to countenance, or more probably, convinced that he could not act with vigor without Aratus, affected to place much confidence in that Achaean ſtateſman, and to give leſs attention to the ſuggeſtions of his enemies.

but are defeated:

But, whatever might be the diſſimulation of Philip, Apelles was tranſported with indignation at this appearance of favour to the man he hated. He had formed a plan for the ſubjection of Greece; and, in return for ſo important a ſervice, had promiſed himſelf whatever the gratitude of his maſter had to beſtow; but now, amidſt theſe viſions of greatneſs, he ſaw himſelf ſupplanted by the man, whom he had marked out for deſtruction. Urged then by ambition, diſappointment, jealouſy, and revenge, he conceived a deſign far more atrocious than any he had yet imagined. In conjunction with Megaleas and Leontius, a formal conſpiracy [21] was entered into for defeating the views of the king in whatever he ſhould undertake; of expoſing his troops to diſtreſs and diſcomfiture, and of encompaſſing him with ſuch inſuperable difficulties, as might either compel him to abandon a war, which his miniſters were not allowed to guide, or to meet his ruin in the proſecution of it. Apelles was ſtill

resolve to compaſs the deſtruction of Aratus, though at the expenſe of their maſter.

[21] See Polyb. L. v. c. 2 & ſeq.

BOOK V. Sect. I.

at the head of adminiſtration, and had powerful influence over the ſeveral departments of government throughout the kingdom of Macedon. The more effectually to execute what he and his accomplices had projected, it was agreed, that under the pretence of public ſervice, the firſt ſhould remove to Chalcis in Euboea, where he might find opportunities of intercepting all remittances from Philip's hereditary dominions. Meanwhile, it was to be the province of Megaleas and Leontius to throw obſtacles in the way of every expedition that promiſed advantage to their ſovereign and his Achaean confederates; to miſlead the king into ruinous meaſures; and even, if found neceſſary, to ſpread diſaffection and mutiny in the army, in order to render its operations feeble and ineffectual.

Philip ſoon felt the fatal effects of this treaſonable combination. Diſappointed of the cuſtomary ſupplies, he was reduced to great diſtreſs. To whatever meaſure Aratus recommended, the king's officers urged numberleſs objections; and in their turn, rather to diſtract than to promote the public operations, propoſed attempts generally uſeleſs and often impracticable. Aratus at length prevailed on the king to attack the Aetolians in their maritime ſettlements, as the only method of annoying them effectually; and he propoſed to begin by a deſcent on Cephallenia, an iſland in the Ionian ſea, near the coaſt of Peloponneſus; the great reſort of the Aetolian pirates, from whence they continually infeſted the neighbouring coaſts of Achaia, Acarnania, and Epire. This attempt, however, was attended

Philip attempts the iſland of Cephallenia.

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with real difficulties. Ships were to be procured, and mariners to be trained; the Macedonians not being converſant in naval affairs. The enemy at the ſame time had many veſſels in actual ſervice; and there was not a creek or a current in thoſe ſeas with which they were not well acquainted. Aratus nevertheleſs perſevered, and Philip ſoon ſaw himſelf in a condition to appear before Palaea, one of the chief cities of the iſland; which he certainly muſt have taken, had he not been prevented by Leontius. A practicable breach had been made, and the aſſault ordered; but that traitor, who ſtill kept the command, contrived to have the party, that mounted the breach, repulſed; when Philip, ſeeing his troops diſpirited at this check, and uncertain upon whom to fix the charge of treachery, in vexation raiſed the ſiege [26].

is baffled by his miniſters:

The Macedonian miniſtry thought they had now carried their point. But they deceived themſelves. Aratus, notwithſtanding this diſgrace, beſought the king not to abandon the expedition, but to endeavour to make an impreſſion upon Aetolia itſelf, where he might have an opportunity of revenging the wrongs of Greece, and of eſſentially diſtreſſing the common enemy. Philip felt himſelf ſtrongly inclined to follow this advice. He could not but remember the ſacking of Dium by the Aetolians; the barbarity and rapine which had marked their incurſions into Epire; and the ſacrilegious ruin of the famous and revered oracle of Dodona,

by Aratus's advice invades Aetolia,

[26] Polyb. L. v. c. 4.

BOOK V.

Sect. 1. with ſucceſs.

which they had ſpoiled of its treaſures, and levelled with the ground [27].

To cover this deſign, however, from the enemy, the fleet had inſtructions not to touch at any part of the Aetolian coaſt [28], but to ſhape their courſe to Leucas, the famed promontory [29] of Acarnania, acroſs which had been cut a canal, which opened into the Ambracaian gulph. Through this canal the fleet was to make its way, and, proceeding up the gulph, was to land the forces on the upper part of the Acarnanian coaſt, within a few hours march of the Aetolian confines. Leontius, who now ſaw clearly into Aratus's plan, tembled for the iſſue. The Aetolians could ſcarcely eſcape deſtruction. They had, he knew, but a ſmall part of their forces at home, Dorymachus, the Aetolian general, having marched with a conſiderable body to invade Theſſaly, with the view of forcing Philip to fly to the defence of his own dominions. The Aetolians, at the ſame time, had received no intimation of the intended invaſion, and on that ſide eſpecially were unſuſpicious of any hoſtile attempt. He endeavoured, however, to baffle Aratus, if poſſible. Under various pretences, he endeavoured to gain time. He talked of encamping; of halting but for a few hours; of not exhauſting the troops, fatigued already by conſtant ſervice. But all his repreſentations

[27] See Polyb. L. iv. c. 67.

[28] Polyb. L v. c. 5. & ſeq.

[29] See Mr. Addiſon's elegant account of the virtues aſcribed to this promontory by the pagan world. Spect. N° 223. 227. 233.

ſerved only to increaſe the ardor of Aratus, who entreated Philip not to liſten to any propoſal of delay, but to puſh on, day and night, ſucceſs depending entirely on the rapidity of their march. The ſecond day from their landing they entered Thermum, one of the moſt remarkable citadels of Aetolia, if not of Greece, for ſituation and opulence. It was ſeated on the brow of a craggy mountain, encompaſſed on every ſide by a rocky and hilly country, and though without wall or defence, but what nature had formed around it, ſeemed to defy every hoſtile approach; the only road, that led to it, being a narrow rugged path, of ſteep aſcent, ſkirted either by thick woods, or deep lakes, by yawning precipices, or tremendous rocks. This remarkable ſtrong-hold, the boldeſt foe had never dared to attempt: and here was depoſited the chief wealth of Aetolia; their ſtores; their arms; their treaſure; all that was elegant or curious in workmanſhip of which Greece could boaſt, paintings and ſtatues, ſplendid porticoes and ſumptuous temples, adorning a city where the Aetolian eſtates held their conventions, and their annual fairs; where they celebrated their national feaſts and ſacrifices; and where was ſent every thing in Aetolia of value and magnificence, for the double purpoſe of oſtentation and ſecurity.

He ſurpriſes Thermum, and lays it in ruins:

Philip had now the faireſt opportunity of ſatiating his revenge; which Polybius himſelf [10], the profeſſed enemy of the Aetolians, acknowledges he

[10] I. v. c. 9.

BOOK V. Sect. I.

indulged to an exceſs altogether unjuſtifiable. Not content with having abandoned the place to pillage, he afterwards laid it in ruins. Of more than two thouſand ſtatues, ſuch only were ſpared as appeared to have been dedicated to the gods; the reſt being either broken in pieces or defaced; the temples were rifled, and the ſacred ornaments, which the piety of ages had dedicated, were defaced or torn down; and when the ſoldiers had ſelected from the booty all the precious things, which they thought they ſhould be able to carry off, they collected the reſt into a heap, and ſet them on fire; whereby fifty thouſand ſuits of armour, beſides an immenſe quantity of rich ſtuffs, were conſumed. The ſame ſucceſs which attended Philip in his march to Thermum, he alſo met with in his return, having had the precaution to ſecure by ſtrong guards all the important paſſes on the way. Some flying parties hung indeed upon his rear, and followed him to the place of embarkation; but they were not able to make any ſenſible impreſſion: and, by the time Dorymachus, who upon the firſt advice haſtened homeward, had reached Aetolia, the Macedonians had retired.

returns into Peloponneſus and ravages Laconia.

Philip reſolved to follw his blow, before the enemy had recovered from the conſternation which this bold enterpriſe had ſpread among them. Having embarked his troops, and committed ſome ſlight ravages along that part of the Aetolian coaſt which lay on the Ionian ſea, he entered again the Corinthian gulph, landed at Lechaeum, and marched into Laconia; Lycurgus the Spartan king having, during

the late ſiege of Palaea, committed devaſtation in the Meſſenian territories, for which Philip now meant to make repriſals. The Spartans had juſt heard of the ſacking of Thermum, and were preparing to ſend ſuccours to their Aetolian confederates, when they diſcovered the Macedonian army within a ſhort diſtance of Sparta. The ſudden appearance of the enemy, the report of their operations, and the amazing expedition they had uſed, left the Spartans without the power of defence. They kept within the city, whilſt the Macedonians, uncontrolled, extended their depredations to the utmoſt verge of Laconia on the ſea of Crete; laying waſte with fire and ſword the faireſt parts of the country, and deſtroying, wherever they moved, every trace of cultivation. On their return, the Spartans prepared to intercept them, but here again they failed, their troops were put to flight, and the Macedonians carried off a prodigious booty.

What renders theſe ſpirited operations more honorable to Philip's military character, is the difficult ſituation in which he found himſelf at the time they were executed; beſet with obſtructions, which his treacherous miniſtry were inceſſantly raiſing to his meaſures; deeply diſtreſſed in mind from the diſcoveries he had already made; and ſtill more perplexed from the grounds he had to ſuſpect that much more was yet to be diſcovered. A more minute detail of theſe dark treaſons will not be improper in this place. Though matters of a private nature, they are cloſely connected with the tranſactions we record.

BOOK V. Sect. I.

Treasonable practices of the king's ministers.

We have mentioned the disloyal machinations of Apelles, and the ministers in combination with him, to embarrass and defeat their royal master in whatever he should undertake, rather than suffer Aratus to guide his councils. The attempt on Thermum, and the success that attended it, had inflamed their resentment higher than ever. Megaleas and Leontius, who accompanied the king in that expedition, had employed every artifice to disappoint him, but, as we have seen, they had been baffled. The sullen gloom [11] that sat on their countenances, in the midst of the general joy upon the safe return of the army to the place of embarkation, plainly demonstrated their treacherous wishes, and struck the observation of the king in so forcible a manner, that, from this appearance, combined with other circumstances, he was strengthened in his suspicions, that villany and treason had taken root among them; and the conduct of Megaleas soon afforded proofs of what he suspected. Determined at any rate to destroy Aratus, he contrived, under color of an affray, to instigate ruffians to attempt his life; and he had probably effected his purpose, had not the intervention of Philip himself, whom the uproar had called forth, compelled the assailants to desist. When summoned on this account before the king, Megaleas had even the insolence to avow his intentions, and his unchanged resolution of executing them: and Philip, who in the art of temporizing was exceeded by none, contented himself at present with putting him under arrest, and imposing on him a fine of twenty talents; for

The king suspects them, but temporizes.

[11] See Polyb. L. v. 14, 15.

which Leontius binding himſelf as ſecurity, the arreſt was ſoon after removed. BOOK V.

The Laconian expedition now engroſſing all the king's thoughts, the matter reſted here for the preſent. But upon the return of the army from Laconia to the Corinthian iſthmus, Leontius [32], uneaſy at the ſuſpected ſituation of Megaleas; in whoſe condemnation he was conſcious he muſt be finally involved, formed a ſcheme to intimidate the king from proceeding farther in this inquiry, under pretence that there were dangerous diſcontents in the army, on account of what had been already done; and, his intereſt among the ſoldiery being powerful, he even excited an inſurrection. This, however, availed him little. Philip, with great vigor and addreſs, ſuppreſſed the mutiny upon it's firſt breaking out; but appeared to take no pains to be informed by whom it had been fomented. This unexpected indifference ſtruck Leontius and his aſſociate with new terror: they began to dread that the king knew more of their proceedings than they had ſuſpected; and that his affected calmneſs was grounded on temporizing diſſimulation. Under the impreſſion of this fear, they diſpatched meſſengers to Apelles, to haſten his appearance at court, in order that his influence might reſtore their drooping cauſe. He appeared accordingly; but the king, who had been already apprized of his criminal connexions, received him with a coolneſs ſo ſtriking, that Megaleas, who now ſaw that he had no protection to expect, fled: Sect. I. and counteracts them:

[32] Polyb. L. v. c. 26. & ſeq.

BOOK V. Sect. 1.

leaving Leontius, his ſecurity, to be reſponſible for his fine; which accordingly Philip immediately demanded.

The guilt of great miniſters is ſeldom more than ſuſpected during their day of favor; it is their diſgrace which completes the diſcovery. The fulleſt evidence now poured in from every quarter. It appeared, that Apelles had poſſeſſed himſelf of an authority not inferior to that of the king; and that he had uſed it to the moſt treaſonable of purpoſes; that he had uſurped an abſolute dominion over the royal revenues, and, with a deſign to ruin the king's affairs, had diverted them from the public ſervice; that he had, in his own name, and by his ſole authority, iſſued orders of the firſt importance, and received and anſwered all diſpatches, without even conſulting his maſter; that every department throughout Macedon was filled with his creatures, who looked up to no ſovereign but him, and were prepared to execute whatever he ſhould command: — that Leontius, in like manner, had eſtabliſhed ſuch an intereſt among the military, as to be able to command them as he pleaſed; and that the diſcomfiture at Palaea, and the repeated diſappointments which had of late cramped the king's operations, had all originated in him: — Megaleas had entertained a treaſonable correſpondence with the enemy, and, by letter under his own hand, had encouraged the Aetolians to proſecute the war, aſſuring them of the low ſtate of the king's finances, and throwing out againſt him many illiberal reflections. Such daring treaſons againſt his honor, his crown, and his life, fully

makes a full diſcovery of their treaſon,

and punishes them with the utmoſt ſeverity.

fully juſtified the utmoſt rigor on the part of Philip. Apelles and his ſon were ſeized and executed. Leontius had been impriſoned upon Megaleas's flight, and the army had interceded in his behalf; but Philip, not intimidated, ordered him alſo to be immediately put to death. Whilſt Megaleas, who had fled to Thebes, hearing that the king was in purſuit of him, endeavoured to expiate his crimes by putting a voluntary period to his life.

BOOK V.

SECTION II.

CONTENTS.

Philip treats Aratus with diſſimulation — forms a connexion with Demetrius of Pharos. — The hiſtory and character of Demetrius — he prevails on Philip to aim at the ſubjection of all Greece; and to join Hannibal againſt the Romans — Philip finds his ſchemes oppoſed by Aratus — has him taken off by poiſon — and behaves to his ſon in a manner ſtill more cruel and flagitious — prepares a conſiderable force to act againſt the Romans — his puſillanimity — defeat — and flight. — The Romans ſtir up the Aetolians againſt him — the fatal conſequences of this meaſure to Greece. — Philip makes peace with the Aetolians — and with Rome — with what view — conſpires with Antiochus to deprive the infant king of Egypt of his paternal kingdom — beſieges Abydos — is reproved and threatened by an ambaſſador from Rome — his haughty anſwer — dreadful ruin of Abydos.

BOOK V. Sect. 2. Seeming advantages to Aratus from the removal

THE removal of the Macedonian miniſters promiſed conſiderable advantages to Aratus. They had been avowedly his enemies; his deſtruction was one principal article of their original plan; and he had taken, therefore, an active part againſt them during the late inquiry. To his ſagacity and zeal Philip

owed moſt of the material diſcoveries he had made; and the king ſeemed to acknowledge his ſervices, by the unbounded confidence he now repoſed in him; living with him as his friend, and paying uncommon attention to his counſels.

of the Macedonian miniſters:

This fair appearance of truſt and royal favor was, nevertheleſs, all fallacy and artifice. It ſoon appeared, that Philip ſtill entertained the ſame inſidious deſigns againſt the liberties of his Peloponneſian confederates, in which Apelles had led the way; and, however highly he might affect to prize Aratus, it became evident, that he conſidered him merely as the inſtrument of his ambition, to be employed whilſt ſerviceable; and, when he ceaſed to anſwer his views, to be removed as dangerous, or caſt aſide as uſeleſs.

Philip acts deceitfully towards him;

In fact, the crime of the late miniſtry, in the eyes of Philip, was not, that they had endeavoured to leſſen the importance of Aratus in the Peloponneſian ſtates, or to reduce thoſe Greek republics under ſubjection to Macedon. So far they had acted in concurrence with the views of their royal maſter. Their crime was, that they had not ſuffered Aratus to take the lead, when it became neceſſary to the intereſts of Philip; and that, inſtead of acquieſcing in that ſubordination which the complection of the times rendered expedient, they had raſhly adopted pernicious counſels; and, in their attempt to overthrow this Achaean chief, endeavoured to involve their ſovereign with him in one common ruin.

entertains views hoſtile to the Grecian liberties.

The war ſtill continued, though its operations were now for the moſt part languid and unintereſt-

Philip changes his plan;

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

ing; the ſeveral ſtates being rather employed in adding to the ſtrength of their own frontiers, than in annoying thoſe of the enemy. Twice had a negotiation for peace been ſet on foot, under the mediation of Rhodes and other maritime powers, but without effect; when on a ſudden Philip declared his reſolution of putting an immediate end to the war [1]. This meaſure, however precipitate and myſterious it might appear, when the profound diſſimulation of that prince is conſidered, had nevertheleſs been formed upon motives, which he had long revolved in his mind. It will be neceſſary to explain what theſe motives were, as they have an important influence on the ſubſequent fortunes of the Grecian people.

on what account.

Towards the latter end of the reign of Antigonus, the Romans had, for the firſt time, paſſed over into Illyricum [2], the north-weſt boundary of Greece, and bordering upon Macedon, to revenge an inſult offered to their ambaſſadors by Teuta, queen of a diſtrict of that country. At the ſame time, a prince named Demetrius reigned in Pharos an iſland on the Illyrian coaſt, which, together with a few places on the neighbouring continent, formed the whole of his poſſeſſions. Whether from hatred of the Illyrian princeſs, whoſe reſentment, Polybius [3] tells us, he had reaſon to dread, or in hopes of ſharing her ſpoils, he had joined the Romans, and at the cloſe of the war, which ended in the defeat of Teuta, had been rewarded with a conſiderable addition to

Demetrius of Pharos aſſiſts the Romans againſt Teuta;

is rewarded by them for his ſervices;

[1] Olymp. cxl. 4. Before Christ 212.
[2] Polyb. L. ii. c. 11. [3] Ubi ſup.

his little principality. But, after their departure, emboldened by a report, that the Gauls threatened Italy, and that Hannibal alſo was preparing to invade it, he renounced the fealty he had promiſed them, ſtrengthened himſelf in men and ſhips, paſſed beyond the limits they had preſcribed for his conduct, infeſted the iſlands and coaſts around, and even deſtroyed cities, in which the Romans had an immediate property [*]. Of theſe outrages complaint having been brought to Rome, the Roman forces returned, and expelled him from his dominions. In this reverſe of fortune, he had taken refuge at the court of Philip. His misfortunes, his military reputation, his impetuous and enterpriſing ſpirit, ſuited to the natural genius of Philip himſelf, gained favor with the king, which he cultivated with aſſiduity and art. He penetrated into his character; addreſſed himſelf to his fears, to his vanity, to his ambition. "Such abilities as his," he told him, "were meanly employed in the petty wars in which he was engaged, when ſo noble an object as Italy was in view; that, inſtead of fighting the battles of one republic of Greece againſt another, it ought rather to be his policy to extend his dominion over them all, and to mould theſe now diſjointed ſtates into one ſolid maſs of empire; which, beloved as he was by ſome of them, and dreaded by others, he might effect without much difficulty; that, were the Romans once to eſtabliſh themſelves in the neighbourhood of Macedon, it would not be long ere that kingdom would

revolts againſt them;

is deprived of all his poſſeſſions;

flies to Philip,

and incites him to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, and attack the Romans;

[*] Polyb. L. iii. c. 16 & ſeq.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

find herſelf reduced to the ſame abject ſituation to which Illyricum was already humbled; that the Carthaginians were then on their march to reſcue the liberties of mankind from Roman uſurpation, that a more favorable opportunity never could offer, as his friendſhip, whilſt the iſſue of the war was yet doubtful, would be of value at Carthage; but, ſhould once the Roman power be ſubdued, he might then find enemies, where now he might have friends and allies[f]."

Philip liſtens to him;

The moſt frivolous arguments, when our own paſſions plead on the ſame ſide, become powerful. Philip, inattentive to the dangers he was plunging into, ſaw nothing before him but victory, glory, and dominion. He enjoined, however, the ſtricteſt ſecrecy to Demetrius, until it was known what progreſs Hannibal ſhould make. He had faithful accounts tranſmitted to him of all his motions. His paſſage of the Rhône, his march over the Alps, his victory at the Ticinus, and again at the Trebia, had ſucceſſively added to the hopes and exultations of Philip; but the tidings of his having overthrown and ſlain a Roman conſul at the lake Thraſimenus, and of his being maſter of Etruria, proved deciſive. Philip, without farther delay, reſolved to put an end to the war in Greece, to enter into alliance with Hannibal, and to pour all his forces into Italy.

Aratus endeavours to

Aratus[g] would have diſſuaded him from this imprudent project; but his repreſentations were

[f] Polyb. L. v. c. 101. Juſt. L. xxix. c. 2.

[g] Polyb. de virtutibus & vitiis, p. 1371.

difregarded. The other part of Philip's plan, "to make himſelf abſolute lord of Greece," he was obliged to manage, however, with greater caution. He had already, by intrigue and artful ſervices, contrived to form a ſtrong intereſt among the Argives; among the Arcadians; as well as among ſome of the Achaean cities; and theſe, he expected, would lead the way to the ſubjection of all the Peloponneſian ſtates. To accompliſh this great object, it was neceſſary to be maſter at the ſame time, of the citadel of Corinth, and of the caſtle of Ithome, two fortreſſes, emphatically called *the fetters of Peloponneſus*. The firſt was already in his power; and the other he hoped ſoon to poſſeſs. Ithome was ſituated in the Meſſenian territories; and the diſſenſions which then prevailed in that ſtate, ſeemed greatly to favor his views. The people complained of the tyranny and oppreſſion of the nobles; and the nobles were jealous of the unbounded ſpirit of liberty which predominated among the people. To both parties Philip pretended to be a friend, and both parties he deceived. The nobles he encouraged not to give way; the people not to ſubmit. His mediation ſerved only to pour oil upon the flames; and the contending factions had recourſe to violence. The people prevailed; and, after much bloodſhed, poſſeſſed themſelves of Ithome: when Philip, under pretence of offering ſacrifices for their proſperity to Ithomean Jupiter, had addreſs to get admiſſion into the fortreſs. Yet, even in this ſtage, he was diſappointed of his object. Demetrius of Pharos, and

diſſuade Philip, but in vain.

Philip forms a ſtrong intereſt in ſeveral of the Grecian ſtates:

has a deſign on Meſſenia;

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

Aratus, had both accompanied him, though with different views. Demetrius, privy to the fraud meditated by Philip, was inceſſant in urging him on to the execution of his purpoſe: whilſt Aratus, ſuſpicious of his deſign, was watchful to defeat it. The inſtant, therefore, that Philip's intention[r] became apparent, he remonſtrated againſt it in the moſt ſpirited manner; reminded him of the honorable part the late Antigonus had acted towards the Grecian ſtates; and intreated him to reflect, in what a diſadvantageous light he muſt ſtand, ſhould he, who had been conſidered as their protector, become the invader of their common liberties. Shame, or more probably the fear of a formidable oppoſition, which he ſaw Aratus was prepared to raiſe, induced him to deſiſt.

but is prevented by Aratus.

Cauſes Aratus to be taken off by poiſon;

From that time Philip's real character began to diſplay itſelf. Aratus and his ſon, who now perceived but too evidently the treacherous views of their Macedonian ally, withdrew immediately their confidence; and this ſtep precipitated their deſtruction, which Philip appears already to have meditated. The diſappointment of Ithome ſtill dwelt upon his mind; and he had long felt with indignant pride the ſuperior and impracticable virtue of thoſe republican chiefs. Their avowed diffidence of his principles and honor, had convinced him that he could now no longer conciliate their friendſhip, but at the expenſe of the great object of his ambition, the ſubjugation of Greece; and he reſolved they

[r] Polyb. Excerpt. L. vii. Plutarch in Arato.

ſhould live no longer to diſturb his purſuits [8]. Taurion, who commanded under Philip in Peloponneſus, was the inſtrument he employed: he lived in intimacy with Aratus, and ſoon found an opportunity of executing his maſter's orders. Poiſon was the means: to prevent detection, the deadly preparation was not to deſtroy life at once, but to undermine it, and waſte it away by ſlow degrees, that the diſeaſe might have the appearance of a natural decay. But Aratus was not ſo deceived. His friend Cephalon, Plutarch [9] tells us, viſiting him one day, and obſerving with concern, that he ſpit blood, "ſuch, Cephalon," replied Aratus, "are the fruits of royal friendſhip."

Before this period, in violation of the rights of hoſpitality, generally held in the higheſt reverence by the pagan world, Philip had privately ſeduced Polycratia [10], the wife of the younger Aratus, who, in the confidence of friendſhip, had received him into his family. The elder Aratus had indeed ſuſpected the intrigue, but in tenderneſs to his ſon had concealed his ſuſpicion. Philip now, however, gloried in the action, and not only prevailed on the wife to elope, but contrived to have a poiſonous draught adminiſtered to the huſband, which, from the quality of the ingredients, or the ſtrength of his conſtitution, deprived him not immediately of life, but diſordered his underſtanding to ſuch a deplorable degree of imbecility, as led him to the

corrupts the wife of the younger Aratus,

and with a poiſonous draught diſorders the huſband's underſtanding.

[8] Polyb. Excerpt. L. viii. Plutarch in Arato.
[9] Plut. ub ſup.
[10] Plutarch. ub ſup. Liv. L. xxvii. c. 31.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

commiſſion of actions ſo abominable and ignominious, that his death, in the flower of his age, was conſidered at length as the greateſt bleſſing that could have befallen his family or himſelf.

The opinion to be entertained of this prince,

When it is remembered, by what ſtrong ties Philip was bound to Aratus; the many important ſervices which he had received from him; the regard which he owed to the dying charge of the excellent Antigonus; the attachment and almoſt filial reverence which he affected towards him; when it is conſidered, too, that the crimes abovementioned were the deeds of a prince, celebrated till then for integrity of ſoul and generoſity of ſentiment, one would almoſt queſtion the hiſtorian's teſtimony. Polybius[11] accounts for this extraordinary alteration, upon the ſuppoſition of his having been perverted by the Pharian Demetrius, a daring and moſt unprincipled ſtateſman; whilſt Plutarch[12], is of opinion, that the virtues of which Philip had made a ſhow in the early part of his reign were all feigned[13]; and that, as opportunity invited, as his fears diminiſhed, and his power increaſed, he diſcovered thoſe vicious principles which dark policy had taught him hitherto to

[11] Polyb. L. v. c. 12. Et de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1371.

[12] In Arato.

[13] It is evident, from Polybius's own account, that, antecedently to any influence which Demetrius of Pharos could have had on him, he had been privy to all the machinations of Apelles and his fellows, and only then diſavowed them, when he found, they were not likely to ſucceed.

conceal. If ſo, ſuch deep diſſimulation, ſuch finiſhed and unrelenting profligacy of mind, at ſo early a ſeaſon of life, is hardly to be paralleled in hiſtory; for at this period his twenty-fourth year was not yet completed; and Plutarch's honeſt indignation, at the review of ſuch a character, led him to pronounce, that the many and ſevere misfortunes, which befel him in the ſucceeding part of his reign, were judgments of heaven for his atrocious crimes: "The vengeance," ſays he, "of Jupiter, the patron of hoſpitality and of friendſhip, viſiting him for the breach of both, and purſuing him through life."

and of the judgments that befel him afterwards.

Amidſt the abhorrence, however, which the guilt of Philip naturally excites, it may be of uſe to obſerve, that to Aratus's own miſtaken counſels, the calamities that overwhelmed him were in a great meaſure to be imputed. Jealous firſt of Cleomenes, and afterwards of the Aetolians, he had called in that very Macedonian power, which in the end deſtroyed him; and in his laſt hours he had the mortification to reflect, that his country, his family and himſelf, were the victims of an ill-directed ambition, which ſought too eagerly the aggrandizement of Achaia at the expenſe of the reſt of Greece. Yet, with ſome blemiſhes, Aratus was certainly one of the greateſt men of antiquity. An able ſtateſman, and a firm patriot, by his genius, vigor, and perſeverance, he gave to his republic that form and ſplendor which raiſed it to the firſt rank among the ſtates of Greece; and, had he been leſs jealous of Sparta and of Aetolia, hiſtory perhaps had not left us a more finiſhed character.

Aratus himſelf to blame for calling in the Macedonian power.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

Philip, in the mean time, had ſeriouſly reſolved to paſs into Italy, and to co-operate with Hannibal in humbling the Roman power. With this view, he had ſent ambaſſadors to the Carthaginian general; but they had been intercepted ſoon after their landing on the Italian coaſt. Pretending, however, that their errand was to Rome, they in a little time obtained their releaſe, and made their way to Hannibal, with whom they concluded a treaty; but on their return, being taken at ſea by a Roman ſquadron, they were ſent with all their papers to Rome. This intelligence, however, did not diſcourage Philip. Another embaſſy was immediately diſpatched, and a ſecond ratification of the treaty was obtained. If we are to believe Livy [24], Philip engaged "to furniſh a fleet of two hundred ſhips, "to be employed in ſpreading devaſtation along "the Italian coaſts; and alſo to aſſiſt Hannibal "with a conſiderable body of land-forces:" in return for which, when Rome and Italy ſhould be finally reduced, the ſole poſſeſſion of which the Carthaginians were to retain, Hannibal was to paſs into Epire at the head of a Carthaginian army, to carry on the war there in any manner Philip ſhould deſire; and, having made a conqueſt of the whole country, to yield up to him thoſe parts of it, and thoſe iſlands, that lay convenient for Macedon [25].

Philip ſends an embaſſy to Hannibal;

his ambaſſadors are taken by the Romans;

he ſends a ſecond embaſſy, and concludes a treaty;

[24] See Liv. L. xxiii. c. 33.

[25] The treaty, which we find in Polybius (Excerpt. L. vii. c. 2.) is of a different tenor, and ſeems to be conceived in more modeſt terms. It contains only general ſtipulations of mutual amity and aid between Carthage and Macedon, and

It is not the buſineſs of the preſent work, to enter into a detail of the wars which Philip had to ſuſtain againſt the Romans. They belong to another hiſtory. It will be ſufficient to take a ſummary view of the principal events, as far as they affect the fortunes of Greece.

enters the Ionian gulph with a conſiderable fleet;

Philip's firſt exploits diſcovered little of that ſpirit, which his bold ſtipulations with Hannibal ſeemed to promiſe. He had equipped a conſiderable fleet, and, ſetting ſail from Macedon, coaſted along the eaſtern ſhore of Peloponneſus, doubled the cape of Malea, entered the Ionian gulph, and advanced as high as the mouth of the Aous, on which ſtood the city of Apollonia; when, receiving advice that the Roman fleet, which lay off Sicily, had weighed anchor to give him battle, ſeized with a panic, he immediately haſtened back to Cephallenia, hauled his veſſels on ſhore, croſſed over into Peloponneſus, as if called away by ſome urgent buſineſs, and made his eſcape into Macedon [16].

ſteers down to the coaſt of Epire, takes Oricum, and lays ſiege to Apollonia;

His next attempt ended in a manner equally diſgraceful. He had ſurpriſed Oricum, on the coaſt of Epire, an unwalled and defenceleſs ſea-port, con-

that *the one* ſhou'd have the ſame friends and enemies as *the other*, except where otherwiſe bound by antecedent treaties; with a particular clauſe, by which the Carthaginians obliged themſelves, in caſe of a peace with the Romans, to inſiſt previouſly on their evacuating Corcyra, Pharos, and all the iſlands which they held along the coaſts of Illyricum and Epire, and on their reſtoring to liberty all *thoſe of the family* (οἰκέας) of the Pharian Demetrius, whom they had priſoners.

[16] Polyb. L. v. c. 110.

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ſiderable only on account of it's ſituation, as from thence there was a ſhort courſe to Italy. Marcus Valerius Laevinus, the Roman commander at Brunduſium, who knew Philip's connexions with Hannibal, and had inſtructions from Rome to obſerve him, upon the firſt information of his having poſſeſſed himſelf of this port, haſtened to diſlodge him. Philip had in the mean while marched to Apollonia, ſituated at a ſhort diſtance from Oricum, and laid ſiege to it. Into this place, before Philip had the leaſt idea of his approach, Laevinus contrived to introduce a choſen body of Romans; who, together with the garriſon, having ſallied out in the night, broke into Philip's camp, and with much ſlaughter routed the whole Macedonian army, the king himſelf, half-naked, eſcaping with difficulty. He made towards his fleet, which lay off Apollonia, on the Aous, with an intention of puſhing to ſea; but, Laevinus having blocked up the mouth of the river, Philip, after running his veſſels aground, or ſetting them on fire, was obliged to ſteal homeward acroſs the mountains [17].

is ſurpriſed and defeated by the Romans.

ſteals away homeward.

The embarraſſed ſituation, however, of the Romans did not permit them to attend to this Macedonian war. The flower of their nation had lately fallen at Cannae. Poſthumus with his whole army had been cut off by the Gauls. Campania had revolted. The faith of Calabria was doubtful. And, excluſive of the variety of armaments, which theſe complicated dangers rendered neceſſary, they had wars to ſuſtain in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia.

[17] Liv. L. xxiv. c. 40.

The Romans ſtir up the Aetolians againſt Philip.

It was therefore determined to endeavour, if poſſible, to raiſe enemies againſt Philip in Greece; that he might be employed at home in defending his own dominions. Valerius Laevinus applied accordingly to the Aetolians, of all the Greeks the moſt likely to liſten to ſuch an overture. He found in them the very temper of mind he wiſhed. Naturally warlike, they entertained a violent reſentment of what they had ſuffered from Macedon in the courſe of the laſt war, and they looked impatiently for opportunities of revenge. Theſe favorable diſpoſitions Laevinus took care to cultivate by the moſt laviſh promiſes on the part of Rome: "they were," he told them, "the firſt nation beyond ſea, with "whom Rome had deigned to make alliance, and "they might therefore be aſſured of holding a more "diſtinguiſhed place in her friendſhip than any "other people"[*]: Philip had been hitherto a troubleſome and a faithleſs neighbour; he ſhould henceforth be diſabled from injuring them: and Acarnania, which they had formerly poſſeſſed, ſhould

[*] "Aetolos eo in majore futuros honore," ſays Livy (L. xxvi. c. 24) "quod gentium tranſmarinarum in amicitiam "primi veniſſent." This, however, is not true. It appears from Polybius (L. iii. c. 22. 24. & 25) that ſo early as the conſulſhip of Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, immediately after the expulſion of the kings, the Romans had made a treaty of amity with the Carthaginians; and that this amity was ſolemnly renewed on two ſubſequent occaſions. And that ſuch a treaty ſubſiſted between Rome and Carthage, and had been thrice ratified Livy himſelf (L. ix. c. 43) acknowledges. The language of negotiation had, it ſeems, it's tricks and ſubterfuges in ancient days as well as in modern.

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"be reſtored to them." The Aetolians believed theſe flattering declarations, and they haſtened to conclude a treaty with the Roman ambaſſador, of which the principal articles were, "that the Aetolians "ſhould wage immediate war againſt Philip by land, "which the Romans were to ſupport by a fleet of "twenty galleys; that, whatever conqueſts might "be made from the confines of Aetolia to Corcyra, "the cities, buildings, and territory, ſhould belong "to the Aetolians; the other plunder of every kind "to the Romans; and that the Romans ſhould "endeavour to put the Aetolians in poſſeſſion of "Acarnania." The Aetolians made it their requeſt, that in this treaty of alliance the Eleans and Spartans, together with Attalus king of Pergamus, with Pleuratus and Scerdiletus princes of Illyricum, ſhould, if agreeable to them, be alſo included. Nothing could conſpire better with Laevinus's views. The more enemies Philip had to contend with, the leſs he was to be feared. Laevinus, on the concluſion of this treaty, immediately employed his arms in reducing Zacynthus, a ſmall iſland on the Peloponneſian coaſt, with Oeniadae and Naxus, two cities ſituate in that part of Acarnania bordering on Aetolia; which, as an earneſt of what they might expect from the generoſity of Rome, he inſtantly gave up to the Aetolians; and, having thus lighted up the torch of war in Greece [19], he retired to Corcyra [20].

From this period the humiliation and final ſubjection of the Grecian ſtates advanced; for ſome

[19] OLYMP. cxli. 4. BEFORE CHRIST. 206.
[20] Liv. xxvi. c. 24.

time,

time, by ſlow degrees, but afterwards with wonderful rapidity. The Romans, having once obtained a footing in Greece, ſoon found means to eſtabliſh themſelves there with firmneſs; at firſt the confederates, and, ere long, the imperious controllers of that very people, who had opened to them the gates of Greece; extending their influence from city to city, by artfully availing themſelves of the credulity, the domeſtic feuds, the ambition, and the avarice, of the different leaders; always ready to ſupport the weaker againſt the mightier, that, the ſtrength of each individual ſtate being broken by degrees, it ſhould be leſs difficult in time to accompliſh the deſtruction of the whole; covering all the while their ambitious views with the ſmooth ſemblance of moderation, equity, and friendſhip; until, the vigor of Greece being on every ſide gradually undermined, the whole tide of the Roman power ruſhing in, it was totally overwhelmed.

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Fatal conſequences to Greece of the Romans obtaining a footing in it;

Among the many calamities, which the unfortunate introduction of the Romans brought immediately upon Greece, it had the effect to give Philip a ſtronger intereſt in moſt of the Grecian ſtates than he had ever before poſſeſſed[21]. It was now no longer remembered, that he was the flagitious tyrant, who had rewarded hoſpitality with libidinous violation and treacherous murder, and had harboured projects the moſt hoſtile to public liberty; the people now even looked up to him as the champion of freedom, and their bulwark againſt the barbarians (for ſo they ſtyled the Romans) whom the perfidious Aetolians had

the influence it had on the Achaean councils,

[21] Polyb. Excerpt. L. x. c. 38. Juſt. L. xxix. c. 4.

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invited into Greece; in conſequence of which, not only the Greeks to the north of the Corinthian iſthmus, but even the Achaean league, prepared to arm in his ſupport. The Achaeans, in particular, were at the ſame time ſtimulated by apprehenſions of immediate danger to themſelves. Between them and the Aetolians as we have ſeen, an inveterate enmity had long ſubſiſted, and in the preſent poſture of affairs they had nothing to expect from the latter but hoſtility and devaſtation. The Spartans too, and the Eleans, the ancient enemies of Achaia, now in avowed confederacy with the Romans and Aetolians, were alſo on their frontiers. The Spartans eſpecially, proud of their alliance with Rome, ſeemed to have reſumed all their ancient ſpirit, and to meditate the recovery of that ſovereignty they had formerly claimed over the reſt of the Peloponneſian nations. The prince at preſent on the Spartan throne, was at the ſame time of a warlike and enterpriſing temper. Lycurgus, who had purchaſed the kingdom of the Ephori, having died, after a ſhort and turbulent [22] reign, Machanidas, another adventurer, had uſurped the throne; and having expelled the young king Ageſipolis, reigned now the ſole tyrant of Sparta; and,

and oo thoſe of the other Peloponneſian ſtates.

[22] Chilon, a prince of the royal line of Sparta, formed the plan of dethroning Lycurgus; and, with a party of his friends, having fallen on the Ephori, who had ſold the kingdom to him, put them all to the ſword; but Lycurgus himſelf made his eſcape. And the Spartan people, though Chilon promiſed them a new diviſion of lands, refuſing to join him, he was obliged to abandon the deſign, and to go into baniſhment.—See Polyb. L. iv. c. 81.

whether impelled by his own diſpoſition, or the ſituation of affairs at home, he gladly availed himſelf of the opportunity of leading out his Spartans to war.

During theſe emotions in Peloponneſus, the tumult of arms had already ſpread throughout the northern provinces of Greece. Philip, now ſenſible of the dangers he had brought upon himſelf, exerted a vigor far different from what he had lately ſhown. He began by ſecuring his frontiers againſt the bordering nations, whom the preſent embarraſſments of Macedon, and perhaps the expectation of ſupport from Rome, might encourage to renew their incurſions; he even carried the war into Illyricum [21], and had taken Liſſus and Acroliſſus; the former, the moſt conſiderable city in that country, and the other, a fortreſs of remarkable ſtrength, at ſome ſhort diſtance, hitherto ſuppoſed to be impregnable; ſo that moſt of the other cities of thoſe parts, terrified at the vigor and rapidity of his progreſs, opened their gates without reſiſtance. Theſe ſucceſſes were followed by his marching to the relief of the Acarnanians, whom the Aetolians were preparing to invade: they had implored aid of Philip; but before he reached their borders, the Aetolians had retired. The like ſpirited meaſures he purſued throughout Theſſaly and the countries adjacent, counteracting the Aetolian influence, wherever he ſuſpected it to prevail, and putting in a poſture of defence every place, which he thought to be in danger of an attack from the enemy.

Philip exerts uncommon vigor;

takes Liſſus and Acroliſſus;

marches to the relief of the Acarnanians,

and ſtrengthens himſelf in Theſſaly.

Hitherto, the Aetolians had gained little by their alliance with Rome. Their great object had been the

The Aetolians receive little

[21] Polyb. Excerpt. L. viii. c. 10, 11.

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reduction of Acarnania; but the report, that Philip was on his march to relieve it, together with the desperate resolution of the Acarnanians[24], who, determined not to survive their liberties, had armed all their males from fifteen years to sixty, and bound them under a heavy curse, never to quit the field of battle unless victorious, had obliged them to abandon the attempt. And although Laevinus, at the return of spring, had re-entered Greece, the whole of his operations amounted only to the taking of Anticyra, a city of the Locri, on the north-side of the Corinthian gulph; the spoils of which, with all the prisoners, he seized on as Roman property, leaving to the Aetolians, according to the strict letter of his treaty, the bare soil and a desolated city[25]. And soon after which he set out for Rome, to take possession of the consulship, to which he had been elected.

benefit from their alliance with Rome;

but, from their hatred of Philip, continue the war;

Stimulated, however, by their hatred of Philip, and of the states confederated with him, they disregarded these discouragements, and pressed the war with the same ardor with which they had at first engaged. Sulpicius, who had been appointed to the command of the fleet on the Ionian station, in the room of Laevinus, had sent them a supply of near a thousad men; and they had likewise received succours from Attalus. They immediately passed over into Peloponnesus, and in conjunction with the Spartans, fell upon Achaia; but as they were returning homeward laden with plunder, they were

defeated by Philip in two engagements.

[24] Liv. xxvi. c. 25. Polyb. L. xvi. c. 17. & fragm. p. 1519.
[25] Ibid. L. xxvi. c. 26.

met by Philip, who, having had notice of the diſtreſſed condition of the Achaeans, was haſtening to their aſſiſtance; a battle immediately enſued, and the Aetolians were defeated. Undaunted, however, they a ſecond time engaged; but were not more fortunate; they were again diſcomfited, with the loſs of a great part of their army, the remainder with difficulty ſaving themſelves in one of the neighbouring cities. Philip's ſucceſs, however, rouſed the jealouſy of ſome of the adjoining ſtates. They ſaw the danger with which they were threatened, ſhould the power of Macedon be increaſed by the reduction of Aetolia; and they intereſted themſelves in mediating a peace [26]. Philip liſtened readily to the propoſal, his ambitious views leading him to other wars; and a peace was on the point of being concluded, when the Romans, to whom the prolongation of the war in Greece was of the utmoſt importance, ſent their fleet to the ſupport of the Aetolians; who, being emboldened alſo by aſſurances they at the ſame time received from Aſia, that Attalus was preparing to join them with a conſiderable force, ſet Philip at defiance; and, in the ſtyle of victory, talked of conditions, to which they knew he could not give his conſent [27].

Peace propoſed by the neighbouring ſtates;

Philip willing to treat;

rejected by the Aetolians.

This, however, was by no means prejudicial to Philip; it gave, on the contrary, his Greek confederates a high opinion of his moderation and

[26] The principal mediators were, the Athenians, the Rhodians, the people of Chios, and the king of Egypt.

[27] See Liv. L. xxvii. c. 30.

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pacific purpoſes; whilſt it ſtrengthened their indignation againſt the Aetolians. Theſe favorable diſpoſitions he ſoon found a brilliant opportunity of cultivating. He was aſſiſting at the celebration of the Nemean games, when tidings arrived that the Romans had landed, and were ravaging the country from Corinth to Sicyon. He inſtantly ſet out, attacked the enemy, obliged them to fly to their ſhips, recovered the booty they had taken, and was again at Argos before the games were concluded. This rapid and ſplendid achievement againſt Roman troops, gave to Philip a high degree of luſtre in the eyes of Greece, now aſſembled at the Nemean ſolemnity; which he greatly improved by the affability and familiar deportment he affected towards theſe republicans, who, accuſtomed to liberty, were wonderfully flattered in beholding a prince in the height of power, and juſt crowned with victory, mix freely among them, and, diveſting himſelf of the pomp of royalty, wear the garb and manners of a fellow-citizen [28].

Philip ſets out from the Nemean games, and repulſes the Romans;

His next enterpriſe, though not ſo ſucceſsful, was not leſs honorable to his valor. The Aetolians having got poſſeſſion of Elis, near the borders of Achaia, Philip advanced in order to diſlodge them; but, upon giving them battle, he found they were ſtronger than he had conceived, and that they had Roman ſoldiers among them; Sulpicius, who lay off the Peloponneſian coaſt, having, unobſerved by Philip, contrived to reinforce

diſtinguiſhes himſelf in a ſecond engagement;

[28] Liv. L. xxvii. c. 31.

the Aetolian garriſon with five thouſand men. He nevertheleſs charged the enemy with vigor; when, his horſe being killed under him, he continued to fight on foot, until, numbers being ſlain on every ſide, and the enemy preſſing on, he muſt undoubtedly have been taken or killed, had not his men, by one bold effort, ruſhed in and borne him off. Diſappointed in his deſign on Elis, he did not, however, return without ſucceſs. There ſtood at ſome diſtance a ſtrong caſtle, in which the Elean peaſants had taken ſhelter, with their flocks and herds, the principal wealth of the country; this caſtle he ſurpriſed, and carried off twenty thouſand head of cattle, together with four thouſand priſoners.

overpowered by numbers;

yet ſurpriſes a ſtrong caſtle, and carries off immenſe plunder:

But [10], amidſt all this exertion of vigor, and ſeeming regard for the independence of Greece, the unprincipled profligacy of Philip's character ſtill betrayed itſelf. Not long before this period, he had, a ſecond time, attempted the liberties of the Meſſenians, but had been baffled by the manly ſtand they had made againſt him; the Pharian Demetrius, to whom he had committed the conduct of his plan, having loſt his life in the attempt [10]. At Argos he had, at the ſame time, incurred much diſgrace by his exceſſive diſſoluteneſs; invading, with the moſt daring licentiouſneſs, the honor of private families, and employing even terror and violence [11], where the powers of ſeduction failed.

his diſſoluteneſs renders him odious;

[10] Liv. L. xxvi. c. 32. [10] Polyb. L. iii. c. 19.
[11] Liv. ubi ſupra.

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returns to Macedon.

Happily for his Peloponnesian confederates, the necessities of Macedon called him away; a report of his death having encouraged domestic insurrections, and the inroads of hostile borderers.

Philopoemen begins to distinguish himself;

Notwithstanding Philip's departure, the military operations of the Achaean states suffered no interruption: a very important alteration having taken place in relation to that people, who now, instead of placing their whole dependence on foreign aid, displayed abilities and resources equal to the most spirited enterprise. It was by Philopoemen [11] this change had been effected. Originally of Megalopolis in Arcadia, this great man had distinguished himself, from his early years, by ardent exertions for the liberties of his country, and a strenuous opposition to the Spartan power, then the most formidable in Peloponnesus; having chosen even to abandon his property, and submit to the miseries of exile, rather than live in subjection to the Spartans, who had made themselves masters of his native city. Aratus, about the same time, was employed in strengthening the commonwealth of Achaia, in order to form it into an effectual barrier against the ambitious attempts of his Spartan neighbours. The disinterested and enlarged views of Aratus, attached Philopoemen [12] to his interests; he co-operated in many of his schemes, and was active in bringing over several of the Arcadian citizens to join the Achaean league. Soon after the

his character.

[11] Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7. Plutarch in Philopoem.

[12] Polyb. L. ii. c. 40.

death of Aratus, the integrity and military capacity of Philopoemen gave him the principal lead in the Achaean councils, in the conduct of which, though inferior to Aratus in political abilities, he equalled him in zeal for the cauſe of freedom; and, in the martial line, he far ſurpaſſed him. War, indeed, was peculiarly his province; ſo that, although he wiſhed to reſemble Epaminondas, whom he had propoſed for his model, it was only in his military genius, according to Plutarch [11], in his activity, his ſagacity, and his contempt of riches, that the parallel was ſtrong; but, to the mildneſs, the gravity, and the wiſdom of that illuſtrious Greek, the character of Philopoemen could never riſe; the department of arms, ſays this hiſtorian, being far more ſuited to his genius than the adminiſtration of civil affairs. The firſt great battle, in which Philopoemen diſtinguiſhed himſelf remarkably, was that of Selaſia; the ſucceſs of that memorable day being in a great meaſure decided by a judicious movement of the corps which he commanded [12]. He paſſed afterwards into Crete, in order to perfect himſelf in ſome parts of the military ſcience, for which the Cretans were famed. But it was not in the field of war alone that Philopoemen ſhowed his genius, for military affairs. They were his conſtant occupation; in his walks, even in his journeys, in his rural ſports, his whole attention was employed in obſerving the difficulties of ſteep or broken grounds;

[11] Ubi ſupra. [12] Polyb. L. ii. c. 67, 68.

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the advantages which might be derived from paſſes, woods, incloſed fields, or open plains; the difference made by rivers, ditches, and defiles, with every ſituation, where the ranks of an army ſhould be extended in front or in file. By this ſingular and inceſſant attention to the military line, he acquired an extraordinary knowledge and readineſs in martial affairs; no emergency, however ſudden, finding him unprepared. When advanced to be general of Achaia, he ſaw with concern the ſtate to which a foreign yoke had reduced his countrymen, and he conceived the noble reſolution of relieving them from their humiliating condition. He altered altogether their diſcipline; he made them acquainted with hardſhip and toil; he gave them weightier armour, and weapons of greater execution. Their cavalry, hitherto oſtentatious and uſeleſs, becauſe moſtly compoſed of young men of rank, who entered into it more from vanity than from public-ſpirited motives, he modelled ſo as to render it vigorous and reſpectable. He turned even to advantage the frivolouſneſs of the Achaeans. The young men of wealth and rank affected much ſplendor in their dreſs; this taſte for magnificence he perſuaded them to transfer to their armour and military accoutrements [16]. This diſplayed a great knowledge of the human heart. To combine a love of ſplendor with a love of arms, will ever have a powerful effect on youthful minds. To have attempted to enforce the ſimplicity of the ancient

[16] Plutarch. in Philopoem. Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7.

garb, at the period of refinement to which the Achaeans had then arrived, would only, in all probability, have generated ſullenneſs and reſiſtance. Philopoemen judged therefore with wiſdom, when he made the foibles of his fellow-citizens ſubſervient to the glory of the ſtate; whilſt even the richneſs of their armour, among men naturally warlike, might powerfully aſſiſt the point of honor in the day of battle, and produce wonderful exertions, to prevent the loſs, as well as the diſgrace, of ſuch armour becoming the property of their foes. The effect indeed of this judicious and inſinuating diſcipline became ſenſibly felt The Achaeans recovered much of the proweſs of former days; the armies of Aetolia and Elis, who, promiſing themſelves, as uſual, an eaſy victory, had ventured, upon Philip's abſence, to attack them, being totally defeated.

The Romans with Attalus attack Euboea.

Sulpicius had in the mean time engaged in an expedition againſt Euboea [17]. Finding that Philip had marched from Peloponneſus, he ſailed to Aegina, and wintered in that iſland, after having made a conqueſt of it, and ſold the inhabitants for ſlaves. Attalus king of Pergamus having afterwards joined him with his fleet, as ſoon as the ſeaſon permitted, they ſhaped their courſe towards Euboea. Of all the provinces of Greece, this, though an iſland, was one of the moſt conſiderable for fertility of ſoil, extent of territory, and ſituation [18]. To the eaſt,

[17] Liv. L. xxviii. c. 5 & ſeq.

[18] See Strabo, L. x. p. 306.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

it opened to the trade of Aſia, and the numerous iſlands that cover the Helleſpontine and Aegean ſeas, and, to the weſt, it reached along the coaſts of Locris, Boeotia, and Attica, from the Maliac bay to the promontory of Sunium; being divided from the continent by a channel, ſo exceedingly narrow in one part, as to admit a bridge over it. Oppoſite to this paſs was Chalcis, the principal city of the iſland, accounted, from it's advantageous ſeat, the key to this quarter of Greece. The king of Macedon had a very valuable ſtake in theſe parts; moſt of the cities, both of Euboea and the adjacent continent, being held by Macedonian garriſons.

Philip makes vigorous preparations:

Philip was not inattentive to the deſigns of the enemy. He had ſettled the affairs of his own kingdom in the beſt manner he could, and had moved down to Demetrias in Theſſaly; he had aſſembled a numerous force, and given aſſurances of effectual ſupport to all his allies. Signals by fire [49] he ordered to be made from the heights of Euboea, and from Peparethus, a ſmall iſland at ſome diſtance from it, and alſo from certain mountains of Phocis and Theſſaly, that he might thereby have regular and ſpeedy intelligence of the enemy's motions, in order to haſten to the relief of places in moſt immediate danger [50]. With all theſe ſpirited and judicious preparations, Philip did not remain merely on the defenſive. He endeavoured to ſurpriſe Heraclea, a

[49] See Polyb. L. x. c. 42, 43, 44.

[50] Liv. ubi ſup.

city on the confines of Theſſaly, where the Aetolian ſtates had aſſembled in order to confer with Attalus; but before Philip got thither, the convention was diſſolved, and he could only lay waſte the country all around. In the mean time, Oreum, one of the ſtrongeſt cities of Euboea, was taken by the Romans; having been betrayed to them by the governor, whom they had corrupted. Encouraged by this ſucceſs, Sulpicius had laid ſiege to Chalcis. But the ſtrength of the place, and the vigorous defence made by the commanding officer, who was not to be tampered with, added to a report that Philip was approaching, obliged him to abandon the attempt. Whilſt Philip, however, was employed in ſaving Chalcis, Opus, a wealthy city of the Locri, his allies, was ſtormed and plundered by Attalus; and though the king of Macedon, upon the firſt advice of the movements of Attalus, marched towards Opus with all poſſible expedition, and warmly purſued the plunderers, who had haſtily retired on his approach, they nevertheleſs eſcaped to their fleet on the Euripus, and ſecured all the booty they had taken.

loſes Oreum by the treachery of the governor,

but ſaves Chalcis.

Attalus ſtorms and plunders Opus.

In this fluctuating manner had the war continued ſix years, neither the Aetolian confederates, nor thoſe of Macedon, having much cauſe to boaſt; when a ſudden revolution in the fortunes of Philip left him arbiter of Greece. Attalus was called away to the defence of his own kingdom, which Pruſias of Bithynia was preparing to invade: and the Romans alſo, to whom the defeat of Aſdrubal had opened other views, and tired at the ſame time

The Romans and Attalus retire from Greece.

BOOK V. Sect 2.

of a war, the events of which were indecisive, and the issue doubtful, withdrew from Euboea, and soon after sailed homeward.

Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, slain in battle by Philopoemen;

These changes were followed by an event very unfavorable to the interests of the Aetolians. Machanidas of Sparta, the most warlike and powerful of their Grecian confederates, fell [41] in battle by the hands of Philopoemen. Upon the departure of the Romans and Attalus, Philip had returned to Macedon, to oppose the inroads of the bordering nations; and Machanidas, who had long sought occasion to reduce all Peloponnesus, availed himself of his absence, and at the head of a considerable army advanced towards Mantinea, a city of Arcadia under the protection of the Achaean states. Philopoemen was at this time general of Achaia. He observed all the tyrant's motions; and, assembling immediately his forces, gave him battle. The victory at first inclined to the side of Sparta; Machanidas, who had begun the charge with great vigor, having broken and put to flight the left wing, composed of a body of Tarentines and other auxiliaries; but urging the pursuit too far, and separating himself from the rest of his army, Philopoemen marked his opportunity; and falling upon the main body of the Spartans, defeated them totally. Machanidas, who saw the confusion of the Spartan line, hastened back; but, Philopoemen having possessed himself of a ditch, intersecting the field of battle, across

[41] Olymp. cxliii. 2. Before Christ 202.

which it was neceſſary for Machanidas to paſs, in order to rejoin his troops; as he was attempting to ſpur his horſe over it, Philopoemen killed him with his javelin [42]. The death, however, of Machanidas did not reſtore liberty to Sparta; he was ſucceeded by Nabis, another tyrant, much inferior to him in military abilities, but infinitely more flagitious and cruel.

Nabis ſucceeds him.

Every thing now, in appearance, favored the ambitious deſigns of Philip. The Aetolians could no longer oppoſe his arms; and Italy lay open to him: where, notwithſtanding the declining ſtate of the Carthaginian affairs, he might ſtill have made a powerful diverſion in favor of Hannibal. But he had at preſent adopted other views. He not only, therefore, made peace with the Aetolians, but entered alſo into terms with the Romans; who, though they affected to be diſpleaſed with the Aetolian ſtates for having liſtened to an accommodation with Philip, ſoon after followed their example, relieving themſelves with ſecret ſatisfaction from a war, which, whatever they might boaſt, had certainly greatly embarraſſed them.

Philip makes peace with the Aetolians and Romans;

The cauſe of this alteration in the Macedonian councils deſerves notice.

Ptolemy Philopator was at this time on the throne of Egypt, a prince of the moſt diſſolute manners; and, though in the prime of life, languiſhing under an infirm and decayed conſtitution, the conſequence of vicious exceſſes. He had only

this alteration occaſioned by his views on Egypt;

[42] Polyb. Excerpt. L. xi. c. 7. Plutarch in Philopoem.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

one child, an infant ſon, whoſe weakly conſtitution afforded but a precarious hope of long life. This complection of Egyptian affairs ſeemed to open new and magnificent objects for Philip's ambition. He had already entered into a negotiation [41] with Antiochus of Syria, in relation to the partition of the Egyptian monarchy, in caſe of Philopator's demiſe: and he now reſolved to ſtrengthen himſelf in thoſe parts of Aſia and Europe, through which he might, upon occaſion, open himſelf a way into the adjoining Egyptian provinces. Under pretence, therefore, of aſſiſting Pruſias king of Bithynia, his ſon in-law, he paſſed over to Cius [42], a free city on the Bithynian frontiers, laid ſiege to it, and took it; putting to the ſword, or ſelling for ſlaves, all the inhabitants, and ſeizing on all the rich plunder [43]. His views, in this ſeverity, were probably the amaſſing of treaſure, and at the ſame time, the making his name formidable in that country, near to which the Egyptian king had large poſſeſſions. The neighbouring ſtates, however, provoked at the cruelties he had been guilty of at Cius, and perhaps ſuſpecting that he had

endeavours to ſtrengthen himſelf in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian provinces;

beſieges Cius,

and takes it.

His cruelties provoke indignation]

[41] Polyb. Excerpt. L. xv. c. 20.

[42] Ibid. c. 21.

[43] It appears from Polybius, (Excerpt. L. xv. c. 21.) that theſe Cianeans were a people exceedingly corrupted, employed in the oppreſſing, and the compaſſing of the deſtruction of, each other. Continual feuds were the natural conſequence of ſuch a ſpirit. Philip availed himſelf of the opportunity, which theſe feuds afforded him, and laid their city in ruins.

deſigns

deſigns alſo againſt them, took up arms; which immediately involved him in a new war with Attalus and the Rhodians. He attempted Pergamus, the capital city of Attalus; but was diſappointed in every effort againſt it. He laid waſte, however, the open country, and obtained ſome trifling advantages by ſea; but he was at length defeated, with the loſs of moſt of his ſhips and ſeamen.

He attempts Pergamus; fails; lays the country waſte.

Meanwhile, Philopator was dead, and Antiochus, in conſequence of his compact with Philip, had already begun the reduction of Coeloſyria and Paleſtine. Upon the firſt tidings of this event, Philip haſtened to ſecure thoſe places to the northward of Macedon, which belonged to Egypt; and, entering the Thracian Cherſoneſe, attacked the ſtrong-holds which the Egyptians held there, and, either by intrigue or force of arms, ejected all their garriſons. Croſſing over, he laid ſiege to Abydos [66], the moſt important place of this part of the Aſiatic coaſt; it commanded the paſs of the Helleſpont on that ſide, as Seſtos did on the ſide of Europe; and whoever was maſter of it, had in his hands the key of Aſia. Philip found here a reſiſtance he little expected. Spirited up by promiſes of aid from Attalus and the Rhodians, the inhabitants, who abhorred Philip, had determined to bury themſelves under the ruins of their city, rather than to ſubmit to his dominion. He was not, however, diſcouraged. The more difficulties he had to combat, the more ſtrenuouſly he puſhed the ſiege; and, notwith-

Philopator king of Egypt dies;

Antiochus and Philip haſten to divide his dominions.

Philip attacks the Thracian Cherſonele.

[66] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 14. & 16.

BOOK V.

ſtanding the moſt obſtinate defence, he ſoon reduced the garriſon to the laſt extremity.

Sect. 2. The Romans jealous of Philip;

But, whilſt employed in theſe ruthleſs works of ambition, he ſaw not the ſtorm which threatened to retaliate upon himſelf the miſeries with which his luſt of empire had overwhelmed other ſtates. The Romans, diſtreſſed by the Carthaginian war, had unwillingly conſented to a peace with Macedon; but that war was at an end: and they now wiſhed for a pretence to break with a prince, whoſe power, if not humbled, might one day become too formidable. A pretence ſoon offered, Philip ſtood charged with having, in direct violation of the treaty ſubſiſting between him and Rome, ſent ſupplies both of men and money to Hannibal. Attalus and the Rhodians likewiſe complained, that, regardleſs of their being expreſsly compriſed in that treaty, he had waged war againſt them. The Athenians accuſed him of infractions of the ſame treaty in relation to them; they had been acknowledged by the Romans as their allies; and yet Philip had aſſiſted the Acarnanians in their invaſion of Attica. The Egyptian miniſtry alſo, terrified at the dangers which threatened their young prince from the rapacity of Antiochus and Philip, ſued to Rome for protection againſt the confederate kings, and implored the ſenate and Roman people to accept of the guardianſhip of the infant Ptolemy, and to ſuperintend the adminiſtration of his kingdom [47].

receive complaints againſt him from Attalus and the Rhodians;

from the Athenians;

from Egypt.

[47] Theſe complaints had a plauſible appearance, the accuſation from Athens excepted. Even the Roman hiſtorian *,

* Liv. l. xxxi. c. 14.

Every thing that tended to criminate Philip was heard favorably in the Roman ſenate. They had, however, the policy to begin by that act, which did moſt honor to Rome. Ambaſſadors were immediately diſpatched into Egypt, to take upon them the guardianſhip of the young king, in the name of the ſenate and Roman people, and to command Antiochus to withdraw from the Egyptian territories. The youngeſt of the ambaſſadors, Marcus Aemilius, had alſo inſtructions, on his way to Egypt, to inform Philip of the intentions of the Roman ſenate. Aemilius found Philip before Abydos, in a ſituation which muſt probably have not a little heightened that impatient ferocity for which he was remarkable; at the head of an army flushed with victory; on the point of carrying the city he was beſieging; and in high exultation from the alliance he had lately concluded with Antiochus. Philip ſeemed to feel the importance of his ſituation; yet, unabaſhed at the Macedonian monarch's de-

The Romans declare themſelves the guardians of the young king of Egypt

The Roman ambaſſador finds Philip before Abydos

delivers the orders of the ſenate:

though the Athenians were now in the intereſts of Rome, obſerves with indignation the meanneſs they ſhowed on this occaſion. In fact, they themſelves had been the aggreſſors. They had cruelly murdered two young men of Acarnania, who had innocently ſtrayed into the temple of Eleuſis, at the time of the myſtical celebration, and by the queſtions they asked, had betrayed their ignorance of the rites of initiation. Provoked at this, the Acarnanians, together with ſome Macedonian troops, had ravaged Attica. And the Athenians, not having the ſpirit either to ſupport the outrage they had committed, or to make due reparation for it, called in a foreign force, and, in the gratification of their revenge, aſſiſted in ſubverting the liberties of their country.

BOOK V. Sect. 2.

portment, the Roman delivered his orders with dignity and firmneſs. He charged Philip not to attack the poſſeſſions of the crown of Egypt; nor to wage war againſt any of the Grecian ſtates; and to ſubmit to fair arbitration the diſcuſſion of the matters in diſpute between him, Attalus, and the Rhodians. — Philip's pride could endure no longer.

the firmneſs of the Roman on this occaſion;

"Attalus and Rhodes" replied he, "provoked "the war, of which they complain. They themſelves were the aggreſſors." — "And were the "Athenians," ſaid Aemilius, "were the people "of Cius, were the unhappy Abydonians, the "aggreſſors alſo?" — "The boaſtful inexperience "of youth," interrupted the king; "thy graceful"neſs of perſon, perhaps; and, ſtill more, the "name of Roman, that thou beareſt; inſpire thee "with this haughtineſs. It is my wiſh, that Rome "may prove faithful to the treaties which ſubſiſt "between us. But, ſhould ſhe be diſpoſed to try "again the iſſue of arms, I truſt, with the pro"tection of the gods, to render the Macedonian "name as formidable as that of Roman [49]."

Philip's bold reply.

Abydos is reduced to great ſtraits,

Soon after the departure of Aemilius, followed the deſtruction of Abydos [50]. No hope of eſcape remaining, the Abydonians determined to man the breaches with the few fighting men they had left; to reſiſt, until they were all either ſlain or diſabled; and then, having put to the ſword their women and children, to conſume with fire what remained

[49] Polyb. L. xvi. c. 19. Liv. L. xxxi. c. 17, 18.

[50] OLYMP. cxliv. 1. BEFORE CHRIST 199.

of the city. This desperate resolution was executed in part, when some of the priests, though solemnly sworn to the execution of the dreadful resolution, found it to be more than humanity could bear, and taken; and opened the gates of the city to Philip. Upon the entrance of the Macedonians was exhibited one of the most tremendous scenes recorded in history; fathers, husbands, in every quarter of the city, plunging the poniard into the breasts, or dashing out the brains, of their dearest connexions; and then, pierced by their own hands, expiring on heaps of mangled carcases. Philip himself felt the horror of the sight. He would have checked the fury of the infatuated multitude; but in vain; and was at last obliged to draw off his troops, and to allow them three days for completing the carnage. So that, the prisoners excepted, hardly one man survived of this unhappy and devoted people [f].

Despair of the Abydonians.

[f] Polyb. ubi sup.

HISTORY

OF GREECE.

BOOK VI.

SECTION I.

CONTENTS.

Second Macedonian war — Sulpicius the conſul enters Greece — Villius ſucceeds him — Flamininus is appointed to the conſulſhip, and conduct of the war — his abilities — vigor — ſucceſs — detaches the moſt conſiderable of the Grecian ſtates, particularly the Aetolians and Achaeans, from their connexion with Macedon — draws Philip into an engagement — defeats him — compels him to accept of peace on terms highly diſadvantageous — ingratiates himſelf with the Grecian ſtates, by making a pompous proclamation of their freedom, at the Iſthmian and Nemaean games — inſidiouſneſs of this grant — the Aetolians avow their jealouſy; condemn the peace with Macedon; and charge the proconſul with entertaining unfriendly deſigns againſt Greece — under a pretence of a zeal for liberty, he propoſes making war on Nabis tyrant of Sparta, lately his confederate againſt Philip — the Aetolians object to this war — the other Grecian ſtates

cooperate with Flamininus. — Nabis attacked, and reduced to extremity — Flamininus, againſt the opinion of his Greek confederates, concludes a treaty with him; and by artifice extorts their conſent — his motives — he returns to Rome, having firſt obtained the freedom of all the Romans who were in ſlavery throughout Greece.

BOOK VI. Sect. I.

Proſperous ſtate of Roman affairs at the beginning of the ſecond Macedonian war;

ROME could hardly have choſen a conjuncture more favorable to her ambitious deſigns, than that which marks the commencement of the ſecond Macedonian war: Carthage was ſubdued; all remains of revolt and popular tumult had ſubſided throughout Italy; Sicily, the prize ſo long contended for, in fertility and opulence the pride of the weſtern world, was now, together with moſt of the adjacent iſlands, annexed to her dominions; even thoſe nations, whom her arms had not reached, heard with terror the fame of a power, to which Hannibal had proved unequal.

ſituation of thoſe of Macedon.

Philip, on the other hand, inſtead of availing himſelf of the barrier pointed out by nature for his defence, ſeemed to be laying himſelf open to invaſion and diſcomfiture. He was on hoſtile terms with moſt of the circumjacent nations. He had loſt the affection and confidence of the moſt conſiderable of the Grecian ſtates. From Egypt no ſuccours were to be expected; and from Aſia but few. The Rhodians, who, on account of their maritime ſtrength, might have been powerful allies, had by his depredations, and ill-timed attempts, been compelled to take part with his enemies. And

BOOK VI. Sect. 1.

Antiochus, of whoſe alliance he made his boaſt, was too intent on his own ſchemes of empire, and too remote from Macedon, to be anxious about the fate of a kingdom, on which, he injudiciouſly imagined, the proſperity of Syria did not at all depend.

The conſul Sulpicius enters Greece;

Three years had elapſed, ſince peace had been concluded with Philip, when the Romans, under the command of the conſul Sulpicius, landed on the coaſt of Epire. The oſtenſible cauſe of this expedition was the relief of Athens, then beſieged by Philip. Accordingly, part of the Roman fleet was detached to Attica, and was ſoon after joined by the combined fleets of Attalus and the Rhodians. Philip was fired with indignation againſt the Athenians, whom he looked upon as the cauſe of the war, and marked them out as objects of his keeneſt vengeance. To add to his reſentment, the Roman commander had detached from the coaſt of Attica, ſome armed veſſels to Chalcis, which ſurpriſed the city, deſtroyed the arſenals and military ſtores, and left the place a ſmoking ruin. Philip, who lay at Demetrius in Theſſaly when tidings were brought him of this event, immediately ſet out, at the head of a choſen body of men, in hopes of overtaking the enemy; but, diſappointed of his aim, he advanced towards Attica, continuing his march all night, with the deſign of ſurpriſing Athens, and of treating it as the Romans had treated Chalcis. He had probably ſucceeded, had not one [1] of thoſe

ſends a fleet to the relief of Athens, beſieged by Philip's forces;

ſurpriſes Chalcis and lays it in ruins.

Reſentment of Philip; he attempts to wreak his vengeance on Athens;

[1] Ἡμεροδρόμοις — See Pollux. Onomaſt. L. i. c. 7.

couriers, whom the Greeks uſually employed on occaſions of diſpatch, deſcried him on his march, and alarmed the Athenians. Finding that he could not carry this point, he took his revenge in another manner. The country of Attica was every where adorned with the moſt exquiſite works of art, ſtately temples, ſumptuous villas, ſtatues of finiſhed beauty, and noble ſepulchral monuments; in which the richneſs of the marble, though of the moſt perfect kind, was of ſmall value, when compared with what had been ſtamped upon it by the hand of the artiſt. All of them fell victims to his fury, the temples excepted; he ſpared not even thoſe awful remembrances of the illuſtrious dead, which the violence of war had hitherto reſpected. He then attempted Eleuſis, and afterwards the Piraeus, but failed in both; and having made a ſhort excurſion into Peloponneſus, he returned again, with redoubled rage, and deſtroyed even the temples, which till now he had ſeemed to venerate; mangling and defacing every work of art in ſuch a manner, that ſcarce a veſtige of ſymmetry or beauty remained [a].

BOOK VI. Sect. 1.

is diſappointed;

lays waſte the country around it.

The Athenians, on their part, had recourſe to the only weapons, they were now expert in, the invectives of their orators, and the acrimony of their popular decrees. It was reſolved, "that Philip "ſhould for ever be the object of the execration "of the Athenian people — that whatever ſtatues "had been raiſed to him, or to any of the Macedo-"nian princes, ſhould be thrown down; whatever

Manner in which the Athenians vented their reſentment;

[a] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 24. 26.

BOOK VI. Sect. 1.

" had been enacted in their favor reſcinded; and " the ſeveral feſtivals and orders of prieſts, which " had been inſtituted in their honor aboliſhed —that " every place, in which had been ſet up any inſcrip- " tion or memorial in praiſe of Philip, ſhould hence- " forth be accounted profane and defiled — that in " all their ſolemn feaſts, when their prieſts were to " implore a bleſſing on Athens and her allies, they " ſhould pronounce curſes againſt him, his kin- " dred, his arms by ſea and land, and the whole " Macedonian name and nation — in a word, that " whatever had in ancient times been decreed " againſt the Piſiſtratidae, ſhould operate in full " force againſt Philip — and that whoſoever pro- " poſed any mitigation of the reſolutions now " formed, ſhould be adjudged a traitor to his " country, and be forthwith put to death [1]."

their exceſs of flattery to the Romans and their allies.

Nor was Athens leſs extragavant in her adulations of thoſe, from whom ſhe had received aſſiſtance. The Romans and Attalus were diſtinguiſhed particularly by the moſt fulſome honors; ſolemn proceſſions of all the prieſts and prieſteſſes attended their entrance into Athens, as if celebrating the reception of tutelary deities. Every Rhodian born was decreed a denizen of Athens. And, in further compliment to Attalus, one of their tribes aſſumed the name of Attalis [2]. Into ſuch meanneſs has corruption of manners the power of betraying the mind of man!

The Achaeans and Aetolians refuſe to aſſiſt Philip.

Philip ſoon found, that from the other parts of Greece he had ſomething yet more formidable

[1] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 44.

[2] Polyb. Legat. iii. p. 1092. Liv. L. xxxi. c. 14, 15.

to dread, than the wordy war of the frivolous Athenians. He had applied to the Achaean ſtates, in their convention at Argos, for ſuccours, offering to repel the attacks of Nabis, who was infeſting their frontiers, on condition that ſome of his cities ſhould be garriſoned by a body of their beſt troops. But the Achaeans, well apprized of his inſidious views, rejected the propoſal [5]. He applied afterwards, with as little ſucceſs, to the national convention of the Aetolian ſtates; ambaſſadors from Athens and the Roman conſul having appeared in the aſſembly, and urged their complaints in ſo forcible a manner, that, had not Democritus, then praetor of Aetolia, bribed, as it was ſuſpected, by Philip, put off the final determination of the matter till the next aſſembly, war had unqueſtionably been immediately declared againſt him [6].

Sulpicius endeavours to penetrate to the weſtern frontier of Macedon:

Meanwhile, Sulpicius, who was encamped on the banks of the Apſus [7], had ſent off a detachment, with directions to penetrate through the countries that covered the weſtern borders of Macedon, and attempt an impreſſion on the Macedonian frontier [8].

[5] It was probably on this occaſion that Philip attempted the life of Philopoemen; Plutarch (in Philopoem.) informing us, that he meantto have had him aſſaſſinated at Argos. This honeſt Greek, who was too much a friend to his country to be in amity with Philip, no doubt oppoſed his demand; and that prince, to whom crimes are ſaid to have been familiar, meditated an effectual revenge.

[6] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 32.

[7] A river of Illyricum, which empties itſelf into the Ionian gulph between Apollonia and Dyrrachium.

[8] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 27 & ſeq.

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This operation had all the effect that could be expected from it. The caſtles and ſtrong-holds in this part of the country, though advantageouſly ſituated in the midſt of defiles and broken precipices, were taken by the Romans; while the Illyrians, the Dardanians, the Athamanes, terrified at the progreſs of the Roman arms, declared againſt Philip. Encouraged by theſe fair appearances, the conſul entered the country of the Daſſaretii, from which there was ſaid to be an eaſy paſſage into Macedon, and got poſſeſſion of all the towns throughout the canton; diſmay and deſolation ſpreading on every ſide as he advanced. Philip himſelf began to tremble for the ſafety of his kingdom; he drew near to thoſe parts which ſeemed to be moſt in danger, and employed all his military ſkill, of which hiſtorians allow him a large ſhare, in watching, and, as occaſion offered, obſtructing the motions of the enemy: when an unlucky event[1] not only damped his vigor for the preſent, but left ſuch an impreſſion on his ſpirits, as well as on the minds of his ſubjects, as is thought to have had a conſiderable influence on their ſubſequent fortunes. A troop of Macedonian horſemen had encountered a party of Roman cavalry, and, a ſkirmiſh enſuing, forty of the former were ſlain, and of the Romans thirty-five. Among the Greeks the rites of ſepulture were highly revered; Philip, therefore, to ſhow the reſpect he had for his gallant ſoldiers, removed the bodies of the Macedonians to his camp, in order to the celebration

Philip's apprehenſions.

Unhappy impreſſion made on the minds of the Macedonians;

from what cauſe.

[1] Liv. L. xxxi. c. 34.

of their funeral obſequies. Hitherto the Macedonians, whoſe wars had chiefly been with the nations of Greece and Illyricum, had been only accuſtomed to wounds made by the ſpear, the javelin, and the arrow, which in their appearance had nothing hideous; but when they ſaw the bodies of their companions mangled by wide-yawning wounds; when they beheld their headleſs trunks, entire limbs lopped from the mutilated carcaſe, with all the ſhocking marks of ſlaughter, which the broad Spaniſh faulchion is ſuited to inflict; they were ſtruck with horror and diſmay. Even Philip ſhuddered at the thoughts of encountering ſuch a foe, and was obſerved, for a conſiderable time afterwards, carefully to avoid any deciſive action; contenting himſelf with ſkirmiſhes, and with cutting off occaſionally ſome ſtraggling parties of the enemy's foragers.

State of the war during the conſulſhips of Sulpicius and Villius his ſucceſſor.

In this languid and indeciſive kind of war two years elapſed, during the conſulſhip of Sulpicius, and that of his ſucceſſor Villius, not much to the honor of the Roman commanders; whoſe ſpiritleſs or intereſted conduct was ſaid to be the cauſe that nothing more had been effected. From this protracted war, however, Philip had reaped no advantage. He had met with diſcomfiture in almoſt every attempt; his frontiers had ſuffered ſevere depredation; and, far from ſtrengthening himſelf with new allies, the Aetolians, who at firſt had preſerved a kind of neutrality, had now avowedly eſpouſed the cauſe of Rome, and appeared againſt him in the field.

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Flamininus is appointed to conduct the Macedonian war:

Thus ſtood affairs at the cloſe of the ſecond year of the war, when the command of the Roman army devolved on the new conſul, Titus Quintius Flamininus. The important ſhare this Roman had in effecting the humiliation of Greece, and the ſubtilty and dark perfidiouſneſs of thoſe councils, with the conduct of which he was intruſted, render his character [10] the object of particular attention.

his character;

Though not remarkably eminent for military abilities, he was, however, what a Roman in thoſe days generally was, a ſoldier, and well acquainted with the ſcience of war. But his excellence chiefly conſiſted in the buſineſs of negotiation. Gentle and conciliating in his manner, he knew how to employ every art to gain the confidence of thoſe, to whom he was deputed. Impenetrable in his deſigns, yet wearing the captivating ſhow of cordiality and frankneſs, he coolly marked every opportunity, and improved every advantage that could ſerve the ſchemes he had in view. To Greece he profeſſed himſelf the zealous vindicator of her liberties; though in effect their moſt refined deſtroyer: conducting himſelf, in every ſtep, with ſuch complete diſſimulation, that, even to this day, it is with ſome, a queſtion, whether he was not guiltleſs of the treacherous policy which Rome practiſed on this occaſion; and, in the honeſty of his heart, promiſed what he believed was to be religiouſly fulfilled.

now raiſed to the conſulſhip;

He had been elected to the conſulſhip when he had not completed his thirtieth year, and without

[10] See Polyb. paſſim. Liv. L. xxxii. & ſeq. Plut. in Flamin.

paſſing through the intermediate offices of aedile and praetor. This extraordinary diſtinction, as Plutarch [11] informs us, he owed chiefly to the reputation he had obtained among the Tarentines, over whom he had been appointed governor towards the end of Hannibal's war. Encouraged by theſe coloniſts with promiſes of powerful ſupport, he ſtood for the conſulſhip, and carried it; the people warmly eſpouſing his intereſt, in oppoſition even to ſome of their own tribunes, and the ſenate underhand favoring his pretenſions. Having drawn lots with his colleague, he had for his allotment the Macedonian war. The proſpect of ſo noble a field rouſed all his ambition; and he was reſolved to purſue it with activity and ardor. It had been uſual with the conſuls to waſte a conſiderable portion of their year at home, in the enjoyment of official parade: hence they ſeldom joined the army until the ſeaſon was far advanced. Flamininus adopted a different plan. Regardleſs of the pomp of Rome, he haſtened over into Greece, as ſoon as the neceſſary religious ceremonies were over, at which his office obliged him to preſide.

his ſpirited manner of entering on the duties of his office:

He found Villius in that part of Epire called Chaonia, near the mouth of the [12] Aous, in a ſituation rather diſgraceful to a Roman conſul, in ſight of the enemy, without daring to attack them.

diſlodges Philip from a ſtrong poſt.

[11] In Flamin.

[12] Plutarch (in Philopoem.) calls it the Apſus. It appears from Livy (L. xxxii. c. 5.) as well as from ſeveral circumſtances, that it ſhould be the Aous. See Palmer. Græc. Antiq. L. i. c. 26.

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Philip, truſting to the ſlender abilities of Villius, had ventured to look the Romans in the face, and had intrenched himſelf in ſuch a manner as gave him a very formidable appearance [11]. He was poſted in a narrow vale, through which the Aous rolled a deep and rapid ſtream. The banks of the river were ſteep and narrow, and ſecured by ſtrong intrenchments; on either ſide roſe high and rugged mountains, and he had taken poſſeſſion of all the hollows and defiles. Flamininus having taken the command, employed ſome days in reconnoitring the ſituation of the enemy, and conſidering the practicability of forcing their lines. At length, by means of ſome neighbouring ſhepherds, he diſcovered a path, which led to the ſummit by a winding courſe. Having detached a party to occupy the heights which hung over the Macedonian camp, on ſeeing the concerted ſignal, he began the [12] attack. In the heat of the engagement, the ſhouts of the Romans on the hills, who now poured down on the Macedonians, threw them into the utmoſt confuſion, and ſoon completed their overthrow; Philip, with the remains of his army, making his eſcape through the ſtraits of the mountains into Theſſaly, and from thence into Macedon [13].

and puts him to flight:

[11] Livy (L. xxxii. c. 10.) gives us an account of an interview between Philip and the conſul, of which no mention is made by Plutarch, and which, all circumſtances conſidered, appears exceedingly improbable.

[12] Olymp. cxiv. 2. Before Christ 194.

[13] Liv. L. xxxii. c. 11, 12.

It

Sect. I. detaches ſeveral of the Grecian ſtates from their connexion with Macedon;

It would have little availed to have purſued Philip through a country, with every ſtrong paſs and intricate winding of which he was intimately acquainted. Flamininus adopted a method of operation " far more effectual: he prepared to deſtroy all remains of power or influence which his enemy poſſeſſed among the Grecian ſtates, and, if poſſible, finally to diſſolve every connexion of intereſts between Greece and Macedon. This plan, artfully laid, was carried into execution with the moſt conſummate ſkill He began his progreſs at Epire, through which he marched, not as an enemy, but as a protector. Philip, in his flight, had marked his route with plunder and devaſtation. Flamininus, on the contrary, committed no hoſtility; and reſtrained his ſoldiers from every act of depredation; ſo that the Epirots, inſtead of being active in the cauſe of Macedon, to which, before this conſul's arrival, they were well affected, now offered themſelves as his guides, or inliſted under his banners. From Epire he marched into Theſſaly, and took poſſeſſion of almoſt every place of ſtrength in the country; conquering oppoſition by lenity and perſuaſion, and employing arms only where gentler means had proved ineffectual. Meanwhile, Lucius, brother to Flamininus, who commanded the Roman fleet, had reached the eaſtern coaſt of Greece; and, being joined by the fleets of Attalus and the Rhodians, made a deſcent on Euboea, where Philip, as we have already ſeen, had many important ſet-

" Plut. in Flamin. Liv. L. xxxii. c. 13 & ſeq.

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tlements. Philocles, who commanded on the iſland, was defeated; and Eretria and Caryſtus, two conſiderable cities, were taken. Flamininus, after a ſhort ſtay in Theſſaly, haſtened into Phocis, with the deſign of extending his conqueſts towards the ſouthern provinces of Greece. His great object was, to gain over the ſtates of Achaia to the intereſts of Rome; for which purpoſe, he gave inſtructions to his brother, to ſend a joint embaſſy to Achaia, in the name of the Romans, Attalus, and the Rhodians, requeſting a convention of the Achaean ſtates, in order to propoſe to them a treaty of alliance with the Romans; while the combined fleets, entering the Corinthian gulph, were to be ſtationed [17] off Cenchreae, one of the Corinthian ports, under color of laying ſiege to Corinth, then poſſeſſed by Philip; but, in fact, the more powerfully to enforce the object of the embaſſy. Alarmed at a meaſure of the higheſt conſequence to him, Philip likewiſe diſpatched ambaſſadors to plead his cauſe at the enſuing diet, which was appointed to be held at Sicyon; directing them to place in the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt point of view, the validity of the treaties ſubſiſting between Macedon and the Achaeans, and to remind them of the ſolemn oaths by which they had pledged themſelves: oaths rendered, if poſſible, more ſtrikingly awful by a cuſtomary yearly renewal. Upon the opening of the diet, the ſeveral ambaſſadors having firſt been heard, the members were called upon to deliver

endeavours to gain over the ſtates of Achaia;

and, in this view, lays ſiege to Corinth.

Philip alſo ſends ambaſſadors to the Achaean diet.

[17] Liv. L. xxiii. c. 19 & ſeq.

their ſentiments; but a ſullen ſilence enſued: ſtunned by the variety of dangers they ſaw around them, they were either at a loſs what opinion to give, or fearful of delivering it. Ariſtaenus, general for the year, and the devoted creature of Rome, having urged the convention in vain, at laſt took the lead, declaring himſelf, in the moſt decided manner, in favor of the Romans: "The ſucceſs," he ſaid, "of whoſe arms in Epire, in Theſſaly, in Euboea, "was the cleareſt proof of their power to protect "thoſe whoſe friendſhip they condeſcended to ſo-"licit; whoſe fleets and armies, whilſt Philip was "lurking in his own faſtneſſes, were now in ſight "of Achaia; whoſe chief motive, in their Grecian "expedition, was to deliver them from the yoke "of Macedon, under which they had long groaned; "and who mildly deigned to requeſt, what they "might eaſily command." At the ſame time, he poured forth the bittereſt invectives againſt the Macedonian king, whoſe crimes, whether real or imputed, he dwelt on with every poſſible aggravation. This ſervile ſtrain, ſo unworthy of the firſt magiſtrate of a yet free people, raiſed an outcry of indignation, not only from the friends of Philip, but from all, who had a real concern for the liberties of their country. The Macedonian party in the convention was conſiderable, and attached to Philip by particular acts of kindneſs; there were, beſides, many of the Achaeans, who, though they diſliked the king's perſonal character, and were cautious of repoſing much confidence in him, had, with great reaſon, no leſs gloomy apprehenſions from this

Ariſtaenus, the general of the year, declares for the Romans.

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foreign power, which they ſaw eſtabliſhing itſelf in the midſt of their country, and conſidered the ſupporting of the royal houſe of Macedon as a meaſure of the higheſt moment to the general welfare of Greece. The aſſembly now became a ſcene of wild uproar; ſome, with indecent clamor, ſupporting the intereſts of Rome, while others as loudly and indecently oppoſed them. Both parties ſeemed callous to every tender or ſacred tie, breathing all the virulence of civil diſcord, and mutually accuſing their opponents with harbouring the moſt traitorous deſigns. What heightened the embarraſſment, the numbers on each ſide appeared nearly equal; and even of the council of ten, a majority of whom was requiſite to the formation of a decree, five were for Macedon, and five for Rome. In this ſtate of turbulence and irreſolution had the diet continued two days; and on the third, by the laws of Achaia, it was to be diſſolved. Next day, however, ſeemed likely to end as the preceding, each party making more ſtrenuous exertions, as the hour of deciſion approached; when Rhiſaſus of Pellene, a member of the diet, and in the intereſts of Rome, but whoſe ſon Memnon, one of the council of ten, notwithſtanding his father's repeated entreaties, had ſteadily refuſed to abandon the ſide of Macedon, once more attempted to ſhake the reſolution of his ſon, ſolemnly ſwearing, that he would, with his own hand, put him to death, if he did not deſiſt from an oppoſition, which muſt involve his country in ruin. A ſtriking inſtance this, both of the virulence of party-ſpirit, and of

Violent conteſts in the Achaean diet:

the ferocity even of Grecian manners in thoſe times! Awed by his father's menaces, Memnon changed ſides, and the queſtion was carried in favor of Rome

the queſtion carried in favor of Rome.

It is worthy of notice, that the deputies from Megalopolis, Argos, and Dymé withdrew, as ſoon as it was perceived what would be the determination of the convention, to avoid giving a ſanction, by their preſence, to reſolutions ſo injurious to Philip. The Dyméans, particularly, alledged their obligations to the Macedonian king, who had ranſomed ſeveral of their fellow-citizens that had been ſold for ſlaves by the Romans, and reſtored them to their families. This generous reaſon, Livy [15] ſays, met the approbation even of Philip's enemies; which leads us to ſuppoſe, that he was not altogether ſo profligate a monarch as the writers of thoſe days, who ſeem to be the adulators of Rome, rather than hiſtorians, have repreſented him.

Noble ſpirit of ſome of the Achaean deputies.

Soon after this affair was brought to a concluſion, the ſiege of Corinth was raiſed. It had been promiſed by the Roman conſul to the Achaeans; but it was now pretended, that the obſtinate defence made by a number of Roman deſerters, together with the reinforcements which the Macedonians had thrown into the garriſon, had forced Flamininus to abandon the ſiege; which, were it even to end ſucceſsfully, was likely to be bought at too high a rate. Probably, the determination of the Achaean diet had rendered the ſiege no longer neceſſary.

Flamininus, having gained his purpoſe, raiſes the ſiege of Corinth.

[15] Ubi ſup.

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About the ſame time, too, Argos had been betrayed by ſome of its citizens into the hands of Philip [19]. So that, after all that the Achaean ſtates had reſolved, this prince ſtill remained maſter of two of the principal cities of Peloponneſus.

Philip, alarmed, applies for an interview with the conſul;

Philip, however, was alarmed. Though poſſeſſed of theſe two cities, yet their diſtant ſituation afforded him but a precarious and expenſive tenure. He clearly foreſaw the approaching fate of Macedon; abandoned by her moſt uſeful confederates deprived of her wonted reſources, and reduced to a narrow and naked frontier. Urged by the embarraſſment of his ſituation, he requeſted a conference with

obtains it.

the Roman conſul; who made choice of Nicaea, a ſea-port on the Maliac bay, for the place of interview [20]. Flamininus repaired thither, attended by the chief leaders of the Aetolian and Achaean ſtates; by Amynander king of the Athamanes; by the ambaſſador of the king of Pergamus; and the

Artful conduct of Flamininus;

commander of the Rhodian fleet. This pompous retinue not only adminiſtered to the conſul's pride, but anſwered alſo certain political ends; it gave him an opportunity of making a plauſible diſplay to his allies of his attention to their ſeveral intereſts; and it afforded him the means of humbling Philip, to whom it muſt have been a ſevere mortification to ſee ſo conſiderable a part of the ſtrength of Greece on the ſide of his adverſary. The Macedonian

[19] Liv. L. xxxii. c. 25.

[20] Polyb. Excerpt. L. xvii. c. 1 & ſeq. Liv. L. xxxii. c. 32 & ſeq.

king, as he approached the ſhore; for he had come by ſea, could not ſuppreſs his indignation, and, being invited by the conſul to land, declined it. "Whom do "you fear?" ſaid Flamininus. "I fear none but the "immortal gods," anſwered Philip; "but I ſuſpect "the faith of thoſe by whom I ſee you ſurrounded, "eſpecially your Aetolians." The conſul obſerved, that, in all caſes of this kind, there was reciprocal danger: "But in the preſent caſe," replied Philip, "the temptation is not equal; for ſhould miſchief "befal Phaeneas (the Aetolian praetor, who "accompanied Flamininus) Aetolia may eaſily get "another praetor; but if I am taken off, who is "to ſucceed me on the throne of Macedon?" After a ſhort pauſe, the conſul requeſted the king to make his propoſals, which, as the interview had been appointed at his ſolicitation, were properly to come from him. "It belongs not to the vanquiſhed "to propoſe," anſwered the Macedonian, "it is "theirs only to accept." — "If ſo," reſumed the conſul. "I ſhall at once name the conditions, "without which no peace is to be expected: — "You are to evacuate thoſe places you hold in "Greece, and relinquiſh all claim to every part of "it — you are to give up all priſoners and deſerters "belonging to Rome and her allies — you are to "ſurrender the cities you have taken in Illyricum, "ſince the concluſion of the laſt peace, and the "places belonging to the crown of Egypt, you "ſeized on the death of Philopator. — Theſe our "allies have, beſides, demands of their own; it "is juſt they ſhould be heard and attended to."

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his haughty and peremptory conditions, on which alone peace was to be had.

BOOK VI.

Sect. I.

Demands made on Philip by Attalus and the other allies of Rome.

The ambaſſador of king Attalus then demanded the reſtoration of the ſhips and priſoners taken in the engagement off the iſland of Chios, and that he ſhould indemnify Attalus for the ravages committed in his dominions. The Rhodians required Perœa, a certain diſtrict on the continent of Aſia, oppoſite to Rhodes, which had formerly belonged to them; together with the evacuation of all the cities and ſea-ports [22] he poſſeſſed on the Aſiatic coaſt: the Achæans claimed Argos and Corinth: and the Aetolians, beſides the demand of certain cities in Theſſaly, inſiſted on an ample compenſation for all the loſſes ſuſtained by them and their allies;

[22] What ever opinion we may be induced to form of Philip's moral character, it clearly appears, from the demands made on him by the Rhodians, that he muſt have been a prince of great abilities, and ſtrenuous in promoting the ſtrength and opulence of his kingdom. In the beginning of his reign, when invited by Aratus into Peloponneſus, the Macedonians had no marine, they had ſcarcely a ſeaman; and yet, in about twenty-two years after, we find him in poſſeſſion of many conſiderable ſea-ports; and that he had eſtabliſhed a number of mercantile ſettlements (portus & emporia) along the Aſiatic coaſt; while he, at the ſame time, poſſeſſed ſuch a navy, as to be in a condition to diſpute the empire of the Archipelago with the Rhodians, in thoſe days the greateſt maritime power in Greece. This accounts for the Rhodian enmity. They ſuſpected, that he meant to rival them in the Levant-trade, the principal ſource of their wealth. Thus mercantile jealouſy drove them into the arms of the Romans. They had ſoon cauſe to repent! Inſtead of a competitor, they brought upon themſelves imperious maſters, the ſlighteſt contradiction to whoſe will was a crime worthy of extermination.

and his total and final excluſion from the Grecian territories.

Sect. I.

How far Philip appears to have been guilty:

From the various charges againſt Philip, which Polybius and Livy have preſerved to us, and in which, without doubt, whatever could make againſt him is accurately recorded, it appears evidently, that he had only done what ambitious monarchs generally do, and that, however guilty he might be in the eye of reaſon, thoſe very ſtates, which preferred theſe complaints, the Aetolians eſpecially, and even the Romans, thoſe ſpirited aſſertors of the rights of mankind, were at leaſt equally criminal. In reality, his guilt conſiſted in being at the head of a kingdom of great ancient reputation, and ſtill ſuppoſed to be of conſiderable ſtrength, which obſtructed the meditated plan of Roman domination. Philip ſeems to have been aware of the Roman deſigns, and by his tameneſs on this occaſion, ſo different from his former character, to have endeavoured either to lead them to gentler purpoſes, or to diſplay to other nations what *they* might in future times expect from the inſatiable rapacity of Rome. Notwithſtanding the extent of the demands made on him, many of them ill-founded, and the aſperity of language with which they were urged, he calmly labored to remove the obſtructions which he ſaw induſtriouſly thrown in the way of peace, yielding point after point, far beyond what could have been expected from a prince not yet of deſperate fortunes. To the Romans, he ſaid, he was ready to reſign whatever they had aſked, thoſe poſſeſſions in Greece excepted, which had deſcended to him

his remarkable temper in the courſe of this conference,

his conceſſions.

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from his anceſtors. Of his Aſiatic ſettlements he deſired to retain nothing but Bargylia and Jaſſus[**], two places on the coaſt of Caria, valuable from the commercial advantages they enjoyed; Jaſſus, in particular, from it's fiſhery. Whatever elſe he held in Aſia, he conſented to abandon to Attalus and the Rhodians, together with their ſhips of war, and all the priſoners then alive. And, as the ambaſſador of Attalus had charged him with having laid waſte his maſter's gardens and orchards, ſince ſuch matters were not unworthy royal notice, he would ſend over gardeners and trees to new-plant them. Of the Achaeans he complained much; they had become unprovoked enemies, in contradiction to their own public acts, in which every poſſible honor had repeatedly been decreed to him; and in violation of a number of treaties ſolemnly ſworn to: he agreed, however, that both Argos and Corinth ſhould be reſtored to them. But his reſentment ran higheſt againſt the Aetolians. There was,

[**] Bargylia, on the coaſt of Caria; Jaſſus, a ſmall iſland oppoſite to it. Of this Jaſſus there is a pleaſantry related by Strabo (L. xiv. p. 453. Caſaub.) A muſician landed there, and was performing to a crowded audience; when on a ſudden, upon the ringing of a certain bell, the uſual ſignal for the opening of the fiſh-market, the whole aſſembly went off, one perſon excepted. The muſician, well pleaſed to find that his performance had power at leaſt over one; began to compliment him upon the excellence of his taſte, "who had not, like the reſt of his countrymen, ſuffered "the fiſh-bell to call him away." — "The fiſh-bell!" replied he; "why, has the fiſh-bell rung?" and immediately hurried after his companions. The man was deaf, and had not heard the bell.

previous to this event, as has been already mentioned, an avowed enmity between them; which was now increaſed by the indecent petulance of the Aetolian delegates, in the courſe of the preſent congreſs. In the very firſt conference, Alexander the Aetolian had attacked the king with remarkable acrimony, and, upon his attempting a reply, Phaeneas interrupted him in theſe inſolent terms: "You talk like a fool": all that remains for the "vanquiſhed is ſubmiſſion to the commands of the "conqueror." "True," ſaid Philip, "that is clear "even to a blind man":[23] a tart, but juſtly merited

[23] Φάσκων αὐτὸν λεξεῖν δεῖν ἢ μαχόμενον νικᾶν, ἢ πολεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι τὸ προστεττόμενον. See Exc. Polyb. L. xvii. c. 4.

[24] Polybius and Livy blame Philip's pleaſantry on this occaſion. *Erat dicacior*, ſays the Roman hiſtorian, *quam regem decet, & ne inter ſeria quidem riſu ſatis temperans.* Is it not ſtrange, that they have not at the ſame time paſſed any cenſure on the illiberal attack of the Aetolian praetor, nor on the Roman conſul's ſarcaſtial reproach. At the cloſe of the firſt day's conference, Philip requeſted that he might have a copy of the ſeveral demands produced againſt him, and be allowed time to deliberate concerning them: *for*, ſaid he, *I am here alone, I have no counſellor with me.* — *With good reaſon are you alone*, anſwered Flamininus; *you have deſtroyed every faithful counſellor you had.* He had put to death ſome of his ſubjects on various ſuſpicions. Philip replied only, with a ſmile of indignation Μαδιάσας Σαρδόνιον. Mr. Hume (Eſſay 14) imputes this illiberality of language to the manners of the times. The reflections of Polybius and Livy ſeem to ſay otherwiſe. But why ſhould not their cenſure fall in part on the Roman and Aetolian? And why is it aimed wholly at the king of Macedon? Are we to ſuſpect, that *his being a king*, and the enemy of Rome, were the circumſtances that aggravated the charge againſt him?

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repartee: Phaeneas, it ſeems, had weak eyes. In diſcuſſing their demands, he therefore began by expreſſing the utmoſt aſtoniſhment and indignation, that thoſe ſhould talk of excluding him from Greece, who knew not even the limits of the country, and were themſelves Greeks but in part, ſeveral of the provinces of Aetolia lying beyond the boundaries of ancient Greece. What injuries they had ſuffered, he ſaid, were no more than the cuſtomary and unavoidable conſequences of war. And as to allies, they had none; influenced merely by the allurements of pay and depredation, they fought indiſcriminately for any ſtate, Aetolians being often to be found in two oppoſite armies. That, however, he would deliver up to them Larriſſa and Pharſalus, two cities lying convenient for their frontiers; but that he could not poſſibly evacuate the other Theſſalian cities which they claimed, conſiſtently with his own ſafety.

Philip's anſwer not deemed ſatisfactory.

In theſe altercations two days had elapſed, and peace ſeemed to be as diſtant as ever; Philip's relinquiſhing all claim to every part of Greece, and engaging never to paſs beyond the boundaries of Macedon, being, excluſively of particular demands, a preliminary from which none of the allied ſtates would depart. Philip's only reſource now, was an application to the conſul, for permiſſion to ſend ambaſſadors to lay his propoſals before the ſenate of Rome; which, if not deemed equitable and ſatisfactory, he proteſted that he would ſubmit implicitly to the conditions and award of the conſcript fathers. This requeſt, hardly indeed to

Deſires time to ſend amb aſſadors to Rome

Flaminius grants it.

be refuſed, was graciouſly complied with, and a two months truce accordingly granted; with this previous ſtipulation, that he ſhould immediately withdraw his garriſons from Locris and Phocis. Beſides gaining this important point, the conſul had other views in complying with what Philip requeſted. It was winter, and the army could not act; ſo that no military operation was ſuſpended by it. And the election of new conſuls was at hand, when he might poſſibly be ſuperſeded His plan therefore was, to have the appearance of finiſhing the war by treaty, if he ſhould find he was to be recalled, or to have it in his power to purſue it, if continued in the command.

and with what views.

The ſenate gratified Flamininus to the utmoſt of his wiſhes. They continued him in the command; with full powers either to proſecute or to end the war, as he ſhould judge expedient. What they really meant was eaſy for him to underſtand. The Macedonian ambaſſadors, it is true, had been admitted to an audience; but not till the deputies from Flamininus, with the miniſters of the ſeveral Grecian ſtates, had been examined, and the ſenate fully informed of the ſituation of Macedonian affairs, with whatever the intereſts of Rome required. When therefore the perſon, who was at the head of the embaſſy from Philip, began to enter upon his maſter's defence, the ſenate, inſtead of ſuffering him to proceed, ſtopped him with this ſhort queſtion. "Has your maſter authorized you to give "up Demetrias in Theſſaly, Chalcis in Euboea, "and Corinth?" termed by the Macedonians, the

Flamininus continued in the command.

Philip's ambaſſadors are treated with mockery at Rome.

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fetters of Greece. The ambaſſadors, in confuſion, making anſwer, that they had not received any inſtructions in relation to theſe points, were ordered inſtantly to withdraw, and full powers ſent to Flamininus; who thenceforth refuſed to receive any farther propoſals from Philip, unleſs he previouſly renounced all claim to every part of Greece.

Philip under the neceſſity of turning his thoughts to war:

That unfortunate monarch, now hopeleſs of any equitable conditions from Rome, and probably rouſed to a more ſpirited exertion by the mockery with which he ſaw he had been treated, employed his utmoſt vigor in providing for his defence. Argos was too diſtant to be of effectual ſervice; and was not to be retained without a force he could ill ſpare; he therefore reſolved to abandon it [21], and in a manner, as he imagined, more pregnant with miſchief, than if it had ſtill been held by a Macedonian garriſon. Nabis was at this time the ſcourge of Peloponneſus; hiſtory records him for one of the moſt profligate tyrants that ever diſgraced a throne; he maintained himſelf in the ſovereignty of Sparta by means of an army of mercenaries, compoſed of the moſt cruel and flagitious of outcaſts, whom he daily exerciſed in deeds of villany, violence, and bloodſhed. Againſt the Achaeans in particular, on whom Philip would gladly have been revenged, Nabis profeſſed a deadly enemity. Philip offered to put him in poſſeſſion of Argos, on condition of his reſtoring it when Macedon was again in tranquillity; and, the more ſtrongly to cement the

gives up Argos to Nabis.

[21] Liv. L. xxxii. c. 38, 39.

alliance, he propoſed to give his daughters in marriage to the tyrant's ſons. Whatever Philip aſked, Nabis promiſed to perform; and, ſuch is the fidelity of tyrants, no ſooner was he maſter of Argos, than he offered his ſervices to Flamininus; who, not very delicate in his choice of means, provided advantage could be derived from them, received him without heſitation among the allies of Rome, and accepted of his tendered ſuccours.

The perfidiouſneſs of Nabis;

Philip merited the deceit with which he was repaid. The caſe of the unhappy Argives was infinitely more to be lamented. Nabis immediately put in practice his uſual ſubtilties, to diſcover the wealth of every man in Argos, and plundered them of all. And ſo low did his rapaciouſneſs deſcend, as to employ his wife Apega to extort from the Argive ladies, by artifice or terror, whatever jewels or ornamental trinkets they poſſeſſed. It appears, that avarice was the ruling paſſion of this wretched miſcreant. Polybius [26] makes mention of an extraordinary inſtrument of extortion, deviſed by him, which upon a leſs grave authority we ſhould be apt to account fabulous. He had contrived a figure of iron, in form like Apega, to move with ſprings, whoſe arms and breaſt were furniſhed with a number of ſpikes. This machine, dreſſed out as if it had really been the queen, was ſeated in his apartment; and when he found his ſolicitations for money ineffectual, "Apega," he would ſay, "will perhaps plead more forcibly;"

his character and cruelties.

[26] Exc. L. xiii. c. 5.

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and, raiſing up the figure, cauſed the arms to cling round and preſs the body of the unhappy delinquent, who generally expired under the torturing embrace.

The Romans and Macedonians take the field.

Soon as the ſeaſon permitted, the two armies haſtened to take the field, and began to move towards Theſſaly. Previous to this meaſure, Flamininus had finiſhed a tranſaction of conſiderable importance. Philip was known to have a powerful intereſt among the Boeotians; they had hitherto obſerved a kind of a neutrality, but it was uncertain how long they might retain the ſame pacific appearances, and in the preſent ſituation of affairs the proconſul earneſtly wiſhed to engage them, if poſſible, to act decidedly for Rome The difficulty was, how to effectuate his purpoſe The arts of perſuaſion and intrigue had been ſo repeatedly employed throughout Greece that their notoriety hindered their effect; and on the Boeotians, a rough people, they had already probably been tried in vain. So that Flamininus found it neceſſary to have recourſe to a different and unhackneyed ſcheme; and, as the execution was of a delicate nature, to take the management upon himſelf. Attalus and the proconſul ſet out [27] attended by a ſmall retinue, as on a friendly viſit to Thebes, where the convention of the Boeotian ſtates was uſually held. The ſlenderneſs of the train raiſed no alarm, and the Thebans opened their gates with an unſuſpicious cordiality; their chief magiſtrate himſelf, to do thegreater honor to the Roman general, and

Flamininus prevails on the Boeotians to enter into alliance with him.

by what artifice.

[27] Liv. L. xxxii. c. 1, 2. Plut. in Flaminino.

perhaps

perhaps in the ſecret, going forth to meet him. But ſcarcely was he within the walls, when a body of two thouſand ſpearmen, whom the winding of the hills had hitherto concealed, appeared in ſight, and, mixing with the proconſul's attendants, entered the city. Flamininus, nevertheleſs, ſtill affected the language of peace; and, an aſſembly having been convened, made it his ſuit, with all the rhetoric of reſpectful entreaty, that the Boeotians would be pleaſed to admit him into their friendſhip and alliance; in ſupport of which, Attalus, the faithful advocate of Rome, ſpoke with ſuch vehemence, that in the midſt of his harangue he fell down ſpeechleſs; and, being immediately conveyed on board his fleet, which ſailed for Aſia, he ſoon after expired. But there was, indeed, little neceſſity for argument to convince the Boeotians of the propriety of a meaſure, which was ſupported by two thouſand men in arms; they readily agreed to all the proconſul's requiſitions. This kind of fraud [28], we learn from hiſtory, began now to be practiſed by the Romans. Time was, when they

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[28] There is, however, good reaſon to ſuſpect, that Flamininus had ſoon recourſe to other means, far worſe than even deceit, to ſecure the influence he had thus acquired. Livy (L. xxxiii. c. 27, 28, 29) ſhall furniſh the account. The Thebans, a great number of whom, notwithſtanding the low ſtate of Philip's fortunes, (it being ſoon after his defeat) were ſtill attached ſtrongly to him, had, in oppoſition to the Roman party, choſen for Boeotarch one Barcilas, in the Macedonian intereſt, and who had lately ſerved in the armies of Macedon. By way of

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would have ſcorned the acquiſition of a victory gained at the price of treachery. But, having

retaliation, proper inſtruments were employed, and Barcillas was aſſaſſinated. But the authors of his aſſaſſination having been traced out, it was found, that one of the chief leaders among the partiſans of Rome was the principal perſon concerned; who, upon the diſcovery, immediately fled to Athens, then Flamininus's place of reſidence. The character and connexions of the man, the place he fled to, the protection he found, together with ſome other circumſtances, not mentioned by this hiſtorian, fixed the ſuſpicions of all Thebes on Flamininus. And ſo exaſperated on account of it, Livy himſelf (ibid. c. 29.) confeſſes, was the whole Theban nation againſt all of Roman race, (efferavit ea cædes Thebanos Boeotoſque omnes ad execrabile odium Romanorum) that they murdered every Roman ſoldier they could find, and were not to be checked but by the march of a Roman army into Boeotia. — Polybius (Legat. viii. p. 1103.) is yet more particular. The conſpirators, he expreſsly tells us, applied to Flamininus, and communicated their plan to him: he promiſed not to give any hindrance to it, though he was unwilling to appear himſelf in the buſineſs; but referred them to Alexamenes, a truſty Aetolian in the Roman intereſt, in concert with whom they carried the ſcheme into execution. Polybius calls the Boeotarch Brachyllas.

Flamininus afterwards made peace with the Boeotians, by the mediation of the Achæan ſtates. And, from a circumſtance mentioned by Livy (bid. c. 29.) we may collect, that there was ſomething exceedingly pitiable in the caſe of the Boeotians. The Achaeans reſolved, ſhould Flamininus not conſent to a peace, to march themſelves to the aſſiſtance of the Boeotians, and join them againſt Rome: (ni impetraſſent pacem Boeotis, bellum ſimul gerere decreverunt) Nothing but the ſtrongeſt conviction of the juſtice of the Boeotian cauſe could have drawn ſuch a

declined from their ancient ſimplicity, they had loſt much [10] of that blunt and inartificial courage for which they were remarkable in their earlier ages. Such, unhappily, has been the progreſs of manners among all nations, the advancement of refinement produces the decline of virtue.

Battle of Cynoſcephalae.

After ſome movements of little conſequence, the two armies advanced [10] from the ſouthern parts of Theſſaly towards Scotuſſa a city near the Peneus; the Macedonians, in queſt of forage; and the Romans, to deprive them of it, by laying waſte the country. As they had taken different routes, they had encamped near to each other without knowing it, being ſeparated only by a range of hills, called *Cynocephalae* [11]. Philip, uncertain as to the poſition of the Roman army, had detached a party to the top of the hills, to reconnoitre, if poſſible, the ſituation of the enemy; who unexpectedly fell in with a detachment of Romans, that had marched with the like deſign to diſcover Philip. By reaſon of the hazineſs of the morning, the Macedonians did not diſcover the Romans till they were within reach of their weapons, when a ſkirmiſh immediately enſued; and each party, as they happened to be

declaration from the Achaeans, at this time much fallen from their independence, and in ſtrict connexion with the Roman people.

[10] See the ſecond and third ſections of this book; and ſection the firſt of book the ſeventh.

[10] See Polyb. Excerpt. L. xvii. c. 14 & ſeq. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 3 & ſeq.

[11] The *dogs-heads*, from the appearance which their ſummits exhibited.

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preſſed, ſending to their reſpective camps for reinforcements, in a ſhort time a general engagement became almoſt unavoidable [11].

Philip averſe to the engagement;

It appears that Philip, whether under the impreſſion of ſome diſcouraging omen, as Plutarch [11] ſeems to think, or, according to Polybius, diſliking the ground, which was ill-ſuited to the operations of his infantry, would have deferred the deciſion to ſome future day. But the advantage being at firſt on the ſide of the Macedonians, and his army, encouraged by the ſucceſs of their fellow-ſoldiers, eagerly ſoliciting to be led againſt the enemy, he at length yielded to their ardor, and drew up his whole forces, conjuring them [11], as they paſſed, "to ſhow "themſelves mindful of their anceſtors, and not to "permit Macedon, illuſtrious by ſo many glorious "achievements, to bend to the yoke of Rome."

he addreſſes his army.

Flamininus addreſſes his.

Flamininus, having formed his troops, employed, with no leſs anxiety, every argument which he ſuppoſed likely to inſpire the moſt vigorous exertions. He reminded them, "of their recent conqueſts "in Italy, in Sicily, in Spain, in Afric, over nations no way inferior to whatever Macedon had to boaſt, even in the days of her glory; that thoſe, with whom they were now to engage, were Macedonians

[11] OLYMP. cxlv. 3. BEFORE CHRIST 193.

[11] Some days before, haranguing his men, he perceived that the place he was ſpeaking from was burial-ground; which circumſtance, having been noticed by the ſoldiers, caſt a deep gloom over the whole army. As ſoon as Philip obſerved it, he withdrew. Omens of this kind were ſuperſtitiouſly attended to by the ancients.

[11] Juſt. L. xx. c. 4.

only in name; not, as the Romans, great by their own exploits; but deriving whatever diſtinction they enjoyed from the remembrance of the achievements of their forefathers, being themſelves a degenerate race, who with difficulty repelled even the predatory incurſions of a few neighbouring barbarians[11]."

The victory doubtful, at length deciſive in favor of Rome.

The right wing of the Macedonians had reached the heights before the enemy, and, having preſerved in their march all that compactneſs and depth, which conſtituted the ſtrength of the Macedonian phalanx, bore down with their whole weight upon the Romans, now aſcending the hill; who, unable to withſtand the ſhock, gave way on every ſide, and had been totally routed, but for the timely ſupport of the Aetolian horſe. On the left, the Macedonians fought not with the ſame advantage. They had formed later than the other wing; and a precipitate march, over broken ground, had thrown the troops into diſorder. Flamininus perceiving their ſituation, and directing his attack where their broken lines admitted of an impreſſion, without much difficulty completed the confuſion; their arms which in a great meaſure derived their power of execution from being interwoven together, and wrought as it were into one maſs, added to their embarraſſment, becoming, in the hands of the ſingle ſoldier, unwieldy and almoſt uſeleſs. Meanwhile, diſcomfiture began alſo to reach the right wing. A legionary tribune, obſerving that this

[11] Juſt. L. xxx. c. 4.

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was the only part of the Macedonian army which ſtill maintained the diſpute, wheeled round with a few choſen men, and made an attack on the rear of the phalanx. Here the Macedonians, from their order of battle, were incapable of reſiſtance; for the phalanx could only advance, and the men were precluded from all power of facing about, by the cloſeneſs of their ranks, and the length of their interwoven ſpears[16]. The Romans having opened, therefore, to themſelves a paſſage, ſlaughtered the Macedonians with impunity; who, finding they could make no reſiſtance, threw down their arms, diſperſed, and fled. Philip, who, according to Polybius, had performed the duties both of the general and the ſoldier, ſeeing the day irretrievably loſt, retreated towards Tempe, on his way to Macedon, endeavouring, as he retired, to collect the ſcattered remains of his army, more than one half of which had either been made priſoners, or fallen in the field of battle; but he previouſly diſpatched meſſengers to his head-quarters at Lariſſa, with directions to have all his papers deſtroyed. Had they fallen into the hands of the Romans, the conſequences might have been fatal to his friends, of whom he had ſtill numbers in almoſt every Grecian ſtate.

This victory, important as it was, became yet more conſiderable by the effect which it had on the councils of the Macedonian king, who immediately ſent a deputation to Flamininus, deſiring a

Philip obtains a truce.

[16] See Polyb. L. xvii. c. 25, 26, 27, 28.

truce for the burial of the dead, and begging that the proconsul would again admit him to a conference. Both these requests being complied with, the Roman general found little difficulty in adjusting the preliminaries of peace: Philip, now completely humbled, readily accepting even the most mortifying conditions; and the senate, approving of the plan laid down by Flamininus, he was impowered, jointly with ten commissioners sent from Rome, to grant a peace to Philip on the following terms [17].

admitted to a conference; submits to the conditions offered.

Flamininus grants him a peace; conditions.

"All the Greek cities, both in Asia and in Europe, "to be free, and restored to the enjoyment of their "own laws [18].

"Philip, before the next Isthmian games, to "deliver up to the Romans all the Greeks he had in "any part of his dominions, and to evacuate all the "places he possessed, either in Greece or in Asia [19].

"To give up all prisoners and deserters.

"To surrender all his decked ships of every kind; "five small vessels, and his galley of sixteen banks "of oars, excepted [20].

[17] See Polyb. Legat. ix. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 30.

[18] This article deserves particular notice. From the use to which it was afterwards applied, we shall see with what an insidious policy it was thus worded.

[19] The cities in Asia were expressly mentioned, viz. Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Jassus, Abydus, Thasus, Myrina, and Perinthus; all in Asia, or on the Asiatic coast. In relation to Cius, Flamininus was to inform the Bithynian king, what the pleasure of the senate was. See Polyb Legat ix.

[20] This last, by Livy's own confession, was merely a vessel of parade, and probably left with him on account of its unwieldy and useless bulk. — Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 30.

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"To pay the Romans a thouſand talents; one "half down, the reſt at ten equal annual payments. And, if we are to believe Livy, "not to exceed "five hundred men in his military eſtabliſhment; "not to have an elephant; and not to make war "beyond the confines of Macedon, without permiſ- "ſion from the Roman ſenate." — Theſe three articles, however, Polybius does not mention.

And, as a ſecurity for the performance of theſe ſtipulations, to give hoſtages; his ſon Demetrius being one.

Aetolians oppoſe the peace; but are over-ruled.

The Aetolians, whoſe ſervices in the late battle gave them, they imagined, a right to interfere, warmly oppoſed the peace. But Flamininus, already highly offended at their having appropriated to themſelves too large a proportion of the ſpoils, magiſterially over-ruled their objections. We ſhall ſee, of what miſchiefs this diſpute was afterwards productive.

Philip's conduct blamable.

Philip's conduct, on this occaſion, does little honor either to his abilities or to his ſpirit. Had he, inſtead of expoſing himſelf to a deciſive action, at once abandoned Greece, which, in his preſent ſituation, he could not expect to preſerve; had he retired to the ſtrong-holds of Macedon, and haraſſed the Romans by occaſional excurſions; had he, at the ſame time, ſought new reſources, either among the northern tribes (which he did at laſt, when it was too late) or in the friendſhip of Antiochus, who now began to perceive what *he* was to expect, when the fate of Macedon ſhould be determined; he might eaſily have protracted

the war beyond the term of Flamininus's command; and, if he had not tired out the Romans, might at leaſt have made his advantage, as formerly, of the imbecility or inexperience of the generals ſent againſt him. Even after the fatal blow at Cynoſcephalae, had not all judgment and reſolution forſaken him, this line of conduct might, in ſome meaſure, have been purſued; but, having loſt a battle, which he ought not to have fought, ſubdued by his terrors, he tamely accepted of a peace, which he ought rather to have periſhed than have ſubmitted to.

The ſubtlety of the Roman councils in granting peace to Philip.

It was the policy of the Romans, on this occaſion, artfully to diſguiſe what farther views they had on Macedon; and, as if ſolely actuated by a generous concern for the liberties of Greece, to content themſelves with having reduced the power of Philip, and obliged him to withdraw within the ancient boundaries of his hereditary kingdom. Had they at once attempted to deprive him of his crown, deſpair might have rendered him formidable; the princes of Aſia, from intereſt, if not from affection, might have joined him; and even the Greeks themſelves would probably have had ſuſpicions of a deſign, which delivered them from one danger, only to expoſe them to a greater.

At the ſame time, under the ſpecious character of *avengers of oppreſſed nations*, the Romans had an opportunity of attacking every prince, whom an extent of dominion made conſiderable, until, none remaining to oppoſe them, they might without control complete their plan of univerſal empire.

BOOK VI.

Sect. I.

Flamininus proceeds to the settlement of Greece; proclaims freedom, and the enjoyment of their own laws, to all the states dismembered from Macedon,

Peace being thus concluded with Philip, Flamininus, with the commissioners, proceeded to arrange the affairs of Greece, and the settlement of those cities and countries which had been dismembered from Macedon.

The Isthmian games were now begun, whither all Greece had repaired with anxious solicitude for their future destiny. When [41], at Flamininus's command, a herald with sound of trumpet stepped forth, and proclaimed, "The senate of Rome, and "the general Titus Quinctius, having vanquished "king Philip and the Macedonians, grant freedom, "with immunity from all garrisons and taxes, and "the enjoyment of their own laws, to the Corin-"thians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans "of Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, and "Perrhaebians." Many among this vast multitude had not heard the proclamation distinctly; and even those who did, could scarcely believe it, so much did it exceed their expectations; numbers, therefore, from every side calling on the herald to repeat what he had said, the proclamation was made again; which was answered with the loudest and most joyful acclamations. The games were no longer attended to; and the whole assembly crowded around Flamininus, hailing him their protector and preserver; some striving to embrace him, others heaping on him flowers and garlands; so that, had he not retired within his pavilion, he had fallen a

[41] See Polyb. Legat. ix. p. 1108. & seq. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 32, 33. Plut. in Flaminino.

ſacrifice to this burſt of joyous gratitude. At the celebration of the Nemaean games, which followed ſoon after, and at which Flamininus likewiſe preſided, the ſame proclamation was made.

with various grants to the ſeveral ſtates in confederacy with the Romans.

The ſtates mentioned in this decree were thoſe which had been in ſubjection to Macedon. The other Grecian communities, however, had not been forgotten. Flamininus informed them, what had been reſolved upon in favor of all the faithful allies of Rome. To ſome an increaſe of territory was granted. Others were re-eſtabliſhed in thoſe poſſeſſions, which had been wreſted from them in the courſe of the late wars. The Achaeans had Corinth, Heraea, and Triphylia, reſtored to them. Even Pleuratus, an Illyrian prince, and Amynander king of the Athamanes, who had aided Flamininus, were rewarded with a portion of Illyricum, and certain caſtles, which had lately belonged to Philip. And the Oreſtae, though within the confines of Macedon, were declared free, as a recompence for their early revolt to the Romans.

Acts of favor to the Greeks in general.

To theſe gracious acts were added many others no leſs pleaſing. All the Grecian priſoners of war, in every part of Philip's dominions, returned to their families. The exiles throughout moſt of the ſtates in confederacy with Rome were recalled; Flamininus himſelf employing his good offices to ſuppreſs faction, and to heal the breaches occaſioned by the late civil diſtractions. Roman garriſons ſtill kept poſſeſſion of Chalcis, Demetrias, and the citadel of Corinth; but even theſe he promiſed ſhould be withdrawn, as ſoon as it was known what Antiochus

BOOK VI. Sect. 1.

Excessive joy of Greece;

designed: These conciliating measures, which had also an additional efficacy from Flamininus's affability and courteous deportment, united the greatest part of Greece in the interests of the Romans; even the few individuals, who yet doubted the sincerity of Rome, were cautious, amidst this general exultation and confidence, of uttering their suspicions. So that in their assemblies, and festive meetings, nothing almost was to be heard but effusions of gratitude and praises of the Roman people: "Regardless either of expense or of toil (it was said) they "had thus interested themselves, merely to obtain "liberty to Greece: that, except the battles of "Marathon, of Salamis, of Plataeae, and Thermopylae, with what Cimon had achieved on "the banks of the Eurymedon and near Cyprus, "Greece had fought to no other purpose but to "bring the yoke upon herself, and to raise monu"ments to her own dishonor; but these strangers, "of whose descent from Grecian ancestors only "a faint tradition [a] remained, and from whom "neither friendly interposition nor even compas"sionate regard were to have been expected, had "exposed themselves to the greatest dangers, to "deliver her from oppression."

this joy ill-founded.

In this kind of language, we learn from Polybius,

[a] It was an old tradition, of which Virgil has made great use, that the south-east parts of Italy had been peopled with colonies from Greece, long before the foundation of Rome. And no doubt the first inhabitants, if not the founders, of Rome (See Dion. Halicarn.) were adventurers, and perhaps outcasts from these early establishments.

Sect. I.

Ancient hiſtorians blamable for not ſpeaking of this ſpecious grant according to it's true value.

Livy, and Plutarch, did the Greeks of thoſe days ſpeak of this memorable tranſaction. And, which is more extraordinary, in the ſame ſtyle of panegyric it is mentioned by theſe hiſtorians themſelves. It is certainly a mortifying reflection, that theſe writers have not expreſſed themſelves in another manner; and that they, who lived after the final cloſe of this illuſive proſpect, and who therefore muſt have known, beyond a poſſibility of doubt, for what ends this ſpecious appearance of liberty had been granted [1], had not the ſpirit to tell poſterity, at the concluſion of this pompous recital, "Such was "the fond dream, that credulous Greece indulged! "little did ſhe think, that all this ſhow of favor "was only the prelude to her ruin! and that when "Rome appeared the kindeſt, it was only that ſhe "might ſtrike the more effectually!"—But, ſo juſtly to be dreaded is the fatal influence of deſpotiſm. It checks the pen even of reſpectable hiſtorians [2].

[1] Polybius eſpecially, perſonally experienced the treachery of Rome, and behe'd the liberties of his country expire.

[2] Plutarch, however, has thrown in an obſervation, under which there ſeems to be couched ſomewhat more than he choſe to ſay. "Freedom," he tells us, "was twice proclaimed "to Greece, by Flamininus, and afterwards by Nero; and "by both at Corinth, and at the celebration of the Iſthmian "games: with this difference, that Nero paid Greece the "h'gher compliment; he himſelf announced the DECREE "OF LIBERTY; Flamininus employed a herald." — What account ought to be made of the freedom conferred by Nero is well known. Did the hiſtorian mean that we ſhould draw a parallel?

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Policy of Rome in this grant of freedom to the Grecian tribes.

This tranſaction, however, ſhows in the ſtrongeſt light the conſummate artifice of Rome. She meditated the ſubjection of Greece. But, while Antiochus was warlike and enterpriſing; while Macedon was not yet enſlaved; and humbled Carthage ſtill exiſted; the attempt had been dangerous. Greece, beſides, was weak only from diſunion; and, if once united at home, an effect which ſuch an attempt would probably have produced, they might have proved again formidable. As the Romans, therefore, had with ſo much ſucceſs employed their policy in keeping Macedon disjoined from Hannibal, Antiochus from Philip, and Greece from Macedon; ſo was the ſame policy now to be employed in diſuniting the ſeveral Grecian ſtates, not only from the great powers of Aſia and Europe, but likewiſe from each other. And in no way could this be done ſo effectually, as by the renovation of their ancient laws and government. Each ſtate having it's own laws, each it's peculiar form of government, each a diſtinct and independent ſovereignty, they would all naturally be engaged in the ſame proud pretenſions, the ſame jealouſies and conteſts, which had animated them before; and, by affording to the Roman ſenate opportunities of interfering as arbiters in their differences, or as redreſſers of their wrongs, gradually and imperceptibly reduce Greece to that vaſſalage, which that artful people had in view. Beſides, *liberty* was the darling object of the Grecian ſtates; they had often been led away even by the name; and the reſtoration of their *liberties*, though but in appear-

ance, gave the Romans a wonderful influence, especially over the multitude; who, provided they enjoyed their rights of ſuffrage, the debates of their orators, and the buſtle of their public aſſemblies, imagined themſelves bleſt with all that liberty has moſt valuable.

Murmurs of the Aetolians.

In this general tranſport of joy the Aetolians, however, took no ſhare [44]. Diſcontented, that, in contempt of their repreſentations, a peace ſhould have been granted to Philip; and high in their reſentment againſt Flamininus, who had not treated them, they conceived, as a free people, and a faithful and brave confederate deſerved, they in revenge accuſed the Roman of having ſold the peace to Macedon; they charged him with ingratitude to a people, to whoſe valor he owed the victory, and with aſſuming to himſelf a reputation he did not deſerve. They accuſed him alſo with a want of perſonal courage; "Whilſt I was engaged "with the enemy," it was the common vaunt of every Aetolian, "Flamininus was at his prayers [45];" they even charged the Romans with perfidious deſigns, and the Greeks with folly in believing their profeſſions: "They boaſt of having beſtowed "freedom on Greece, by ſetting at liberty ſome "diſtant and inconſiderable places, whilſt your "principal and moſt important cities, Demetrias, "Chalcis, Corinth, are garriſoned by their troops,

[44] See Polyb. Legat. vi. Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 31. Plutarch in Flaminino.

[45] Plutarch. in parallel. Philop. & Flam.

BOOK VI. Sect. 1.

"they have unfettered the legs, and fixed their "yoke upon the neck." This laſt accuſation, particularly, gave Flamininus much pain, becauſe it was but too well founded. The commiſſioners had in fact propoſed, that the Romans ſhould retain theſe ſtrong holds as pledges of the fidelity of Greece; and it was only in conſequence of the apprehenſions excited throughout the Grecian ſtates, by the murmurings of the Aetolians, that the proconſul at laſt evacuated them. It certainly had been eaſy for Flamininus to have regained the affections of this brave people, whom on the contrary he endeavoured rather to exaſperate, by ſtudied ſlights, and rejecting claims to which they apparently had a juſt right. But the pride of the Roman would not bend to ſuch conciliating meaſures. And perhaps it was more agreeable to the views of Rome, that ſome ſparks of diſaffection ſhould remain, from which, at a convenient ſeaſon, the flame of war might be rekindled.

Flamininus propoſes to make war on Nabis, in order to diſpoſſeſs him of Argos.

The Aetolians had ſoon an opportunity of manifeſting their diſcontent. Nabis [47] ſtill kept poſſeſſion of Argos; and, as ſovereign of Sparta, was alſo maſter of a number of ſea-ports, and particularly of Gythium, a place of great ſtrength on the Cretan ſea, and the moſt conſiderable harbour in the ſouthern part of Peloponneſus. Flamininus thought it dangerous, that ſo conſiderable a ſhare of power ſhould remain in the hands of a tyrant, on whoſe faith he could place no dependence; and was beſides willing

[47] Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 22 & ſeq.

to

to gratify the Achaeans, who had a natural jealouſy of Sparta, by the recovery of Argos, formerly one of their ſocial cities. Having accordingly aſſembled the confederate ſtates at Corinth, he propoſed to attack the tyrant, and diſpoſſeſs him of Argos; obſerving, "that this was a matter which related "immediately to themſelves, and in which he had "no other concern, than as a friend to their liberties "and welfare; but that it became them to conſider, "whether to have ſo ancient a city in ſlavery, in "the heart of Greece, was not of pernicious example, "as well as reproachful to them all; and whether "therefore they ought not to reſtore it to the en-"joyment of rights, which other Grecian ſtates "enjoyed, rather than ſuffer it to remain in bondage "under a tyrant. He cloſed his ſpeech by telling "them, that whatever the majority ſhould decree, "he was ready to execute." The Aetolians with great eagerneſs laid hold of this occaſion to inveigh againſt the Romans, "who manifeſted," ſaid they, "the "ſincerity of their concern for the rights of Greece "by the partial and nominal liberty they had pro-"claimed: that it was abſurd to talk of a new war, "in order to obtain Argos for the Achaeans, whilſt "the Aetolians were deprived of thoſe cities, which "they were to have poſſeſſed by expreſs ſtipulations, "and which the Romans themſelves with-held from "them: that, what the Romans really had in view, "was to perpetuate war in Greece; Nabis was now "the pretence, another would ſoon ariſe, until "that ambitious people had ſo effectually eſtabliſhed

The Aetolians object to it, and charge Flamininus with inſidious views;

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"themſelves, that their diſpoſſeſſion would baffle "the united powers of Greece."

the other Grecian ſtates approve of the attack upon Nabis, and join Flamininus.

Theſe repreſentations, however juſtly founded, were heard impatiently by all the other ſtates: the Aetolians were not beloved; and the attack upon the tyrant was popular. So that, the war being reſolved on by the unanimous ſuffrages of the whole aſſembly, the Aetolians excepted, the armies immediately took the field, and, after a fruitleſs attempt on Argos, advanced, by Flamininus's advice, towards Sparta where Nabis kept his head-quarters, where his moſt valuable poſſeſſions lay, and where, of courſe, whatever impreſſion they made, would have the greater effect.

Nabis reproaches Flamininus with duplicity.

Nabis was aſtoniſhed at ſeeing the Romans turn their arms againſt him. "You Romans," ſaid he, in a conference with the proconſul, "received me "into your alliance; how have I deſerved to forfeit "it? You talk of Argos; but Argos was already "mine, by the voluntary ceſſion of the king of "Macedon, when I entered into an alliance with "you; and my holding it at that time was not "made a ground of objection. Or is it becauſe I "am, as you pretend, a tyrant, and guilty of "lawleſs deeds? But was I leſs a tyrant, or leſs "criminal, at the very time this alliance was "made?"

In caſes of this kind, the ſtrongeſt are always the beſt reaſoners. "The alledged treaty," the Roman unbluſhingly replied, "was altogether null from "the beginning: he was a tyrant, and with "tyrants Rome could not conſtitutionally have

", connexion"." Nabis, the moſt perfidious of men, well deſerved this perfidious anſwer. He had even then, in providing means for his defence, been guilty of new cruelties". He had arreſted eighty of the principal citizens of Sparta, that they might not be expoſed, he ſaid, to ſuſpicion, during the invaſion; promiſing that, as ſoon as peace was reſtored", they ſhould be releaſed; but the enſuing night they were every one murdered. Their eſtates and wives he beſtowed on ſome of the moſt favored profligates, of which his army was compoſed. And, pretending that the Helotae " favored the enemy, he put many thouſands of them to the ſword.

The war againſt Nabis is carried on with vigor.

Meanwhile, Flamininus and his confederates made the moſt vigorous exertion. The Roman fleet, together with the fleets of Pergamus and the Rhodians, had taken or blocked up all the ſea-ports belonging to the tyrant; and even Gythium, though at firſt obſtinately defended, at laſt ſurrendered. By land, the army, after reducing all the places around, had laid ſiege to Sparta. Philopoemen, who commanded the Achaeans, had, in the courſe of theſe operations, diſtinguiſhed himſelf in an extraordinary manner. Beſides the particular intereſt the Achaeans had in the ſucceſs of this war, and his perſonal hatred of Nabis, he was actuated by another powerful conſideration,

" Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 33.

" Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 27.

" The ſlaves employed in tillage, who had their ſettlements throughout the country of Laconia.

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" his deſire of ſhowing the Romans, that the " Greeks were not inferior to them in military " proweſs." It appears, that this brave man could not, without indignation, behold his country dependent on foreign councils; and, equally an enemy to every power that meant to inſlave Greece, was, on all occaſions, as earneſt to vindicate her liberties againſt Rome, as he had been againſt Macedon.

The tyrant, reduced to great ſtraits, offers large conceſſions

Nabis, who had been obliged to retire into Sparta, now offered not only to cede Argos, but alſo to make other large conceſſions; but the confederates declared againſt peace with him on any terms. They inſiſted on the deliverance of Sparta;

the Greek confederates reject his advances.

and that he ſhould be expelled from Peloponneſus, which could never otherwiſe hope for permanent tranquillity. Flamininus, nevertheleſs, under various pretences, oppoſed the continuance of the war;

Flamininus concludes a treaty with him:

and at laſt, when Sparta appeared on the point of being taken, and even Argos, by an inſurrection of its citizens, had been forced out of the tyrant's hands, concluded a treaty with the man to whom, when it ſerved his purpoſe, he had made this haughty reply; *Rome can form no treaty with a tyrant.*

the abſurdity and injuſtice of this meaſure:

What makes this ſtep appear the more extraordinary is, that Ageſipolis [51], confeſſedly lawful

[51] It appears from Polybius (Legat. xlix.) that this unhappy prince was afterwards ſent on an embaſſy to Rome from the Spartan exiles, and, having in his paſſage thither fallen in with pirates, was ſlain by them.

heir to the throne of Sparta, whom the tyrant Lycurgus had expelled, was at this very time in the Roman camp, together with a number of Spartan exiles; who, under the protection of Rome, now expected to be reſtored to their country; and whoſe intereſts were all ſacrificed on this occaſion. The treaty does not even make mention of them, one article excepted, which ſeems rather a cruel mockery, than a clauſe in favor of friends and allies It was ſtipulated, that the wives of the Spartan exiles (the richeſt of whom, however, Nabis had already diſpoſed of among his mercenaries) ſhould had permiſſion to join their huſbands, if they choſe it. The chief of the other articles were, that the tyrant ſhould have no fortified places; that he ſhould ſurrender all his ſhips; and pay a certain ſum to the Romans.

the reaſons alledged by hiſtorians for Flamininus's conduct.

It appears, from the pains taken by ancient hiſtorians to account for this tranſaction, that it expoſed Flamininus to much cenſure. "Nabis," they tell us, "could not have been deſtroyed, "without involving the Spartans in ſevere cala- "mities. To ſpare them, Flamininus was obliged "to ſpare the tyrant.—Lacedemon, beſides, was "in a condition [52] to ſtand a long ſiege; and "Antiochus was preparing to invade Greece: the

[52] Lacedemon, nevertheleſs, was walled only in part, and, juſt before the peace granted to Nabis, had been on the point of being taken by ſtorm, the confederate troops having carried part of the town by aſſault; ſo that the beſieged were under the neceſſity of ſetting fire to a quarter of the city, in order to diſlodge them.

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" conſequences might have been fatal, had he " found Nabis in arms, and effected a junction " with him. — Winter alſo was approaching, and the " army had not the neceſſary proviſions for remain- " ing in the field during that inclement ſeaſon ".[11]"

the artifice uſed to ſilence his Greek confederates;

Theſe arguments Flamininus is ſaid to have advanced in his juſtification. The laſt argument, eſpecially, he employed with great art. The Greek confederates were earneſt for continuing the war; " which it had been better," they ſaid, " not to " have commenced, if the tyrant is not to be " cruſhed." — " I am content ",[12]" replied the Roman; " let us then proſecute the war: but, " we ſhall want a large reinforcement of troops, and " a number of expenſive machines; ſufficient ſtores " muſt alſo be provided, and ample proviſion " made for the ſupport and convenience of the " army, without which it will be impoſſible for " them to ſuſtain the rigors of a winter-ſiege. Write, " therefore, to your reſpective ſtates, and know " what proportion of men, money, and proviſions, " they are willing to furniſh on this occaſion."— He knew what their anſwer would be. Low in their finances at beſt, theſe republicans had alſo been exhauſted by the repeated wars they had been engaged in. It was therefore left entirely to his determination, either to urge or put an end to the war.

his principal motives, probably, for adopting ſuch a meaſure.

Beſides the reaſons here alledged, there were other motives, as we are informed, which he did not chuſe to mention: his fear of being ſupplanted

[11] Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 33. [12] Liv. ibid. c. 34.

by a ſucceſſor; and, what Plutarch [11] thinks made the deepeſt impreſſion on his mind, a jealouſy of Philopoemen. It is certain, that this Grecian commander was generally looked upon as the hero of this war; he was placed on a footing of equality by the moſt zealous of Flamininus's friends; and it mortified the Roman exceedingly, that the exploits of an Arcadian, who had only commanded in ſome inconſiderable diſputes on the confines of his own country, ſhould, in the eſtimation of Greece, be raiſed to an equality with his own achievements. Perhaps he conſidered alſo, that the Spartans, if now relieved from the tyrant's yoke, might not only become again formidable, but be apt to aſcribe their deliverance to the Achaeans and their general; whilſt Achaia, from ſuch a revolution, might probably derive a larger ſhare of power, than it was the intereſt or the intention of Rome ſhe ſhould poſſeſs. In continuing Nabis on the Spartan throne, Flamininus acted, therefore, according to the cuſtomary policy of Rome: he prevented Sparta's riſing from her preſent debaſement, while he left ample matter of anger and conteſt among the ſeveral Peloponneſian ſtates; and thus prepared a plentiful harveſt for Rome's ambitious arms.

Flamininus returns to Rome:

Flamininus returned ſoon after to Rome; and, to the great ſatisfaction of all Greece, withdrew, as he had promiſed, all the Roman garriſons. From this, however, it may be ſuſpected, that

[11] In Flaminino.

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his fears of Antiochus, which he pleaded in excuſe for the peace with Nabis, were not ſo ſtrong as he had pretended: had he really thought that Antiochus was on the point of invading Greece, it can hardly be ſuppoſed, that he would have left the country ungarriſoned.

obtains the freedom of the Romans, ſlaves in Greece.

Before his departure, he made it his requeſt to the ſeveral Grecian ſtates, as the moſt acceptable return he could receive from them, to grant him the freedom of all Roman ſlaves. Theſe priſoners had been taken in the war with Hannibal, and ſold by the Carthaginians: "It were a "reproach to the Greeks," he added, "ſhould "any Roman want liberty in a country that owed "its liberty to Rome"[a]. — A requeſt highly to his honor! and which was chearfully complied with; each ſtate ranſoming, at the public expenſe, whatever Romans were found in ſlavery within their territories. Among the Achaeans only, Livy informs us, twelve hundred were found, whoſe ranſom, at five minae a man[b], amounted to one hundred talents[c].

How many of theſe wretched men muſt there have been in Greece, when in ſo ſmall a part of it were found ſo great a number!

[a] Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 50.
[b] *L.* 16. 2*s.* 11 *d.* [c] *L.* 19, 375.

BOOK VI.

SECTION II.

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THE humiliation of Antiochus was the object Rome had next in view. The magnificence of his court; the intimate connexion he had formed with Egypt, on whoſe young king he had juſt beſtowed his daughter in marriage; the reports

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Antiochus obnoxious to the Romans.

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his reputation.

diſſeminated of his immenſe treaſures, numerous armies, and all the formidable apparatus of war; gave this prince a reputation for power far beyond what he really poſſeſſed. He was, beſides, high in fame for political wiſdom and martial abilities. By his vigorous conduct he had extinguiſhed a dangerous rebellion, fomented by his own miniſters, in the heart of his dominions; and he had reſtored peace to the eaſtern provinces of his empire, which, during the three laſt reigns, had been involved in a ſtate of the utmoſt confuſion. He had alſo at this period viſited the coaſts of the Helleſpont, formerly ſubject to the kings of Syria; he had even paſſed over into Thrace, where he had likewiſe claims; and he was preparing to raiſe from it's ruins Lyſimachia, anciently the royal city of Lyſimachus, in order to make it again the ſeat of government in thoſe countries.

Romans diſſemble with him during the Macedonian war.

Theſe ſpirited exertions of a prince, who ſeemed well able to ſupport his pretenſions to countries which the Romans had already marked as their own, rouſed and ſtimulated their ambitious jealouſy. As long, however, as the fate of Greece and Macedon was doubtful, they had concealed their views, and great care had been taken to keep up a friendly intercourſe with Antiochus. Of this we have a remarkable inſtance from Livy [1]. At the beginning of the ſecond Macedonian war, Attalus, then with the conſul in Greece, complained to the Roman ſenate that Antiochus had

[1] L. xxxii. c. 8.

attacked his frontiers; and applied for ſuccours againſt the invader: it was anſwered, "that Antiochus, as well as Attalus, was the ally of Rome; that the Romans could not employ their arms in favor of one ally againſt another; but that "they would ſend ambaſſadors to Antiochus, to "repreſent that Attalus was engaged in their ſervice, and would eſteem it a kindneſs done to "them, if the Syrian monarch would withdraw "from his territories:" with which requeſt Antiochus accordingly complied.

Different behaviour after Philip's defeat.

Now, however, they ſpoke in a very different tone. No ſooner was peace concluded with Philip, than it was notified to the ambaſſadors of Antiochus[3], who then attended Flamininus, "that, by the treaty "with Macedon, the Grecian cities, in Aſia as "well as Europe, had been declared free[4]; that "Rome expected their maſter would conform to "that declaration;" and farther, "that henceforth "Aſia was to be the boundary of his dominions, "and any attempt to make a ſettlement in Europe would be conſidered by Rome as an act "of hoſtility." The ſame notification was afterwards repeatedly made to him in perſon, by commiſſioners deputed for the purpoſe. In vain was it alledged by the king and his miniſters, "that his reſentment "he had nothing in common with Philip or his "fortunes, and was not therefore intereſted in the "ſtipulations to which he had agreed; that the

[3] Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 34.
[4] See Section the firſt of this book.
[5] See Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 39, 40. & L. xxxv. c. 16.

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"poſſeſſions he held in Aſia and Europe he inherited from his anceſtors; and, as it did not concern him, in what manner the Romans dealt with the cities of Italy, to the liberties of which, though of Grecian origin, Rome paid little regard, his treatment of the Aſiatic cities did not appear to him at all a Roman concern." The requiſition nevertheleſs was peremptorily inſiſted upon. And though he ſent ambaſſadors to remonſtrate with the ſenate, he found it impoſſible to obtain any mitigation of the imperious mandate.

The deep policy of the Roman councils.

We have in this place a freſh opportunity of admiring the profound policy of the Roman councils. A method of injury, more effectual than the preſent, could not have been deviſed againſt Antiochus. The greater part of the cities of the lower Aſia had in ſome ſhape or other availed themſelves of the weak or turbulent reigns of the late Syrian kings: many of them had aſſumed an independent ſovereignty; ſome had extended their territories at the expenſe of the provinces around them; new ſtates had even ſprung up amidſt the confuſion of the times, and riſen to a conſiderable degree of ſtrength and independence. All theſe ſtates were with good reaſon apprehenſive, that Antiochus would ſeize the firſt opportunity of recovering what had been loſt by the fault or misfortune of his anceſtors. But by the public declaration of the Romans in favor of the Grecian coloniſts (to which denomination the inhabitants of theſe cities had a claim) they were not only confirmed in their defection, but became fixed in the intereſts of Rome

In her cauſe, of conſequence, the cauſe of all the Aſiatic Greeks ſeemed neceſſarily to be involved: whilſt Antiochus, in the midſt of his own dominions, ſaw himſelf encompaſſed with jealous ſtates or declared adverſaries.

Alarming apprehenſions of the deſigns of Antiochus propagated over Italy.

Much art had at the ſame time been employed to fill Italy with apprehenſions of mighty danger from Antiochus [s]; "his forces were already col-"lected, and he was to appear immediately on their "coaſts;" while the ſeveral commiſſioners, in their return from Aſia, labored to confirm this belief, by their pompous accounts of his alarming preparations, and by aſſerting that all was in readineſs for the invaſion of the Roman territories. This nevertheleſs was the tale of artifice, and the contrivance of the Roman chiefs, in order to deceive the Plebeians; who, tired of wars, (which, adminiſtering only to the ambition and inſolence of the Patricians, afforded the people nothing but bloodſhed and toil) had ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the laſt expedition into Greece [t]; and it was expected would more ſtrongly reſiſt the launching into the vaſt and ſeemingly boundleſs tracts of Aſia It is, in fact, plain, from the unprovided condition in which the war found Antiochus, that, whatever hoſtile purpoſes he may be ſuppoſed to have meditated againſt Rome, they were not yet ripe for execution. He even ſeems, from the train of negotiation he entered into, and the inſtructions to his

[s] See Liv. L. xxxiii. c. 44. & L. xxxv. c. 23.
[t] See Liv. L. xxxi. c. 6.

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ambaſſadors at Rome, evidently [7] to have wiſhed for peace, and, in order to obtain it, to have been inclined to make large conceſſions; could any thing leſs than the utter humiliation of the crown of Syria have ſatisfied Roman ambition.

Hannibal and the Aetolians incite Antiochus to war;

He ſoon after, however, abandoned all thoughts of accommodation. Hannibal, the ſworn enemy of Rome, upon the firſt tidings of his meditating a war againſt the Romans, made his eſcape from Carthage to the Syrian court, and urged him to arms. The Aetolians [8] alſo earneſtly ſolicited him to come and vindicate the cauſe of Greece, "enthralled," ſaid they, "more then ever, notwithſtanding the ſpecious grant of liberty Rome had mocked her with." Hannibal [9] warmly recommended the invaſion of Italy, where alone, he affirmed, the Romans were vulnerable; and with a body of only eleven thouſand land-forces [10], and a ſuitable naval equipment, he offered to make a deſcent, and to carry the war into the heart of the country; provided Antiochus ſhould appear at the ſame time at the head of a powerful army on the weſtern coaſt of Greece, and make a ſhow of preparing for an invaſion from that quarter; that the Romans, perplexed by a variety of dangers, might find it the more difficult to obſtruct his operations.

their different plans.

Antiochus adopts the plan of the Aetolians.

Notwithſtanding the plauſibility of this idea, a narrow jealouſy [11] prevented Antiochus from adopt-

[7] See Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 58, 59. [8] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 22.
[9] Liv. L. xxxiv. c. 60.
[10] Ten thouſand, ſays Appian (de bello Syr.) p. 147.
[11] Liv. ibid. c. 42, 43.

ing a plan of operations, of which another was to have the direction; and, if ſucceſsful, would inherit the largeſt ſhare of the glory. He choſe rather to liſten to the Aetolians, who told him [11], if Greece was made the ſeat of war, a general inſurrection would immediately take place; that not only Theſſaly and Euboea, but Nabis, the Achaeans, and even Philip himſelf, waited impatiently for an opportunity of declaring againſt the Romans; and that, the inſtant he entered the Grecian frontiers, he ſhould have ample ſupplies of men and money pouring in from every quarter. To theſe aſſurances, Antiochus liſtened with a fond attention; and entertained them, in return, with exaggeratal accounts of the mighty armaments he had in readineſs; his fleets were to cover the Helleſpont, and numerous nations from every part of Aſia were already on their march, before whom the Romans would not dare to appear.

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Promiſes of the Aetolians;

and of Antiochus:

The amount of theſe mutual promiſes and boaſted power was ſoon [11] diſcovered. When Antiochus entered Greece, the utmoſt force he could muſter was ten thouſand foot, five hundred horſe, and ſix elephants; for the ſupport alſo of which, he informed his confederates of Aetolia they were to provide. Of the Grecian ſtates, the Aetolians had influence to bring over to their party none but the Spartan tyrant, the Acarnanians, with the city of Demetrias in Theſſaly; of which they had even acquired poſſeſſion by the treachery of one of it's

ill-ſupported by them both;

[11] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 12. 18. [11] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 43, 44.

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citizens. The Achaeans, at the ſame time, were, from principle, particularly adverſe to any cauſe eſpouſed by Nabis and the Aetolians. And Philip, beſides his dread of the Roman arms, and the conſideration that his ſon Demetrius, with many of his nobles, were then hoſtages at Rome, had ſtrong reaſons to complain of the conduct of Antiochus. Indifferent to Philip's fate, that prince, during the late diſaſtrous war, had not only left him unaſſiſted, but, taking advantage of his ſituation, had afterwards attempted an eſtabliſhment on the Thracian Cherſoneſe, where Philip's pretenſions were at leaſt equally ſtrong, and where he now ſaw with indignation, a rival kingdom riſing on the confines of Macedon.

the Achaeans and Philip refuſe to join them.

Revolution in Sparta;

A ſudden revolution had entirely changed the face of affairs in Sparta [*]. The Spartan tyrant; upon the proſpect of being joined by the Aetolians and Antiochus, had taken up arms, and laid ſiege to Gythium, then held by an Achaean garriſon for the Romans: and he had even defeated, in a naval combat, Philopoemen, then at the head of the commonwealth of Achaia; who, though highly jealous of the influence the Romans had obtained in Greece, gladly laid hold of an opportunity of making war on the infamous Nabis, and immediately haſtened to the aſſiſtance of the Gythian garriſon. Philopoemen was not expert in naval affairs, and, in his precipitate zeal, he had put to ſea with ſuch ſhips as were ready; moſt of them old and unfit

[*] See Liv. L. xxxv. c. 25. 30, 35, 36. & Plut. in Philopoem.

for

for ſervice. Nabis, ſenſible of the advantage, attacked him without delay, deſtroyed his fleet, he himſelf narrowly eſcaping; and, in conſequence of this victory, Gythium ſoon ſurrendered to the Spartans. This diſcomfiture did not, however, diſconcert Philopoemen. He was ſoon in a condition to proſecute the war by land; and having, by his judicious conduct, obtained two victories over the tyrant, obliged him to retire towards Sparta, and to provide for the defence of his capital. Nabis, held in deteſtation at home, could ill maintain himſelf againſt enemies abroad; and the Aetolians, beginning to fear that Sparta muſt, in the end, fall into the hands of the Achaeans, diſpatched Alexamenus with a thouſand men, under color of ſuccouring Nabis, but with ſecret inſtructions to deſtroy the tyrant, as ſoon as an opportunity offered, and to make himſelf maſter of Sparta. The miſconduct of the Aetolian commander rendered the ſcheme abortive. Soon after his arrival, under the pretence of getting Nabis to review the auxiliary troops, he drew him aſide from his guards; and put him to death; but, inſtead of proclaiming himſelf the vindicator of the Spartan people, and engaging their confidence, he employed himſelf and his Aetolians in plundering the city. The citizens, rouſed to indignation and reſiſtance, attacked theſe treacherous invaders, and Alexamenus, with moſt of his men, fell in the tumultuary combat. During the confuſion, Philopoemen appeared before their gates, and invited them to accede to the Achaean confe-

Nabis ſlain.

The Spartans accede to the Achaean league.

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deracy; they accepted his invitation, and were incorporated into the commonwealth of Achaia.

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Vigor of the Romans;

Meanwhile, the Romans haſtened to improve the favorable opportunity, which the unhappy policy of the Syrian king and his Grecian confederates preſented to them. Their object was the ſubjection of Antiochus; and he was delivering himſelf into their hands. A firm union in Greece might have baffled the Roman deſigns; but the Aetolians were again diſtracting that country by their infatuated councils. To take advantage of this ſituation of affairs, the praetor Baebius was diſpatched into Theſſaly; two fleets were ordered to be fitted out, the one for Sicily, the other for Greece; and Quintius Flamininus, from whoſe influence among the Grecian ſtates much was expected, had orders, together with three other commiſſioners, to viſit the principal cities, and prevent their defection from the intereſts of Rome. It was in the courſe of this ſervice, that he made the memorable reply to the ambaſſadors of Antiochus, as recorded by hiſtorians of thoſe times [15]. He met them in the Achaean diet, whither they had come to ſolicit an alliance with their maſter, "who," ſaid they, "zealous for the liberties of Greece, waited not "until his forces were all aſſembled, but would "be followed by numerous armies from every pro-"vince of his empire, the Dahae, the Medes, the "Caddusians, the Elymaeans, from the ſtroke of "whoſe weapons there was no eſcaping." — "This

their fleets and armies diſpatched to Greece.

Embaſſy of Flamininus;

[15] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 48, 49.

" pompous detail," anſwered Flamininus, "reminds me of an entertainment, to which I was once invited by a certain Grecian hoſt; though in ſummer, the table was covered with wild fowl and veniſon of every ſpecies, and all excellent in their kinds; amazed, I inquired how, at that ſeaſon of the year, he could be ſupplied with ſuch a variety of delicacies. Be not ſurpriſed, my friend," replied the honeſt Greek; "what you ſee is all ſwine's fleſh; the art of the cook has given it the various forms and flavors you admire. In like manner are you to judge of the various nations which have now been mentioned. Whatever different appellations the ſkill of the orator has beſtowed on them, they are in fact one people; all abject Syrians, ſtrangers themſelves to liberty, and therefore little capable of vindicating the liberties of others."

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His anſwer to the ambaſſadors of Antiochus.

The Romans, indeed, had little to fear from Antiochus. Unable, from the ſlender force he had brought into the field, to exert himſelf vigorouſly, and depending for the maintenance of his troops on the money and proviſions which the Aetolians could ſupply, his progreſs muſt have been inconſiderable, had he even found no enemy to oppoſe him. The acquiſition of the principal cities of Euboea, and a few towns in Theſſaly, and the gaining over of Amynander, the petty king of the Athamanes, to his intereſt, were all the exploits he had to boaſt of. But, beſides the difficulties which aroſe from his ſituation, his own conduct was, in many reſpects, feeble and ill-judged. His

Imprudent conduct of Antiochus;

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wiſeſt plan had been, a reconciliation with the king of Macedon; and Hannibal earneſtly recommended this meaſure; but, on the contrary, he provoked Philip by new indignities. He ſet up againſt him a pretender to his Crown [16], one of the ſame name, ſaid to be deſcended from the ancient kings of Macedon, whoſe ſiſter was wife to the king of the Athamanes; and, that he might eſtabliſh this adventurer in the affections of the Macedonian people, as well as to inſult Philip, he ſent him to Cynoſcephalae, to inter the bones of thoſe Macedonians [17] who had fallen in the battle; which pious act Philip, in the midſt of his embarraſſments and diſtreſs, had hitherto neglected to perform. But, what was moſt prejudicial to the affairs of Antiochus, was his diſſipation at Chalcis. At his firſt arrival in Greece, he endeavoured to make himſelf maſter of that city, and failed; but, by means of an underſtanding between him and a party of the citizens, he had carried it upon a ſecond attempt. Inſtead, however, of making a proper uſe of this important acquiſition, he abandoned himſelf [18] to the purſuit of a filly amour. Though upwards of fifty, he married a maiden under twenty, the daughter of his hoſt: and, in the feſtivities of this unſeaſonable and ill-ſuited match, he waſted that time which his public affairs demanded; his whole army following his example in unwarrantable and ill-timed indulgences.

his diſſipation at Chalcis;

[16] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 47.

[17] Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 8.

[18] Liv. ibid. c. 11.

Upon the election of new consuls, the care of the war in Greece had been allotted to Manius Acilius Glabrio [19], one of the consuls elect; who, as soon as the necessary levies were completed, passed over from Brundusium, and advanced into Thessaly. Alarmed at the approach of the enemy, Antiochus was roused from his lethargy, and took the field; but the numerous forces, which he had boasted were to follow from Asia, had not yet arrived, and four thousand men were the total amount of the Aetolian succours. His only resource was to stop the progress of the Romans by possessing himself of the streights of Thermopylae, and securing the heights of mount Oeta, over which the Persians had made their way in the days of Leonidas. These precautions availed little. Cato [20], whose name was afterwards rendered illustrious by his spirited discharge of the Censorial office, having been sent over the mountains at the head of a considerable detachment, soon dislodged the Aetolians to whom the defence of that post had been committed; and, while his victorious troops were pouring down from above, the consul having forced the pass below, a general discomfiture involved the whole Syrian army: Antiochus, who was wounded in the mouth by a stone, escaping only with five hundred men into Chalcis; from whence he retired, with precipitation, to his Asiatic dominions [21]. — What consequences his inconsiderate conduct produced afterwards to his affairs, and the

the consul Acilius advances against him.

Battle of Thermopylae.

Antiochus defeated.

[19] Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 14 & seq.

[20] Plut. in Catone.

[21] Olymp. cxlvii. 1. Before Christ 187.

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ruin it entailed on his unhappy kingdom, are matters that belong not to the preſent hiſtory.

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The Romans affect kindneſs to the Achaeans and to Philip.

Antiochus was defeated and had fled. He was now to be followed into Aſia, where his great ſtrength lay, and where, if joined by Greece, he might have proved more formidable than ever. But the firſt uſe which the Romans made of their victory was, to annihilate whatever influence the Syrian monarch was thought ſtill to poſſeſs among the Grecian ſtates, and to confirm thoſe in the intereſts of Rome, who had declared againſt him. They accordingly were laviſh of their favors to Philip and the Achaeans. The latter had, in the courſe of the war, extended their dominions over all Peloponneſus; and the Romans, without expreſſing the leaſt jealouſy of this increaſe of power, left them in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of all they had acquired. Philip, in aſſiſting the Romans, had recovered ſeveral towns on the ſide of Theſſaly and Athamania which he had formerly held, and which he had been obliged to cede upon the concluſion of the late peace; he was ſuffered to retain whatever he had taken; his ambaſſadors, who bore his congratulations to Rome, were treated with diſtinguiſhed regard; his ſon Demetrius, and the reſt of the Macedonian hoſtages, were ſet at liberty; and, ſoon after, that part of the tribute, which remained unpaid, was remitted. Rome ſhowed lenity even to thoſe, whoſe fidelity had been moſt doubtful; the people of Chalcis had their lives and eſtates ſecured to them; and the Epirots and Boeotians, though ſtrongly ſuſpected of a connexion with

Lenity to thoſe ſtates whoſe friendſhip had been doubtful;

Antiochus, and of having ſent him ſupplies, were pardoned upon their ſubmiſſion. The Aetolians[23] themſelves might have had favorable terms, the conſul offering them peace, provided they renounced all alliance with Syria, and delivered up their chief city, Heraclea, into his hands: but, whether apprehenſive that the Romans, when poſſeſſed of Heraclea, would impoſe harder conditions, or prevailed upon by the intrigues of Damocritus, one of their popular leaders, the avowed enemy of Rome, who encouraged them with hopes of immediate ſuccours from Antiochus, they rejected the offer. To the counſels, principally, of this demagogue, was owing their firſt treaty of alliance with the Syrian king. Damocritus was then chief magiſtrate of Aetolia; and ſo violent againſt the Romans[24], that when Flamininus, at that time ambaſſador from Rome to the Aetolian ſtates, demanded of him a copy of the decree in favor of Antiochus, "I have other "matters," replied he, "to attend to at preſent; I "ſhall deliver it to you on the banks of the Tiber."

offer terms to the Aetolians, who reject them.

More vigorous meaſures having thus become neceſſary, the conſul urged the ſiege of Heraclea[25]; which, notwithſtanding its ſtrength of ſituation, and the obſtinate defence of the Aetolians, did not long reſiſt the Roman arms; the garriſon, with Damocritus their turbulent commander, ſurren-

The conſul urges the ſiege of Heraclea; takes it;

[23] Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 22.

[24] Liv. L. xxxv. c. 33.

[25] A city at the foot of the mount Oeta, on the river Aſopus, defended by a caſtle, from its ſituation ſuppoſed to be of great ſtrength.

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dering at diſcretion. Soon after the reduction of Heraclea, Lamia, at a ſmall diſtance, ſurrendered alſo to the Romans; who, following theſe ſucceſſes, prepared to attack Naupactus, a ſea-port on the Corinthian gulph, of the firſt conſequence to the Aetolian nation. Alarmed at this rapid progreſs, and diſappointed of the aids they expected from Aſia, the Aetolians would now gladly have accepted of the peace which they had formerly ſpurned at; but the conſul at firſt refuſed to treat with them; and with much difficulty was at length prevailed on to admit the Aetolian deputies into his preſence. At the head of this deputation [25] was Phaeneas, of whom mention has been already made; he began his diſcourſe, by bewailing the ill-adviſed conduct of the Aetolians, who now, repenting of their imprudence, had decreed *to ſubmit themſelves to the faith of the Roman people.* It would appear, that Phaeneas did not apprehend the full import of the expreſſions he had employed; which, as the conſul choſe to underſtand them, implied a total ſurrender of all Aetolia to the Romans. Acilius laying hold on what he had ſaid, "Is it then true, "that the Aetolians ſubmit themſelves to the faith "of Rome?" Phaeneas confirming it; "if it is ſo," reſumed the conſul, "let no Aetolian, from hence-"forth, on any account, public or private, preſume "to paſs over into Aſia; and let Dicaearchus [26],

prepares to lay ſiege to Naupactus:

the Aetolians make overtures,

the conſul refuſes to treat with them;

at laſt admits their deputies;

takes advantage of their expreſſions;

[25] Polyb. Legat. xiii. Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 28, 29.

[26] One of the Aetolian leaders, who had been active in promoting the treaty with Syria.

"Meneſtratus the Epirot [27], and Amynander, "with all the Athamanes who have had any ſhare "in his revolt, be delivered into my hands."— "The Aetolians," interrupted Phaeneas, "in ſub- "mitting themſelves to the faith of the Romans, "meant to rely upon their generoſity, but not to "yield themſelves up to ſervitude. The requiſi- "tions which you make, neither the honor of "Aetolia, nor the cuſtoms and laws of Greece, "will allow us to comply with."— "It is inſolent "prevarication," anſwered the conſul, "to mention "the honor of Aetolia! and the cuſtoms and laws "of Greece! It even deſerves that I ſhould com- "mand you to be put in chains." He inſtantly ordered chains to be brought forward; but the repreſentations of his chief officers prevented him from violating the ſacred character of ambaſſador; and a truce of ten days was granted, in order that the Aetolian deputies might lay the conſul's demands before the general aſſembly of their nation.

treats them contumeliously.

The report made by the deputies, highly exaſperated the Aetolians, who ſeemed reſolved to ſubmit to every extremity rather than ſurrender their liberties to imperious Rome. What made them more determined, Polybius [28] informs us, was the favorable accounts brought by Nicander, one of their chiefs. He had been diſpatched to Antiochus, and returned in twelve days, with a conſiderable ſupply of money, and the ſtrongeſt

The Aetolians highly exaſperated;

are encouraged in vigorous meaſures by expecta-

[27] Who had entered Naupactus with a body of auxiliaries.

[28] Ubi ſupra.

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tions of ſuccours from Aſia. and from Macedon:

aſſurances, that early in the ſpring all the forces of Syria ſhould be ſent to the aſſiſtance of the Aetolians. He added, that he had alſo had an interview with Philip, having, on his return, as he avoided the Roman camp, fallen in with a party of the Macedonian army. They carried him to their king; who not only ſet him at liberty, but employed him to inform the Aetolians of his friendly diſpoſitions; that; although their imprudence in calling in foreign aid, firſt from Rome, and now from Aſia, had occaſioned the calamitous condition to which Greece was reduced, he nevertheleſs ſhould forget the injuries he had ſuſtained from them, and expected that they, in return, would bury in oblivion the enmity they bore to him.

are deceived.

There is reaſon to ſuſpect the truth of this account of Philip. In his preſent ſituation, he had an opportunity of recovering much of what he had loſt, and was apparently in high favor with the Romans; accordingly, he could hardly have entertained the thoughts here aſcribed to him; or, if he had, would ſcarcely have diſcloſed them to a people with whom he had generally been on terms of hoſtility. Whatever may be in this, Nicander's purpoſe was anſwered. Ready to believe whatever flattered their hopes, the Aetolians determined to bid defiance to Rome, and drew all their forces to the city of Naupactus, which Acilius, with the whole conſular army ſoon after inveſted.

Naupactus preſſed by the Romans;

But, with whatever vigor the Aetolians exerted themſelves, their bad fortune continued: the promiſed ſuccours did not appear; and Naupactus, after a

siege of two months, was reduced to the last extremity. Philip, meanwhile, was availing himself of the war, and, under pretence of fighting the battles of Rome, had possessed himself of Demetrias, and several considerable districts both in Epire and Thessaly. Flamininus, who, since the flight of Antiochus, had taken up his residence at Chalcis, and was perfectly acquainted with the views of the senate in relation to Philip, saw with concern the re-establishment of his power, and hastened to the Roman camp [29], in order to induce the consul to pursue different measures. "Do you know," said he to Acilius, "how prejudicial to the interests "of the republic your conduct is? wasting your "time in humbling the contemptible Aetolians, "whose subjection we can effect when we please, "you are suffering the Macedonian king, Rome's "most dangerous foe, to render himself more "powerful than ever." Acilius was soon convinced by the reasoning of Flamininus; the only difficulty that remained, was to raise the siege without impeachment of the consul's honor; and this difficulty Flamininus undertook to remove. The Aetolians had applied to him for his mediation; under color of which, he advised them to sue to the consul for a truce, that they might send ambassadors to Rome to implore the clemency of the senate. This request he promised to support; and, a suspension of arms having accordingly taken place, Philip was obliged to discontinue his military operations.

Flamininus intercedes in its behalf:

his views:

prevails on the consul to grant a truce.

[29] Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 34, 35.

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The Aetolians ſend ambaſſadors to Rome; treated with ſeverity;

The ſequel of the fortunes of the Aetolians, till their final ſubjection to the Roman power, may, from it's connexion with the preceding narrative, not improperly be recorded here. At Rome their ambaſſadors found little favor. The only conditions [10] they could obtain were, either to pay the republic a thouſand talents, a ſum which, they declared, far exceeded their abilities; and to have neither friend nor foe, but with the approbation of Rome; or, to ſubmit to the pleaſure of the ſenate. They deſired to know, what they were to underſtand by "*ſubmitting to the pleaſure of the ſenate;*" but a particular explanation was refuſed, and an implicit obedience to whatever orders the ſenate ſhould be pleaſed to iſſue was peremptorily inſiſted upon. With this anſwer they returned home; and in this ſtate of terror the Aetolians remained, uncertain of their future deſtiny, until the arrival of Lucius Cornelius Scipio, the newly-elected conſul, to whom the command in Greece and Aſia had been aſſigned. To him they made their application [11], but without ſucceſs, though the Athenians, and even Scipio Africanus, the conſul's brother, interceded in their behalf. The ſevere terms, which the ſenate had decreed, he alſo pronounced; but, as a mighty favor, he granted a ſix months truce, that they might again proſecute their cauſe at Rome. In fact, this truce, whatever the Aetolians were made to believe, was not leſs agreeable to

return uncertain of their fate.

[10] Polyb. Legat. xvi. Liv. L. xxxvii. c. 1.

[11] Polyb. Legat. xvii.

Scipio than to them. He was impatient to have the glory of paſſing into Aſia, ground hitherto untrodden by any Roman general; and, if obſtructed by an Aetolian war, he feared that he might loſe, perhaps, the grand object of his purſuit.

The Aetolian war renewed, upon various pretences.

The day of Magneſia decided the fate of Antiochus; and the Romans were now at leiſure to attend to the reduction of the Aetolians. Theſe people had rendered themſelves more obnoxious than ever. Whilſt the Romans were employed in Aſia, they had driven Philip not only out of ſome of their territories, in which he had eſtabliſhed himſelf; but alſo from others, to which he had a good claim; and had beſides recovered Athamania, and reſtored it to Amynander, to whom legally belonged. The Romans, not ill-pleaſed that the power of Philip ſhould be circumſcribed, confirmed the kingdom of Athamania to Amynander; but at the ſame time declared their reſentment at the Aetolians, whom they required to evacuate their conqueſts. What at the ſame time greatly hurt their cauſe, was the ſtrange conduct of the ambaſſadors they had ſent to Rome [11]. They had circulated a report, that the Roman armies in Aſia were defeated, and the two Scipios taken priſoners; and this piece of intelligence they urged as an argument to induce the Romans to grant the peace they applied for. The Roman indignation was provoked at this inſult; the ambaſſadors were ordered immediately to leave the city, with inſtructions to the

[11] Liv. L. xxxvii. c. 48, 49.

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Aetolians never to preſume again to ſend plenipotentiaries to Rome, without the expreſs permiſſion of the Roman commander in Greece.

The conſul Fulvius lays ſiege to Ambracia,

After the election of new conſuls, the Aetolian war was allotted to Marcus Fulvius Nobilior [11]: who immediately prepared for the expedition; and began his operations with the ſiege of Ambracia [12]. Every thing that ingenuity could deviſe, or valor achieve, was employed for the defence of this important place. But, deterred by no difficulties, the Romans perſevered; when, far inferior to them, both in reſources and numbers, the Ambraciots found themſelves at laſt obliged to capitulate. The payment of five hundred Euboic talents was ſtipulated; two hundred down, the remaining three in ſix equal payments; and they were to deliver up to the conſul, all the priſoners and deſerters then in Ambracia [13]; on which terms the Aetolian garriſon

which capitulates

[11] Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 4 & ſeq.

[12] A ſtrong city near the mouth of the Aracthus, on the borders of Epirus and Acarnania, formerly belonging to Epirus, but now held by the Aetolians, and the key to the Aetolian dominions.

[13] It appears, nevertheleſs, (Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 43, 44) that Fulvius's proceedings againſt the Ambraciots, were afterwards diſapproved of at Rome; whether upon a principle of juſtice, or, as Livy thinks, by the contrivance of the conſul Aemilius and his party, to whom Fulvius was obnoxious, it is now difficult to determine. However, it was decreed by the ſenate, "that the Ambraciots ſhould "not be conſidered as a conquered people — that they "ſhould have their laws and liberties reſtored to them, "and enjoy again all tolls and cuſtoms formerly enjoyed

was permitted to march out unmoleſted. Amynander was of great ſervice to the Romans on this occaſion; he was again their faithful ally; and, to make amends for his late defection, had employed all his influence to bring about the capitulation.

The Aetolians apply for mercy; and ſubmit.

Alarmed at the progreſs of the Roman arms, the whole Aetolian nation [16] applied to the conſul for mercy. The requiſitions he made were nevertheleſs ſo humiliating, that the commiſſioners ſent to treat with him, not thinking themſelves authorized to agree to ſuch hard conditions, returned for more full and explicit inſtructions. But a general deſpondency had now ſeized the Aetolians, and the commiſſioners were hurried back with orders to ſign whatever terms were dictated by the imperious conqueror. The moſt remarkable of theſe [17] were, "That *obſervance* ſhall be paid to the *empire* and "*majeſty* of the Roman people" (ſuch is the inſolence of victory) "throughout all Aetolia" — "that the "friends and enemies of Rome ſhall be the friends "and enemies of Aetolia" — "that the Aetolians "ſhall immediately pay down to the conſul two "hundred Euboic talents of ſilver, of the ſame

"by them; the Romans only, with their Latin allies, not "to be ſubject to the payment of any ſuch tolls, &c."— and "that as to the paintings and other ornaments, of "which their temples had been plundered, and which "Fulvius had ſent away to Italy, it ſhould be referred "to the college of the prieſts to decide about them." — What *their* deciſion was, may eaſily be conjectured.

[16] Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 8, 9.

[17] Polyb. Legat. xxviii. Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 10, 11.

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" fineneſs as the Attic ſtandard, with permiſſion to " pay the third part in gold, a minae of gold to be " accounted equal to ten minae of ſilver; to pay, " beſides, a tribute of fifty talents yearly for ſix " years, which was to be ſent to Rome at their " own riſque and charges — that all cities and coun- " tries, with their reſpective inhabitants, which " have formerly been ſubject to the Aetolians, and " have, ſince the time of Flamininus's conſulſhip, " either by conqueſt or voluntary ſurrender become " ſubject to Rome, ſhall from henceforth be deemed " the property of the Roman people; and the " Aetolians ſhall relinquiſh all claim to them " — " that they ſhall deliver into the hands of the conſul, " forty hoſtages, to be choſen by him, none under " twelve or above forty years of age; the chief " magiſtrate of Aetolia, the general of the horſe, " and the ſecretary of ſtate, to be excepted out of the " number; and, in caſe of the death of any hoſtage, " another to be given in his room. "

The Roman ſenate, with difficulty, prevailed on to ratify the peace;

Even theſe conditions, when laid before them for approbation, the Roman ſenate refuſed at firſt to confirm; a ratification being at length with difficulty obtained, by the interceſſion of ſeveral Roman patricians, and of the Rhodian and Athenian ambaſſadors. Damis [11], the Athenian, more particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf on this occaſion: " Whatever the Aetolians have been guilty of, is not, " ſaid he, " to be laid to the charge of the body of the " Aetolian people. In all ſtates, the multitude are

[11] Livy calls him Leon.

like

" like the ſea: the ſea, in its natural ſituation, is " ſmooth and compoſed, and not dangerous to the " navigator; but, when ruffled and agitated by " ſtorms, it becomes raging and tremendous. Thus " the Aetolians, when left to themſelves, were of " all the Greeks the beſt affected to the intereſts of " Rome, and ready to aſſiſt in all her enterpriſes; " but when a Thoas and a Dicaearchus from Aſia, " and a Meneſtas and a Damocritus from Europe, " began to excite a ferment, and to throw the " multitude into commotion, then boiſterous coun- " cils and mad reſolves naturally followed. Againſt " the authors of theſe miſchiefs pronounce, there- " fore, as you ſhall pleaſe, but let the multitude " experience your clemency."

Nevertheleſs, all the *clemency* obtained, was a confirmation of the conſul's terms, without the leaſt mitigation.

perform it at laſt, without any mitigation of terms.

This treatment of a people who were the firſt that opened Greece to the Romans, harſh as it may appear, was exceedingly merciful when compared with what followed, when the final overthrow of the royal houſe of Macedon left Rome at liberty to avow the genius of her empire. That tranſaction ſhall have its place hereafter.

The moſt important buſineſs the Romans had now in contemplation in Greece, was to reduce, within narrower limits, the power of the Macedonian king, and the republic of Achaia which had acquired a formidable increaſe of territory during the late Syrian and Aetolian wars. The Achaeans, as we have already obſerved, were maſters at preſent of all

The Romans jealous of Achaia and Macedon.

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Peloponnesus; and Philip had not only recovered most of those provinces of which his wars with Rome had deprived him, but had also made other considerable acquisitions [19]. The designs upon these allies was a matter to be managed with the greatest delicacy. Both states had been firm in the interests of Rome, and several of the Roman commanders had spoken highly of the support they had received from them. To repay their services with distrust and acts of hostility, because they were no longer necessary, had been to avow the very purposes which Rome was industrious to conceal. The political form of government which prevailed throughout Greece, afforded to the Romans the wished-for opportunity. Though confederated with Achaia, the Peloponnesian cities retained each of them peculiar privileges, and a kind of independent sovereignty, which naturally gave rise to many jealousies and contests. In like manner, Philip had but a limited authority in most of the Grecian states over which he had established his dominion; his title to some of them was controverted, and much was to be done before the rights of the numerous claimants could be adjusted The Romans saw what advantages were to be derived from these particular circumstances, and took their measures accordingly.

Artifice used in reducing the power of Achaia.

They began with Achaia. Fulvius, when peace was concluded with Aetolia, had adjudged the island Cephalenia to Rome, and fixed his residence there, to be at hand to decide whatever disputes

[19] See Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 33, 34.

ſhould ariſe between the Grecian cities; that iſland being divided from the coaſt of Peloponneſus by an arm of the ſea only twenty-four miles over, from whence an eaſy paſſage lay open into that country. Upon the firſt diſpute, therefore, in Achaia, he paſſed over [**] into Peloponneſus. The general convention of the Achaean ſtates had, from ancient time, been held at Aegium; but Philopoemen, now chief magiſtrate of Achaia, having thought fit to divide among all the cities of the Achaean league, the advantages which thoſe aſſemblies brought to the place where they were held, had named Argos for the next ſucceeding diet. This innovation the inhabitants of Aegium oppoſed, and applied to the Roman conſul for his determination. The conſul, it appears, behaved on this occaſion in the moſt cautious manner. He favored, as Livy tells us, the cauſe of the Aegienſes: but finding a great majority to be againſt them, he concealed his private ſentiments, and made no oppoſition to the appointment of Philopoemen. He had gained, however, the main point he had in view; an appeal had been made to him, and the judicial authority of Rome over the Peloponneſian ſtates was thus virtually acknowledged.

Caſe of the Lacedemonian exiles;

A cauſe of much greater moment ſoon preſented itſelf. The Lacedemonian exiles, who had been expelled in the days of the tyrants, and who on account of the domeſtic feuds ſtill prevailing in Lacedemon, had never been reſtored, reſided in

[**] Liv. L. xxxviii. c. 30 & ſeq.

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certain towns along the coaſt of Laconia, under the protection of Achaean garriſons. The inhabitants of Lacedemon, thus cut off from all intercourſe with the ſea-coaſt, bore the reſtraint impatiently; and to free themſelves from it, attacked, in the night-time, one of the maritime towns called Las, but were repulſed by the exiles with the aſſiſtance of the Achaean ſoldiery. Philopoemen, who was ſtill at the head of the Achaean commonwealth, having convened an aſſembly, repreſented this attempt upon Las as an inſult to the whole Achaean body, and obtained a decree, commanding the Lacedemonians to deliver up the authors of that outrage, on pain of being treated as enemies. Proper officers were ſent to Lacedemon, to notify the decree. But this ſtep ſerved only to exaſperate the Lacedemonians. They immediately put thirty citizens to death, who were known to be in the Achaean intereſt, diſſolved their alliance with Achaia, and ſent ambaſſadors to Fulvius, entreating him to come and take poſſeſſion of their city. To revenge this inſult, Philopoemen declared war againſt Lacedemon, and though the ſeaſon was far advanced, entered the Lacedemonian territory, ſpreading devaſtation wherever he came.

Inſulted by the Lacedemonians.

Philopoemen eſpouſes their cauſe,

and obtains a decree in their favor

Lacedemonians refuſe to obey the decree;

offer their city to the Romans.

Philopoemen enters Laconia, and lays it waſte.

On the return of ſpring, both ſides ſtill remaining exceedingly exaſperated, Fulvius croſſed over into Peloponneſus, and demanded that an aſſembly ſhould be convened at Elis, in order to diſcuſs the pretenſions of Achaia over Lacedemon. After hearing both parties, unable, or perhaps unwilling, to bring the perplexed claims to a final deciſion, he

adviſed them to ſend ambaſſadors to Rome, and while the cauſe was depending, to ſuſpend hoſtilities. They complied; the Achaeans ſending as their deputies, Lycortas the father of Polybius, who, as a ſpirited aſſerter of the liberties of Achaia, was ſtrenuous in the ſupport of Philopoemen's meaſures, and Diophanes, a man in appearance of moderate counſels, but in fact devoted to the intereſts of Rome. Diophanes, accordingly, in his application to the ſenate, referred the deciſion of the cauſe wholly to their arbitration; whilſt Lycortas, on the contrary, maintained the decree of Philopoemen, which, he aſſerted, could not be reverſed without making void the regulations of Flamininus, who had committed to Achaia the protection of the ſea-coaſt. The ſubtle Romans, however, ſecretly pleaſed to ſee the confederates of Achaia in arms againſt her, framed their anſwer in ſuch ambiguous terms as left the matter juſt as they found it; the Lacedemonians inſiſting, that the determination was in their favor; while the contrary was as ſtrenuouſly aſſerted by the Achaeans. The conſequence was, that Philopoemen, who had been re-elected chief magiſtrate, marched to Lacedemon, and demanded by name the authors of the attempt upon Las; promiſing at the ſame time that they ſhould not be condemned unheard. Truſting to this promiſe, theſe men ſet out for the Achaean camp, attended by the chief citizens of Lacedemon, who conſidered their cauſe as a national concern. But as they entered the camp, they were inſulted with reproaches by the exiles, who having engaged

Both parties ſend ambaſſadors to Rome;

the inſidious anſwer received.

Philopoemen marches to Lacedemon;

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the Achaean ſoldiers in their quarrel, ſuddenly attacked them with ſuch fury, that ſeventeen were killed upon the ſpot: the remainder, ſixty-three in number, were reſcued with difficulty by Philopoemen, not in order to ſave them, but that it might not be ſaid, they had been put to death without trial. Next morning being accordingly produced before the multitude, they were condemned, and executed, being hardly allowed the ſemblance of a defence. This ſevere proceeding ſtruck the Lacedemonians with ſuch a panic, that they ſurrendered at diſcretion; and Philopoemen, reſolving to humble them effectually, treated them as if their city had been taken by ſtorm. He commanded them, "to demoliſh their walls, to diſband their mercenaries, to expel the ſlaves whom the tyrants had enfranchiſed, to reſtore the exiles, and to renounce the laws of Lycurgus; the laws of Achaia being to be conſidered from that time as the laws by which Lacedemon was to be governed [41]."

his cruel treatment of the Lacedemonians.

Philopoemen's conduct on this occaſion (ſuch are the fatal violences into which the ſpirit of dominion, ſucceſs, and revenge, are apt to betray us!) was certainly cruel; and in regard to thoſe whom he had abandoned to the fury of the exiles, highly perfidious. The Romans, however, ſhowed nothing of that vigor in behalf of this oppreſſed people, which they had often diſplayed in more trifling matters. Though a ſolemn appeal had been made by the Lacedemonians to Rome, the Roman

The conduct of the Romans on this occaſion;

[41] See Plut. in Philopoemen.

conſul, Lepidus, contented himſelf with coolly informing the Achaeans, that the ſenate did not approve of theſe ſevere proceedings. And Nicodemus of Elis, having been deputed from the Achaean diet to juſtify what had been done, received for anſwer, "that Rome was not pleaſed with the "ſubverſion of the Spartan government, but did "not annul what the Achaeans had decreed [41]."

The infant ſtate of the Rome empire in Aſia, and the attention required in marking the deſigns and controlling the power of thoſe ſtates that bordered on the dominions lately belonging to Antiochus, produced this temporizing policy. Macedon, beſides, was again growing formidable; and the Romans were cautious of provoking Achaia, who, had ſhe at this period boldly declared againſt Rome, had probably united in her cauſe not only the greater part of Greece, but many of the neighbouring potentates. Such, at this time was the reputation of the Achaean republic, that her friendſhip was courted "by the kings of Pergamus and Egypt. And ſoon after, Seleucus, having ſucceeded to the throne of Syria upon the death of his father Antiochus, ſent ambaſſadors to the Achaean ſtates, to ſolicit their alliance. Eumenes even propoſed a ſubſidy of a hundred and twenty talents, towards the eſtabliſhment of a fund for the ſupport of the members of the general aſſembly. Ptolemy preſented them with ſix thouſand ſhields and two hundred talents; and Seleucus

and why.

The Republic of Achaia high in reputation at this period; her friendſhip courted by the kings of Pergamus, Egypt, and Syria.

[41] Polyb. Legat. xxxvii. 41.

[41] Polyb. Legat. 41.

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offered them ten ſhips of war completely equipped. The preſent from Ptolemy was the only one accepted; to Eumenes particularly they returned an anſwer worthy of a free republic, "that they "were rather to deem him an enemy, ſince he "ſought to corrupt the members of that venerable "aſſembly; which he would not have attempted, "had he not entertained views unfriendly to the "liberties of Achaia."

The Romans deal craftily with the Achaeans.

Though Rome in the preſent ſituation of her affairs found it neceſſary to diſſemble, ſhe was not inattentive to the councils of ſtate, whoſe riſing importance ſhe beheld with a jealous eye. Caecilius, who, with two other commiſſioners, had been ſent to viſit Macedon, had orders in his return to paſs through Achaia, and to employ himſelf in ſupporting the cauſe of Sparta, as the moſt effectual means of diminiſhing the conſequence of the Achaean confederacy. At the ſame time Rome had taken care to gain over a party among the Achaeans themſelves, to oppoſe Philopoemen, and ſupplant him if an opportunity offered. Among theſe was Diophanes already mentioned, and Ariſtaenus, now firſt magiſtrate of the Achaean ſtates, who diſplayed a ſtriking ſpecimen of his intriguing genius, in rendering abortive the purpoſed alliance with Ptolemy. We have an account of this tranſaction from Polybius [*]. It had been carried in the general aſſembly, "that the treaty of alliance "with the Egyptian king ſhould be renewed." To

[*] Ubi ſup.

elude therefore the force of a reſolution which interfered with the purpoſes of Rome, Ariſtaenus produced a number of treaties made at different periods between the Achaeans and Egypt, and deſired to be informed to which of theſe the reſolution referred; and thus, by perplexing the queſtion, contrived that nothing ſhould be done.

Caecilius pleads the cauſe of Lacedemon:

Caecilius ſhowed conſiderable ability in the execution of his commiſſion. Having obtained an audience of the council, he complained of the treatment the Lacedemonians had received, but rather in the language of expoſtulation; tempering his cenſures with high encomiums on the wiſdom of their government, and their zeal for the proſperity of their country. Ariſtaenus, general of the year, with whom probably the whole matter had been previouſly concerted, made no reply, as if he acknowledged by his ſilence, that the conduct of Achaia towards the Lacedemonians did not admit of a juſtification. Diophanes, however, went farther. He made a formal charge againſt Philopoemen; imputing to him not only the ruin of Lacedemon, but the violent meaſures alſo which Achaia had lately adopted, particularly the unjuſt and ſevere treatment of the Meſſenian exiles, who had not been reſtored, as Flamininus had ordained; and this oppreſſion of the Meſſenians, he repreſented as the crime of Philopoemen alone.

is diſappointed;

Philopoemen did not want ſpirit to defend himſelf; and he was ſo effectually ſupported by Lycortas and other Achaean chiefs, that notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the Roman party, it

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demands the national diet to be convened; is refuſed.

was reſolved, "that nothing ſhould be altered in "the decrees, which the Achaean ſtates had en- "acted;" and "that this anſwer ſhould be given "to Caecilius." Highly exaſperated, he then deſired, that the national diet ſhould be convened. But to this it was replied, that by the laws of Achaia he muſt produce a letter from the ſenate of Rome authorizing his requeſt: and as he had no ſuch document, he was obliged to return home, with the mortification that always attends defeated projects; and with the additional regret of being baffled by men he held in contempt.

Ambaſſadors ſent to Rome from Achaia and from Lacedemon.

The Achaeans nevertheleſs thought it neceſſary, that their ambaſſadors[65] ſhould immediately follow him to Rome, and lay before the ſenate, their reaſons for not complying with his requiſition. They had hardly arrived, when ambaſſadors from Sparta alſo appeared. What was yet more ſurpriſing, the perſons employed in this embaſſy were Areus and Alcibiades, two of thoſe very exiles lately reſtored to their country by means of Philopoemen, an action now imputed to him as a crime. Theſe ungrateful men, either to ingratiate themſelves with their fellow-citizens, or ſtimulated by Rome, had undertaken to plead the cauſe of Sparta. They made accordingly a moſt affecting repreſentation of the condition to which Lacedemon, once the pride of Greece, was now reduced; her walls laid in ruins, her citizens led into ſlavery, and the ſacred laws of Lycurgus aboliſhed; and concluded

[65] Polyb. Legat. xlii.

by praying the Romans to extend their protection to this afflicted people, and to relieve them from deſpotiſm and oppreſſion.

Commiſſioners appointed by the Roman ſenate, to decide between Achaia and Sparta.

A ſuit ſo congenial with the deſigns of Rome, eaſily found attention and favor. It was decreed, that three commiſſioners ſhould be ſent to the Achaean diet, in order to determine upon the ſpot, all matters in diſpute between Achaia and the Spartans: and that the Achaeans ſhould be required to convene their general aſſembly whenever the demand was made by a Roman ambaſſador; as the ſenate, on their part, admitted the Achaeans to an audience as often as they deſired it [46].

Indignation, and angry reſolutions of the general aſſembly of Achaia.

When the Achaeans received an account of theſe proceedings, they could not ſuppreſs their indignation. The general aſſembly was inſtantly called together; in which it was reſolved, "that the "Spartans, by their appeal to Rome, had depart- "ed from their plighted allegiance to the Achaean "ſtates; that Areus and Alcibiades were therefore "in rebellion againſt their rightful lords, and "ſhould be adjudged to death."

Theſe reſolutions, the paſſionate ebullitions of an impetuous multitude, were as vain as they were intemperate. Areus and Alcibiades, protected by Rome, were beyond their reach, bidding defiance to a power from which, in other circumſtances, they had every thing to fear.

The commiſſioners arrive.

Scarcely was the decree enacted, when the Roman commiſſioners [47], at the head of whom was

[46] Polyb. Legat. xlii.

[47] Polyb. Legat. xliii. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 35, 36, 37.

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Appius Claudius, arrived at Cleitor in Arcadia, where the Achaean ſtates had been convened; and, what was moſt mortifying to thoſe people, Areus and Alcibiades accompanied them. The gloomy apprehenſions to which this circumſtance gave riſe, were fully juſtified by the ſequel. The commiſſioners entered the diet, not as miniſters deputed to deliberate with a free ſtate, but rather as judges, inveſted with full authority to paſs ſentence, and to puniſh. "You have incurred," ſaid Appius, "the diſpleaſure of the Roman ſenate, by your "meaſures: you have perfidiouſly murdered thoſe "Spartans who, on the faith of Philopnemen, had "delivered themſelves into your hands: and, as "if this were unimportant, you afterwards demo-"liſhed the walls of that ancient city Lacedemon; "you deprived her of her laws, and you deprived "her of that diſcipline eſtabliſhed by Lycurgus, "which for many ages had been her ſtrength and "her glory."

open their charge with great haughtineſs.

But neither the haughty port theſe Roman commiſſioners aſſumed, nor the imperious language which they held, could ſubdue the ſpirit of Lycortas. He was the friend of Philopoemen, coadjutor in all his councils, and at this time firſt magiſtrate of Achaia. From his reply, (which Livy [a], ſurely a competent witneſs, has preſerved to us) the pretenſions of Rome, as well as their foundation, may be eaſily perceived. "The ſupport which the Achaeans had afforded to the Spartan

Spirited anſwer of Lycortas.

[a] Ubi ſup.

exiles," he told Appius, "was in conſequence of the alliance Achaia had entered into with Rome; Rome had conſigned them to her protection, and, the more effectually to protect them, the Achaeans had taken up arms againſt the inhabitants of Lacedemon: that, with regard to the ſlaughter of the Lacedemonians who had ſurrendered, the Achaeans were guiltleſs; it was the act of thoſe very exiles, whoſe cauſe the Romans were now patronizing, Areus and Alcibiades being bound to anſwer for that violence, if ſuch it was to be called. In regard to the demolition of the walls of Lacedemon, which the Achaeans acknowledged to be their act, the Spartans, far from complaining on that account, rather owed them thanks; thoſe walls were indeed the diſgrace of Sparta, monuments of her ſervitude, raiſed in expreſs violation of the inſtitutions of Lycurgus, by the tyrants who had ruled over her, and which that lawgiver, were he to reviſit the earth, would rejoice to ſee in ruins. That the laws of Lycurgus, of which Achaia was ſaid to have deprived her, had, by the management of thoſe tyrants, long ſince ceaſed to exiſt in force, or even to be known in Sparta: the Achaeans finding therefore the bands of government diſſolved, and her polity in ruin, had admitted her to a participation of the laws and privileges enjoyed by the whole Achaean body." — "It is, however," continued he, "juſt "matter of ſurpriſe to the Achaeans, that they, a "free and independent ſtate, and in alliance with "Rome, ſhould thus be called upon to account

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" for their actions, as if they were not the confe-
" derates but the ſlaves of Rome. If the voice
" of the herald that proclaimed liberty to Greece,
" meant any thing; if the league that ſubſiſts be-
" tween us, is not an illuſion; and if the rights
" of friendſhip and alliance are to be held mutually
" ſacred; why may not we as well ſcrutinize your
" proceedings in Italy, as you decide upon our
" tranſactions in Greece? Admit, then, that we
" have ſacrificed ſome Lacedemonians to our reſent-
" ment, has your treatment of Capua's ſenators
" been leſs ſevere? or ſay, that we have levelled
" the walls of Lacedemon, has not Capua not
" only beheld her walls in ruins, but her territo-
" ries, her ſole means of ſubſiſtence, ſwallowed
" up by Roman rapacity? We ſhall, perhaps, be
" told, that what freedom remains to us is only
" in name, and that, in reality, we are the ſlaves
" of Rome: I know it well, Appius; and if I
" muſt ſuppreſs my indignation at the thought,
" I will. Let me, nevertheleſs, conjure you,
" however great the diſtance is between the Ro-
" mans and the Achaeans, not to ſhow a more
" jealous ſolicitude for the privileges of our com-
" mon enemies than for thoſe of your own allies.
" To bring the Lacedemonians to a level with
" ourſelves, we wiſhed them to be governed by
" the ſame laws: they want more; though van-
" quiſhed, they refuſe to ſubmit to regulations with
" which the victors themſelves are ſatisfied; and
" they require us to infringe compacts, which we
" have ſworn not to violate: No, Romans; we

" honor you, and, if you will ſo have it, we " fear you; but we honor more, we fear more, " the immortal Gods!"

Appius avoided entering into the diſcuſſion of arguments, which probably he could not anſwer; he contented himſelf with this haughty reply: " A " voluntary compliance is more eligible than that " which is extorted by force." At theſe words, a deep groan, the voice of an injured and an oppreſſed people, was heard to iſſue from every part of the aſſembly. But they felt the inequality of the conteſt, and that all reſiſtance would be vain. The following humiliating requeſt to the commiſſioners was therefore the ſole reſult of their deliberations: " that the Romans themſelves would reſcind what- " ever part of the decrees of the Achaean diet they " wiſhed to have reſcinded, and not require a free " people to annul what they had ſworn to obſerve." This apparent ſubmiſſion ſeems to have ſoftened Appius; he only reverſed the decree pronounced againſt Areus and Alcibiades; and referred them, reſpecting all other matters, to the pleaſure of the ſenate. It appears as if the ſenate themſelves thought it dangerous, in the preſent ſituation of their affairs, to exaſperate the Achaeans farther. They ſeem to have done little more than copy the deciſion of their commiſſioners, by decreeing, that thoſe who had been condemned by the Acheans ſhould be reſtored, and all ſentences repealed that had been pronounced in the aſſembly of Achaia, againſt Lacedemon. They only added, by way of ſoftening theſe ſtern injunctions, " that for the future,

Reply of the commiſſioner Appius.

The expedient which the Achaeans wiſely employed;

its effect.

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the Lacedemonians ſhould be deemed members of the Achaean league, and be ſubject to its regulations [59].

Some other device was now to be employed; of which Rome, however, might ſeem innocent, and which at the ſame time might ſtill more effectually humble the importance of theſe high-ſpirited republicans. The Meſſenians formed a conſiderable part of the Achaean body: a plan was formed to detach them from the league; and the execution was committed to Dinocrates, a Meſſenian leader, buſtling and bold, in the confidence of Flamininus, a foe of courſe to Philopoemen, and ready to engage in any hoſtile enterpriſe againſt the Achaean generals. Philopoemen [60], now for the eighth time chief magiſtrate of Achaia, no ſooner had advice of the movements of the Meſſenians, than, though ill of a fever, he mounted his horſe, and being joined by Lycortas, with ſome Megalopolitan cavalry, advanced to Carone, a fortreſs belonging to the Meſſenians; but finding the enemy already in poſſeſſion of it, he marched towards Meſſene, their capital, with the view of taking it by ſurpriſe. On his march he was met by Dinocrates, at the head of a ſmall detachment, whom he charged, and defeated; when, unexpectedly, a body of five hundred horſe came up to the aſſiſtance of the Meſſenians, who attacking the Achaeans in their turn, forced them to give way. Philopoemen excelled in this branch of the military art; he commanded his

The Meſſenians revolt:

Philopoemen marches againſt them;

[59] Liv. L. xxxix. c. 48.

[60] Ibid. c. 49, 50. Plutarch in Philopoem.

men

men to retreat through defiles and hollow grounds, where the enemy muſt purſue with diſadvantage, he himſelf covering the rear, and repeatedly facing about to repel the attacks of the purſuers. At length his horſe, entangled in rocky ground, ſtumbled and fell; and the venerable Philopoemen, now in his ſeventieth year, weak, at the ſame time, from his late illneſs, and exhauſted by the fatigue of the day, unable by exertion to overcome the ſhock, remained ſtunned and ſenſeleſs on the ground. He was immediately ſurrounded by Dinocrates and his Meſſenians, who, proud of their captive, the champion of Achaia, entered the city in triumph. The ſight, nevertheleſs, excited the compaſſion of the multitude; they remembered Philopoemen's great exploits, and what Meſſenia in particular, when oppreſſed by the Spartan tyrant, owed to his gallantry. Thus, inſtead of an *enemy*, they beheld in him the *deliverer* of their country. Dinocrates and his faction, whoſe purpoſe it was to break the ſtrength of the Achaeans by depriving them of their gallant general, beginning to dread the reſult of theſe workings of compaſſion, next morning commanded the executioner to deſcend into the ſubterraneous vault where Philopoemen was impriſoned, and put him to death. When the brave Achaean ſaw him enter with the fatal bowl in his hand, raiſing himſelf up, though with difficulty, "Canſt "thou," ſaid he, "inform me of the fate of Lycortas, "and the young men with him?" the executioner anſwering, they were ſafe; "then," replied Philopoemen, taking the bowl with a chearful counte-

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He falls into their hands.

His magnanimity.

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nance, "we are not altogether wretched;" and having drank the deadly draught, ſoon after expired.

and death.

When the Achaeans were informed of this baſe tranſaction, they were fired with indignation.

The Achaeans complain to Rome,

Lycortas, now appointed chief magiſtrate in the place of Philopoemen, immediately ſent a formal complaint to Rome againſt the Meſſenians, and at the ſame time demanded that aſſiſtance which the Romans, by treaty, were bound to furniſh. The

and are anſwered with perfidiouneſs.

anſwer was worthy of the policy of Rome. The Achaeans were told, "that ſhould even the Lacedemonians, or the Corinthians, or the Argives, "ſeparate themſelves from the Achean confederacy, the Achaeans were not to wonder if Rome "looked upon it as a matter that noway concerned her." Had Rome expreſsly invited all Peloponneſus to diſclaim all farther dependence on Achaia, ſhe could not have ſpoken plainer [51].

Reſentment of the Achaeans;

The Achaeans were ſtill more exaſperated by this perfidious declaration. They inſtantly flew to arms; and, led on by Lycortas, marched to Meſſene [52], threatening deſtruction to that city, unleſs all who had ſhared in the guilt of Philopoemen's murder were

they revenge Philopoemen's death.

delivered into their hands. The Meſſenians, who in general highly diſapproved of Philopoemen's inhuman execution, gladly accepted of the conditions. Dinocrates, unable to ſupport the idea of falling into the power of this enraged people, laid violent hands on himſelf: ſeveral of his aſſociates followed his

[51] See Polyb. Legat. li.

[52] Polyb. Legat. lii. Plutarch in Philopoemen.

example; and the reſt being abandoned to the vengeance of the Achaeans, were ſtoned at the tomb of Philopoemen. The obſequies of their favorite general they celebrated with the greateſt ſplendor, and the moſt paſſionate lamentations; Polybius the hiſtorian, ſon to Lycortas, ſurrounded by the principal nobility of Achaia, bearing his urn; and not only the army, but the inhabitants of all the neighbouring towns, attending the funeral proceſſion from Meſſene to his native city, Megalopolis, where his aſhes were depoſited. He was accounted by the Romans themſelves, according to Plutarch [11], the laſt of the Greeks. He certainly was the moſt able as well as the moſt zealous defender of Grecian liberties, from the time Rome began to extend her influence over this ill-fated people. It appears, that his countrymen carried even their veneration for his memory ſo far, as to pay him divine honors.

Duplicity of the Romans.

When the Romans found the bad ſucceſs which had attended the revolt of Meſſenia, they changed their tone; applauding the Achaeans for having revenged the death of Philopoemen, and aſſuring their ambaſſadors of the particular care the ſenate had taken, that neither arms nor proviſions ſhould be ſent from Italy to their enemies [12]. But this applauſe and friendly profeſſions the Achaeans eſtimated at their real value.

Flamininus ſuſpected of having a ſhare in the guilt of Philopoemen's murder;

We have not ſufficient authority from hiſtory to ſay how far Flamininus was concerned in this criminal tranſaction, in which he ſeems to have acted

[11] In Arato.

[12] Polyb. Legat. li.

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a part. Dinocrates was confeſſedly his creature; and in exciting [11] the Meſſenians to revolt, acted, it appears evidently, with his privity, if not by his inſtigation. Flamininus, beſides, hated Philopoemen, both as a man whoſe unſeaſonable loyalty to his country obſtructed the views of Rome, and as his rival in military glory. Whether his inſtructions to Dinocrates pointed to the execution of Philopoemen, is a circumſtance impoſſible now to be determined; but had not the Meſſenian expected that Rome would not diſavow the action, he probably had not embrued his hands in the blood of that great man. It is recorded by Polybius [12], that Flamininus had, before this period, in conjunction with Dinocrates, formed a plan to throw the Achaean councils into confuſion, by ſupporting the Meſſenian intereſt in oppoſition to that of Achaia; and in order to try his influence among the Peloponneſian ſtates, had required a general aſſembly to be convened. But Philopoemen, at that time chief magiſtrate, ſuſpecting ſome ſiniſter deſign, demanded that he ſhould firſt ſignify in writing, what was to be the buſineſs of this convention. As the Roman would not comply with this requiſition, Philopoemen refuſed his requeſt.

But the behaviour of Flamininus bears a more

[11] It is remarkable, that Livy (L. xxxix. c. 48.) makes ſlight mention of this revolt; into the cauſes and progreſs of which, he ſays he will not inquire, as being a matter altogether foreign to his object, the hiſtory of the Roman people.

[12] See Polyb. Legat. xlvii. See alſo De virt. & vitiis, p. 1435.

unfavorable aſpect, from the recollection that he himſelf had adjudged [11] Meſſenia to the Achaeans; and in conſequence of this deciſion, had afterwards prevailed on them to cede Zacynthus to the Romans [12]. The argument he employed on this occaſion, deſerves notice. "Achaia," ſaid he to them, "is a kind of tortoiſe, around which nature "has placed a ſhell by way of armor; and if it thruſts "out its head or feet beyond this armor, it is in "danger of receiving injury. Your frontier-cities, "O Achaeans! are your ſhell, your natural defence: "but whatever acquiſitions you make beyond the "continent, thoſe are the parts which lying without your ſhell, are expoſed to inſult, and which "are not to be ſecured without an expenſe far greater "than their real worth." The ſhrewdneſs of the obſervation, aided by thoſe arts of intrigue in which he excelled, ſecured the wiſhed-for ſucceſs.

But the part, which Flamininus acted in relation to Hannibal [13], who died the ſame year with Philopoemen, evinces, that this commander, the boaſted favorite of Roman hiſtorians, poſſeſſed little of that noble generoſity of ſpirit, by which the brave are generally diſtinguiſhed. After the total overthrow of Antiochus, the Carthaginian, fearing he ſhould be given up to his enemies, had retired to the court of Pruſias king of Bithynia, who promiſed

his baſe treatment of Hannibal.

[11] Liv. L. xxxvi. c. 31, 32.

[12] An iſland lying between Sicily and Peloponneſus, which the Achaeans had lately purchaſed, and from its ſituation, of conſiderable importance to Rome.

[13] Liv. L. xxxix. c. 51. Plut. in Flaminino.

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him protection. Flamininus being on an embaſſy to the Bithynian monarch, in order to negotiate a peace between him and the king of Pergamus, took this opportunity, either in conſequence of ſecret inſtructions from the ſenate, or from a mean paſſion for fame, as Plutarch thinks, to demand, that Hannibal ſhould be delivered into his hands. Pruſias at firſt, according to the laſt-mentioned hiſtorian, earneſtly pleaded the rights of hoſpitality and his plighted faith, of which ſo diſhonorable an action would be an avowed violation. But the Roman, regardleſs of ſuch conſiderations, perſiſted in his demand; and the daſtardly Pruſias at length agreed to comply. Hannibal, who had but ſlight dependence on the Bithynian's honor, and, from the time of Flamininus's arrival, ſuſpected the object and reſult of his machinations, had contrived in the caſtle of Libyſſa, where he reſided, ſubterraneous paſſages, to favor his eſcape in caſe of danger; when having information that his caſtle was ſurrounded by ſoldiers, he had recourſe to theſe ſecret outlets: but finding them all guarded, and no hope of eſcaping, he at once formed his reſolution. Taking then in his hand the cup which contained the ingredients, long before prepared for ſuch an occaſion, "Let us," ſaid he, "deliver Rome from her perpetual diſ-
"quietude, ſince ſhe thinks it tedious to wait for
"the death of a poor yet dreaded old man. What
"a change in Roman manners! their fathers warned
"Pyrrhus, even when in arms againſt them, of
"the poiſon that was treacherouſly prepared for

" him; while their degenerate ſons are not aſhamed " of employing their ambaſſador, a man of con- " ſular dignity, to prevail on the perfidious Pruſias " to give up a gueſt to whom he had promiſed " protection." Then invoking the gods to take " vengeance on Pruſias and his kingdom for his violation of hoſpitality, he ſwallowed the fatal draught, and expired. When an account of this tranſaction reached the ſenate, ſeveral members of that auguſt body, Plutarch tells us, expreſſed the higheſt diſpleaſure at a conduct which diſgraced not only Flamininus but the Roman name.

After an inſtance ſo notorious, the deciſion is obvious with regard to the character of this conqueror of Greece.

His conduct to the virtuous Cato was not leſs diſhonorably mean; and though foreign to the preſent hiſtory, it may, further to illuſtrate the character of this celebrated general, not improperly find a place here. Lucius, brother to Titus Quintius Flamininus, had been guilty of a crime of the blackeſt die [*]. A favorite boy whom he had carried with him into his province of Gaul, was reproaching him, in the hours of dalliance, for taking him from Rome juſt before a ſhow of gladiators was to have been exhibited, and thereby depriving him of the pleaſure of ſeeing a man killed; a ſight which he moſt ardently deſired. At that inſtant the proconſul was informed, a Boian Gaul, a man of diſtinction in his own country,

His flagitious treatment of Cato.

[*] Liv. L. xxxix. c. 42. Plut. in Flaminino.

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was come to take the oaths of allegiance to Rome, and with his wife and children waited without He immediately ordered him to be admitted. And turning to his pathic, "to ſatisfy thy longing, "wilt thou then," ſaid he, "that I ſhow thee "this Gaul in the agonies of death? ſo ſaying, with his own hands he ſtabbed the unſuſpecting Boian. This flagitious action came to the knowledge of Cato, who, when cenſor, charged Lucius with it, and the fact being fully proved, degraded him from the ſenatorial dignity, notwithſtanding the moſt earneſt ſolicitations of his brother and his powerful relations. In revenge, Titus purſued Cato with unrelenting animoſity. He leagued againſt him with his inveterate enemies. By means of a corrupt majority, which he had acquired in the ſenate, he annulled all contracts, leaſes, and bargains, which Cato had entered into relative to the public revenue; not on account of any defect, but merely becauſe Cato had made them: and he took every opportunity, upon the ſlighteſt grounds, of haraſſing him with frivolous and vexatious proſecutions.

Wretched Greece! what had ſhe to expect from an adminiſtration directed by men of the character we have deſcribed! And yet of all the Romans to whom the care of Grecian affairs were committed, one of the moſt humane, ſays hiſtory [61], was TITUS QUINTIUS FLAMININUS!

[61] See Plutarch. Parallel. Philopoem. & Flaminin.

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SECTION III.

CONTENTS.

Injurious conduct of the Romans to Philip of Macedon — he is required to evacuate Aenos and Maronea — his violent reſentment — cauſes the Maronites to be maſſacred — is threatened by the Romans — ſends his ſon Demetrius to Rome — his ſucceſs. — Philip's ſuſpicions of the connexions Demetrius had formed in Rome — encouraged in his ſuſpicions by Perſeus — is impoſed upon by a forgery — believes Demetrius guilty of deſigns againſt his crown and life — cauſes him to be put to death — diſcovers his innocence — dies of a broken heart. — His character.

WE are now to view the affairs of Macedon during the period of which we have been ſpeaking.

The Romans jealous of Philip;

Rome jealous, as we have ſeen, of the increaſe of dominion which Philip had acquired in the courſe of the late wars, ſeized every opportunity of confining him within narrower limits. Athamania had already been wreſted from him, a few inconſiderable fortreſſes excepted, under pretence of reſtoring it to its lawful prince. Thoſe cantons of Theſſaly, in which he had re-eſtabliſhed his authority, were now encouraged to aſſert their independence; and whatever violence, either here or in the countries adjacent, the Macedonian king had committed

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whilſt employing his arms on the ſide of Rome, though perhaps nothing more than the natural conſequences of war, were brought into account againſt him, as wanton outrages for which reparation was to be exacted. Even thoſe parts of Thrace which, chiefly through his means, had been recovered from Antiochus, and to which the Macedonian kings had ancient pretenſions, were demanded by Eumenes of Pergamus. A large portion of it had been already decreed to Eumenes, by the ten commiſſioners employed after the battle of Magneſia, in the partition of the provinces of Antiochus in Europe and the Lower Aſia: but not content with this acquiſition he now demanded more.

appoint commiſſioners to ſettle differences.

To all claimants againſt the Macedonian monarch the Romans gave a favorable hearing. And, as if they had nothing more in view than to make an equitable ſettlement among all parties, they appointed [1] three commiſſioners, Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius Sempronius, to paſs into Greece, where they were to erect themſelves into a court of judicature, and to decide upon all differences between Macedon and her adverſaries. With this procedure, doubtleſs exceedingly humiliating to a prince not yet deprived of ſovereign power, and ſtill oſtenſibly numbered among the faithful allies of Rome, Philip found it expedient to comply. He attended the commiſſioners in their progreſs through Theſſaly; and, however unable at times to ſuppreſs his indigna-

[1] Polyb. Legat. xl. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 24 & ſ.q.

tion, disdained not to put in answers to the various demands which interest or resentment urged against him. "The Thessalians, he stated, far from having any thing to lay justly to his charge, had been guilty of many acts of violence against Macedon; and, without the least title, had deprived him of several cities, which he either possessed by inheritance; or, by express stipulation with the Roman consul, had won with his sword, from the Aetolians and Athamanes then in arms against Rome." — "They complain," he continued, "that I have diverted the course of commerce "from Thebes of Pthiotis, whilst in my possession, "to Demetrias. But when was it accounted cri- "minal in a prince, to open a new channel of "trade? or to allow mariners the choice of their "port? They accuse me of preparing an ambuscade "for certain deputies sent with their complaints "to the Roman commander. In consequence of "this pretended ambuscade, let me know what "injury these deputies have sustained? In truth, "the liberty you have bestowed on these Thessa- "lians has taught them insolence: like slaves newly "manumitted, they pride themselves in the exer- "cise of their petulance against those who lately "ruled over them. *But*," added he, with an energy the result of various feelings, "*the sun of all my days has not yet set.*" — Notwithstanding, however, this spirited defence, the commissioners decreed, that the Macedonian garrisons should immediately evacuate the several towns and castles in question, and that Philip should withdraw

Philip's spirited defence; disregarded.

BOOK VI. northward within the ancient boundaries of Macedon.

Sect. 3. From Theſſaly the Roman commiſſioners proceeded to Theſſalonica, to adjuſt the ſettlement of Thrace, where the more important object of contention lay. Philip had extended himſelf on this ſide with great ſucceſs; and, beſides a large portion of territory, had got poſſeſſion of Aenos and Maronea, two cities on the Helleſpont, which from their maritime ſituation afforded their ſovereign many valuable advantages. In Maronea particularly, the moſt conſiderable of the two, he kept a ſtrong garriſon, and had ſo far eſtabliſhed himſelf, as to procure the baniſhment of a numerous body of the citizens, who ſtood in oppoſition to his intereſts. Theſe exiles were now loud againſt him; ſupported, privately by the Romans, and openly by Eumenes, who maintained that theſe cities were appendages of that part of Thrace already adjudged to him; and charged Philip with the moſt flagrant oppreſſions. It was eaſy to perceive from what had paſſed, the complection of the commiſſioners; and Philip, judging it now in vain to keep meaſures with men determined at any rate to ſide with his adverſaries, no longer ſought to diſguiſe his ſentiments. "It is neither with the "Maronites nor with Eumenes," ſaid he, addreſſing himſelf to the commiſſioners, "that the "conteſt now lies; but with you Romans, from "whom I have long obſerved, that I have no "juſtice to expect. The cities of Macedon, which "revolted from me to you at the very time a truce

Aenos and Maronea claimed by Eumenes.

Philip expoſtulates.

" ſubſiſted between us, I claimed, and met with
" a refuſal. Inſtead of matter of right, had I claimed
" them as matter of favor; the favor had been
" ſmall for you to grant, as theſe cities were to
" you of little importance, and in the extreme
" borders of my kingdom; but it was of moment
" to me to have them reſtored, that their defec-
" tion might not encourage others to imitate their
" treachery. During the Aetolian war, by deſire
" of the conſul Manius Acilius, I ſat down be-
" fore Lamia, and was on the point of taking it,
" when the conſul appeared, demanded it for him-
" ſelf, and wreſted the conqueſt out of my hands.
" To ſoften the injury, I was permitted to turn
" my arms againſt ſome towns, or rather caſtles,
" of Theſſaly, Perrhaebia, and Athamania; theſe
" you have *now* taken from me.—Even the claims
" of Eumenes are thought preferable to mine, by
" his ſhare of the dominions which Antiochus was
" poſſeſſed of; he, who fought under your ban-
" ners, not for your ſakes, but for his own, againſt
" an enemy, from whom he had every thing to
" fear, and who, if not cruſhed, had been his
" deſtruction. Antiochus, on the other hand, cour-
" ted my friendſhip, and would have purchaſed
" it at no leſs a price than the ceſſion of all Greece,
" a fleet of fifty decked ſhips, and three thouſand
" talents. Regardleſs of theſe ſplendid offers, I
" took the field againſt him, even before your
" forces had paſſed over from Italy; declining nei-
" ther toil nor danger to procure you victory.
" When Scipio was on his way to Aſia, I ſhowed

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" myſelf equally zealous in your ſervice; I conducted him through Macedon and Thrace, and by my preſence prevented the oppoſition which otherwiſe he had met with from the barbarous inhabitants. In return for all this, I might reaſonably have expected an increaſe of dominion; on the contrary, I ſee myſelf deprived not only of what your own grants have beſtowed, but alſo of my hereditary poſſeſſions. And as if I were Antiochus, I am now to be plundered even by Eumenes; who, not content with having Lyſimachia and the Cherſoneſe aſſigned to him, pretends, that Aenos and Maronea are included; in expreſs contradiction to the very decree on which he grounds his title. Determine therefore; am I the foe, or am I ſtill the ally of Rome? If the former, proceed as you have begun, in perſecuting me; if the latter, abſtain from injuring a man, who ſurely has deſerved a very oppoſite treatment."

How liable ſoever Philip's private character might be to objections, or whatever were the conſiderations that moved him to join the Romans, certainly their treatment of him was exceedingly perfidious. Livy, from whom we have taken his defence, tells us, that the commiſſioners themſelves were affected: they were more probably embarraſſed and aſhamed. Unwilling to venture a definitive ſentence, againſt which ſo much might be ſaid, they only pronounced, that, *if* theſe two cities had been adjudged to Eumenes by the former commiſſioners, it was not in their power to reverſe

the decree; if, on the other hand, it ſhould appear, that Philip held them by right of conqueſt, he ought to hold them ſtill; if neither the one nor the other was the caſe, it muſt be left to the ſenate in what way they were to be diſpoſed of; meanwhile, the garriſons ſhould be withdrawn [2]."

The ſenate decide againſt Philip;

This temporizing ſentence, however, did not long impoſe on Philip. His ambaſſadors whom he had ſent to Rome, had orders from the ſenate to inform their maſter, that his garriſons muſt forthwith evacuate the conteſted cities. The Macedonian king was fired with rage. The ſcorn of Eumenes, the dupe of Rome, he eagerly wiſhed to have wreaked his vengeance on both; but his power agreed not with his inclination. In this ſituation he reſolved to diſcharge his fury at leaſt on the Maronites [3], whoſe ſolicitations, he ſuppoſed, had been employed againſt him. Onamaſtus was his lieutenant in Thrace. He intruſted him with orders to Caſſander, governor of Maronea, to introduce into the city, in the night before the Macedonian garriſon was to march out, a body of his fierceſt Thracian mercenaries, who, under pretence of a ſudden tumult, ſhould put to the ſword all the inhabitants ſuſpected of favoring the oppoſite intereſt, without diſtinction of condition, age, or ſex, and leave the place drenched in the blood of its citizens. Theſe cruel orders were but too faithfully executed.

he revenges himſelf on the Maronites:

[2] See Liv. L. xxxix. c. 28.

[3] Polyb. Legat. xliv. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 34 & ſeq.

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Upon the firſt tidings of the maſſacre, the ſenate inſtructed Appius to make inquiry concerning it. Philip pretended ignorance: "He had heard of a "popular inſurrection at Maronea, occaſioned by "certain petty conteſts between the friends of "Eumenes and thoſe of Macedon, in which blood "had been ſhed; but as to the aggravating cir-"cumſtances which the Romans mentioned, he "was altogether a ſtranger to them." He was then required to deliver up Onomaſtus and Caſſander, that they might be ſent to Rome for examination. The propoſal made him tremble. They knew too much, and might betray him. "Ono-"maſtus," he replied, "was a neceſſary perſon, "and not to be parted with; beſides, having been "at a conſiderable diſtance from Maronea at the "time of the inſurrection, he could not poſſibly "have known any thing of it. But Caſſander, "he promiſed, ſhould be ſent to Rome." Nothing, however, was farther from the intention of Philip than this compliance. It was attended both with indignity and danger. Accordingly, Caſſander was taken off by poiſon, at Epire, in his way to the Roman capital.

the indignation of the Romans on this occaſion.

Philip's evaſive and flagitious conduct.

He is alarmed;

The outcry againſt Philip became now more clamorous than ever. The different ſtates around were rouſed, by theſe recent inſtances of violence, to a more lively remembrance of the wrongs they had already ſuſtained, or the ſtill more painful apprehenſions of what they had yet to dread; whilſt Rome, intent on reducing the power of Macedon, ſtrengthened theſe impreſſions, by encouraging

couraging all to whom the Macedonian king was obnoxious, to bring forward their complaints, and to expect her protection. Philip saw the storm gathering, and likely to burst upon him unprepared. In this situation, he employed with the senate the mediation of his son Demetrius *, who, from his gentle and conciliating deportment whilst an hostage, was thought to be high in favor at Rome. The senate received him with apparent cordiality; and having appointed a day of audience for the ambassadors and deputies who attended with complaints against Philip, they permitted Demetrius to be present, and to speak in justification of his father's conduct; but, instead of availing himself of this permission, the young prince, naturally timid, and thrown into the utmost confusion by the heavy, the unexpected, and the numerous charges brought against his father; became incapable of attempting a reply. With seeming tenderness, the senate asked him, whether the king had not furnished him with some notes or secret instructions, from which he was to speak? Demetrius was weak enough to own he had, and to permit them to be read. Their views were, to discover by this confidential paper, Philip's opinion of Rome, and the secret purposes he had in contemplation. It fully answered the senate's expectations. Interspersed were observations on the iniquitous treatment he had met with — "This was unfair in Caecilius and his fellow-commissioners" — "I had

sends his son Demetrius to Rome;

the Romans deal artfully with him;

* See Polyb. Legat. xliv. & xlvi. Liv. l. xxxix. c. 46, 47.

BOOK VI. not, surely, deserved this!" — "thus were my enemies encouraged to insult me."

Sect. 3. affect kindness towards him;

The result was, the senate told Demetrius, that, on his account, whatever had been improper in his father's conduct, should be passed over; and that, from the confidence they had in him, they were well assured Philip would, for the future, perform every thing that justice required: that ambassadors should be sent, to see all matters properly adjusted; and with special directions to inform the king, "that from the regard they bore to the son, they were willing to excuse the father."— To complete the whole, according to Polybius and Livy [f], they took care to inflame the mind of this vain and unexperienced prince with expectations of the throne of Macedon; on which, though he had an elder brother, they gave him hopes he should shortly be placed.

with what views.

The Roman annals scarcely afford a stronger instance of the duplicity of this rapacious people. To have despoiled at once Philip of his kingdom, immediately after so many important services received from him, for no other ostensible reason, but because he would not tamely resign whatever they required, would have been a measure highly odious as well as dangerous, whilst the spirit of Achaia was not altogether subdued, nor the extirpation of Carthage yet accomplished. A more secure method was adopted. They practised on the easy nature of this credulous and unsuspecting

[f] See Polyb. Legat. xlvi. Liv. L. xxxix. c. 53.

youth; they debauched his affections; they gained him over to the intereſts of Rome; and had they ſucceeded in obtaining for him the crown, Macedon had probably, under this paſſive and Rome-devoted king, ſunk gradually, without even one ſtruggle, into the inſignificance of a Roman province. Whilſt by pointing out Demetrius to the Macedonians as their future ſovereign, the ſenate had another and an important object in view. They ſet up a formidable party againſt the reigning prince in the very heart of his dominions; which, beſides weakening the authority of Philip, tended to divide the royal family. Diſtracted thus by jealouſies and domeſtic feuds, the royal houſe of Macedon muſt have loſt much of its importance, and its ſtrength; and Philip have ended his reign, if he had even been ſuffered to end it by a natural death, heart-broken and deſerted.

Part of this ſcheme actually ſucceeded; and it was not owing to the Romans that the whole had not equal ſucceſs.

Philip had only two ſons, Perſeus and Demetrius. Demetrius, a prince weak and vain, as we have already ſeen; but at the ſame time, open and undiſguiſed, adorned with all the faſhionable accompliſhments that could be acquired either in Greece or Rome and of manners remarkably placid and engaging. Perſeus, on the contrary, of a buſtling and turbulent diſpoſition, was at the ſame time, if the Roman writers are to be credited, ungenerous, ſordid, dark, and ſubtle; under the faireſt ſemblance covering the moſt flagitious of

Characters of Perſeus and Demetrius.

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views. Both princes were in the bloom of life; Perſeus, the eldeſt, was aged about thirty years when Demetrius returned from Rome; but born, if we are to believe Plutarch [a], of a mother of mean birth, a ſempſtreſs of Argos, and of ſo queſtionable a character, as to make it doubtful whether he were really Philip's ſon. Demetrius was five years younger, and the ſon of his queen, a lady of royal lineage.

Perſeus jealous of Demetrius I

From the difference of their diſpoſitions, as well as from the diſproportion of their maternal origin, Perſeus had conceived an early jealouſy of his brother, whom he looked upon as his rival in a kingdom, to which priority of birth gave him, he conceived, a juſter title. The avowed preference ſhown by the Romans to Demetrius, together with the vanity of this young prince, who was at no pains to diſguiſe his hopes, riveted the antipathy of Perſeus: and he took care to poiſon his father's mind with ſuſpicions of the deſigns of this aſpiring youth, the minion of Rome, and devoted to her intereſts.

Philip alſo is prepoſſeſſed againſt him,

Philip was but too well diſpoſed to liſten to theſe inſinuations. From the return of Demetrius, a viſible alteration had taken place in this unhappy king. Notwithſtanding the various artifices he had hitherto employed in order to elude the ſenate's requiſitions, he had at length been obliged, by the arrival of new commiſſioners, to ſubmit to their imperious commands, and to evacuate all his ma-

and confirmed

ritime poſſeſſions in Thrace [b]. And the only fruit

[a] In Paul. Aemil. & Arato. [b] Polyb. Legat. xlii. & xlviii.

he derived from his ſon's interceſſion, was the humiliating reflection, that to him he owed his being left in poſſeſſion of his mutilated kingdom. The imprudent conduct of Demetrius, added to the gloomy thoughts which haunted the unfortunate Philip. He was on all occaſions the advocate of the Romans; the power of their arms, their probity, their unblemiſhed faith, were his favorite topics; even their manners and their buildings, at that time confeſſedly inelegant and ill-contrived, he affected to ſpeak of, as equal if not ſuperior to whatever Macedon had to boaſt [8].

in his hatred of the Romans:

Thus agitated by doubts and reſentment, Philip reſolved to exert his utmoſt vigor for the recovery of his former independence; and the moment he was again in a condition for war, determined to bid defiance to the Romans. The fortifying of the cities that lay on the ſea-coaſt, or adjacent to the great roads, might have given them umbrage: he therefore began his operations in places more remote [9], where, being leſs expoſed to their obſervation, he found means to fill his inland-towns and caſtles with ſoldiers, arms, and treaſure. At the ſame time, he tranſplanted [10] a large body of Barbarians from Thrace and the countries adjacent into his maritime and ſouthern provinces, obliging thoſe Macedonians on whom he had leſs reliance, to remove northward, and give up their dwellings to thoſe fiercer tribes. So that, throughout Mace-

meditates the renewing of war.

[8] See Liv. L. xl c. 5.

[9] Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

[10] Liv. L. xl. c. 3.

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don, there was now exhibited a moſt affecting ſcene of wailing and deſolation; a number of innocent families torn from their native homes, the poſſeſſions of their forefathers, and dragged away to diſtant and inhoſpitable wilds

Yet this was mercy, in compariſon of what followed.

Philip had, in the courſe of his reign, ſacrificed a number of his ſubjects, of the nobleſt blood of Macedon, to his gloomy ſuſpicions; and in his preſent ſituation dreaded the vengeance of their children. To relieve the apprehenſions of his guilty mind, he ordered that ſearch ſhould be made for the deſcendants of all thoſe whom he had deſtroyed, and that they alſo ſhould be put to death. The moſt dreadful inſtances of what the ſpirit of deſpotiſm can perpetrate, followed theſe inhuman orders: but the melancholy cataſtrophe of the family of [11] Herodicus, a man of high conſideration in Theſſaly, as it excited univerſal compaſſion, merits a more particular detail. He had fallen by the ſword of regal violence; and not ſatisfied with this, the jealous tyrant had alſo murdered the huſbands of his two daughters, Archo and Theoxena, by whom they left each of them an infant ſon. Theoxena, though tempted with many rich offers, remained a widow. Archo married Poris, a perſon of the firſt diſtinction among the Aeneatae, a people inhabiting that part of Macedon which lies on the gulph of Theſſalonica, anciently

Diſaſtrous fate of the family of Herodicus.

[11] Livy ibid. c. 4.

known by the name of Thermae. Archo dying a few years after, and leaving a numerous iſſue, Theoxena, from the tender affection ſhe bore to the dear pledges of her departed ſiſter, conſented to become the wife of Poris. Being informed of the tyrant's orders, they were ſtruck with the moſt alarming fears; and Theoxena, abandoning herſelf to deſpair, would have plunged the poniard herſelf into the boſom both of her own ſon and of every one of Archo's children, rather than ſuffer them to fall into the power of the brutal Philip. Poris ſtrove to allay her fears, by promiſing, that it ſhould be his care to have them conveyed to Athens; and ſhortly after, ſet out with his whole family from Theſſalonica, his uſual reſidence, in order to attend a ſolemn ſacrifice at Aenea, the chief town of the Aeneatae, in honor of Aeneas their ſuppoſed founder; propoſing from thence to eſcape to ſome of the Euboean ports. Accordingly, the ſacrifice ended, they embarked during the night, as if on their return to Theſſalonica; but changing their courſe, ſtood for Euboea, and would probably have made it, had not the wind proved contrary. At dawn, the king's officers, who had charge to watch the coaſt, deſcried their manœuvre, and having manned one of the royal pinnaces, immediately gave chaſe. Theoxena too evidently ſaw her danger; the veſſel was gaining on them, and a few minutes more had delivered them into the hands of their enemies. Firm in her purpoſe, ſhe put a dagger into the hand of each of the elder children, charging them to provide inſtantly for

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their own ſafety; to the younger ſhe adminiſtered a draught of ſtrong poiſon; and having, as they expired, committed their bodies to the ocean, Poris and herſelf, laſt of all, entwined in mutual embraces, ſought a refuge from intolerable tyranny in the boſom of the deep. The veſſel was all that remained to Philip's miniſters of death.

An adminiſtration blackened by ſuch enormous crimes, Livy juſtly obſerves, called for ſome ſignal vengeance from heaven: and the day of vengeance and retribution was faſt approaching.

New diſſenſions in the royal family of Macedon.

That ſpirit of diſſenſion, which, for a time, had been the reproach of the royal family of Macedon, had apparently ſubſided. Demetrius had learned caution, and avoided mentioning the Romans; and Perſeus, to whom his brother's gentleneſs ſcarcely left a pretence for altercation, was leſs intemperate in his complaints. But though not at open variance, all fraternal cordiality was at an end; Demetrius dreaded Perſeus; and Perſeus had ſtill a deep jealouſy of Demetrius. Things were in this ſituation when, through the artful management of Perſeus, an incident, in itſelf of little moment, gave vent to the ſmothered flame, which blazed inſtantly with a redoubled fierceneſs.

Martial exerciſes were, at this time, the principal occupation of the Macedonian court. After a general review of the army [11], the troops had, according to cuſtom, divided into two bodies, each headed by one of the king's ſons, and had engaged

[11] See Liv. L. xl. c. 6 & ſeq.

in a mock-combat. On this occaſion, the diviſion of which Demetrius was the leader, in their eagerneſs for victory, had charged the other party with rather too much impetuoſity, and driven them off their ground; at which Perſeus expreſſed ſome reſentment. The ſolemnity was followed by entertainments, which the princes gave to their companions and friends.

Perſeus retained in his ſervice a number of ſpies, whom he chiefly employed in watching his brother; one of theſe had contrived to get admittance into the banqueting-room of Demetrius; and being diſcovered by ſome of the gueſts, he was roughly treated, and expelled. Ignorant of this circumſtance, Demetrius, towards the concluſion of the banquet, when elevated with mirth and wine, propoſed, that they ſhould viſit his brother, and form one convivial ſociety; "and if," ſaid he, "any lurking "reſentment remains for what has happened to-"day, it will be diſſipated by our jollity and good-"humor." Thoſe who had treated the ſpy belonging to Perſeus in ſo rough a manner, fearful of the event, privately provided themſelves with arms, in caſe of an inſult. Perſeus, who had his creatures abroad, had immediate notice of all; and when Demetrius and his companions arrived, ordered the doors to be ſhut againſt them, and ſpoke from a window, charging them with having come with criminal intentions; and next morning he accuſed Demetrius to the king, of an attempt to aſſaſſinate him.

Perſeus acts inſidiouſly.

Philip, familiar as he was with deeds of blood, Philip's anxiety:

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was ſtruck with horror at the relation of Perſeus—his two ſons, the laſt hopes of his houſe, in arms againſt each other! Whatever might be the iſſue of the accuſation, to him the conſequence muſt be miſery; he felt himſelf the moſt wretched of fathers: if the accuſation was true, Demetrius deſerved to die; if not truth, Perſeus ought not to live.

He ſits in judgment on his ſons:

After ſome days of anxious ſolicitude and agitation, he reſolved to inveſtigate the horrid truth. Retiring therefore into the inner apartment of his palace with two of his nobles, of whoſe judgment and unbiaſſed probity he had the higheſt opinion, he commanded both his ſons to appear before him. At ſight of them he broke out into paſſionate lamentations: "Here," ſaid he, "I ſit this day in

his ſpeech.

"judgment on my own ſons, of all parents the "moſt miſerable; certain, whether the charge is "proved or diſproved, of finding a criminal in "one of you. Your diſſenſions I have long obſer-"ved, I have long bewailed; but I had hopes, "that as your reaſon advanced to maturity, a "ſenſe of what you owe to your country, of what "you owe to yourſelves, and to me, would have "inſpired you with better thoughts. Often have "I endeavoured to inſtruct you by the examples "of other nations and other times. I have told "you how many royal houſes and flouriſhing em-"pires domeſtic diſcord has overthrown; and "how, on the contrary, a firm union at home "had, from the moſt inconſiderable beginnings, "raiſed others to the height of proſperity and "power. Remember the fate of Sparta; whilſt its

" two kings acted in concert, it flouriſhed; but, " blaſted by their diſcord, it withered and decayed. " View even the Pergamenian kings, that new " race, whoſe regal title is an inſult to other kings; " by w' at means have they riſen to the large ſhare " of dominion they are now poſſeſſed of? By " unanimity and ſtrict concord, the diſtinctive " characteriſtics of that family. Among the Romans, " in like manner, think what luſtre their greateſt " men have derived from the cultivation of this " brotherly union — with what glory the two " elder Scipios, in the war in Spain, fought and " fell by each other's ſide — and how again the " two ſons of one of thoſe Scipios, one the con- " queror of Hannibal, the other of Antiochus, " labored to adorn the brows of each other with " the wreaths of victory. But, I know it well, " my throne is your object: if I yet live, it is " only becauſe each of you ſees a dreaded rival in " his brother; that rival removed, I too ſhall " fall. — Proceed therefore; ſince the ears of a " father muſt be polluted with the narrative of his " ſons crimes; proceed; employ every argument " that truth or artifice can furniſh; to-day I ſhall " liſten to all, determined from henceforth never " to ſuffer accuſations of this kind either in public " or private to approach me."

Such is the ſubſtance of what the Roman hiſtorian has put in the mouth of Philip on this occaſion; certainly, not what he did ſay, but what he might naturally have ſaid, and from which a tolerable judgment may be formed of the character and ſituation of this unhappy prince.

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Perſeus produces his charge.

The charge brought by Perſeus was deſtitute of proof; the want of this, however, he ſupplied by peremptory aſſeverations, inſiſting on the moſt minute circumſtances that had occurred either in the courſe of the late ſolemnity, or during the ſucceeding night, and giving the moſt malignant interpretation to the whole; adding, what he knew would have the greateſt weight with Philip, that Demetrius was, beyond a doubt, acting by the inſtigation of the Romans, and in full aſſurance of their ſupport.

Demetrius juſtifies himſelf.

The deep atrocity of the crimes of which Demetrius heard himſelf accuſed, ſo foreign to his gentle nature; the boldneſs with which Perſeus had maintained the charge; and the fell rancor diſcernible through every part of it, overpowered the feeble ſpirits of the young prince; he melted into tears; and with difficulty was at length encouraged to attempt, in tremulous and faultering accents, his own juſtification. His defence, though void of art, and delivered under great perturbation of mind, was nevertheleſs a full refutation of his brother's charge. And whether it was malice or error on the ſide of Perſeus, it was plain, that guilt was not to be imputed to Demetrius.

All determination on the preſent caſe was precluded by paternal tenderneſs. Philip therefore declined pronouncing ſentence; and only ſaid, that their future conduct ſhould be the criterion by which he ſhould judge of the truth or the falſhood of the allegations which had been produced before him.

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Demetrius probably ſtood acquitted by his father, of any attempt on his brother's life; but what Perſeus had thrown out, of his connexion with Rome, and of the conſequent dangers to be apprehended, made the deepeſt impreſſion on his gloomy mind. He held the Romans in deteſtation, and looked for every kind of inſidious treatment and perfidy from that quarter: and though Demetrius was hitherto innocent, yet, open to their inſinuations, and allured by the temptation of a crown, he might ſoon be guilty. Diſtracted by his doubts, Philip reſolved to be ſatisfied; and fixed upon two noblemen, Philocles and Apelles [11], who, as he thought, had no kind of attachment to either of his ſons, to proceed as his ambaſſadors to Rome; with inſtructions to find out, if poſſible, with what perſons Demetrius correſponded, and what were his deſigns.

Philip ſuſpects Demetrius of carrying on a private correſpondence with the Romans;

ſends ambaſſadors to Rome, to make diſcoveries;

Philip could not have made a worſe choice. Perſeus, deep in contrivance, indefatigable in the purſuit of his object, and, from his being the eldeſt born, as well as confeſſedly the firſt in his father's favor, conſidered by the kingdom in general as the preſumptive heir, had privately gained over moſt of the chief men of Macedon. Of all his creatures, none were more devoted to him, than theſe two truſty counſellors of Philip. Having therefore previouſly concerted matters with Perſeus, they returned to the king with an account that Demetrius was held in the higheſt eſteem at Rome,

they impoſe on Philip.

[11] Liv. L. xl. c. 20. 23, 24.

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and that he certainly appeared to have entertained moſt unjuſtifiable views; delivering to him at the ſame time a letter, which they pretended to have received from Quintius Flamininus. The hand-writing of the Roman, and the impreſſion of his ſignet, the king was well acquainted with, and from the exactneſs of the imitation, was induced to give entire credit to the contents, more eſpecially as Flamininus had formerly written in commendation of Demetrius, when he laſt returned from Rome, adviſing Philip to ſend him back ſoon with a more honorable retinue, as nothing could be more agreeable to the ſenate, or more for the intereſts of Macedon. The preſent letter was of a different tenor. The writer owned Demetrius to be blame-worthy, and deprecated the king's anger in his behalf, entreating him "to believe, that, "whatever unwarrantable enterpriſes the young "prince, through ambition of a throne, might "have deſigned, yet certainly he had projected "nothing againſt the life of any of his own blood;" adding, "that as to himſelf, he was not a man "that could be thought the adviſer of an unjuſt "action."

Philip convinced that Demetrius is guilty.

The ſuſpicions of Philip now gave place to the moſt dreadful certainty. Demetrius appeared to him evidently guilty of the moſt atrocious deſigns; he ſaw him not only deſirous of aſcending the throne by ſupplanting his brother, but ſcrupling not to wreſt the ſceptre from the hands even of a father!

Demetrius forms the Plan of

The ſituation of Demetrius had for ſome time been exceedingly deplorable. Without any ſhare

in his father's affection; the object of his brother's hatred; ſhunned by the tribe of courtiers, who, as uſual, paid their homage where the royal favor was beſtowed; and beſet with ſpies, by whom he found himſelf obſerved on all occaſions, Macedon appeared to him a priſon where every thing was diſguſting and dreadful. No wonder, therefore, that he wiſhed to provide for his comfort and ſafety, by eſcaping to Rome. He communicated his deſign to Didas, governor of Paeonia, who with much art had inſinuated himſelf into his confidence, and who immediately betrayed him to Perſeus, and through Perſeus to the king. The diſcovery ſet Philip on meditating ſome violent ſtroke; and Flamininus's letter confirmed him in his purpoſe. A dread of the Romans made it inexpedient to proceed againſt Demetrius by public proſecution for puniſhment; Philip had recourſe therefore to Didas, whom the unſuſpecting Demetrius ſtill continued to make the choſen partner of his convivial hours. This villain proved himſelf the worthy inſtrument of an inhuman tyrant, and ſoon ſeized an opportunity, at a banquet, after a ſolemn ſacrifice, of conveying poiſon into the cup of the unhappy prince. This did not operate, however, in the ſpeedy and ſilent manner he had expected, but cauſed ſuch excruciating torture, as made the villany conſpicuous, and drew from Demetrius agonizing complaints againſt the unnatural authors and vile perpetrators of the deed: till, tired with the ſlow operation of the baneful potion, Didas completed his enormity by ſending two ruffians into his chamber, who,

eſcaping to Rome;

is betrayed by Didas,

and treacherouſly put to death.

BOOK VI.

ſmothering this unfortunate prince, put an end to his life.

Sect. 3. Infolence of Perſeus after the death of Demetrius.

Philip did not long continue ignorant of the extent of his guilt, and of his mi-fortune [19]. The conduct of Perſeus himſelf, firſt awakened his ſuſpicions. Having now no rival in his future proſpects, inſtead of that pliant and obſequious conduct, which, whilſt Demetrius lived, he had obſerved towards his father, he now treated him with the moſt inſolent neglect, affecting, on all occaſions, the haughty port of independence, and looking towards the throne with an undiſſembled impatience. A change ſo viſible and ſo ſurpriſing, made Philip call to mind the various circumſtances of the late melancholy tranſaction, to which, in the ſtorm of paſſion, he had but ſlightly attended. Suſpicions naturally aroſe, that Demetrius had fallen a ſacrifice to treachery. Among all his courtiers, ſuch is often the fate of kings, he had but one friend, Antigonus, his uncle's ſon; Antigonus had alſo been the friend of Demetrius, and, from a conviction of his innocence, ſincerely lamented his fate. To him the king often made paſſionate mention of that unhappy prince; bewailing, that his condemnation had been ſo precipitate, and wiſhing to be aſſured whether he had not fallen a victim to villany and artifice.

Philip ſuſpects that Demetrius was innocent;

is confirmed in this by Antigonus;

Philocles and Apelles, in their late embaſſy to Rome, had employed one Xychus as their ſecretary. This man Antigonus contrived to have ſecured, and brought before the king. At firſt he heſitated;

diſcovers the whole truth;

[19] See Liv. L. xl. c. 54 & ſeq.

but,

but, at ſight of the rack, confeſſed every thing: "That the ambaſſadors had acted, throughout the whole affair, in conſequence of inſtructions they had received from Perſeus;" "that the charge againſt Demetrius was altogether void of foundation;" and "that Xychus himſelf, by order of his employers, had been the forger of the letter from Flamininus."

his rage and remorſe.

All, that fierce reſentment, the tranſports of grief, the anguiſh of remorſe, can impreſs on the human mind, was now felt by the unfortunate Philip. Incenſed to madneſs, he ordered the two ambaſſadors to be inſtantly ſeized. Apelles had, upon the firſt intimation of his danger, fled to Italy [11]; the other, Philocles, after having been

He executes vengeance on one of the ambaſſadors;

[11] Upon the authority of this circumſtance, of "Apelles making his eſcape to Italy," where, had he been guilty of the death of Demetrius, he could not have expected to find protection, joined with ſome other circumſtances of this remarkable ſtory; ſuch as Philocles's perſiſting, according to ſome hiſtorians, though confronted with Xychus, and in the agonies of the rack, in the denial of all; and the Romans refuſing, when required by Philip (ſee Liv. L. xlii. c. 5.) to deliver Apelles into his hands; to which we may add Perſeus's treatment of this very Apelles, whom, when he came to the throne, inſtead of rewarding, he found means to get into his power and put to death; (ſee Liv. ibid.) Mr. Hooke in his Roman Hiſtory (ſee B. v. c. 14.) grounds a conjecture, that this *charge of forgery* againſt Perſeus and the Macedonian ambaſſadors, was the contrivance of Antigonus, who hoped, by means of it, to get the kingdom; and that Flamininus really wrote the letter aſcribed to him. And he ſuppoſes that, ſenſible of Demetrius's vanity and imprudence, and of the many juſt cauſes of complaint he had given the king, the Roman wrote it out of kindneſs to the young prince, and in

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confronted with Xychus, was put to death. Some hiſtorians ſay, that he confirmed what Xychus had depoſed; others, that he perſiſted to the laſt in an obſtinate denial [16].

the other eſcapes;

he finds it impoſſible to ſeize Perſeus,

Perſeus nevertheleſs was evidently the moſt guilty. But he had little to fear. He kept out of his father's reach; and had Philip attempted to ſeize him, he might eaſily, with the formidable party he had at his devotion, have ſet the feeble and almoſt deſerted monarch at defiance. The king did what he could. He never afterwards ſuffered him to come into his preſence; and declared it to be his determined reſolution, that he never ſhould aſcend a throne, to which he had attempted to wade through a brother's blood. He likewiſe talked of ſettling the crown on Antigonus; a ſcheme dictated by the

but reſolves to leave the throne to Antigonus;

the view of deprecating his father's anger. How far this conjecture deſerves to be admitted, the reader may judge. Livy is clear that the letter was a forgery, and Perſeus the contriver of it. But it muſt alſo be owned, that even Livy's teſtimony, in caſes of this kind, when guilt is to be thrown off Rome upon her enemies, is ſometimes queſtionable. However, allowing the letter to have been really written by Flaminius, it certainly does not follow, that the intention of it was as friendly as Mr. Hooke ſuppoſes. In fact, what could have been the deſign of ſuch a letter, but to excite new terrors in the mind of the unhappy Philip, already a prey to gloomy ſuſpicions? Indeed, this *weapon of deſtruction* did more than he meant it ſhould. It was alſo fatal to Demetrius. But at the ſame time it accompliſhed the main purpoſe for which it had been ſent; it brought Philip to his grave, and added to the diſtraction, the weakneſs, and the reproach of Macedon's royal houſe.

[16] See Liv. L. xl. c. 55.

momentary impulſe of paſſion, and which, in the utmoſt plenitude of his power, and with a much larger portion of life before him, he had probably found it difficult to effect. BOOK VI. Sect. 3.

But Philip had only a few days longer to live. The detection of Perſeus's guilt had been to him the ſtroke of death; for from that moment he dragged out a life of melancholy and languor. Though in this declining ſtate, he ſtill, however, pleaſed himſelf with the thought of taking vengeance on the Romans, to whoſe perfidious councils he chiefly aſcribed the ruin that had fallen on his houſe. Beſides the mighty preparations for war, which he had made at home, he had taken into his ſervice the whole tribe of the Baſtarnae [17], a fierce and hardy nation from the other ſide of the Danube, whom he meant to introduce into Dardania, with the view of exterminating the people of that country, who had ſold themſelves to Rome, and of pouring afterwards theſe barbarians through Illyricum into Italy. Antigonus was diſpatched to haſten their march. Whilſt he was abſent on this errand, the king breathed his laſt at Amphipolis, whither he had removed, in order to welcome his new allies, and ſee them conducted to their place of deſtination. Perſeus, who was in expectation of his father's death, and had immediate information of it, aſcended the throne without oppoſition. languiſhes, and dies. Perſeus aſcends the throne.

As to Antigonus, the favorable intentions which

[17] Liv. L. xl. c. 57.

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the king had expreſſed towards him, only ſerved to make him more particularly the object of Perſeus's reſentment. It was one of the firſt acts of his reign, to order him to execution.

and puts Antigonus to death.

Philip reigned forty-two years, from the third year of the 139th Olympiad to the firſt year of the 150th [11]; a period of time as buſy and eventful as any in the Grecian annals.

It was undoubtedly a misfortune to the Grecian people, that ſuch a prince was on the throne of Macedon when the Romans firſt invaded them. Under any Macedonian king it had been difficult to have united into one compact body theſe ſeveral ſtates, independent, and therefore naturally jealous, of each other, and from whoſe jarring intereſts, conteſts were perpetually ariſing; but under a prince like Philip, whoſe ambitious attempts and repeated treacheries provoked every ſuſpicion, it was impoſſible. The Romans ſaw this, and with their uſual policy turned it to their own advantage. Philip had beſides, if Polybius and Livy may be credited, moſt of thoſe private vices which mark the tyrant; he was intemperate, libidinous, vindictive, cruel; as a king, unworthy of truſt; as a man, an object of deteſtation.

Character of Philip.

Yet amidſt theſe deep ſhades with which we find his character darkened, he appears to have had qualities of a very different caſt. His generous and noble acts, as we have already ſeen, had ſo endeared him to many of the Achaean confederates,

[11] From about the 218th to the 175th year before Chriſt.

that when the queſtion was put, whether Achaia ſhould have alliance with Rome or Macedon, the deputies of ſeveral of the Achaean cities pleaded his cauſe with uncommon warmth, in oppoſition to the ruling party ſupported by the Roman power; and at laſt, when their oppoſition could not avail, left the diet rather than ſeem, by their preſence, to give ſanction to a meaſure injurious to the Macedonian king. The eſtimation in which he was held by many others of the Grecian ſtates, is not leſs to his honor. He was alſo poſſeſſed of many amiable accompliſhments; and ſuch were the elegance of his court, and the eaſe and dignity of his manners, that Scipio Africanus himſelf, who ſpent ſome days with Philip in his way to Aſia, ſpoke of him with eſteem and high commendation[19]. — Was he ſo able a diſſembler? — Or ſhall we rather ſay, that, had the accounts of other writers, leſs under the influence of Rome, reached us, his faults had not been handed down to us with ſo many heavy aggravations?

As to thoſe exceſſes of violence and bloodſhed which, the caſe of Aratus excepted, are more particularly the reproach of his later years, even Polybius[20] acknowledges, that after the overthrow of Antiochus, when he found his numerous and ſignal ſervices to Rome repaid with perfidiouſneſs and hoſtility, a total change in his diſpoſition became conſpicuous. The mortification of ſeeing himſelf

[19] See Liv. L. xxxvii. c. 7.

[20] De virt. & vitiis, p. 1436.

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fallen from the dignity of a ſovereign prince, into a ſtate of humiliating dependence on a haughty, powerful, and enterpriſing republic; and of finding all his ſecret enemies called forth againſt him, from every quarter of Greece, by the open encouragement or inſidious arts of Rome; were circumſtances ſufficiently painful; which, added to the diſtractions of his own family, might, it may eaſily be ſuppoſed, have ſoured his mind, and rendered his temper as age advanced, more gloomy and ſuſpicious.

As a king, he had unqueſtionably great abilities. In war, he often gave proofs both of his courage and his conduct. The marine of Macedon was altogether of his formation; before his time, it had ſcarcely an exiſtence; under him, it ſoon became conſiderable; and by the commercial connexions and ſettlements which he made in different parts, he ſo ſucceſsfully extended the Macedonian trade, as to excite the jealouſy of the greateſt commercial ſtates of Aſia. His conduct in regard to Syria, it muſt be confeſſed, was impolitic to a high degree. The ruin of Antiochus, it was obvious, muſt pave the way to his own. Sound policy pointed out, therefore, an alliance with that prince, and with other powers of Europe and Aſia. But in thoſe days [21], the balance of power was a matter little

[21] "Le monde de ce temps-là," ſays an ingenious modern, "n'étoit pas comme notre monde d'aujourd'hui: les voyages, "les conquêtes, le commerce, l'établiſſement des grands "états, les inventions des poſtes, de la bouſſole, & de l'imprimerie, une certaine police générale, ont facilité les communications, & établi parmi nous un art, qu'on appelle

underſtood. And from the narrow and confined views which each ſtate had of its own intereſts; from the want of proper intelligence of the tranſactions and probable deſigns of other kingdoms; and from the jealouſies which Rome induſtriouſly kept alive between nation and nation; every potentate, if not immediately attacked, looked on with unconcern whilſt his neighbour was deſtroyed; not conſidering, that the fate of one neceſſarily involved in it the fate of all.

ardent to the laſt in his enmity to Rome:

The latter part of his reign ſhows, that he had a proper ſenſe of his treatment from Rome, and, had he not been broken by the misfortunes of his own houſe, it is probable ſhe had ſtill found him a vigorous and formidable adverſary. So ardent was he to the laſt, in the purſuit of his favorite ſcheme of attacking the Romans, that about a year before his death, he aſcended to the top of mount Haemus [21], an attempt of immenſe labor, and exceedingly perilous, merely becauſe he had been told, that from the ſummit of this mountain might be ſeen the Adriatic ſea and the whole country of Italy to the Alps, the deſtined ſcene of his future operations. The meaſure he adopted, of introducing the Baſtarnae, was certainly a deep ſtroke in politics; and, had he lived to have brought his plan to maturity, or had, his ſucceſſor had the

" la politique: chacun voit d'un coup d'œil tout ce qui ſe " remue dans l'Univers."

Grand. & Décad. des Rom. c. 1.

[21] Liv. L. xl. c. 21.

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abilities to make a right uſe of this new connexion, it had probably laid Italy open to ſuch inroads, as would have left her little leiſure for the invaſion of other kingdoms [21].

his preparations for war.

Philip, beſides, without making any ſhow of war, or giving the Romans the leaſt ſuſpicion of his operations, had collected at home an army more numerous and better diſciplined than any he had ever brought into the field. He had laid up, Plutarch [22] tells us, in his arſenals, arms for thirty thouſand men; in his garriſons eight millions of

[21] It appears, that the Romans were ſoon ſenſible of their danger, had Philip's plan been carried into execution. We are informed by Livy (L. xl v. c. 1.) that, about eight years after this period, the conſul Caſſius would have attempted to penetrate from the Lower Gaul through Illyricum into Greece, in order to join the other conſul; but that the ſenate, upon the firſt intimation of his project, ſent him peremptory orders not to proceed, "leſt he ſhould ſhow the neighbouring bar-"barians the way by which they might enter Italy." Mithridates, we read, ſome time before his death, had adopted Philip's plan, and, had not his ſon's revolt baffled his ſchemes, would probably have executed it. Upon the ſame principle, Auguſtus, who, from the fate of Lollius and Quinctilius Varus, had found what formidable foes theſe fierce tribes were, and how vain it was to attempt the wilds and deep foreſts they inhabited, appointed the Danube for the boundary of the Roman empire on that ſide, having ſecured the hither-banks of it by a ſtrong line of forts and military ſtations; and even left an expreſs injunction to his ſucceſſors, not to paſs beyond it (Dio Caſſius) as if foreſeeing, that from this quarter were to iſſue forth thoſe nations who, during a length of ages, were to be the terror and the ſcourge of Rome.

[22] In Paul. Aemilio.

measures of wheat; with money in his treasury to defray the charge of maintaining ten thousand mercenaries for ten years. And all this was executed, after he had been reduced and plundered by the Romans, cut off from the benefits of commerce, and obliged to retire within the ancient boundaries of Macedon. A striking proof of his abilities, and of the resources of that kingdom under an able and active prince.

But all the designs of Philip were defeated by the machinations of treacherous policy: the flame of jealousy and division was kindled in his family to which the unhappy Demetrius fell a victim, and by which the aged monarch himself was sent broken-hearted to the grave. Rome exulted in her success, beheld with joy all his bold and well-concerted projects at an end; and, in the future vassalage of Macedon, contemplated one more prostrate kingdom groaning under Roman domination.

HISTORY

OF GREECE.

BOOK VII.

SECTION I.

CONTENTS.

Perſeus aſcends the throne of Macedon — begins his reign with ſome appearance of vigor — courts the affections of the Macedonian people, and the friendſhip of the neighbouring ſtates. — The Romans jealous — prefer ſundry complaints againſt him, and invade Greece. — Perſeus, with advantages in his favor, loſes the benefit of them by his avarice and puſillanimity. — Suffers himſelf to be over-reached by the Romans — neglects to improve the repeated opportunities, which, during the ſpace of three years, the incapacity or the corruption of the Roman commanders preſented to him.

BOOK VII. Sect. I. Perſeus begins

THE firſt years of the reign of Perſeus exhibit ſcenes which by no means juſtified that contempt in which the Romans appear to have held Macedon at the time of his acceſſion [1], or the opinion which

[1] OLYMP. CLI. BEFORE CHRIST 175.

hiſtorians tell us had been generally entertained of Perſeus himſelf. His chief object was, to eſtabliſh himſelf in the affections of the Macedonian people; and, as if the late ſanguinary meaſures had been altogether his father's crimes, he immediately aſſumed an air of benignity and gentleneſs. Antigonus, his rival in the kingdom, had ſuffered the fate which uſually attends the unſucceſsful rivals of kings [2]; but Perſeus prevented the apprehenſions of farther ſeverities, by publiſhing a general pardon to offenders of every deſcription. He not only recalled all thoſe whom fear or judicial condemnation had, in the courſe of the late reign, driven from their country; but he ordered even the income of their fortunes, during their exile, to be reimburſed [3]. To the reſt of his ſubjects, his whole deportment, in like manner, exhibited princely dignity and parental tenderneſs. Whatever debts were due to the crown of Macedon at the period of his father's death, he remitted. Skilful in the art of war, which he had ſtudied under his father, he made the diſcipline of his troops, and the improvement and ſtrength of his kingdom, his principal occupation; and he carefully avoided thoſe illiberal exceſſes which diſgraced a great part of Philip's reign.

his reign with an appearance of ability;

his conduct at home,

His conduct to foreign ſtates was equally conciliating. Ambaſſadors were ſent to the Roman ſenate, to notify his acceſſion to the throne, and to requeſt a confirmation of the treaties ſubſiſting between

and abroad.

[2] See Liv. L. xlii. c. 5. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

[3] Polyb. de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1440.

BOOK VII. Sect. I.

Rome and Macedon. Rome anſwered with the ſame diſſimulation with which he had probably addreſſed her; acknowledged his title, and pronounced him the friend and ally of the Roman people [4]. To the ſeveral ſtates of Greece and Aſia he made his application with more ſincerity. Senſible of what importance it was to ſtrengthen himſelf by alliances with the powers around him, he ſtudied to remove thoſe jealouſies, to which his father's ambitious projects had given birth. With the Rhodians [5] he found little difficulty. Relieved from the uneaſy ſuſpicions which Philip's naval improvements had occaſioned, they ſaw the miſtake they had been guilty of, in aſſiſting the Romans to overthrow the power of Macedon; and eſpouſed with cordiality the intereſts of Perſeus. Pruſias [6] of Bithynia was prevailed on with the ſame eaſe; and, to render the connexion betwixt this prince and himſelf more binding, Perſeus gave him his ſiſter in marriage. The Syrian court was not leſs favorably diſpoſed. Antiochus was dead, and his ſon Seleucus on the throne; who, irritated by his father's ſufferings and his own, willingly gave ear to every thing Perſeus had to urge againſt the Romans [7]. He found, therefore, no difficulty in convincing

[4] Liv. L. xl. c. 58.

[5] Polyb. Legat. lxv. & lxvii.

[6] Liv. L. xlii. c. 12.

[7] This was, according to Livy (L. xliv. c. 24.) the purport of the embaſſy ſent afterwards by Perſeus to Antiochus; but it is evident he had before applied to Seleucus; and as his views in both embaſſies were the ſame, ſo, very probably, in both were the ſame arguments employed.

Seleucus, that theſe republicans were, from principle, the enemies of kings; and that whatever portion of empire they had left him, would be violently wreſted from his houſe on the firſt favorable occaſion. But the weak and impoveriſhed ſtate of Syria permitted not his following the dictates of his heart. All he could do was, to wiſh Perſeus ſucceſs; and, as a pledge of his regard, to give him his daughter Laodice in marriage. The Rhodians [9] diſtinguiſhed themſelves on this occaſion; as if to make amends for having employed their arms againſt Macedon, they equipped a moſt ſuperb fleet, and deſired to have the honor of convoying the princeſs to her royal huſband. The ſame diſpoſition prevailed throughout the greater part of the Lower Aſia. Perſeus looked even as far as Carthage for confederates, and diſpatched ambaſſadors accordingly. The opportunity favored his views; exaſperated by the encroachments of Maſiniſſa, and the duplicity of Rome, the Carthaginians were ripe for violent councils; they gave audience to the ambaſſadors by night, in the temple of Aeſculapius [9], in order to conceal the tranſaction from the Romans; and immediately diſpatched ſome of their chief men, to concert meaſures with the Macedonian king.

He courts the ſtates of Greece.

Meanwhile, the emiſſaries of Perſeus had been employed in every quarter of Greece; and in ſupport of their negotiations, he made a progreſs to Delphi [10].

[9] Polyb. Legat. lx.
[9] Liv. L. xli. c. 22.
[10] Liv. L. xli. c. 22.

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Religion was his pretence; but his real objects were a diſplay of his power, a ſhow of moderation, and an appearance of a regard for the liberties of Greece. Attended by a formidable eſcort, the flower of the Macedonian army, he paſſed through Greece without hoſtility or depredation; and, having performed his devotions, returned in the ſame pacific manner to his own kingdom.

The general temper, at this period, of moſt of the Grecian ſtates.

What rendered theſe intrigues the more effectual, was the general temper of the Greeks themſelves [11]. Moſt of them began to have prophetic fears of what they had to expect, ſhould the Roman dominion be once fully eſtabliſhed in Greece, and looked on Macedon as the laſt bulwark of their liberties. Accordingly, a revolution of intereſts took place almoſt every where. The people of Epire favored Perſeus. Several of the Theſſalian tribes inclined to the ſame ſide. The Boeotians declared themſelves avowedly; and, having put to death the moſt ſtrenuous of the Roman partiſans, entered into an alliance with Macedon; and, to give the ſtronger ſanction to the treaty, cauſed it to be engraven on tables of braſs, and ſet up in the temples of Delphi, Delos, and Thebes. The Aetolians, though divided into two factions, animated by all that virulence which civil diſcords produce, agreed in one point, that Perſeus ſhould be the arbiter of their differences. Athens and Achaia alone ſtood firm to the Roman cauſe; though even Achaia was nearly loſt to Rome. The Achaean

[11] See Liv. L. xlii. c. 12 & ſeq.

ſtates, in the days of Philip, had prohibited by law all communication with Macedon; many of the Achaean ſlaves availing themſelves of this interdiction, had fled from their maſters, and taken refuge in the Macedonian territories. Perſeus, to ingratiate himſelf with the Achaean people [11], cauſed as many of theſe ſlaves as could be found to be ſent back; accompanying the preſent with a letter, in which he requeſted the reſcinding of this unſocial edict; and that a friendly intercourſe ſhould again be opened between the two nations. The requeſt was plauſible, and met with powerful advocates in its favor among the Achaeans. But upon a repreſentation by the friends of Rome, that it was beneath the dignity of the Achaean ſtates to take public notice of a letter, ſent by a private meſſenger, conveying a requiſition, which ſhould have been made in form by ambaſſadors, in order to be laid before the next general diet, the farther conſideration of the matter was poſtponed; and afterwards, when the national convention was held, they had influence ſufficient to defeat the propoſition.

The domeſtic advantages poſſeſſed by Perſeus.

Excluſive of the advantages Perſeus might derive from the well-grounded jealouſy of Roman ambition, which was entertained by moſt of the Grecian ſtates, he ſucceeded to all thoſe mighty preparations which his father had made during the latter years of his life. He had a rich treaſury; an army, numerous, well diſciplined, and well

[11] Liv. L. xli. c. 23.

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appointed; and, both in Thrace and Illyricum, a number of petty princes, connected with his crown, were ready to march at his command The vigor of his operations appeared at the ſame time not unworthy of his power. The Dolopians [11] had conteſted ſome of his claims, and had made their appeal to Rome; but, regardleſs of this appeal, he entered their country, and reduced them to ſubjection. The people of Byzantium, preſſed by Eumenes, had applied to him for aid; when he immediately ſent forces to their aſſiſtance, and obliged the king of Pergamus to retire. Abrypolis, who reigned over a diſtrict of Illyricum, and was one of the allies of Rome, having made an inroad into Macedon, Perſeus marched immediately againſt him, put him to flight, and purſued him into his own dominions, of which he took poſſeſſion. And even afterwards, when attacked by the Romans themſelves, he maintained war againſt them for three years, with conſiderable ſucceſs.

In what manner all this ſeeming ſtrength came to be annihilated, and ſo many advantages to terminate in diſcomfiture, and the utter extirpation of him and the houſe of Macedon, is a fit ſubject for hiſtorical inquiry.

His error in relation to the Baſtarnae.

Perſeus, at the very commencement of his reign, was guilty of a capital error. The Baſtarnae, of whom mention has been made, were on their march through Thrace when his father died. Philip had ſtipulated the ſubſidy they were to receive,

[11] Liv. L. xli. c. 22. L. xlii. c. 12.

and

and the different ſums to be paid to the chiefs of the Thracian tribes for granting them a free paſſage through their territories. Perſeus, who, although poſſeſſed of immenſe treaſures, was under the dominion of the moſt ſordid avarice, would not abide by theſe ſtipulations; in conſequence of which, the Baſtarnae refuſed to advance, thirty thouſand men excepted, who having already entered the Macedonian frontiers, purſued their route to Dardania. The reſt halted in Thrace; where, provoked by the treatment they had met with, they fell on the people of the country, and, as if to indemnify themſelves, plundered wherever they came: ſo that Perſeus loſt an ally, who had probably rendered Macedon, at leaſt for the preſent, exceedingly formidable; whilſt he at the ſame time forfeited the confidence of his Thracian neighbours, who were not only defrauded of the promiſed ſubſidy, but compelled, through his perfidiouſneſs, to take up arms in their own defence.

From the importance of the ſervices performed by the thirty thouſand Baſtarnae who entered Dardania [14], the conſequences are obvious had the whole force of thoſe emigrants, ſaid to amount to upwards of a hundred thouſand men, been poured into this country. The Dardanians, heretofore the moſt active enemies of Macedon on that ſide, now finding more than ſufficient employment at home, were forced to retreat to their ſtrong-holds; where, with difficulty, they maintained themſelves againſt

[14] See Liv. L. xli. c. 19. & Polyb. Legat. lxii.

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those bold invaders. The Bastarnae found powerful auxiliaries in the Scordisci [15], a fierce nation to the north-west of Dardania, whose settlements extended to the confines of Italy; and who, originally from the same neighbourhood, and similar in language and in manners, rejoiced in the opportunity of joining their kindred tribes. At length, however, neglected by Macedon, and hopeless of supplies from their own country, the Bastarnae were under the necessity of retiring homewards; but even then, not dispirited by their situation, they made good their retreat, and without any material loss regained the banks of the Danube. The sequel of their adventures [16] seems, by the Roman historians, to be heightened by the marvellous. We are informed, that the Danube being frozen over, as they approached their own confines, they attempted to pass over on the ice, which breaking under them, they all perished. The like fate, Livy [17] tells us, involved their countrymen who had halted in Thrace; most of them, according to him, being miraculously destroyed by a violent tempest of thunder and lightning. The

[15] Justin, or rather Trogus, (L. xxxii. c. 3.) is of opinion, that they were a part of those known by the name of Gauls, who had emigrated under Brennus and his fellow-leaders, and who had settled in this country after their unsuccessful attempt on Delphi. According to this historian, they had their head-settlement near the confluence of the Save and the Danube, in that part of Hungary where Belgrade now stands.

[16] See Liv. L. xli. Supplem. Frensh.

[17] L. xl. c. 58.

truth of both theſe accounts is much to be queſtioned: they probably took their riſe from ſome vague reports, at firſt readily believed, and afterwards induſtriouſly propagated, by a people whoſe vanity it was to imagine, "that, to have marched forth in ſupport of the enemies of Rome, was an impiety which it concerned Heaven to puniſh." And it even appears from Strabo [11], who is ſilent as to theſe tales of wonder, that the Romans of thoſe days, far from having a knowledge of the hiſtory of the different tribes of this part of Germany, ſcarcely were inſtructed even in their names. BOOK VII. Sect. I.

The Romans ſoon diſcovered, or at leaſt ſuſpected, the deſigns of Perſeus. The invaſion of Dardania by the Baſtarnae; his reducing the Dolopes; the relief he had ſent to the Byſantines; and his progreſs to Delphi; had raiſed an alarm at Rome. Commiſſioners had repeatedly been diſpatched to demand the reaſon of theſe hoſtilities, and, above all, to inſpect narrowly into the ſituation of affairs in Macedon. During the firſt years of his reign, Perſeus had ſubmitted to the pleaſure of the ſenate, and had given the different commiſſioners an honorable reception. But provoked at length, that meſſengers from Rome ſhould ſtill continue to infeſt his court, renewing inquiries, of which he plainly ſaw the deſign, he began to ſhow his reſentment at the indignity; and Caius Valerius Laevinus, with ſome other Roman patricians, having, in the ſeventh year of his reign, come to Macedon on

The Romans, jealous of Perſeus, ſend commiſſioners into Macedon;

Perſeus treats them with contempt.

[11] See L. vii. p. 203, 204. Caſaubon.

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the uſual errand, he put them off from day to day, under various pretences, until at laſt they were obliged to leave Macedon, without an audience [19].

The machinations of Eumenes:

The report of the contempt with which their commiſſioners had been treated, had already reached the ſenate, when Eumenes of Pergamus afforded new matter to ſtrengthen their ſuſpicions [20]. Mortified at the increaſe of power which he ſaw Macedon was acquiring, and apprehenſive of the conſequences to himſelf, ſhould that kingdom be reſtored to its ancient ſplendor, he haſtened to Rome; and having obtained a private audience of the ſenate, laid before them a full account of the formidable appearance of the Macedonians, and of the enterpriſing ſpirit of their king; of the treaſures he poſſeſſed; the mighty armaments he had in readineſs; and the alliances he had formed with moſt of the Greek and Aſiatic ſtates, who, from a ſettled jealouſy of Rome, were prepared upon the firſt opportunity to unite againſt her as a common foe.

is received favorably at Rome.

The ſenate acknowleged the zeal which Eumenes manifeſted on this occaſion, by beſtowing on him extraordinary honors; he was preſented not only with magnificent gifts, but alſo with the higheſt enſigns of Roman magiſtracy, the curule chair and the ivory wand. The utmoſt precaution was at the ſame time taken, that no part of his information ſhould tranſpire. It only was whiſpered in

[19] See Liv. L. xli. c. 25 & L. xlii. c. 2.

[20] Liv. L. xlii. c. 11 & ſeq.

Rome, that Eumenes had attended the ſenate with very intereſting intelligence; and it was not till after the overthrow of Perſeus, that the particulars were made public [21]. This affectation of ſecrecy, together with their effuſions of gratitude to the Pergamenian king, were evidently deſigned to impreſs the Roman people with apprehenſions of mighty dangers from Macedon, and of the abſolute neceſſity of a war; the moſt urgent motives to which, were however the ambition and avarice of the ſenators themſelves.

Perſeus ſends ambaſſadors to counteract Eumenes;

Perſeus, who had notice that Eumenes had ſet out for Rome, cauſed ambaſſadors to follow him; where for ſeveral days they attended in vain, ſoliciting an audience; which having at length obtained, they were treated with ſuch marks of ſlight and diſreſpect, that Harpalus, at the head of the deputation, could not ſuppreſs his indignation: "The "king," ſaid he to the ſenate, "wiſhes to be "believed, when he declares, that neither by words "nor by actions has he given the Roman people "cauſe to think him an enemy; but if he finds "that you are ſeeking a pretence againſt him, he "wants not courage to defend himſelf. The chance "of war is alike to both; the iſſue uncertain." [22]

their remonſtrance to the Roman ſenate.

The Macedonian king had no poſitive information of the buſineſs of Eumenes at Rome; but, from the character of that prince, and the hoſtile purpoſes the Romans ſeemed now to avow, he

[21] See Liv. L. xlii. c. 14.

[22] Liv. L. xlii. c. 14.

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Perſeus ſeeks to revenge himſelf on Eumenes.

ſuſpected it, and meditated vengeance. In his ſervice was Evander of Crete, a captain of auxiliaries: this officer, with three Macedonians accuſtomed to the perpetration of ſuch crimes, he employed to aſſaſſinate Eumenes, who had declared his intention of taking the route of Delphi, in his return homeward in order to ſacrifice to the Delphic god. The ſituation of Delphi, on the declivity of a mountain, rendered the road to it for the moſt part ſteep and difficult; and the path leading to the temple, winded through a valley ſo narrow, that only one perſon could paſs at a time. Here the aſſaſſins took their ſtand, concealed by a wall that hung over this hollow way, and waited the approach of the king [21]. His retinue had moved forward, and laſt of all came Eumenes himſelf, preceded by Pantaleon an Aetolian chief; when the wretches, juſt as the king came under the wall, tumbled down upon him two huge ſtones, one of which falling on his head, and the other on his ſhoulders, ſtruck him to the ground, and a ſhower of ſmall ſtones ſucceeding, ſeemed to have overwhelmed the unfortunate monarch; when the aſſaſſins, thinking they had effectuated their purpoſe, made their eſcape up the mountain, after having killed one of their accomplices, whoſe ſlowneſs of pace expoſed them to a diſcovery.

Eumenes eſcapes with life.

Eumenes, however, was not dead. His attendants, Pantaleon excepted, had all fled upon ſeeing their maſter fall; but now gathering round, they

[21] See Liv. L. xlii. c. 15 & ſeq.

found him, though ſenſeleſs, ſtill warm and breathing. They immediately conveyed him to a place of ſafety in the neighbourhood, and ſoon after to Aegina, where he lay concealed till he was in a condition to be removed to Aſia. For ſome time a report of his death prevailed, and ſo confidently was it believed, that his brother purpoſed to take poſſeſſion of the kingdom, and to marry the wife of Eumenes. Already had he been *talking*, as Livy terms it, *with* the queen, and the commander of the citadel of Pergamus, when tidings arrived, that his brother was returning. From another brother, and a prince, this precipitancy might have provoked the ſharpeſt reprehenſion. Eumenes, however, contented himſelf with telling Attalus in a whiſper, "not to think for the future of marrying his brother's wife, until he was certain "that her huſband was dead."

All the friends of Eumenes conſidered Perſeus as the author of the aſſaſſination, although no direct proof could be brought againſt him. The Romans undertook the tracing of this dark affair. A woman of ſome diſtinction, named Praxo, who lived at Delphi, was known to have connexions with the Macedonian king, and at her houſe the aſſaſſins were ſaid to have lodged. Valerius, lately one of the commiſſioners at the court of Macedon, who was now at Chalcis, contrived to carry off this woman to Rome; where Rammius of Brunduſium, who had informed Valerius that he had important diſcoveries to make, alſo attended him. From the teſtimony of theſe two perſons, accord-

Perſeus is charged with the aſſaſſination.

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ing to the Roman writers, the cleareſt evidence appeared of Perſeus's guilt. Praxo confeſſed ſhe knew the aſſaſſins, and that they were employed by Perſeus, having received them into her houſe in conſequence of his directions. And Rammius, who generally entertained at Brunduſium every eminent perſon, Greek or Roman, in their paſſage to and from Greece, depoſed, that Perſeus had practiſed with him to poiſon not only Eumenes, but other perſons whom he was to have named; that, apprehenſive for his own life, Rammius had promiſed compliance; and that a poiſon of the moſt ſubtle kind had been delivered to him, for the propoſed purpoſe, by Perſeus himſelf.

Commiſſioners ſent to Perſeus to demand reparation;

With a prince of ſuch a character (for at Rome theſe ſeveral charges were conſidered as undoubted facts) the ſenate held it a reproach to be on terms of amity; commiſſioners [24] were therefore immediately diſpatched, requiring him to deſiſt from all further acts of violence, and to make ample reparation for what he had already been guilty of; and, ſhould he refuſe to comply, to renounce, in the name of the Roman people, all friendſhip and alliance with him. Perſeus, probably apprized of the purpoſe of the embaſſy, after making the deputies wait ſeveral days for an audience, condeſcended at laſt to admit them, when they were on the point of returning to Rome unheard. The freedom of their remonſtrances added to the indignation which already ſwelled within him, and he retorted on them the keeneſt recriminations;

he treats them with inſult.

[24] Liv. L. xlii. c. 25.

exclaimed againſt the haughtineſs of the Romans; their inſolence to kings; their inſatiable luſt of empire; and their infeſting his court with their daily ambaſſadors, who joined the mean artifices of ſpies to the imperiouſneſs of deſpots, to whoſe control they expected he ſhould ſubject all his actions. Unmoved by this intemperate language, they calmly demanded an anſwer to the requiſitions they had made. "To-morrow," ſaid he, "you ſhall have it under my hand." Accordingly, next day he delivered them a writing, in which he declared, "That as to the treaty of alliance ſaid to ſubſiſt between Macedon and Rome, he held himſelf no way bound by it; that it was a contract entered into by his father, and binding on him only; that at his acceſſion, when not yet firmly ſeated on his throne, he had ſubmitted to it from policy; — yet he was ſtill ready to conclude a treaty of alliance with Rome on equitable conditions, and if they had ſuch to offer, he would take it into conſideration." The reply of the Roman deputies was ſhort. They pronounced Perſeus to be no longer the ally of Rome. And Perſeus, in the voice of defiance, commanded them, within three days to quit Macedon.

A Roman army paſſes into Greece.

This apparent vigor was but poorly ſupported on the part of Perſeus. The ſenate, upon the report of their ambaſſadors, had ordered a body of eight thouſand foot and four hundred horſe, under the command of the praetor Cn. Sicinius, to march into Epire [21]. The inſtant Perſeus heard of this,

[21] Olymp. cli. 4. Before Christ 202.

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he ſeems to have ſhrunk with diſmay from the approaching conteſt; for he ſent ambaſſadors to Rome, to ſolicit terms of peace. They were received as he might have expected: they had audience, not in the ſenate, but without the city, in the temple of Bellona [25], as coming from a prince the declared enemy of Rome; and after ſome queſtions, relative to certain hoſtile attempts lately committed by the king of Macedon in Perrhaebia and Theſſaly, concerning which, the ambaſſadors ſaid they had no inſtructions, they were ordered to leave Italy within eleven days, and to tell their maſter, never more to preſume to ſend embaſſies to Rome, but to make his future application to the commanders of the Roman armies in Greece.

Perſeus ſends ambaſſadors to ſolicit peace.

who are ordered to leave Italy.

Sicinius was ſoon after followed by five commiſſioners, appointed by the ſenate to viſit the Grecian ſtates, and to confirm them in the intereſts of Rome; of whom Aulus Hoſtilius and Quintus Marcius Philippus had Epire, Aetolia, and Theſſaly, aſſigned to them for their department. The father of Marcius had been the gueſt and friend of the late king of Macedon. The mean-ſpirited Perſeus laid hold of this circumſtance; and though he had already applied by letter to the five commiſſioners upon their arrival on the coaſt of Greece, deſiring to be informed why he was threatened with hoſtilities, and had been anſwered with manifeſt contempt; he nevertheleſs renewed his application to Marcius at Lariſſa, reminded him of the

Roman commiſſioners ſent into Greece.

Perſeus applies to Marcius;

[25] Liv. L. xli. c. 46.

mutual hoſpitality by which their families were united; and requeſted, that he might be admitted to a conference [27].

the policy of Marcius;

Marcius received the application in the moſt gracious manner. "He had often," he ſaid, "heard "his father mention his connexions with the Ma- "cedonian king; and it was chiefly in the view "of doing Perſeus ſervice, that he had accepted "of his preſent commiſſion; he therefore chear- "fully granted him the conference which he de- "ſired." Accordingly, on the appointed day, the Macedonian king and the two Roman commiſ- ſioners arrived on the oppoſite banks of the Peneus. The Romans were accompanied by deputies from moſt of the Grecian ſtates, who, either anxious for their own fate, or as a mark of reſpect to Rome, had come to witneſs the important iſſue; and Perſeus was attended by his guards, with a number of Macedonian lords and Thracian chiefs. The adjuſting of the ceremonial was the firſt point in queſtion, whether the king ſhould paſs the river to the Romans, or the Romans to the king. The compliment ſeemed to be due to regal dignity: but it was the policy of Rome to manifeſt a con- tempt of royalty; and, as the king had requeſted the conference, the Romans alledged, that he ſhould yield the point of precedency. At length, by an inſipid kind of jeſt, Marcius put an end to the conteſt: "let the younger," ſaid he, "paſs "to the elder, the ſon to the father," alluding to

[27] Liv. xlii. c. 38. & ſeq.

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his own name, Philip. The next point was, whether the king ſhould paſs over with only a few of his guards, or with all his retinue. The latter Perſeus inſiſted on, as moſt honorable: but in that caſe Marcius required hoſtages, that no act of hoſtility ſhould be committed. To this humiliation alſo the Macedonian king was obliged to ſubmit.

his artful charge againſt Perſeus.

Marcius opened the conference with many profeſſions of his perſonal regard for Perſeus, at the ſame time acquitting the Romans of having provoked the impending war, of which he aſſerted the king alone was guilty, whoſe repeated acts of violence had made it neceſſary for Rome to ſend an army into Greece. In one point only, he told Perſeus, the ſenate thought he had acted wiſely, in ſending his ambaſſadors to renew the treaty of alliance with the Roman people; and yet, how much better had it been never to have renewed the treaty, than to have broken it as ſoon as renewed. Abrupolis, the friend of Rome, he had driven from his kingdom. Artetarus, the moſt faithful confederate that the Romans had among all the Illyrian princes, had fallen by domeſtic treachery, and to his murderers he had given an aſylum in his dominions; evidently ſhowing, to ſpeak in the mildeſt terms, how much he rejoiced in their treaſon. In direct contravention of the late ſtipulations, he had marched an army through the midſt of Greece to Delphi; he had ſent ſuccours to the Byzantines; he had entered into a league with the Boeotians; he had made war on the Dolopes. Everſa and Callicritus, the Theban

ambaſſadors, periſhed as they were returning from Rome; "I would rather aſk," continued Marcius, "whoſe crime this was, than fix it on any individual. Violent commotions have ariſen in Aetolia, "in which ſome of the principal men have loſt "their lives; by what party but the Macedonian "were thoſe commotions excited? Eumenes had "nearly fallen a ſacrifice to treachery before the "altars at Delphi; I am unwilling to name the "perſon he accuſes. As to Rammius, what diſ-"coveries he has made, your own ambaſſadors, "no doubt, have already informed you. The "hearing of theſe things is irkſome to you. You "brought it on yourſelf, by inquiring, in the "letter which you addreſſed to us, why the Romans "ſend an army into Macedon, or garriſon the "cities of their allies. You have now heard their "reaſons. And, harſh as you may think the anſwer, "you would probably have thought yourſelf more "ſeverely treated had your inquiry been left alto-"gether unanſwered. Mindful of the friendſhip "that ſubſiſted between our fathers, I ſhall lend "a favorable ear to whatever you can offer in "your juſtification; and I wiſh you may furniſh "me with arguments to plead your cauſe in the "ſenate."

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The king's anſwer.

So ſevere a charge, delivered in this manner, not only before a number of his own ſubjects, but alſo in the preſence of the deputies of the Grecian ſtates, ſhows little of that tender concern for Perſeus, by which the Roman pretended to be actuated. And, what renders this conduct more worthy of

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notice, it appears from the defence which Livy has put in the mouth of the Macedonian king, that of theſe accuſations, ſome were evidently ill-grounded, and many heightened with much unfair aggravation. Rammius, Perſeus declared, had never been at the court of Macedon but once, nor was he ever expected there again: how improbable therefore was it, that he ſhould intruſt a perſon, in whoſe fidelity he could not repoſe confidence, with a commiſſion of ſo delicate and hazardous a nature? The Theban ambaſſadors, it was well known, had periſhed by ſhipwreck. The murderers of Artetarus he had ordered to be expelled from his dominions the inſtant he heard that they had taken refuge there. With relation to Eumenes, he was ſenſible he had been pointed at as the author of his aſſaſſination; but upon what kind of evidence! had that prince, whoſe oppreſſions had made him odious throughout Greece and Aſia, no enemies to fear but from Macedon? — This was his reply to thoſe articles, that concerned him as an individual; as a king, his anſwer was yet ſtronger. Abrupolis, unprovoked, had made an inroad into Macedon, and had ſpread his depredations as far as Amphipolis, before Perſeus took up arms againſt him; on whom lay the blame, if the iſſue of the war proved fatal to this lawleſs invader? The province of Dolopia had been aſſigned to the Macedonian king by the Romans themſelves; the Dolopians nevertheleſs had riſen againſt Euphranor, the Macedonian governor, and had put him to death, with circumſtances of the moſt barbarous

cruelty; when did it become criminal in a prince, to reduce rebellious ſubjects to obedience? He had marched through a part of Greece to Delphi, in diſcharge of his vows; but if any of the ſtates that lay on his way, could make it appear, that the ſmalleſt outrage had been offered to them, or if, under the diſguiſe of religion he had been found to conceal any ambitious deſign, he was willing to ſubmit to condemnation. Reſpecting his aſſiſting the Byzantines, and his league with the Boeotians, his ambaſſadors had already explained thoſe matters to the ſenate, who, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of a few, had accepted of his apology. "This "defence of mine," he added, "will be received "by thoſe who hear me, according to their paſ- "ſions and affections; nor is it of ſo much import- "ance, what my conduct or my views have been, "as in what light you mean to ſee my actions. "My conſcience bears me witneſs, that I have "not offended knowingly; and if through igno- "rance I have tranſgreſſed, inſtructed by your "reproof, I ſhall endeavour to correct whatever "is amiſs. I have certainly done nothing wrong, "which I may not remedy, nor for which you can "think I merit all the horrors of an impending war. "With little reaſon therefore are you renowned "for moderation and diſpaſſionate councils, if, "for cauſes that ſcarcely deſerve expoſtulation, you "take up arms againſt princes who are your friends "and allies."

Marcius ſeemed much moved, and wiſhed the king again to ſend ambaſſadors to Rome, with

An inſidious truce propoſed by Marcius;

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conciliating propoſals. The difficulty was, how, in the mean while, to ſuſpend hoſtilities. After many labored objections from the Romans, Marcius, "who could not," he ſaid, "but reverence the "ſacred ties of hoſpitality, which ſubſiſted between "Perſeus and him," appeared to yield at laſt to the ſolicitations of the king; and granted him a truce, until his ambaſſadors ſhould have time to return.

All this ſpecious ſhow of friendſhip to the Macedonian king, was no more than a feint [99], which Marcius employed, in order to betray him into this very truce, the moſt ruinous meaſure that the unhappy prince could poſſibly have adopted. It will be proper to enter into an explanation of this matter.

the ruinous conſequence of it to Perſeus.

When Sicinius and the Roman commiſſioners arrived in Greece, they found the ſituation of things very different from what they had expected. Perſeus was at the head of an army the beſt appointed and moſt numerous that Macedon had ſeen ſince the days of the great Alexander; his exchequer rich, and his magazines of war completely ſupplied; whilſt his ſubjects appeared united and hearty in his ſervice. Beſides the intereſt he was at the ſame time ſaid to have with the Aſiatics, as well as with his Illyrian and Thracian neighbours, there was, throughout all ſtates of Greece, a general diſpoſition in his favor. The people were every where for Macedon; and though ſeveral of their leaders

[99] Liv. L. xli. c. 43.

were,

were, from a principle of venality or ambition, attached to Rome, yet even among the chief men, Perſeus had many perſonal friends; and, in general, the wiſeſt and the beſt men in every city, apprehenſive of what muſt be the fate of Greece ſhould the Roman power remain without control, wiſhed ſucceſs to Perſeus. As Licinius, the new conſul, at the ſame time, had not yet made the neceſſary levies, and the force of the Romans in Greece was but inconſiderable, had Perſeus, inſtead of ſending his daſtardly deputations to the Roman commiſſioners, to inquire what brought them into Greece, taken advantage of this fortunate aſſemblage of circumſtances, and attacked his enemies the inſtant they landed, he could hardly have failed of victory; when, encouraged by ſuch an act of vigor, the greater part of Greece had probably declared in his favor. But the timidity and irreſolution of this devoted prince relieved the Romans from their embarraſſment; and they improved the opportunity. Their troops they cantoned in the ſtrong holds of Epire, ſo as to form a line along the weſtern frontier of Macedon, whilſt the five commiſſioners, taking their progreſs through the different ſtates of Greece, moſt of them ſeeing the hopes they had placed in Perſeus diſappointed by his ſpiritleſs conduct, readily promiſed whatever was aſked. The truce completed what the Romans had in view. It gave them time to provide more effectually for the war; and it ſhowed to all the confederates of Macedon, how little dependence there could be on a king, who, after all his boaſtings, and with

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the numerous advantages he poſſeſſed, was abject enough to become an humble ſuppliant for peace.

The art employed by Marcius to diſſolve the Boeotian confederacy.

The Boeotians firſt experienced the conſequences of this fatal meaſure [10]. They had, as we have ſeen, entered into a league of alliance with Perſeus. And ſeveral of their cities, when charged with this fact by the Roman commiſſioners, had alledged, that it was the act not of any particular city, but of the whole Boeotian body; in which, however, ſome of the cities had not concurred. This apology furniſhed Marcius with a hint, which rendered the league abortive, and at the ſame time deſtroyed the Boeotian power for ever. He offered to conſider every city as a ſeparate and independent ſtate, and as ſuch, to conclude with it an alliance. The pride of independence, or perhaps the dread of Rome, induced moſt of them to accept of the offer. Thus was the Boeotian confederacy, which derived its whole ſtrength from its union, crumbled into ſeparate and inconſiderable ſtates; and never afterwards recovered its ancient importance. Two Boeotian cities only, Corona and Haliartus, refuſed to depart from their alliance with Macedon; and being threatened on this account by the Thebans, now in the Roman intereſt, applied to Perſeus for protection. His anſwer was worthy of his character. "The truce had tied up his hands, and they muſt "provide for their ſafety as they could [11]."

The conduct

The Roman hiſtorians, however, tell us, that

[10] Polyb. Legat. lxiii. Liv. L. lxii. c. 38. 43.

[11] See Polyb. Legat. lxvi. Liv. L. xlii. c. 46.

upon Marcius's return to Rome, the fineſſe by which he had deceived Perſeus, obtained him but little praiſe. The old ſenators, who remembered ancient manners, could not, without abhorrence, hear a Roman ſenator pride himſelf in having practiſed deceit even on an enemy, eſpecially under the diſguiſe of friendſhip, and a pretended reverence of the ſacred rites of hoſpitality [19]. "Not ſo our "forefathers," ſaid they; "who, diſdaining a victory "that was not the prize of generous valor, in "their war with the Faliſci delivered up to the "prince of the country, the wretch who had be-"trayed into their hands the royal children in-"truſted to his care; and who again, in their wars "with Pyrrhus, warned that king, though want-"only invading them, of his phyſician's traiterous "deſigns." But their remonſtrances were over-ruled. The majority of the ſenate, now governed by other principles, approved of the conduct of Marcius; and, as the reward of his ſervices, appointed him to the command of part of the fleet to be employed on the coaſt of Greece.

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of Marcius diſapproved of by many old ſenators.

Meanwhile, Perſeus, proud of his fancied ſuperiority in the late conference, ſoothed himſelf with the thoughts of an approaching peace. "I have," ſaid he, in his diſpatches to ſome of his Aſiatic friends, "been heard before the Roman commiſ-"ſioners in vindication of my conduct, and have "fully anſwered all their objections." The return of his ambaſſadors awakened him from this deluſion.

Perſeus finds himſelf deluded:

[19] Liv. L. xlii. c. 47.

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They informed him, that, after having been admitted to the parade of an audience before the Roman ſenate, where their repreſentations had been treated with the utmoſt contempt, they had been ordered to leave Rome inſtantly, and Italy within thirty days; and that the conſul Licinius, whoſe levies were now finiſhed, was on his way to Greece.

irreſolute and fearful of entering upon a war.

Perſeus, rouſed from his dream of ſecurity, immediately convened at Pella a council of his principal nobility, in order to conſider what was to be reſolved upon in the preſent emergency [11]. Every expedient which fear could ſuggeſt, were ſucceſſively mentioned by the king, or by thoſe who poſſeſſed his confidence: they even propoſed "to "pay whatever tribute, or to give up whatever "portion of territory the Romans ſhould demand; "nay, ſhould other conditions, ſtill more humiliating, be inſiſted upon, to ſubmit even to theſe, "rather than abide the hazard of a war." Some of the council, however, proteſted warmly againſt theſe ignominious meaſures, and urged the certain ruin which muſt attend them. They inſiſted, that if the king did not mean to cede all, he muſt reſolve to give up nothing; that the rapacioufneſs of Rome would not be ſatisfied with leſs than his whole kingdom; that he was now in a condition to bid them defiance; and that, ſuppoſing even the worſt, it was far more honorable to encounter any dangers in the defence of his throne, than tamely to reſign it. — "Be war then our choice," replied

[11] Liv. L. xlii. c. 50.

the king, whether from conviction, or from ſhame; "and may the gods grant us ſucceſs!"

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The ſpirited loyalty of the Macedonians on this occaſion[11], ſhows, that whatever were the vices of the man, Perſeus was not wanting in thoſe qualities which uſually endear kings to their people. As ſoon as it was known that war was reſolved upon, from every part of Macedon he had offers of large ſubſidies, and ample ſupplies of all things neceſſary for the maintenance of an army. His conduct did him no leſs honor. He thanked his ſubjects for their honeſt zeal; but told them, that his own treaſures were ſufficient to anſwer all his demands; and that the only ſervice with which he ſhould burden them, was the furniſhing of carriages for tranſporting his machines and implements of war.

Spirited loyalty of the Macedonian people.

Perſeus was early in the field[11]; and having made himſelf maſter of the ſtreights which open from the Macedonian frontier into the vale of Tempe, had advanced, before the Romans appeared, as far as Sycurium, a city ſituated at the ſouthern extremity of mount Oſſa. He had now a favorable opportunity of opening the campaign with advantage. The conſul, on his march through Athamania to Theſſaly, was at this very time intangled in the defiles and intricate paſſes which interſect this mountainous part of Greece. Had Perſeus attacked him here, the Romans themſelves confeſſed, that a total defeat was almoſt unavoidable: but fearful of

Perſeus takes the field;

has an opportunity of beginning the war to advantage;

[11] Liv. L. xlii. c. 53.

[11] Ibid. c. 54, 55.

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engaging in any hazardous enterprife, fay the Roman writers, or more probably, not having proper intelligence of the enemy's motions and fituations, which in thofe days was often difficult to be obtained, the Macedonian king contented himfelf with the opportunity which his pofition afforded him, of covering Macedon and the northern Theffaly

loſes it:

the Romans advance againſt him.

At length Licinius reached Lariffa; and, having been joined by a thoufand auxiliaries from the Achaean ftates, a reinforcement of five thoufand men under Eumenes from Afia, and a body of Theffalian horfe, he encamped on the north-fide of the Peneus. The two armies were now within a few miles of each other [16]; but though the foraging parties from the Macedonian army overfpread the country, and had extended their ravages into Pheraea [17], and though Perfeus had for feveral days appeared every morning in order of battle, and even infulted the Roman camp, in the hopes of bringing on an engagement; the conful, nevertheleſs, feemed induſtriouſly to avoid it. Emboldened by this, Perfeus moved his camp feven miles nearer; and the enfuing morning, by the firſt dawn of day, having formed his whole army, advanced at the head of his cavalry and light-armed infantry to the verge of the Roman intrenchments. The fudden appearance of the enemy at an hour much

Battle of the Peneus;

[16] Liv. L. xlii. c. 57 & feq.

[17] One of the faireſt provinces of Theffaly, and under the immediate protection of the Romans.

earlier than uſual, and their reſolute and firm appearance, threw the Roman camp into confuſion; the tumultuous hurry of the ſoldiery making the danger from without appear greater than it was. The conſul, in this critical ſituation, commanded all his cavalry, with the light-armed and auxiliary troops, to ſally forth and repulſe the enemy, he himſelf remaining within the trenches with his legionaries, ready to anſwer any exigency. The Roman detachment found the taſk aſſigned to them, much more difficult than they expected. Unable to ſtand the furious charge of the Thracian horſemen, who, to uſe the expreſſion of the Roman hiſtorian, "ruſhed forward with a ferocity like that of wild beaſts ſpringing on their prey," they gave way on every ſide, after having ſuſtained conſiderable loſs; and had been all cut to pieces, if the Theſſalian cavalry, who covered the left wing, and had hitherto ſtood their ground, had not received them within their ranks, and ſheltered them from the purſuers.

the Macedonians victorious:

The inſtant it was known that the advantage was on the ſide of Macedon, Hippias and Leonnatus, who commanded the phalanx, advanced to the field of battle, in hopes of crowning the glory of the day by ſtorming the Roman camp. And had the king yielded to their martial ardor, there had been little doubt of ſucceſs: but ſo daring an exploit was more than Perſeus durſt aſpire to. His natural puſillanimity returned; and Evander, who was no ſtranger to his maſter's weakneſs, and probably diſcovered his wiſhes in his looks, at

Perſeus wants ſpirit to improve his victory;

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ſight of the phalanx adviſed him, "not to tempt fortune any further for the preſent, but rather be ſatisfied with the ſucceſs he had already obtained, which would certainly facilitate a peace, if peace was his object, or, if he choſe to continue the war, would induce numbers to join him." Perſeus, with much commendations of Evander's prudence, ordered the phalanx to halt, and a retreat to be ſounded [14]. In this action, there fell of the Roman infantry two thouſand, with two hundred of their cavalry; two hundred more of their horſemen being made priſoners. Forty foot and twenty horſe were all the Macedonians loſt.

ſees his miſtake:

Next morning diſcovered to Perſeus his fatal error [15]. Dreading the very enterpriſe which the Macedonian durſt not attempt, Eumenes had adviſed the conſul to decamp by night, and retreat to the other ſide of the Peneus, where he might remain in ſafety; and Licinius, notwithſtanding the humiliating confeſſion which ſuch a ſtep implied, found it expedient to follow the advice. Perſeus now ſaw, what might have been done had he followed his victory, or even been attentive to the enemy's motions during the night, and attacked them in their retreat over the river.

his victory occaſions general exultations throughout Greece.

From the temper of mind with which the news of this ſucceſs, imperfect as it was, were received throughout Greece, we may judge what the real diſpoſitions of the people were, and how difficult the Romans would have found this war, had a

[14] Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio. [15] Liv. L. xlii. c. 60.

prince of abilities, and worthy of public confidence, been then ſeated on the throne of Macedon. The different ſtates had before ſhown their diſaffection to the cauſe of Rome, in the ſcanty ſuccours they ſent to the conſul; which, in general, ſays Livy [40], were ſo inconſiderable as not to be worth recording, whilſt they apologized under various pretences, and ſtill profeſſed an ardent zeal for her ſervice. That diſguiſe which the dread of Roman power had obliged them to aſſume, was now thrown off [41]; and not only the friends of the royal houſe of Macedon, but even the men who were ſuppoſed to have been warm in the intereſts of Rome, joined in the general joy. The Romans, it appears from the confeſſion of their own writers, had already made Greece feel their inſolence and oppreſſion; and many of their moſt zealous partiſans began to entertain the moſt melancholy apprehenſions of impending ſervitude.

Perſeus meanly ſues for peace.

Perſeus, by his own conduct, ſoon weakened the impreſſions which, properly cultivated, might have been highly advantageous. As if former experience had not taught him that a vigorous proſecution of the war was his only reſource, he renewed his ſolicitations for peace with all the abjectneſs of a vanquiſhed enemy [42]; offering to cede to the

[40] Quorum pleraque (adeo parva erant) in oblivionem addicta. Liv. L. xlii. c. 55.

[41] "Fama pugnae," ſays Livy, ſpeaking of this battle, "nudavit voluntates hominum." L. xlii. c. 63.

[42] Polyb. Legat. lxix. Liv. L. xlii. c. 62.

BOOK VII. Sect. 1. Is refuſed:

Romans, all the cities and provinces which had been ceded by his father Philip, and to pay the ſame tribute he had agreed to pay. But the Romans, whoſe maxim it was, "never, in whatever fortune, "to make peace with a victorious enemy," rejected his offer with ſcorn, imperiouſly requiring Perſeus "to ſurrender himſelf and his kingdom to the "Romans at diſcretion," as the only way by which peace was to be obtained. Incenſed at this haughty anſwer, the king's counſellors adviſed him to abandon all thoughts of accommodation; but the very haughtineſs of the anſwer terrified his ſpirit, and became a new argument with Perſeus for renewing his application. He thought it impoſſible that the conſul ſhould manifeſt ſuch firmneſs, without an aſſurance of ſucceſs; and ſent a ſecond deputation with an offer of a much larger tribute; to which the Romans returned the ſame anſwer.

Bad conduct of the Roman commanders.

The manner in which the conſul proſecuted the war during the remainder of this year, ſhowed but little of that firmneſs or aſſurance of victory, which theſe ſpirited anſwers ſeemed to imply [41]. In Theſſaly, the two armies were employed in attacking or defending, with various ſucceſs, places of little importance, except merely on account of their ſituation; or in occaſional ſkirmiſhes, moſtly between the foraging parties, which, though ſometimes bloody and attended with loſs to the Macedonians, made no material alteration in the ſtate of affairs. Perſeus, in defiance of all the Roman efforts, ſtill

[41] See Liv. L. xlii. c. 64 & ſeq.

kept poſſeſſion of the paſſes and ſtrong holds that commanded the Macedonian frontier. In Illyricum [90], one of the conſul's lieutenants had made himſelf maſter of two opulent towns, and had granted the inhabitants their effects, in the view of alluring to ſubmiſſion, by this apparent clemency, another ſtrong town in the neighbourhood: but finding his expectations diſappointed, and that neither his ſubtlety of contrivance nor force of arms could give him poſſeſſion, he returned and pillaged both the places which he had formerly ſpared. In Boeotia [91], the praetor Lucretius laid ſiege to Haliartus, and having taken it after an obſtinate and vigorous defence, plundered it of every thing valuable, appropriating moſt of the ſpoils to his own uſe, and then razing it to the ground. From thence he proceeded to Thebes, which, though ſhe opened her gates, he nevertheleſs treated with all the ſeverity of an exaſperated enemy; not content with reſtoring the citizens that had been baniſhed for their attachment to the Roman intereſt, but alſo ſelling, with their families, as ſlaves, all who were ſuſpected of favoring the cauſe of Macedon.

Perſeus acts with vigor and ſucceſs.

Perſeus having, in the mean time, ſurpriſed a part of the Roman fleet [92] which lay at Oreum in Euboea, had taken twenty of their ſtore-ſhips, ſunk the reſt, laden with wheat, and made himſelf maſter of four gallies, of five benches of oars. Intelligence having been received, that ſome of

[90] Liv. L. xliii. c. 1.
[91] Liv. L. xlii. c. 63.
[92] Plutarch. in Paul. Aemilio. Liv. L. xliii. c. 2.

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the Thracian tribes, inſtigated and aſſiſted by Eumenes of Pergamus, had broken into the dominions of Cotys, a king of Thrace in alliance with Perſeus, and an auxiliary in the Macedonian camp, he immediately diſmiſſed the Thracian king with large preſents, and a conſiderable ſum of money, to the defence of his own territories; and ſo little now were his apprehenſions of danger from the Romans, that he himſelf marched ſoon after to the aid of Cotys, and obtained for him a complete victory over the invaders.

The conſul Hoſtilius ſucceeds to the command;

Licinius was ſucceeded in the command by the conſul Hoſtilius, who was more unſucceſsful than his predeceſſor. Upon his very entrance into Epire, of whoſe defection there was not, as yet, any ſuſpicion, he narrowly eſcaped falling into an ambuſcade of Epirots, who had lain in wait for him, in order to deliver him up to Perſeus. He afterwards endeavoured to penetrate into Macedonia by the province of Elymaea; and was defeated. He attempted a paſſage by the Cambunian mountains; and found it impracticable. He detached his lieutenant Appius Claudius, to infeſt the Macedonian frontier from the ſide of Illyricum; who having formed the deſign of plundering Uſcana [97], a city on the confines of Macedon, ſuffered himſelf to be caught in a ſnare by a ſtratagem of the Cretan garriſon: they had promiſed to betray the place to him; but upon his approaching the walls with a careleſs ſecurity, they ſallied out with the inhabitants, and attacked

fails in every attempt.

[97] Liv. L. xliii. c. 10.

him ſo vigorouſly, that ſcarcely a fourth part of his army eſcaped.

Sect. 1. Cauſe of theſe miſcarriages.

This train of bad ſucceſs became the more reproachful from the cauſe to which it ſeemed juſtly to be aſcribed, "the rapacity and inſolence of oppreſſion," with which moſt of the Roman commanders of the preſent year, as well as the preceding, ſtood charged. Decimus [49], who at the beginning of the war had been ſent on an embaſſy to Gentius of Illyricum, was, with good reaſon, ſuſpected of having ſold himſelf to the Illyrian king. Complaints, ſupported by the ſtrongeſt proofs, had been laid before the ſenate, againſt Lucretius [50], one of the praetors of the laſt year, who, after enriching himſelf with the pillage of the enemies of Rome, had not even ſpared her friends; deſpoiling the very temples of Chalcis, then confederate with the Romans, of their moſt precious ornaments, in order to add to the magnificence of his villa in the neighbourhood of Antium. There was alſo reaſon to ſuſpect, that Licinius himſelf had not been guiltleſs. The like complaints were now brought againſt the conſul Hoſtilius, and the officers under his command. Caſſius, one of his prætors, was infamous for his depredations. His admiral, Hortenſius [51], had put to death the chief men of Abdera, on the Thracian coaſt, and ſold for ſlaves the reſt of the citizens becauſe they had refuſed to comply with his mercileſs exactions,

[49] Liv. L. xlii. c. 45.

[50] Liv. L. xliii. c. 7.

[51] Liv. L. xliii. c. 4.

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and had dared to appeal to the conſul for relief; ſo that the neighbouring cities, alarmed by theſe enormities, and dreading ſimilar acts of violence, had ſhut their gates againſt him. On his return to Chalcis, the unhappy Chalcidians again experienced all the cruelty and rapine of Lucretius. Even the army under the immediate command of Hoſtilius [11], had been rendered unfit for ſervice, either by the facility or avarice of the conſul and his principal officers; numbers of the ſoldiers having, for money, or through favor, obtained leave of abſence, and returned to Italy.

The Macedonian affairs in a proſperous ſituation;

The Macedonian affairs, on the contrary, wore a proſperous appearance [12]. Perſeus had defeated every attempt againſt Macedon during the ſummer; and as ſoon as winter had ſet in, and the ſnows had rendered the mountains and glens around him impaſſable to the Romans, he attacked and defeated the Dardanians, who, probably upon the retreat of the Baſtarnae, began again to be troubleſome, leaving ten thouſand of them dead on the field. From thence he had advanced into Illyricum, with the view of recovering ſome places of ſtrength, formerly taken by the Romans, which were of conſequence to the ſecurity of the Macedonian frontier; and, at the ſame time, of entering into alliance with Gentius, the moſt powerful of the Illyrian princes. He found little difficulty in the accompliſhment of the former, and might as eaſily

[11] Liv. L. xliii. c. 11.

[12] See Liv. L. xliii. c. 18, 19, 20.

have effected the latter, had not his own avarice[13] been the only obſtacle. Gentius wanted money; and Perſeus could not think of ſupplying him; ſo that, after a repeated interchange of meſſages, the negotiation ended without effect. He had not yet entered Illyricum, when he received the pleaſing intelligence, that the Epirots, at the inſtigation of Cephalus, one of their chieftains, had renounced the friendſhip of Rome, and declared in his favor, The Aetolians too ſolicited his preſence, offering to put Stratus into his hands, a conſiderable city of Acarnania on the Acheolus, which at this time was in their poſſeſſion. The invitation was eagerly accepted, and Perſeus was inſtantly in motion. But the ſeverity of the ſeaſon and the difficulty of the roads rendering his march exceedingly tedious, a Roman commander, who was ſtationed in the country, conceiving ſome ſuſpicion of the deſign, had entered the city with a ſtrong body of troops the evening before Perſeus reached it. He made himſelf, however, ſome amends, by getting poſſeſſion of Aperantia, a neighbouring diſtrict of Aetolia; and this ſucceſs was ſoon followed by advice, that Clevas, one of his generals, had defeated the Romans on the borders of Epire, in two ſucceſſive engagements, in which, two thouſand of the enemy had fallen, and three hundred been made priſoners.

Nothing, indeed, ſeems now to have been want- but injured by

[13] See Polyb. Legat. lxxvi. lxxvii.

[14] Liv. L. xliii. c. 25.

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ing to Perſeus, but to have known how to employ properly, the treaſures of which he was maſter. The corruption and inſolence of the Roman commanders, had made them generally odious. Polybius himſelf acknowledges, that, had the Macedonian king (whoſe avarice, to ſuch a wonderful exceſs of ſordidneſs and folly, muſt, ſays he, have been a judgment on him from the gods [15]) improved the preſent opportunity, by giving moderate ſubſidies to the kings and ſtates of Aſia and Greece, gratifying at the ſame time with preſents the principal men in the different cities, he had effectually ruined the Roman intereſt with moſt of the Greek and Aſiatic nations.

Sordid avarice of Perſeus.

Conſternation and proſecutions at Rome.

When tidings of theſe matters were received in Rome, they occaſioned the deepeſt conſternation. Upon the firſt complaints, commiſſioners had been immediately ſent into Greece [16]; and their report exceeded even the voice of fame. Ambaſſadors alſo had now arrived from thoſe ſtates which had ſuffered moſt from the oppreſſions and rapacity of the Roman commanders, to implore juſtice from the ſenate and Roman people. To the Romans the criſis was alarming: they were in danger of loſing Greece, if not Aſia: and ſome of the firſt nobility were among the accuſed criminals. Orders were immediately iſſued, requiring all the ſenators throughout Italy, unleſs employed on public ſervice,

[15] Δεισιδαιμονία is the expreſſive name that Polybius gives to the amazing avarice of this wretched prince. See Legat. lxxvii.

[16] Liv. L. xliii. c. 8. 11. 17.

to

to repair immediately to Rome, and forbidding any ſenator to go farther than one mile from the city. Lucretius [10], the late praetor, had already been ſummoned to appear. The nobles would gladly have ſaved him, but they found it impoſſible. Two tribunes of the people, M. Juventius Thalna and Cn Aufidius, were active in the proſecution; and his trial being brought on, the thirty-five tribes, with one voice, pronounced him guilty. Several others, not leſs criminal, had probably ſhared the ſame fate, had not their trials been put off, under pretence, that they were neceſſary perſons in the army abroad, and could not therefore appear in their own defence.

Edict to check the abuſes committed by the Roman commanders.

The next buſineſs was, to guard againſt the conſequences to be dreaded from the reſentment of an injured people. An edict was accordingly paſſed [11], which enacted, "That henceforth the "allies of Rome ſhould not pay obedience to any "requiſitions made by any magiſtrate whatſoever, "unleſs it appeared, that theſe requiſitions had "proceeded from the ſenate themſelves." Orders were likewiſe tranſmitted to Hoſtilius [12] and the other commanders in Greece, to conduct them-

[10] When the charge againſt him was firſt laid before the ſenate, it was pretended, that he was abroad with the army, and that therefore it was neceſſary to poſtpone the inquiry. It afterwards appeared, that at this very time he was at his villa; employing in expenſive works, the vaſt ſums which he had brought home from the pillage of Haliatus, and the plunder of the Chalcidians. See Liv. L. xliii. c. 4.

[11] Liv. L. xliii. c. 17.

[12] Ibid. c. 8.

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ſelves for the future with greater caution; and wherever reparation could be made, to make it as ſpeedily as poſſible. To the ſeveral ſtates alſo ambaſſadors were deputed, to aſſure them of the affectionate regard paid to their intereſts, and to notify the new edict, which the ſenate, *ever attentive to the* LIBERTIES *of* GREECE, had been graciouſly pleaſed to iſſue.

ambaſſadors ſent to the Grecian ſtates to notify the edict:

infidious inſtructions given to thoſe ambaſſadors:

This, however, as appears from Polybius [**], was only the *oſtenſible* part of their commiſſion. Beneath all this ſemblance of affection, lurked the moſt treacherous deſigns. The ambaſſadors had ſecret inſtructions to ſeize the opportunity, when theſe gracious aſſurances ſhould have lulled every ſuſpicion, to deſtroy all thoſe, whom eminent abilities and zeal for the liberties of their country had rendered obnoxious to Rome. In thoſe ſtates, where their opponents were too many to be thus diſpatched, they were to endeavour at leaſt, to get into their hands a number of the moſt conſiderable perſons, by way of hoſtages; or to obtain permiſſion to introduce Roman garriſons into their cities, in order to lay thoſe ſtates under the neceſſity of ſubmitting to whatever terms Rome might thereafter think fit to preſcribe.

The ambaſſadors were to have entered on the execution of this part of their inſtructions in Achaia: and three Achaeans of the higheſt diſtinction, Lycortas, Polybius, and Archon, whoſe virtue had withſtood every temptation, were the firſt victims

[**] Legat. lxxiv. lxxv.

marked for deſtruction. But upon the opening of the Achaean diet, it was found, that matters were not yet ripe for their purpoſe. Even the queſtion, "whether Achaia ſhould take part with Rome againſt Macedon?" was likely to produce great heats. And the ambaſſadors began to fear, that, ſhould they venture on the attempt they had in view, it would only ſerve to diſcloſe what it was their intereſt to conceal, and perhaps involve their whole party in ruin.

the reception they met with from the Achaeans;

With the Aetolians, from whom they were to have exacted hoſtages, they had no better ſucceſs. The diet was a ſcene of tumult and confuſion; and to ſuch an exceſs of mutual violence did the Macedonian and Roman parties proceed, that thoſe in oppoſition to Rome, ſtoned, in the very diet, and in the preſence of the ambaſſadors, one of the contrary faction. From ſuch an aſſembly it had been to little purpoſe to have demanded hoſtages; and the ambaſſadors took care to withdraw without mentioning them.

the Aetolians;

From thence they proceeded to Acarnania, too inconſiderable a ſtate in appearance to be capable of much firmneſs. And here, beſides, Rome was ſuppoſed to have a ſtrong party; yet, the inſtant it was propoſed that they ſhould receive Roman garriſons into their cities, the greater part of the aſſembly expreſſed the higheſt indignation [61]; and

the Acarnanians;

[61] Livy (L. xliii. c. 17.) has given ſome account of this tranſaction, but in a very ſlight and curſory manner. However, what he mentions of the oppoſition made to the

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the ambaſſadors, who ſaw it would be in vain to contend againſt ſo general an oppoſition, had the prudence to deſiſt.

Theſe proceedings need no comment. They clearly develope the Roman character at this period. And ſhow what powerful aids Macedon might ſtill have drawn from Greece, had not Perſeus been wanting to himſelf and to his cauſe.

Quintus Marcius Philippus elected conſul, and appointed to conduct the Macedonian war.

The conduct of the war now devolved on Quintus Marcius Philippus, the *truſty friend* by whom Perſeus had been circumvented; who, with Q. Servilius Caepio, had been elected to the conſulſhip. His ſetting out had an appearance of vigor that promiſed great things; his neceſſary levies were completed with unuſual expedition; and by the firſt opening of the ſpring he had already joined the army in Theſſaly. The commencement of his operations was equally ſpirited. Ambitious of ſucceeding where the preceding commanders had failed, and ſenſible, that the artifice which he had practiſed before, could not avail him again, he ſtaked all his hopes on boldneſs and enterpriſe; declaring himſelf reſolved to force his way [a] through ſome of thoſe formidable barriers which had hitherto defied the Roman arms. Upon inquiry, he was told there were three paſſes where he might poſſibly ſucceed; one by the way

article of *garriſons* in the Acarnanian convention, is remarkable. "Pars," his words are, "recuſare, *ne quod* "*bello captis & boſtibus mos eſſet, id pacatae & ſociae ci-*"*vitates ignominiae acciperent.*"

[a] See Liv. L. xliv. c. 2. & ſeq.

of Pythium, another by the Cambunian mountains, where Hoſtilius had failed, and a third by the lake Aſcuris. For ſome part of the way, one common road led to all, which afterwards branched into three, each leading to one of the above mentioned paſſes. Undetermined which to chuſe, he nevertheleſs began his march, purpoſing to form his plan according to the diſcoveries he ſhould make as he advanced. Being arrived at the place where the road divided, he detached, for what reaſons we are not told, a body of four thouſand men under two commanders, one of them his ſon, to attempt the paſs by the lake Aſcuris; halting with the reſt of the army, until he had intelligence of the event.

He attempts the Macedonian frontier;

The road through which this detachment had to march; was rugged, ſteep, and worn into channels by the mountain-floods; ſo that after two days inceſſant labor, they had ſcarcely proceeded fifteen miles. At length, on the evening of the ſecond day they gained the top of a hill, where they ventured to encamp; and the enſuing morning, having moved on about ſeven miles farther, they reached the ſummit of another mountain, from whence they could deſcry one of the enemy's ſtations about a mile from them, and at a farther diſtance, Dium, the camp of Perſeus, with all that part of the Macedonian coaſt that is waſhed by the gulph of Theſſalonica. Advice was immediately diſpatched to the conſul, who, fortunately for them, was already on his march; anxious to know the fate of his men, whom, inconſiderately

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enough, he had ventured into the midſt of the enemy's poſts, defiles, and hollows, to which they were ſtrangers. No ſooner were the army ſomewhat recovered from their fatiguing march, than Marcius prepared to drive the Macedonian party from the poſt, without which it was impoſſible for him to advance. The Macedonians were not leſs ready to receive them. The party which Hippias commanded was twelve thouſand ſtrong; and having only a mountain's ſummit to defend, where he knew every advantage of ground, and where only a few combatants could engage, he was more than a match for the Romans; who were repulſed. On the ſecond day they renewed the attack; and in like manner on the third; but ſtill without ſucceſs.

attacks a Macedonian poſt without ſucceſs.

Perilous ſituation of the Roman army;

The conſul ſaw his critical ſituation. It was impoſſible for his army to ſubſiſt on the ſharp ridge of a barren mountain He could not advance: and to retreat was highly dangerous, from the nature of the road, through which he muſt paſs, and from the enemy's commanding the mountain-heights, from whence they might pour down deſtruction on him and his army. It is ſcarcely conceivable, that at this critical conjuncture, Perſeus ſhould have ſhown that imbecillity of conduct, of which he appears to have been guilty. Had he done what was in his power, had he ſupported Hippias, or endeavoured to cut off Marcius's retreat, the Romans themſelves confeſſed their ruin had been inevitable. Inſtead of this, though during the three days that the engagement laſted, he was ſo near

folly of Perſeus in not advancing againſt them,

the ſcene of action as probably to hear the ſhouts of the combatants, he employed himſelf in parading along the ſhore at the head of his cavalry, without ſending the ſmalleſt reinforcement up the mountain.

Marcius, however, reſolved not to return back, but at all hazards to deſcend the mountain, and endeavour to penetrate into Macedon through the glen below, leaving Popilius with a party of the army on the ſummit to cover his rear. This was an enterpriſe of infinite toil. The mountain was in many places exceedingly ſteep, and even where it ſeemed to be leſs abrupt, there was no ſure footing to be found in thoſe untrodden paths; ſo that the troops, rather than truſt to their feet, for the moſt part rolled themſelves down. To add to the difficulty, the elephants refuſed the precipices, and became outrageous, throwing their riders, and ſcaring the horſes with their hideous cries. During the general confuſion which this occaſioned, had only a ſmall part of the enemy appeared, the conſul himſelf acknowledged afterwards, there had been an end of the Roman army. After trying ſeveral expedients, it was contrived to let down theſe unwieldy animals by wooden platforms, one end of which was joined to the cliff, and the other end ſupported by poſts faſtened in the ſlope beneath; over the floor of the platform was ſpread a covering of earth, that the elephant might not be ſhy of venturing on it. As ſoon as he had gotten on the platform, the poſts that upheld it being cut, he was made to ſlide off to

Marcius ventures down from the mountain;

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a ſecond, which began where the firſt ended; in like manner to a third; and ſo onward to the bottom. In this tedious and laborious employment was the whole day conſumed. Towards night they reached a level ſpot, which, though they were ignorant where they were, or with what dangers they were ſtill encompaſſed, was a circumſtance which greatly relieved them, as they could now ſtand on firm ground. The morning-light afforded them no better information. They found themſelves in the hollow of a gloomy foreſt, through which it was impoſſible to deſcry what lay beyond. Here, however, they remained all that day, in order that Popilius, who had received directions to follow as ſoon as he ſafely could, might have time to join them. The two ſucceeding days they moved forward without meeting any obſtruction, excepting what aroſe from the deep and wood-entangled glens through which they had to march; when at length their proſpect opened into the champaign country between Heracleum and Libethrum, a conſiderable way above the entrance into the ſtreights of Tempe, and a few miles from Dium, where Perſeus had his head-quarters.

with great riſque makes his way to the neighbourhood of the Macedonian camp.

Terroe of Perſeus.

Perſeus was bathing, when tidings were brought him that the Romans had paſſed the defiles, and were advancing. Every part of his conduct now betrayed his abject character. In an agony of fear he flung out of the bath, exclaiming he was vanquiſhed without fighting; and, as if he gave up all for loſt, inſtantly ſent off orders to burn his

naval ſtores at Theſſalonica, and to throw his treaſures at Pella into the ſea; recalled Hippias from his poſt at the Aſcuris, and in like manner all the other commanders from the ſeveral paſſes where they were ſtationed; and, having removed on board his fleet the ſtatues of Alexander's ſoldiers that were at Dium, abandoned that city to the enemy, and fled to Pydna. Even now, had there been the ſmalleſt firmneſs on his ſide, Marcius had paid the full price of his temerity. He had got beyond the paſs of Aſcuris, and the ſtreights of Tempe; but what did this avail him? Unable to advance, without a poſſibility of retreat; having no means of ſubſiſtence from the country in which he was, and cut off from all foreign ſupplies; he muſt, had Perſeus continued only to guard the ſeveral paſſes, have inevitably periſhed. He could not have retreated by the way he had come; as the Macedonians were maſters of that road, and with eaſe could have deſtroyed him from the heights, of which they were in poſſeſſion. And, ſhould he have attempted to penetrate farther into Macedon, the only opening into it from that quarter was by Dium, and that flanked on the one ſide by Mount Olympus, and on the other, partly by a dangerous moraſs, and partly by the ſuburbs of the city, ſo that only a narrow ſtrait remained, where a ſmall force was ſufficient to diſpute the paſſage againſt the moſt formidable army. The ſole reſource, therefore, that he had left, was to have returned into Theſſaly through the vale of Tempe. But that was hardly to be

The dangers to which the Romans were expoſed, had Perſeus ſhown firmneſs.

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effected. For the length of five miles the road through this vale was ſo exceedingly narrow, that it was not poſſible for two beaſts of burden to paſs abreaſt; and on each ſide ſo frightful was the precipice, that the traveller with averted eye ſhrunk from the tremendous proſpect; below alſo rolled the Peneus, the ſtunning noiſe of whoſe waters, tumbling over the rocky bottom, and broken into frequent falls, deepened wonderfully the horror of the ſcene. In addition to all this, the Macedonians had forts and intrenchments ſtrongly garriſoned at all the important poſts along the valley. So that had not Perſeus weakly given up every advantage which he poſſeſſed, he had now the enemy at his mercy. But the unthinking temerity of the conſul, ſay the Roman writers, found its apology in the *puſillanimity* of the king [91]. Whatever Marcius's folly was, luckily for him, it was conſpicuouſly outdone by the king's ſuperior imbecillity.

The Roman conſul enters Dium:

The conſul, in amazement that the Macedonians had evacuated Dium, entered the city with great caution, apprehenſive, that under ſo ſtrange an appearance of timidity, ſome hoſtile ambuſcade muſt be concealed. His wonder increaſed when he ſaw the ſtrength of the place, and what a ſtand might have been made there, had it been properly defended. From Dium he puſhed on northward with the ſame ſucceſs; the Macedonians every

pushes on northward:

[91] "Quae temeritas conſulis videri potuiſſet, quod eo proceſſiſſet, unde invito hoſte regredi nequiret, eam non inconſultam audaciam (rex) fecit." — Liv. L. xliv. c. 6.

where ſubmitting as he approached. But though he had no enemy to oppoſe him, he ſoon found, that he had advanced farther than prudence could juſtify. The country was poor; and as he proceeded farther north, it became every day more difficult to procure proviſions. His fleet alſo, which he had ordered to follow, and on which he depended for the ſupport of his army, diſappointed his expectations; it had arrived off the coaſt, but the ſtore-ſhips, by ſome miſtake, had remained at Magneſia. At laſt, when at the height of diſtreſs, he received advice from Lucretius, that the Macedonians had abandoned all their poſts in the ſtreights of Tempe, and had left plenty of proviſions behind them; and that ſufficient ſupplies ſhould, with all poſſible expedition, be haſtened forward to his relief. But whether Marcius began to fear, that the neceſſities of his army might provoke them to mutiny; or that the Macedonians, recovering from their panic and dejection, might intercept the ſupplies, and perhaps cut off his retreat; he immediately marched to Phila, near the entrance of the vale, where he had reaſon to ſuppoſe the proviſions were by this time arrived; thus abandoning all his conqueſts with the ſame rapidity with which he had acquired them. Whatever induced this extraordinary ſtep, it fixed a conſiderable blemiſh on his military character [a].

finds himſelf in diſtreſs:

abandons all his conqueſts.

Perſeus now ſaw, with ſhame and regret, what his terror had not permitted him to ſee before,

Perſeus ſtung with ſhame at

[a] Liv. L. xliv. c. 8.

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his own miſconduct:

" that to his own ſpiritleſs conduct the Romans owed their preſervation;" and having returned to Dium, and repaired what the Romans had diſmantled, he encamped on the Enipeus, five miles to the ſouth of that city, with a deſign to cover this part of Macedon from farther inſult. What mortified him moſt, were the orders he had given concerning his treaſures at Pella, and his naval ſtores at Theſſalonica; they were a confeſſion of fears, which at preſent he was unwilling to avow, and he reſolved, at any rate, to wipe off the reproach.

the cruel manner in which he ſeeks to wipe off the reproach.

The perſons he had employed in this ſervice, were Andronicus and Nicias; the one had been ſent to Pella, the other to Theſſalonica. Nicias, punctual to the directions which he received, had cauſed the treaſures to be ſunk in the ſea. Andronicus, ſuſpecting that his maſter would ſoon repent, had delayed the deſtruction of the ſtores until farther orders. To have, or not to have obeyed, Perſeus conſidered as equally criminal, and put both his agents to death. To recover the treaſure, he procured divers, who brought up the greater part of it. They met with the reward of Nicias and Andronicus; the tyrant vainly imagining, that all remembrance of his puſillanimous conduct would be obliterated, by deſtroying thoſe who had it more immediately in their power to diſcover it [11].

The remainder of the operations of the year

[11] Liv. L. xliv. c. 10.

did little towards reſtoring honor to the Roman arms. The only town the conſul was able to take, was Heracleum, a place of no great conſequence, and which the Macedonians, though their camp on the Enipeus was within ſight of it, made no motion to relieve. He next attempted certain cities on the Thermaic gulph, Theſſalonica, Torone, Caſſandrea, with Meliboea and Demetrius on the confines of Theſſaly; but all without effect; the whole of his achievements, amounting to ſome tumultuary depredations, in one of which he was even repulſed with conſiderable loſs.

does nothing elſe conſiderable;

His conduct in relation to Appius Cento the praetor, was not leſs diſreputable. Appius commanded in Illyricum, and, finding the ſuperiority of the enemy, had applied to the Achaeans for ſuccours. The Achaeans had before ſent Polybius to the conſul, with an offer of marching a body of troops to his aid [a], which, probably deſpairing of making any impreſſion on the Macedonian frontier, he had refuſed; and ſuch was his illiberal ſpirit, he would not permit Appius to be reinforced from that quarter, notwithſtanding his application and preſent neceſſity, that he might not be in a better condition than himſelf. The caſe was delicate. It was of importance to the Achaeans, to be conſidered as the faithful allies of the Romans. And the ſituation of the Roman commander required inſtant relief. Polybius, artfully enough, contrived to elude the praetor's application, and withal to

meanly prevents ſuccours being ſent to Appius.

[a] See Polyb. Legat. lxxviii.

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affect the higheſt reſpect for Rome. He repreſented to the Achaean ſtates, that by the ſenate's late edict, they were not to pay regard to any requiſition made by a Roman commander, unleſs that requiſition appeared to have the ſanction of the ſenate. Appius had no ſuch ſanction to produce; and therefore his demand could not be complied with.

The conſequences of the conſul's mean jealouſy proved nearly fatal to Appius; for hiſtory [77] informs us, that with the utmoſt difficulty he eſcaped being cut off by the enemy.

[77] Liv. L. xliv. c. 20.

BOOK VII.

SECTION II.

CONTENTS.

Lucius Aemilius Paulus elected conſul, and appointed to conduct the Macedonian war — reſtores and improves the diſcipline of the Roman army, which had ſuffered from the miſmanagement of the preceding commanders — advances againſt Perſeus — forces him from his intrenchments on the Peneus — engages, and defeats him at Pydna. — Perſeus flies to Pella — to Amphipolis — to Samothrace — ſurrenders himſelf to the Roman admiral — is brought to Rome — produced before the triumphal car of the victorious Roman, and dies in wretchedneſs. — Humiliation of Macedon under the Romans — their inhuman treatment of the people of Epire — the people of Aetolia — and moſt of the other Grecian ſtates — Cruel deſigns entertained by them againſt Achaia, not carried into execution — for what reaſons.

THREE years and upwards had the Roman arms been employed againſt Macedon, to little advantage. At Rome, the fault of this dilatory and unſucceſsful war was altogether imputed to the incapacity or the corruption of the ſeveral commanders, to whom the conduct of it had hitherto been intruſted; and it was now the

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general voice of the people, that, regardleſs of the intrigues of ambition, ſome perſon ſhould be called forth to this ſervice, whoſe known abilities and integrity merited the public confidence [1]. In

Lucius Aemilius Paulus;

Lucius Aemilius Paulus they ſeemed to have found the man whom they were ſeeking; ſon to the conſul Aemilius Paulus, who had refuſed to ſurvive the carnage of his countrymen on the fatal day of Cannae: He had been conſul fifteen years

His character;

before, and in the diſcharge of that office, as well as the other offices through which he had paſſed, was conſpicuous both for military ſkill and unblemiſhed honor. But having ſtood a ſecond time for the conſulſhip without ſucceſs, he had retired from public life, untainted by the contagion of diſſipated manners, which began to be the diſgrace of the Roman nobility. His only reproach was, that he had divorced this wife Papiria, a lady unexceptionable in her conduct, and deſcended from one of the nobleſt families in Rome She had lived with him many years in wedlock, and had brought him ſeveral children, two of them ſons, who promiſed to be the ornaments of their illuſtrious houſe. At the ſame time it muſt be confeſſed, that this was not ſo much the reproach of Aemilius as of the times; the Roman law and manners, by the free permiſſion of divorces, having now entirely levelled that important fence of domeſtic happineſs and national virtue, reverence for the marriage-bond [2]. He made, however, ſome

[1] Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

[2] How lightly the Romans accounted the marriage-

amends

amends to his young family, for the loſs which they ſuſtained in being deprived of their mother, by the extraordinary care he beſtowed on their education. Removed from the buſtle of the world, he gave up his whole attention to the cultivation of their minds, ſuperintending their ſtudies and exerciſes with the moſt watchful tenderneſs and attention. At this period Aemilius was in his ſixtieth year, but ſtill in the full vigor of body and mind; and from his natural firmneſs and ſeverity of manners, was well qualified to correct that licentiouſneſs of the Roman ſoldiery, to which the late relaxation of diſcipline had afforded much encouragement.

is appointed to the conſulſhip, and the conducting of the Macedonian war;

Aemilius having been prevailed on to appear among the candidates, was elected conſul by the unanimous ſuffrages of all the tribes; and, if we are to believe Plutarch, immediately upon his election was appointed to the command in Macedon, without ſuffering the lots to be caſt[s], as generally was the cuſtom in the diſpoſal of provinces.

The ſpirited and judicious manner in which he entered on the department aſſigned to him, ſhowed,

compact, we may judge from an anecdote mentioned by Plutarch (in Paul. Aemilio). A certain Roman had divorced his wife, and being preſſed by the expſtoulations of his friends, who aſked, *was ſhe not fair? was ſhe not chaſte? was ſhe not fruitful?* holding up his ſhoe to them, replied, *is it not handſome? is it not new? yet none knows where it pinches but he that wears it.*

[s] Livy (L. xliv. c. 17.) ſays otherwiſe.

BOOK VII. Sect. 2. his judicious precautions.

that their choice had not been miſplaced. Report had made very unfavorable repreſentations of the ſituation of the Roman affairs in Greece. But report was not to be truſted. He therefore obtained of the ſenate, that commiſſioners * ſhould be ſent thither, with orders to inquire minutely into the ſtate both of the fleet and armies on ſervice in the Macedonian war; what progreſs the land-forces had made; what magazines they had eſtabliſhed, and how they were ſupplied; what poſts and places of ſtrength they were maſters of; how near they were to the enemy; what allies the Romans had, and how far theſe allies were to be depended on.

The diſtreſsful ſtate of the Roman affairs in Greece;

The report of the commiſſioners fully explained why ſo little had been done †. The late conſul Marcius, they ſaid, had, with the utmoſt riſque, paſſed certain defiles, which he might as well not have paſſed. The Romans, it is true, were in ſight of the Macedonian camp; but beſides that the Macedonians had the command of all the country, Perſeus, who was poſted on the Enipeus, ſeemed unwilling to hazard an engagement, and to force him to it was not in the power of his enemies: thus were the Romans hemmed in on all ſides, without a poſſibility of attempting any thing, and with proviſions for only ſix days. The condition of the Roman fleet was equally bad; diſeaſe had carried off a great number of the ſeamen; moſt of thoſe who had ſurvived,

* Liv. L. xliv. c. 18. † See Liv. ibid. c. 20.

had deſerted; and the few that remained on board, had neither ſubſiſtence nor even clothing. The ſituation of Appius Cento in Illyricum, was ſtill more wretched; a ſtrong and immediate reinforcement being neceſſary to prevent a Roman commander from owing his ſafety to *flight!* BOOK VII. Sect. 2.

He endeavours to reſtore them.

Aemilius made it his firſt care, to recover every part of the Roman army under his command from this ſtate of debility. Anicius the praetor was ordered into Illyricum with a large body of forces. Octavius, another of the praetors, was appointed to command the fleet. Aemilius himſelf haſtened the neceſſary levies with all poſſible expedition; and in eleven days from the time of his leaving Brundusium, though on his way he ſtopped at Delphi to ſacrifice, he was in perſon at the head of the army in Macedon.

Faults committed by Perſeus.

But, whatever advantages Aemilius might obtain from theſe vigorous exertions, he derived more from the timidity and ſordidneſs of Perſeus[*]. During the winter, which had been uncommonly ſevere, whilſt the Romans, hemmed in on every ſide, had ſcarcely the means of ſubſiſtence, and every road, excepting to the hardy and experienced native, was utterly impaſſable, the Macedonian king had not made the leaſt attempt to drive his enemies from that part of the country, and to regain the ſtreights of Tempe. A winter's campaign, to his Thracian auxiliaries, a matter certainly of little difficulty or hardſhip, had probably com-

[*] Liv. L. xliv. c. 20.

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pleted the ruin of this part of the Roman army, and reſtored the king to the poſſeſſion of all thoſe important paſſes which in the phrenzy of fear he had abandoned.

What is ſtill more extraordinary, Perſeus had at length prevailed on a tribe of the Baſtarnae [7] from the banks of the Danube, to march to his aſſiſtance, by the promiſe of a large ſubſidy, ten pieces of gold to every horſeman, five to every foot-ſoldier, and a thouſand to every chieftain; and they were already, to the number of ten thouſand horſe and as many foot, within ſeventy miles of the Macedonian camp. When the king ſaw that he muſt part with his money, his predominant paſſion interfered; and in hopes of putting off the payment, or perhaps of eluding it, he ſent Antigonus with ſplendid preſents to the leaders, and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that they ſhould find plenty of proviſions and every kind of refreſhment prepared for them, on their march. But, barbarians as they were, they were not to be ſo trifled with. Clondicus their leader, immediately demanded of Antigonus, "Have you alſo "brought the promiſed ſubſidy?" who returning an evaſive anſwer, "Let your maſter then know," replied the barbarian, "that the Baſtarnae ſhall "not advance one ſtep farther, until the ſtipu-"lated gold is paid down to them." The ſole expedient that now occurred to Perſeus, was, at leaſt to ſave a portion of his darling treaſure, by

his ſordid treatment of the Baſtarnae.

[7] Liv. L. xliv. c. 26. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

taking into pay a part only of the auxiliaries; pretending to his lords, that they might prove dangerous inmates, ſhould ſo large a body be permitted to enter Macedon. Antigonus was again diſpatched, to inform Clondicus, that his maſter had only occaſion for five thouſand horſemen. This prevaricating propoſal was anſwered with a cry of indignation from the whole army: "However", ſaid Clondicus, "have you brought "the gold for theſe five thouſand, whom you "demand?" when, perceiving by the confuſion of Antigonus, what the caſe was, he turned from him with indignant rage, inſtantly commanded his troops to move homeward, and in revenge, as well as for ſubſiſtence, marked his return with ravage and deſolation. It was extraordinary, that Antigonus was not made the victim of their fury. His eſcape, as Livy tells us, was more than he himſelf expected. Theſe barbarians, it ſeems, of whoſe manners we are apt to conceive very injurious ideas, reſpected the ſacred character with which Antigonus was inveſted,* notwithſtanding the perfidiouſneſs they had experienced from his maſter.

* The learned reader will recollect, that the ſacking of Rome by the Celtic tribes from Gaul, was occaſioned by the violation of the rights of nations, of which the Roman ambaſſadors had been guilty: theſe ambaſſadors had been ſent to the Gauliſh camp before Cluſium, to deprecate the deſtruction of that neighbouring city; but not ſucceeding in their ſuit, they departed from the character of miniſters of peace, and fought under the Cluſian banners; provoked at which, the Gauls inſtantly raiſed the ſiege, and marched to Rome.

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The loſs ſuſtained by him in conſequence of it.

The return of the Baſtarnae proved an irreparable misfortune to Perſeus. They were, Plutarch informs us, the fineſt body of men Macedon had ever ſeen. In ſtature, in activity, agility of body, and expertneſs at every kind of martial exerciſe, they were not to be excelled; while energy was given to all theſe advantages, by an uncommon boldneſs of ſpirit and contempt of danger. The occupations of navigation, agriculture and paſtoral life, being accounted diſreputable among them, to fight and to conquer was their only object. Had the whole of this fierce emigration therefore been permitted to advance, and been employed in ſpreading devaſtation through Theſſaly, whilſt Perſeus, by maintaining his poſt on the Enipeus, kept the conſular army at bay, the Romans, Livy acknowledges, had with difficulty eſcaped.

The ſame ſordidneſs of temper prevailed through all the tranſactions of this weak and impolitic prince. He might at this time have gained the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of Eumenes; but he loſt both by his avarice. That king, long the zealous friend of Rome, was ſaid to be diſguſted by certain inſults, which he had received from the haughty Marcius [9]; and he began perhaps alſo to perceive what he himſelf might expect from this formidable power, which he was aiding to advance to univerſal dominion. He entered therefore into a ſecret negotiation with Macedon. [10]. On the payment of a thouſand talents, he offered to withdraw his

Negotiates with Eumenes, and loſes him by his avarice.

[9] Liv. L. xliv. c. 13. [10] Liv. ibid. c. 25.

assistance from the Romans; and for fifteen hundred, to oblige them to conclude a peace; engaging at the same time to give sufficient hostages for the performance of his stipulations. The bargain to Perseus was highly advantageous; but with him, the difficulty was, to part with his money. He was willing enough to promise; but Eumenes, from experience of the man, was unwilling to place confidence on such unsolid grounds. After much negotiating, little to the honor of either party, Perseus consented to pay down the sum required, provided it was deposited in the temple at Samothrace, until Eumenes should fulfil his engagements. But this island being subject to Perseus, Eumenes considered it as perfectly the same, whether the money were in the coffers of the Macedonian king or in the temple at Samothrace: and thus the negotiation proved abortive [11].

His mean and perfidious dealing with Gentius.

But the baseness of the Macedonian monarch appears most conspicuous in his treatment of Gentius the Illyrian [12]. The district of Illyricum which he reigned over, was washed on its western extremity by the Hadriatic, on the eastern it was divided from Macedon by a ridge of mountains, and it extended southward to that part of Illyricum which the Romans claimed by right of conquest. The situation therefore of this prince rendered him to Rome, as

[11] Some time after, the Romans discovered the intended treaty, and never forgave Eumenes for the share he had in the transaction.

[12] Liv. L. xliv. c. 27. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

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well as to Macedon, a convenient friend or a troubleſome enemy. Perſeus and the Romans had both ſought his alliance; but his inclination led him to the Macedonian intereſt; which he offered to join, on payment of three hundred talents. Perſeus, however, had hitherto protracted the negotiation, in hopes of bringing him down to lower terms. But the preſent emergency would not admit of a longer delay. Peace, he ſaw, was not now to be obtained; and two envoys had at this very time arrived at the court of Gentius, in order to put the finiſhing hand to an alliance, between Illyricum and Rome. In this ſituation Perſeus had recourſe to a ſtratagem. He agreed to the terms of Gentius, and deſired that his ambaſſadors might attend to receive the ſubſidy, and to ſwear to the due performance of the treaty; when he ordered the three hundred talents to be delivered to them; and in order to give the greater ſolemnity to the act, the treaty was executed in preſence of his whole army. It was now proper, that meſſengers ſhould be ſent to the Illyrian king with an account of the tranſaction; and as the weight of treaſure would have prevented the neceſſary diſpatch, they took with them only ten talents, leaving the remainder ſealed up with the ſignets of the Illyrian ambaſſadors, to be delivered to confidential perſons, who were to convey it without delay. Gentius entertained no ſuſpicion; the money he was told was on the way; and, as a proof of his attachment to Macedon, he immediately ſeized and impriſoned the Roman envoys. This was the very

thing that Perſeus had in view. "He has now," ſaid he, "advanced too far to recede; and ſhould "he even repent, it is impoſſible the Romans "ſhould forgive him." Exulting in the ſucceſs of his ſcheme, he commanded the money to be ſtopped. This deſpicable policy, however, produced no advantage to Perſeus. It ſacrificed, on the contrary, an ally, by precipitating the ruin of Gentius. This wretched prince, by the perfidy of the Macedonian king, loſing both his crown and his liberty; Anicius, the Roman praetor, having ſoon after attacked him, reduced his whole kingdom, and carried him, with all his family, into captivity.

Gentius undone by it.

This tranſaction ſtrongly marks the character of Perſeus. Gentius indeed appears, from hiſtory, to have been a prince of a very unamiable character [11]; being a violent, mercileſs tyrant, rendered ſtill more brutal by intemperance, to which he was much addicted. He ſtands charged with having ſacrificed to caprice or jealouſy, ſome of his moſt valuable ſubjects, and with having even imbrued his hands in the blood of his brother, whoſe virtues he probably conſidered as his own reproach. But however unworthy of our pity the Illyrian may have been, the conduct of Perſeus was not the leſs impolitic and unprincipled.

Character of this Illyrian prince.

Had the king of Macedon adopted a more manly and more liberal ſyſtem; had he made a proper uſe of the wealth and other reſources of which he was

[11] See Liv. L. xliv. c. 30.

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still master, the Romans had found his overthrow a work of infinite difficulty. Had he been brave, generous, and honest, not only mercenaries, but voluntary succours had poured in to him from every quarter. Most of the Grecian states secretly wished him success, well knowing, that in the fortune of Macedon was involved the fate of Greece. The Asiatics, in like manner, whatever connexions many of them appeared to have with Rome, could not, without the most painful apprehensions, look forward to the probable consequences of the extinction of the Macedonian power. Even Prusias of Bithynia [24], the most servile of the Roman vassals, had ventured to remonstrate, by his ambassadors, against the continuance of the war. The Rhodians did more: they required both the Romans and the Macedonian king to lay down their arms, threatening to declare war against whicheyer power should refuse to adopt pacific measures. But such was the folly of this prince, that every resource which might have contributed to his safety, was either rejected or misemployed; and he was at last deserted by all, only because he was the first to desert himself.

The Greek and Asiatic states well affected to the interests of Macedon;

Perseus neglects to improve these favorable dispositions.

The presence of Aemilius gave new vigor to the Roman arms. He began by improving their discipline [25]. The advanced posts had been permitted the use of shields, from which many inconveniences had arisen. Trusting to this defensive armor,

Activity of Aemilius;

his attention to the discipline

[24] Liv. L. xliv. c. 14.

[25] Liv. ibid. c. 33. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

they were often leſs watchful of the approach of the foe; and even ventured to ſtand and ſkirmiſh, when their duty was to have retreated, and alarmed the poſts behind them. They had frequently been found reclined on their ſhields aſleep; and the gleaming of the braſs had been known to diſcover them to the enemy: the conſul, therefore, gave directions, that when employed on this duty, they ſhould leave their ſhields [16] behind them. It had been the cuſtom alſo, to give out the daily orders aloud to the whole army; hence the pretence, that they had not been heard diſtinctly, afforded an excuſe, or at leaſt a palliation for every failure in duty; and what was ſtill more dangerous, no ſooner had the orders been delivered out, than the enemy generally was apprized of them. The conſul, therefore, gave it in command, that thenceforth the military tribunes ſhould whiſper their orders to the firſt centurion, he to the officer under him, and ſo on, until every perſon had received them. At the ſame time, notwithſtanding the ſeverity with which theſe regulations were inforced, the attention he paid to every thing which could contribute to the ſecurity or refreſhment of the troops, endeared him to them all. At his arrival, they were in great want of water, which, in this climate, and at this ſeaſon of the year [17], was exceedingly diſtreſſing; and thoſe who had

and wants of his army:

[16] Plutarch ſays, their *pikes* alſo were left behind, that they might guard the more againſt ſleep, when they were ſenſible that they had nothing to defend themſelves.

[17] It was now midſummer.

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been ſent to look out for ſome, reported, that none but brackiſh water was to be found. The verdant and leafy ſummits of the mountains around, induced Aemilius, nevertheleſs, to pronounce, that ſprings could not be far diſtant; but poſſibly the water was abſorbed in the ſands, or diſcharged through ſome ſubterraneous ducts into the neighbouring ocean; deep pits were, therefore, ſunk at certain diſtances along the ſhore, he himſelf ſuperintending the workmen. The conſul's opinion was juſtified by the event. Freſh water guſhed out in great abundance, and the army was relieved. The diligence of the ſoldier was equal to the attention of the general. Inſtead of ſullen murmuring, or the uproar of tumult, lately the diſgrace of the Roman arms, nothing was now to be heard throughout the camp, but the poliſhing or ſharpening of arms, and the chearful buſtle of men buſied in preparing for action.

finds it difficult to force the Macedonian lines;

Perſeus, meanwhile, was ſtill poſted [16] on the oppoſite ſide of the Enipeus, and as the channel at this time was fordable in many places, he had added to the ſecurity of his camp, by fortifying it towards the river with a ſtrong paliſade, which, together with the height and ſteepneſs of the bank, rendered the approach difficult, and an attack exceedingly hazardous. Aemilius, after ſome attempts, finding, that here no impreſſion was to be made, changed his plan [17]. Being informed of a bye-path

[16] OLYMP. CLII. 4. BEFORE CHRIST 164.

[17] Liv. L. xliv. c. 35. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

over Mount Olympus, by the caſtle of Pythium, which led to the rear of the Macedonian camp, where it was not defended by any intrenchment, he detached a body of eight thouſand men, under the command of Scipio Naſica; and Fabius Maximius his eldeſt ſon. This detachment had public orders to embark on board the fleet then on the coaſt, and make a deſcent on ſome of the maritime parts of Macedon; but with ſecret inſtructions to return as ſoon as night had ſet in, and aſcend the mountain, the ſummit of which, by computation, they were to gain early in the morning of the third day; Aemilius, mean time, employing the enemy's attention in the plain, by repeated attacks on their lines. The Macedonians had neglected the paſs by Olympus, ſo that the Romans advanced without oppoſition, till a Cretan deſerter having at length given notice of their approach, a detachment of twelve thouſand men was ſent to repulſe them. But it was now too late; the enemy were already in poſſeſſion of the ſummit; and, after a ſhort though ſharp conflict, drove the Macedonians down the mountains; who, in their flight to the camp, ſpread the alarm, that the Romans were preſſing hard upon their rear.

attacks, by ſurpriſe, the rear of the Macedonian camp.

Struck with terror, the king, as uſual, loſt ſight at once of all the advantages of his ſituation; and as if on the point of being immediately ſurrounded, broke up his camp, and fled to Pydna: he wiſhed to have retreated even farther. He talked of diſbanding his army; of ſecuring all the cattle and grain in the ſeveral ſtrong holds throughout Macedon; of laying

Terror of Perſeus; who flies to Pydna:

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the country waſte to deprive the Romans of ſubſiſtence; and of retreating into his interior provinces, where the numberleſs defiles and intricate windings would enable him to baffle for ever the purſuing enemy. The repreſentations of his officers checked theſe timid and unmanly purpoſes He had ſtill, they told him, a force far ſuperior in numbers to the Roman army; and his men, fighting as they now would, in defence of their altars and their families, thoſe pledges which every generous mind holds moſt dear, and animated beſides by the preſence of their ſovereign ſharing every danger with them, would certainly exert a vigor that could hardly fail of proving victorious. Aſhamed, though probably not convinced, he aſſumed a more reſolute countenance, and commanded his army to form under the walls of Pydna; where, ſoon after, Aemilius appeared in order of battle, having been previouſly joined by the detachment from the mountains.

Aemilius advances againſt him;

but defers fighting until the enſuing day;

Naſica, flushed with his late ſucceſs, urged the conſul to begin the attack inſtantly [19]. But the Macedonians were refreſhed, while the Romans were fatigued and almoſt parched with drought after their precipitate march through ſandy roads, expoſed to the ſultry heat of the mid-day ſun. "Young man," replied the conſul, "at your years I ſhould have "thought as you do; at mine you will act as I ſhall:" and having given directions to mark out the ground for incamping; and to incloſe it with a ditch and rampart, he ordered the rear to move into it, as ſoon as it was completed; the front-ranks ſtill preſenting

and on what account.

[19] See Liv. L. xliv. c. 36. Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

an unbroken face to the enemy, until the reſt of the battalions having ſucceſſively quitted the field, they alſo fell back in like manner without confuſion, though in the preſence of an embattled foe: a remarkable inſtance of the excellence of Roman diſcipline.

Eclipſe of the moon;

The enſuing night, there happened an eclipſe of the moon [20]. The Roman ſoldiers were apprized of it, the tribune Sulpicius Gallus having foretold it to the conſul, and, with his permiſſion, to the whole army. But in the Macedonian camp it occaſioned the greateſt diſmay. This phaenomenon they were accuſtomed to view with terror; and they now conſidered the darkening of the lunar orb as a ſure preſage of the extinction of the glory of Macedon.

different effects it had on the Roman and Macedonian ſoldiery.

Battle of Pydna;

Next morning the two armies were drawn out in order of battle; but, however ſpirited and determined in appearance, probably rather for the purpoſe of obſerving each other's motions, than with any ſerious intentions to engage [21]; the conſul as well as the king betraying, in their whole conduct much irreſolution and anxiety. Early in the day Perſeus withdrew from the field into Pydna, "to offer," he told his ſoldiers, "his ſupplications to Hercules;" a god, ſays Plutarch, who never hears the coward's prayer. Aemilius, more artfully protracted the time, ſacrificing beaſt after beaſt, under pretence that the omens were not yet propitious, until, upon the ſlaying of the twenty-firſt victim, the aruſpices had orders to announce to the army, "that the gods had promiſed them the victory, "on condition they ſtood on the defenſive." The

[20] Liv. L. xliv. c. 37. Plut ubi ſup.

[21] Liv. ibid. c. 37. 40.

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Roman writers ſcruple not to acknowledge, that this language of piety was all an artifice deviſed by the conſul himſelf. During the former part of the day, the Romans had the ſun in their faces; Aemilius wiſhed to defer engaging, until his declination to the weſt had relieved his army from this inconvenience. The Macedonian phalanx, beſides, was poſted on advantageous ground, and preſented to view ſuch an impenetrable front of interwoven ſhields and pikes, as ſeemed to bid defiance to the moſt vigorous aſſault. Aemilius himſelf was wont to confeſs, that ſo ſtrong was the impreſſion which the ſight of this formidable phalanx had made on his mind, that a certain terror always attended the recollection of that day. He was therefore deſirous, that the Macedonians ſhould begin the attack, in hopes they might break their ranks as they advanced.

brought on by an unlooked-for incident.

Theſe were the reaſons which the conſul alledged for his conduct. Livy [21], however, is of opinion, that his real purpoſe was to amuſe and reſtrain the Roman ſoldiery, who were impatient of delay; and, at leaſt for that day, not to have ventured a battle. At length, an unlooked-for incident [22] put an end to all farther heſitation. Towards three in the afternoon, ſome Thracian ſoldiers endeavouring to intercept a Roman convoy, or, according to others, to ſeize a horſe that had eſcaped from the Roman to the Macedonian lines, a ſkirmiſh enſued, and large reinforcements being detached from both armies, the engagement ſoon became general.

[21] Liv. L. xliv. c. 40. [22] Plutarch in Paul. Aemilio.

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An exact detail of this battle is not at preſent to be obtained, as moſt part of the narrative, which Polybius and Livy had given of it, is long ſince loſt; the principal circumſtances, however, may be gathered from the few facts which Plutarch and the later hiſtorians have preſerved.

The Romans in danger at the beginning;

It began in a manner that threatened utter diſcomfiture to the Romans. Having attempted to make an impreſſion on the front of the Macedonian phalanx, the length of whoſe pikes rendered it impoſſible for the Roman ſoldiers to reach the enemy with their ſwords, their firſt line was broken, and cut in pieces; and the ſecond, diſcouraged by the fate of their companions, declined the charge, and retreated. Could this body of Macedonian infantry now have puſhed on, without loſing that compact form and ſolidity which conſtituted its ſtrength, the fate of the Roman army had been at once decided. The conſul's preſence of mind ſaved them from deſtruction. He immediately ordered his men to divide into ſmall platoons; and, inſtead of ruſhing againſt this dangerous rampart with unavailing intrepidity, to mark the ſeveral breaks and interſtices into which the long-extended front muſt neceſſarily open as it advanced, from the irregularity of the ground, and the different exertions of the combatants; to penetrate between the pikes into thoſe vacant ſpaces, and charge the enemy ſword-in-hand. This manoeuvre had all the ſucceſs that could have been expected. The inſtant a void ſpace appeared, the Romans, piercing through it into the very heart of the phalanx, dealt deſtruction on every ſide. The pike, meanwhile, remained a cumber-

but obtain a complete victory.

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ous embarraſſment in the hands of the Macedonian ſoldier; and the ranks, from their being wedged together, were ſlaughtered without the power of reſiſtance. The Roman armor, beſides, had conſiderable advantage over the Macedonian in cloſe combat. The ſword of the Macedonians was ſhort, and their bucklers ſmall and ſlight; the Romans, on the contrary, had ſhields that covered them from head to foot, and ſwords ponderous, well-tempered, and of powerful execution.

At the ſame time that diſcomfiture was thus ſpreading along the whole front of the phalanx, both the flanks and the rear were likewiſe ſucceſsfully attacked. So that this formidable maſs of warriors, which had lately ſo fierce an aſpect, now exhibited one continued ſcene of diſorder and carnage.

Young Cato's diſtreſs at loſing his ſword;

The victory was no longer doubtful, and the rage of battle was beginning to ſubſide, when an unexpected event unhappily added to the ſlaughter of this bloody day. The younger Cato, ſon to the cenſor, and afterwards married to one of the conſul's daughters, had loſt his ſword[24]. After diſtinguiſhing himſelf in the attack on the phalanx by many acts of valor, it had ſprung from his hand in the heat of action, and he had hitherto ſearched for it in vain. For a ſoldier to have returned without his ſword, though he had even returned victorious, had been highly reproachful[25]. He hurried from rank to rank, bewailing the diſaſter and imploring the aſſiſtance of every companion and friend. A conſiderable number ſoon joined him, and under his command, again

its effects fatal to the enemy.

[24] Plutarch. in Paul. Aemilio. & in Catone.

[25] Excerpt. Polyb. L. vi. c. 25.

ruſhed impetuouſly on the foe, relentleſs ſlaughter marking their way as they advanced; until at length they diſcovered the fatal ſword under a heap of arms and dead bodies. Elevated with this ſucceſs, they charged the few that remained unbroken, with redoubled ardor. Three thouſand Macedonians, all choſen men, had hitherto kept their ranks; they were now cut off to a man. The reſt of the army fled; but few eſcaped; neither flight nor darkneſs ſaving them from the Roman ſword; the purſuit being eagerly continued during the night, for upwards of fifteen miles. The ſides of the neighbouring hills were covered with the dead and dying; and the river Leucus, which the Romans paſſed the following morning, was even then tinged deep with blood [26].

Remarkable circumſtances that attended this battle.

If we are to believe Plutarch [27], this important action was determined in leſs than one hour. It began, he tells us, at the ninth hour [28], and before the tenth hour the Romans were in full poſſeſſion of victory. The returns which he gives us of the dead, is not leſs amazing. Twenty-five thouſand of the Macedonians fell; and of the Romans. one hundred at moſt; according to Scipio Naſica, only eighty [29].

[26] From this memorable day, the Macedonian phalanx ſeems to have been held in low eſtimation. It gained little credit at Cynoſcephalae; but the battle of Pydna completely ruined its reputation.

[27] In Paul. Aemilio.

[28] The ſame with our three in the afternoon.

[29] The circumſtances of this battle, as related by Plutarch, will ſuggeſt to the reader of reflection, many reaſons for doubting the truth of this account.

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It is alſo remarkable, that the auxiliary troops of the Macedonian king, and particularly the Thracian horſe, who at the battle on the Pencus had done important ſervice, and might have retrieved, perhaps, the fortune of the day, appear to have taken no ſhare in the engagement [10]. Are we to ſuppoſe, that they had received the conſul's gold? or that they diſdained to fight for a prince who had not the ſpirit to fight for himſelf? We certainly have it on Livy's [11] authority, that the Bifaltae, a Thracian tribe to whom Perſeus made application in his flight, denied him aſſiſtance; and that the Thracians he had in pay, as ſoon as they had reached the banks of the Strymon, abandoned his ſervice, and retired homeward.

the Thracian auxiliaries deſert.

Immediately on the defeat of his army, Perſeus, in terror, fled from Pydna, eſcorted by a conſiderable body of cavalry; but numbers of the Macedonian infantry, who were making their eſcape from the field, coming up, and inſulting the horſemen, to whoſe cowardice and treachery they imputed the diſcomfiture, Perſeus began to fear, that an affray would follow, in which he might poſſibly be involved. Apprehenſive of the conſequences, he ſtruck off from the road into the thickeſt part of a wood, through which, with great difficulty, and with only a few attendants, he at length, about midnight, made his way to Pella.

Perſeus flies to Pella;

The anguiſh of diſappointed ambition, remorſe, and terror, tacked the tyrant's mind, and added to his natural ferocity. Euetus and Eudaeus, two principal officers of his exchequer, having ventured

his diſtraction and ferocity:

[10] Liv. L. xliv. c. 42. [11] Ibid. c. 45.

to blame ſome part of his conduct, he ſtabbed them with his own hand [13]. Shocked and alarmed at this act of barbarity, his other lords refuſed to approach him; ſo that, not knowing where to hide himſelf, or whom to truſt, he ſet off again from Pella before break of day, taking with him what treaſure he could carry. The whole force he had now to attend him [14], conſiſted of three captains of auxiliaries (every Macedonian having deſerted him) Evander the Cretan, Neon the Boeotian, and Archidamus the Aetolian, together with five hundred Cretan mercenaries, who had been allured by the hopes of ſharing the treaſure of which they ſaw him in poſſeſſion. He ſuſpected their motive; and, to ſave the reſt, ſuffered them to carry off a number of veſſels of gold and ſilver, which he had deſignedly cauſed to be ſcattered in their way.

obliged to leave Pella;

abandoned by the Macedonians;

The third day after the battle, he entered Amphipolis [15], to as little purpoſe as he had entered Pella. He would have addreſſed the people, before whom he preſented himſelf with his eldeſt ſon, in hopes of exciting their compaſſion, when a guſh of tears ſtopping his utterance, he made ſigns to Evander to ſpeak for him; but they unanimouſly refuſed to hear him, exclaiming with indignation, "Away, away, leſt we alſo ſhould "be involved in ruin." Driven in this digraceful manner from Amphipolis, he haſtened to the ſea-

flees to Amphipolis,

and is driven from thence;

ſeeks to eſcape to Samothrace;

[13] Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

[14] Lib. ubi ſup. c. 43. Plut in Paul. Aemilio.

[15] Liv. L. xlv. c. 45.

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side, in order to pass over into Samothrace, where the reputed holiness of the place promised him, he imagined, a secure asylum. But anxious to save his treasure, not less than to save his life, he could not think of leaving with the Cretans what his fears had induced him to disperse among them. Among the vessels which they had carried off, he told them, were certain vases which had belonged to Alexander the Great, for which, if restored, they should receive the most ample recompence. The Cretans of those days are said to have surpassed all the nations of the earth in fraud and artifice: they were, nevertheless, overmatched on this occasion. Depending on his royal word, they restored to Perseus most of the vases he required, to the amount of thirty talents; but he forfeited his promise: they received nothing in return.

over-reaches his Cretan mercenaries.

Total revolution throughout Macedon.

By this time, a total revolution had taken place throughout Macedon, one of the most rapid recorded in the page of history. In fifteen days after Aemilius had begun to put his army in motion, all that formidable armament under Perseus was broken and dispersed; and in two days after the defeat at Pydna, the whole country had submitted to the consul. This extraordinary change, effected so soon and with so much facility, Plutarch [11] seeks to ascribe to some miraculous interposition of the gods, exerted in favor of Rome; "that a people, "hitherto eminent for the love they bore to their "kings, should now, as if the chief bulwark of

[11] In Aemilio.

" their conſtitution were overthrown, and all were " fallen with it, have at once given up all thoughts " of reſiſtance, and have renounced their native " and kindred princes!" But the cauſe is eaſily diſcovered in the conduct of Perſeus himſelf. The puſillanimity, the cruelties, and ſordidneſs of this unhappy prince, had loſt him that affection which he certainly poſſeſſed in the beginning of his reign, and from which a wife and virtuous king had derived ſtrength and ſecurity. But even a foreign yoke ſeemed now, to the Macedonian nation, more tolerable than the domination of a native tyrant, equally mercileſs and oppreſſive [16].

The Romans purſue Perſeus to Samothrace:

As ſoon as it was known that Perſeus had fled to Samothrace, the prætor Octavius ſailed thither in purſuit of him [17]. Perſeus had taken ſhelter in the temple of Caſtor and Pollux. The difficulty was, how to draw him from thence without violating the privileges of a ſanctuary, held in the higheſt reverence by the pagan world. Evander had accompanied him; and the Romans availed themſelves of this circumſtance. The prieſts to whom the ſuperintendency of the iſland belonged, were aſked, whether it was not a defilement of the ſacred

[16] We are ſometimes apt to queſtion the character which the Roman writers have drawn of this prince, and to ſuſpect, that the coloring has been overcharged: but that he ſhould have been thus abandoned by his own ſubjects, forms a preſumptive evidence againſt him, to which it is difficult to give an anſwer. Forſaken by a people, lately zealous in his ſervice, it is hardly poſſible, but his adminiſtration muſt have been beyond meaſure oppreſſive.

[17] See Liv. L. xlv. c. 5 & ſeq.

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ground, that a polluted perſon ſhould there find a retreat? and why this holy aſylum was permitted to Evander, the aſſaſſin of king Eumenes, and the impious profaner of the Delphic temple? Perſeus, who ſoon had notice that Evander was not to be protected, felt, with excruciating agony, the conſequences of his being delivered up. The king had not one guilty ſecret, to which this worthleſs aſſociate was not privy; and in the hands of the Romans, the hopes of life might tempt him to reveal all. Apprehenſive of the event, he endeavoured to perſuade Evander to prevent, by a voluntary death, the tortures that certainly awaited him, ſhould the Romans once have him in their power. The Cretan ſeemed convinced, and agreed to poiſon himſelf; but the king perceiving that he procraſtinated, and beginning to fear that he meditated an eſcape, procured him to be murdered; and corrupted Theondas, chief of the Samothracian prieſts, to report that he died by his own hands. This perfidious treatment of the unhappy inſtrument he himſelf had employed, and whoſe chief guilt it was, that he had too faithfully obeyed the orders of ſuch a maſter, deprived Perſeus of his few attendants that remained, almoſt all of them going over to the Romans. The Macedonian monarch had before this, ſolicited Aemilius [11] to accept his ſubmiſſion; but though this requeſt was conceived in the moſt abject terms, the conſul refuſed to liſten to any propoſal that was not

the daſtardly and perfidious arts he has recourſe to:

[11] Liv. L. xlv. c. 4.

accompanied with a reſignation of the regal title. The only reſource that now remained to this wretched prince, was to attempt an eſcape to the Thracian coaſt, and to implore the protection of Cotys his late ally. Oroandes, the captain of a Cretan veſſel, who lay off Samothrace, had engaged to take him on board the enſuing night, when under favor of the darkneſs he might elude the vigilance of his enemies. He had accordingly cauſed his treaſure to be ſhipped; but when he reached the ſhore, to his inexpreſſible mortification, Oroandes was already ſailed with all his wealth. Thus bereaved of his treaſure, and expoſed to his enemies, he wandered diſconſolate for ſome hours along the beach, and was forced, at the approach of morning, to ſhrink back to his ſanctuary, which with difficulty he reached before the Romans could prepare to intercept him. In addition to his misfortunes, Ion of Theſſalonica, his chief favorite, to whoſe care he had intruſted the younger part of his family, now deſerted alſo to the Roman admiral, to whom he delivered up all the royal children committed to his charge. Abandoned thus by all but his eldeſt ſon Philip, without a probability of eſcape, without means even of ſubſiſtence, he was under the neceſſity of ſurrendering at laſt to Octavius, who immediately ſet ſail with his priſoner to Amphipolis, and from thence tranſported him to the conſul's camp.

finds it impoſſible to ſave himſelf, and ſurrenders to the Romans.

Aemilius received the king [19] in a manner which,

The behaviour of Aemilius.

[19] Plutarch. in Paul. Aemilio.

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whatever Perſeus deſerved, did the victor little honor. The Macedonian, remarkably mean under every reverſe of fortune, approached with the moſt abject ſervility, bowing his face to the earth, and endeavouring, with his ſuppliant arms, to graſp the knees of Aemilius. "Why, wretched man," ſaid the proud Roman, "doſt thou acquit fortune "of what might ſeem her crime, by a behaviour "which makes it appear that thou deſerveſt her "indignation? Why doſt thou diſgrace my laurels, "and detract from my glory, by ſhowing thyſelf "an abject adverſary, and unworthy of having "a Roman to contend with? Courage in the "unfortunate is revered even by an enemy, and "cowardice, though attended with ſucceſs, is, "by the Romans, treated with contempt."

This ſtern and humiliating addreſs, which a more generous conqueror would have ſpared, he ſeemed afterwards to temper, by raiſing him from the ground, and bidding him nevertheleſs, to hope every thing from the clemency of the Roman people. Of this boaſted clemency, Perſeus ſoon had the moſt bitter experience. A ſpectacle to his enemies in the ſtreets of Rome, he was forced to adorn the victor's pomp, expoſed, with all his family, before the conſul's triumphal car. With much earneſtneſs he begged of Aemilius to ſave him from this ignominy: "It is in his own power "to ſave himſelf," replied the obdurate Roman. The triumph ended, he was caſt into a dank and dreary priſon, the common receptable of the meaneſt malefactors, and fed on the ſame allowance

with theſe outcaſts of ſociety; until Aemilius, probably aſhamed [10] of ſuch exceſs of cruelty, procured his removal to a cleaner apartment, and took care he ſhould be ſupplied with better food; but, unable to brook his almoſt unparalleled reverſe of fortune, and the contempt with which he was treated, this wretched prince ſoon after ſtarved himſelf to death. If we are to believe others, he ended his days in a manner yet more dreadful. The ſoldiers who guarded him, from ſome provocation which he had given, marked him as the object of their vengeance; and, finding no other means more effectual, contrived to hinder him from ſleeping. They watched him by turns, and uſed ſuch diligence to effect their purpoſe, that, worn out at laſt with want of reſt, he expired. His eldeſt ſon Philip [11] and one of his younger ſons, are ſuppoſed to have died before him. Another ſon, Alexander, became ſo great a proficient in the Roman language, as to be able to diſcharge the office of a writing-clerk; in which capacity he is ſaid to have been employed by the chief magiſtrates of Rome.

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Death of Perſeus.

Fate of his family.

Such the uncertainty of human greatneſs! and ſuch the cloſe of the royal houſe of Macedon, once one of the moſt illuſtrious the world had ever ſeen, and whoſe empire ſeemed, by its ſtrength and

[10] Plutarch tells us, that thoſe Macedonian nobles who were obliged to remove to Rome, found afterwards an active protector in Aemilius.

[11] Livy (L. xlii. c. 52.) ſays he was his brother, and his ſon only by adoption.

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vigor, to promiſe ſtability for a length of ages! Perſeus reigned eleven years. And from the death of Alexander the Great, to the final ſubverſion of the Macedonian monarchy, one hundred and ſixty years only had elapſed.

Settlement and humiliation of Macedon.

The ſpirit of Rome appeared ſtill more glaringly deſpotic in the ſettlement of Macedon [42], and the policy ſhe now obſerved towards the ſeveral ſtates of Greece. Ten commiſſioners were appointed to aſſiſt the conſul in arranging the Macedonian affairs; the principal outlines of which arrangement, had previouſly been traced out to them at Rome. In conſequence of this plan, a new form of government took place throughout Macedon. The whole kingdom was divided into four diſtricts; the inhabitants of each were to have no connexion, intermarriages, or exchange of poſſeſſions, with thoſe of the other diſtricts, but every part to remain totally ſeparated and diſtinct from the reſt. They were neither to fell timber themſelves, nor to permit others to fell any. They were not to import ſalt; nor even where they had it in plenty, to export it, but under certain regulations laid down by their Roman maſters. They were prohibited the uſe of arms, unleſs in thoſe places which were expoſed to the incurſions of the barbarian borderers. They were permitted to work their iron and copper-mines; but the working of thoſe of gold and ſilver was ſtrictly prohibited; probably leſt the Macedonians, by thus acquiring wealth, ſhould regain any portion of their former greatneſs. They were

[42] Liv. L. xlv. c. 29.

excluded from all ſhare in the adminiſtration of government; ſome unimportant offices in the civil department excepted, which were delegated to certain municipal officers annually choſen by the Macedonian people. Whilſt all the nobles of Macedon, all who had held any command in the king's fleets or armies; all governors of towns, and officers of his court; all, in a word, who had been in any ſhape diſtinguiſhed by high birth, large poſſeſſions, elegant living, or any circumſtance which raiſed them above the level of the vulgar, were ordered, with all their children above the age of fifteen, under pain of death, to leave their native land, and tranſport themſelves into Italy [21].

A more ſevere humiliation could hardly have been deviſed: indeed, a more complete debaſement almoſt baffles imagination. Muſt we not then turn with diſguſt and indignation from thoſe writers, who, after the narration of ſuch facts, wiſh to convey the idea, that the Roman conqueſt beſtowed liberty on Macedon? But it ſeems, that the overthrow of royalty, and the ſubjecting a kingdom to the far more oppreſſive yoke of a Roman ſenate, was, in the language of Rome, *to give liberty to a people.* In one point alone, the alteration ſeems at firſt ſight to have been favorable to the conquered. They were to pay the Romans one half only of the taxes they were accuſtomed to pay to their kings. Had this indulgence been even meant as a relief, it had been a poor com-

Miſrepreſentations of the Roman writers in favor of Rome.

[21] Liv. L. xlv. c. 32.

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penſation for a diſmembered kingdom, bereaved of its chief ſtrength by the expulſion of its nobleſt and moſt reſpectable families, and laid proſtrate beneath a foreign yoke. But, in truth, even this diminution of taxes, in the preſent impoveriſhed ſtate of Macedon, far from being dictated by mercy, was the reſult of neceſſity. It was the utmoſt that Macedon could bear. The Roman conſul had not only poſſeſſed himſelf of the numerous magazines and granaries which Perſeus had erected throughout his territories, and plundered the royal palaces of all the rich furniture, precious vaſes, and other coſtly manufactures, in which they are ſaid to have abounded; he had alſo drained the kingdom of its wealth, having every where ſeized on all the treaſure he could find. The amount there is reaſon to conjecture, muſt have been prodigious, as it appears, that the Romans themſelves were induſtrious to conceal it, every one of their hiſtorians giving us a different account of the matter. From one circumſtance, however, which we have on the authority both of Cicero [**] and Plutarch, ſome judgment may be formed. In conſequence of the money brought into the treaſury by Aemilius on his return from the Macedonian war, the Romans were exempted from taxation during the ſpace of a hundred and twenty-five years [††].

Prodigious value of the plunder of Macedon.

[**] Tantum in aerarium pecuniae (Paulus) invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attu'erit tributorum — ſays Cicero. De Off. L. ii. 2:.

[††] Until the conſulſhip of Hirtius and Panſa, who were conſuls in the firſt war between Caeſar and Antony.

The arrangement of the adminiſtration of government in Illyricum, was conducted on the ſame plan with that of Macedon.

Triumphal games celebrated by the conſul at Amphipolis.

Aemilius concluded the ſettlement of Macedon with the celebration of triumphal games at Amphipolis [ee]; to which all the neighbouring nations both of Europe and of Aſia were invited. The magnificence exhibited on this occaſion ſurpaſſed, we are informed, all that this part of the world had ever ſeen. Beſides the extraordinary pomp and elegance with which the various ſports were introduced, and the richneſs of the prizes beſtowed on the ſucceſsful candidates, all the ornaments of gold and ſilver, with every thing precious, elegant, and rare, that had been found in the numerous palaces of the Macedonian princes, were oſtentatiouſly diſplayed, and the ſcenery beautifully diverſified with ſuch prodigious quantities of curious armor, exquiſite paintings, and finiſhed ſtatues, that the eye was not only filled, but dazzled with the variegated profuſion. The conſul prided himſelf in exhibiting theſe ſplendid marks of victory, and he was probably no leſs pleaſed with the opportunity of impreſſing on the different nations who witneſſed them, an awful idea of the power of Rome, before which, an empire, ſeemingly ſo formidable, and provided with ſuch ample means of ſtrength and defence, had not been able to ſtand. The vaſt concourſe of people that crowded to the ſight, as well as the Roman armies in the neighbourhood, were all entertained, at the ſame time, by Aemilius,

[ee] Liv. L. xlv. c. 32, 33. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

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in the moſt ſumptuous manner, from the ſtores which had lately belonged to the Macedonian king. And ſuch was the abundant proviſion of all things, that theſe feaſts were not only continued as long as the games laſted, but the gueſts were, at their departure, preſented with whatever they choſe to take away. In the midſt of the different pompous pageants produced at this feſtival, was ſeen to ariſe an immenſe pile of various weapons and inſtruments of war, which at the cloſe of the ſolemnity the Roman ſoldiers, upon a certain ſignal, ſet on fire and deſtroyed. Theſe, it ſeems, were the leaſt valuable part of the Macedonian arms, not worth the tranſporting to Rome, and improper to be left in the hands of a vanquiſhed people.

Treatment of Epire by the Romans;

From Amphipolis Aemilius directed his courſe to Epire. The Epirots had ſubmitted ſome time before; and thoſe leaders who had been inſtrumental in promoting the alliance with Macedon, and who had not ſaved themſelves by flight, had all fallen by the ſword, or been delivered up to the Romans. The conſul now gave out, that the Roman garriſons were immediately to be withdrawn from Epire, and the whole country reſtored to the enjoyment of it's liberties; and having ſummoned ten of the principal inhabitants from every town to attend him, commanded them to collect whatever ſilver or gold was to be found in their houſes or temples, in order to be delivered, at an appointed day, to perſons to be commiſſioned by him for that purpoſe. The requiſition was punctually complied with: and, lulled into profound

found ſecurity, the Epirots fondly pleaſed themſelves with the thought, that this heavy contribution was all the penalty they were to incur. BOOK VII. Sect. 2.

But they knew not the atrocity of Roman policy. Parties of ſoldiers [47], under various pretences, were diſpatched to their different towns ſo as to arrive about the ſame time; with orders, that on the ſame day, and at the ſame hour, they ſhould ſeize, for ſlaves, every native of Epire, level the walls of their cities, and totally deſpoil them of all they poſſeſſed. The gold and ſilver having, in obedience to the conſul's commands, been accordingly brought in and delivered to the Roman officers, the ſignal was given, and a hundred and fifty thouſand perſons, unheard, unconvicted, unſuſpecting, without any particular crime even alledged againſt them, were, at one inſtant, doomed to ſlavery, their dwellings given up to the ſpoiler, and all their towns, to the number of ſeventy, laid in ruins: a deed ſo horrid, and of ſuch exceeding perfidy, that, to uſe the words of a judicious hiſtorian, *I ſhould not believe it, had any one writer ſaid to the contrary* [48].

their perfidiouſneſs and cruelty.

Plutarch [49] endeavours to exculpate Aemilius. This military execution, he would have us believe, was altogether contrary to the gentleneſs of his

[47] Liv. L. xlv. c. 34. Plut. in Paul. Aemilio.

[48] Raleigh's Hiſtory of the World.

[49] Plutarch ſays, Every ſoldier had only eleven drachmas to his ſhare (ſomewhat more than ſeven ſhillings.) Livy ſays, That every horſeman got 400 denarii (about 12l. 18s. 4d.) and every foot ſoldier half that ſum.

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diſpoſition: and he only yielded obedience to orders, which it was not in his power to control. Should this excuſe be admitted, in what light muſt the Roman ſenate appear! But from the manner in which Aemilius had juſt before treated the Aetolians, we are led to form of him a very different judgment.

Barbarous treatment of the Aetolians.

Violent diſputes had for ſome time prevailed among the people of Aetolia, a great number of them having declared in favor of the Romans, whilſt others were ſtill for maintaining an oppoſition to a power, which they ſaw threatened ruin to the Aetolian liberties. Encouraged by the ſucceſs of Aemilius in Macedon, two chiefs of the Roman faction [10], Lyſiſcus and Tiſippus, obtained from A. Baebius, the Roman commander in Aetolia, a body of ſoldiers; and ſurrounding the place where the convention of the Aetolian eſtates was held, fell unexpectedly on thoſe in the contrary intereſt, and having put to the ſword five hundred and fifty of the principal perſons, baniſhed the reſt, and confiſcated the poſſeſſions of them all. The matter was ſoon after laid before Aemilius; and the families of thoſe who had periſhed, together with the unhappy exiles, made application to him for redreſs. His anſwer is memorable. The only queſtion before him, he ſaid [11], was, "To what "party the ſufferers had belonged; if not friends "to Rome, whatever they had ſuffered, they had "ſuffered deſervedly:" nor would he reverſe the iniquitous decree. Yet ſo flagitious in the eyes of the Romans themſelves was the barbarous deed,

[10] Liv. L. xlv. c. 48. [11] Ibid. c. 31.

that this acquittal of the perpetrators of it, did not ſave Baebius; he was pronounced guilty of having debaſed the Roman ſoldiery, by making them the inhuman inſtruments of the perfidious maſſacre.

Humiliation of Greece.

From Livy it appears, that this deciſion of the Aetolian cauſe, in which Rome ſeems indeed to have laid aſide all diſguiſe, completed the humiliation of moſt of the Grecian commonwealths. The creatures of Rome became now all-powerful in almoſt every place: they obtained poſſeſſion of every magiſtracy; and the direction of every meaſure: whilſt thoſe who preſumed to vindicate their ancient liberties, or even to recommend temperate counſels, were marked out as harbouring treaſonable deſigns againſt their Roman lords, or of having ſome ſecret connexion with their enemies.

Tyrannical proceedings of the Romans throughout the Grecian ſtates;

The Romans, on their part, did every thing to confirm them in this ſervile dejection. Neon the Boeotian, and Andronicus the Aetolian, two perſons of the firſt rank in their reſpective cóuntries, had ſerved under Perſeus; they were both beheaded, as having departed from the allegiance they owed to Rome. Emiſſaries were diſpatched throughout Boeotia, and all the adjacent ſtates, with ſpecial inſtructions, to make inquiry concerning all who had favored the Macedonian intereſt, and report them to Aemilius; when the accuſed were commanded immediately to attend him to Italy, in order to take their trial. This mode of inquiry was extended even to Aſia. And it having appeared that Antiſſa, a city of Leſbos, had in the courſe of the late war received the Macedonian

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fleet into her harbour, and ſupplied them with proviſions, Labeo was ſent to exterminate the inhabitants, and to lay the place in ruins.

Achaia excepted; whence this exception.

Of all the Grecian ſtates, Achaia alone remained not yet totally ſubdued; having hitherto been exempted from this ſpecies of inquiry. The reaſons of this apparent lenity, however, we are not to look for in the moderation of the Romans. A portion of the ſpirit of ancient days ſtill animated that republic, from which they apprehended much oppoſition. And though even there they had gained over ſeveral leaders, who were prepared to betray the liberties of Achaia, it was neceſſary to proceed with great circumſpection, leſt the deſtruction of their own creatures ſhould defeat the Roman deſigns. Theſe conſiderations Livy [11] himſelf mentions. He adds another conſideration; which, for the honor of his country, a leſs candid hiſtorian had concealed. "After the ſevereſt ſcrutiny, not the leaſt veſtige was found of a correſpondence having ever ſubſiſted between any member of the Achaean body and the late king of Macedon." Accordingly, in order to ground an accuſation, *invention* was to ſupply the place of *evidence*. On this account it was thought expedient, that ſome of the Roman commiſſioners ſhould, in perſon, paſs over into Achaia, and either by terror or ſubtilty, bring the Achaean diet to make conceſſions, of which advantage might be taken at ſome future period.

Deſigns of Rome againſt the Achaeans.

The diſhonorable ſcheme was accordingly carried into execution; with what ſucceſs, will be ſeen in the following pages.

[11] See Liv. L. xlv. c. 31. See alſo Polyb. Legat. xciv.

HISTORY

OF GREECE.

BOOK VIII.

SECTION I.

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ACHAIA, guiltleſs of any connexion with Macedon, remained unſuſpicious of the Roman

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machinations. Whatever jealouſy ſhe might have entertained of the deſigns of Rome againſt Greece, or however averſe, in general, the Achaeans might have been to the total overthrow of the Macedonians; yet the follies and the crimes of Perſeus, with the apprehenſion of being involved in his ruin, had given a bias ſo different to the national councils, that, far from aſſiſting that depraved and puſillanimous monarch, repeated offers had even been made to ſecond the Roman operations in Macedon with the united ſtrength of Achaia. But their innocence or guilt was a matter perfectly indifferent to the Romans. *Is Achaia formidable?* was the ſole queſtion at Rome.

Cautious councils of the Achaean ſtates.

Though much fallen from her ancient ſplendor, Achaia ſtill maintained a reſpectable appearance. That form of government, which had been the foundation of her power, notwithſtanding the wide breaches made by foreign cabals and domeſtic faction, ſtill ſubſiſted. She was at the head of the Peloponneſian ſtates, and ſhe poſſeſſed a territory well cultivated and populous. Her cities were numerous; and ſome of them, Corinth particularly, ſuperbly ornamented with thoſe works of magnificence and taſte, which are conſidered as indications of opulence and power. All theſe, to a Roman eye, were objects of envy and of rapacious deſire. The Achaeans were beſides diſtinguiſhed by their diſcipline, and that kind of warlike knowledge which experience alone can teach; while many of their leaders were equally conſpicuous in the cabinet and the field. What rendered all theſe

Rome jealous of Achaia;

circumſtances the more formidable to Roman jealouſy and ſuſpicion, was, that they could not be ſuppoſed to have beheld the fate of Macedon with an indifferent eye; and yet not the leaſt trace was to be diſcovered of their having had any correſpondence with Perſeus; an alarming proof, according to the interpretation of Rome, of their well-concerted ſchemes, and of the art with which they were conducted.

Sends commiſſioners to the Achaean diet.

Fraught with theſe impreſſions, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius Aenobarbus, the two Roman commiſſioners [1] who had Achaia for their department, entered the Achaean diet. The infamous Callicrates, whoſe perfidious practices againſt his country have been already recorded, had previouſly delivered to Claudius and his colleague a liſt of all thoſe citizens who were moſt diſtinguiſhed by their zeal for the liberties of Achaia, and from whom an oppoſition to Roman meaſures was of courſe to be expected. The commiſſioners accordingly opened their addreſs to the diet with a complaint "That "ſome of the firſt men of Achaia had acted in "concert with Macedon." At the ſame time, they required that ſentence of death ſhould be immediately pronounced againſt them; and promiſed, that after ſentence ſhould be given, they would produce the names of the guilty. "After ſentence "is given!" exclaimed the aſſembly; "what ſort of juſtice would that be? firſt name thoſe whom

[1] See Polyb. Legat. xciv. Liv. L. xlv. c. 31. Pauſan. in Achaicis.

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you accuſe, make good your charge, and we ſhall "be ready to proceed againſt them." — "I name "then," reſumed the commiſſioner; "all thoſe, "who have borne the office of chief magiſtrate of "Achaia, or have been the leaders of your armies."— "In that caſe," anſwered Xeno, a noble Achaean of eminent worth, "I alſo ſhall be accounted guilty, "for I have commanded the armies of Achaia; "and yet I am ready to make proof of my inno- "cence, either here, or before the ſenate of Rome "— "You ſay well," replied the ſubtle Roman, laying hold on his laſt words; "Let the *ſenate of Rome* "then be the tribunal, before which you ſhall "anſwer." A decree was accordingly obtained, by which all whom he ſhould name were to be ſent as delinquents to Rome, in order to anſwer for their conduct [2].

Roman duplicity.

The Achaean chiefs tranſported into Italy;

Thus, by a ſentence general, indiſcriminate, arbitrary, and ill-founded, was the ſtrength of Achaia, her noble leaders, her ableſt and moſt faithful counſellors, in number above a thouſand, tranſported into a foreign land. It was an act of oppreſſion, ſays a Grecian writer [3], beyond the moſt daring attempts even of Philip or Alexander, in the meridian of their power.

the principal cauſe of this iniquitous meaſure.

This tranſaction, ſo reproachful to Rome, exhibits the noble remains of virtue which ſtill exiſted in the midſt of Grecian degeneracy. Every other probable expedient to enſlave, had doubtleſs been already tried by the Romans; and it was not,

[2] OLYMP. CLIII. 1. BEFORE CHRIST 163.
[3] Pauſan. in Achaicis.

we may ſafely pronounce, till after the failure of all thoſe arts of corruption, which they had practiſed with ſuch fatal ſucceſs throughout the other Grecian ſtates, that they had recourſe to a deed ſo replete with unbluſhing and infamous oppreſſion. What then muſt Achaia have been! that in this little corner of Greece, not three or four choſen ſpirits only, but upwards of one thouſand patriots ſhould have been found, whoſe integrity had remained unſhaken amidſt every effort of corruption, and every impreſſion of fear; who, unſeduced by the ſplendid offers of Rome, and unintimidated by her arms, devoted themſelves with a manly ſteadineſs to the ſervice of their country.

Cruel treatment of the Achaean exiles.

This, as a famous hiſtorian [a] juſtly calls it, was truly *the captivity of Greece.* From the ſubſequent treatment of theſe illuſtrious priſoners, the deſigns of Rome appeared notoriouſly conſpicuous. Inſtead of admitting them to a hearing, and inſtead of the ſmalleſt inquiry into the truth of the accuſation; the ſenate imperiouſly decreed, that they ſhould be diſperſed through the cities of Etruria. This was to add cruelty to injuſtice, by depriving them of that mutual intercourſe which alleviates the ſorrows of the unfortunate. The only coloring they could give to theſe unjuſtifiable proceedings was, that their cauſe had been already heard, and their condemnation pronounced, by their own countrymen. Repeated deputations [b] were in vain

[a] Raleigh, Hiſtory of the World.

[b] See Polyb. Legat. 105. 122. 129, 130. 137. and Pauſan. ub. ſup.

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ſent from the Achaean ſtates, diſavowing this pretended trial, and requeſting the ſenate to take cognizance of the matter. But theſe cares were ineffectual. The united power, however, of Roman influence and policy could not prove the priſoners to be guilty; and yet their acquittal was a meaſure which Rome was determined never to permit. The anſwer of the ſenate to one of theſe deputations, addreſſed to the chief magiſtrates of Achaia, has been preſerved by Polybius[f]. It betrays the whole ſecret, and diſcloſes the ſhameleſs rapacity of Roman artifice. "It is neither advan-"tageous for *you*," ſay the ſenate, (who, by the removal of ſo many illuſtrious perſonages, are now at the head of the Achaean affairs) "nor for the "good of your *people*." (whoſe wiſeſt policy it is to ſubmit in ſilence, and who might be raiſed to bolder hopes than we mean they ſhould, were their high-ſpirited chieftains to be reſtored to them again) "that the exiles ſhould be ſuffered to return "into Achaia." Thus did the Roman fathers endeavour, at the ſame time, to work upon the hopes and fears of the Achaean magiſtrates, by reminding them, in this indirect manner, that the exile of their countrymen had placed them in the ſeat of power, and that a ſecure poſſeſſion could only be inſured by the abſence of thoſe illuſtrious citizens; whoſe return, with their ſuperior talents, and influence in the ſtate, would reduce *them* to their former inſignificancy, and rouſe the ſpirit of the

[f] Legat. 105.

people to a vain ſtruggle againſt the impoſition of a yoke, which Rome was determined to impoſe. At length, after a period of ſeventeen years, when more than two thirds of the unfortunate victims had periſhed, either by the lawleſs outrage of their tyrants, or by that conſuming anguiſh which preys on the unhappy [7]; and when Achaia was ſo reduced, that the interpoſition of the remaining few could be of little avail; the ſenate granted to the ſurvivors the permiſſion ſo often applied for in vain [8]. Nor had even this indulgence been obtained, had it not been for Cato's repeated expoſtulations: "Shall we for ever be debating," ſaid he to the ſenate, "whether a few old Greeks ſhall have leave to "be buried in their native land?" An expreſſion of his to Polybius the hiſtorian, who was one of the exiles, paints, on this occaſion, in the ſtrongeſt colors, the opinion which that venerable Roman entertained of his countrymen. When the permiſſion to return home had been at laſt granted

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[7] Pauſanias informs us (in Achaicis) that "as many of "theſe illuſtrious captives, as were found attempting to "eſcape out of the hands of their oppreſſors, were put to "death without mercy by the Romans." What a dreadful charge is this againſt Rome!

[8] After ſome years, Polybius informs us, the ſolicitations of the Achaean ſtates were only employed in behalf of a few of thoſe captives, whom they applied for by name; *for*, ſays he, *length of time had conſumed almoſt all the reſt: men, whoſe memories well deſerve to be held in reverence*; τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πλείστους σχεδὸν ἅπαντας ὁ χρόνος ἤδη κατανάλωκεν, τοὺς γε δὴ καὶ μνήμης ἀξίους. See Legat. 122.

[9] Plutarch in Catone.

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to them, Polybius implored Cato's mediation with the ſenate, that they might alſo be reſtored to their honors. "Polybius," ſaid he, "you do not "imitate the wiſdom of Ulyſſes; you are for going "back to the den of the Cyclops, in queſt of the "hat and belt you left behind you."

Seventeen years, abounding in events, had elapſed, as we have obſerved, from the firſt perpetration of this act of deſpotiſm, to the return of the remaining exiles[10]. We have given an unbroken and circumſtantial detail of the whole of this memorable event; and ſhall now endeavour to delineate the other tranſactions of this period, which are not leſs important or intereſting.

Farther attempts of the Romans againſt Achaia;

The carrying to Rome as delinquents the chief men of Achaia, was only a ſmall part of the Roman plan of ſubjugation. Having removed that barrier againſt her tyrannical deſigns, the Romans took the remaining ſteps with more confidence of ſucceſs, and contemplated with a ſecret ſatisfaction the future completion of her ſchemes. What had principally contributed to render the Achaeans formidable, was the aſſociation, which they had framed, of the ſeveral ſtates of Peloponneſus and the adjoining parts. To diſſolve this confederacy was the object the Romans had in view[11]. For this purpoſe Sulpicius Gallus was ſent to Greece, with inſtructions to encourage faction and diſſenſion among the ſtates compoſing the Achaean league, and in the name

[10] OLYMP. CLVII. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 146.

[11] Juſt. L. xxxiv. c. 1. Pauſan. ub. ſup.

of the Roman ſenate to hold out the lure of protection and aſſiſtance to all who ſhould conſent to be diſmembered from that powerful body. The temper of the times was but too favorable to this inſidious plan. Numbers, to ingratiate themſelves with the Romans, were aſſiduouſly employed in ſowing every where the ſeeds of diſcontent, and in foſtering a jealouſy of the preſent eſtabliſhment. The Spartans, above all, bore with impatience their preſent abject condition, and wiſhed eagerly for an opportunity of attempting a revolution. The Achaean councils too were perplexed, unſtable, and turbulent; the families of thoſe, who had been carried off into Italy, filled all Achaia with their complaints; the people warmly eſpouſed the ſame intereſt; and, under the pretence of ſupporting this public-ſpirited cauſe, the factious and moſt contemptible of the citizens had got poſſeſſion of the adminiſtration. A general ferment thus prevailed throughout all Greece; and there was ſcarcely a ſingle ſtate or city that was not tainted with corruption, or inflamed with anger.

and their ſucceſs.

In ſuch a ſituation of affairs, it was hardly poſſible that Sulpicius could have failed to operate the purpoſes of his commiſſion. Pleuron, a city of Aetolia, which ſome time before had been incorporated into the Achaean league, now applied to be relieved from this connexion, and was pronounced an independent ſtate [11]. A difference about their boundaries, between the Lacedemonians and

[11] Paſ. in Achaicis.

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Argives, was referred to the arbitration of the Roman commiſſioner. He might eaſily have ſettled the diſpute; but this would not have accorded with his views. He choſe rather to leave it to the deciſion of Callicrates the Achaean; who, being the moſt inſolent of all the Greeks, and one of the moſt flagitious inſtruments of Rome, was therefore the moſt likely to widen the breach. There was, beſides, a farther policy in this. The Spartans, exaſperated by the treatment which they were probably to receive from Callicrates, would have an additional reaſon for reſenting the domination of Achaia, to whoſe ſupreme court of judicature they, as part of the Achaean body, were now amenable; and they might reſolve upon a ſeparation, and demand their independency. Sulpicius, accordingly, gave them a private intimation, that Rome was ready to encourage and aſſiſt them in their expectations of this kind. Similar intimations, it appears from Pauſanias, were given to all the ſtates belonging to the confederacy of Achaia. So that this noble fabric of alliance being ſhaken and disjoined, became every day more feeble and more ruinous.

Affairs of Oropus.

The Athenians, mean time [11], impoveriſhed by their continual wars with Macedon, had been tempted by the proſperous circumſtances of the people of Oropus [12], to make a predatory incurſion on their territory, and had taken and plun-

[11] Pauſan. ibid. Plutarch in Catone.

[12] A city on the confines of Attica.

dered their capital. The Oropians carried their complaint before the ſenate of Rome; who, with what view is obvious, inſtead of determining the matter themſelves, left it to the deciſion of the Sicyonians. They accordingly condemned Athens to pay a fine of five hundred talents; from which ſentence the Athenians having appealed to the Roman ſenate [11], the Romans, ſtill farther to excite

[11] The conteſt, in which this affair of Oropus involved the Athenians, holds a diſtinguiſhed place in hiſtory, from the ſhare it had in introducing the arts of Greece into Rome. The Athenians, according to Plutarch (in Catone) had ſent thither Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, (to whom Cicero (Orator. l. ii.) and Aulus Gellius (vii. 14.) add Critolaus the Peripatetic,) to plead their cauſe before the ſenate; the three perſons, doubtleſs, from whoſe eloquence they thought the greateſt ſucceſs was to be expected. Some years before, certain Greek philoſophers and orators had attempted to eſtabliſh themſelves in Rome; but thoſe Romans who ſtill retained the ancient ſpirit of their anceſtors, apprehenſive that this kind of ſtudy might check that martial ardor, which they rather wiſhed to encourage, procured an edict to be iſſued, by which they were expelled the city. This, according to Suetonius, (de Clar. Rhetor.) happened in the year of Rome 592, in the conſulſhip of Caius Fannius Strabo and Marcus Valerius Meſſala. The preſent philoſophers ſtood on a different footing. They came inveſted with the ſacred character of ambaſſadors; and by the law of nations were entitled to an honorable reception upon their arrival. All the Roman youths, therefore, who had a taſte for learning, crowded to hear them. Above all, they were charmed with the impetuous and forcible eloquence of Carneades, *who*, ſays Cicero, *never attempted to ſupport an argument, which he did not eſtabliſh, or to combat*

BOOK VIII. Sect. I. the mutual enmity and contention of the Grecian ſtates, pronounced the puniſhment to be exceſſive, and reduced it to a mulct of a hundred talents,

an opinion, which he did not overthrow: "qui nullam "unquam rem defendet, quam non probârit; nullam op- "pugnavit, quam non everterit," ſo that his reputation filled in a ſhort time the whole city, and drew an audience of the politeſt and moſt conſiderable perſons in Rome. The report was, "that there had come from Greece a "man of aſtoniſhing powers, whoſe eloquence, more than "human, was able to control and diſarm the fierceſt "paſſions, and who had made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion on "the Roman youths, that, abandoning every former "amuſement and purſuit, they burned with an enthuſiaſ- "tic love of philoſophy alone." The fathers in general were delighted to behold their ſons thus fondly receive the Grecian literature, and follow theſe wonderful men. Cato on the contrary, was alarmed. From the moment he perceived this paſſion for Grecian learning prevail, he began to fear, that the Roman youths would turn their ambition that way, and prefer the glory of eloquence to reputation for arms. When he found, that the fame of theſe philoſophers was riſing higher every day, and that even ſome of the ſenatorial order did not diſdain to tranſlate their ſpeeches into Latin, he had no longer patience, but went to the ſenate, and preferred a complaint againſt the magiſtrates for detaining ſo long ſuch ambaſſadors as theſe, who could perſuade the people to whatever they pleaſed. "Decide in their affairs," ſaid he to them, "as ſpeedily as poſſible, that, returning to their ſchools, "they may hold forth to the Grecian youth; and that "our young men may again give attention to the laws "and the magiſtrates." He had conceived an opinion, Plutarch tells us, which he was wont to deliver with a kind of prophetic confidence, "that, when the Romans "came thoroughly to imbibe the Grecian literature, they

but

but without taking the leaſt ſtep to inforce its payment. The Oropians, thus baffled, implored the protection of Menalcidas, at this time firſt magiſtrate of Achaia; who, in conſideration of a reward of ten talents, engaged to oblige the Athenians to do them juſtice. Callicrates, then at the head of the Roman faction, and therefore exceedingly powerful in the ſtate, was prevailed upon, by the promiſe of three talents, to join with him in perſuading the Achaean diet to ſupport the cauſe of Oropus. This compact, however, was of little ſervice to that city; for the Athenian garriſon, as ſoon as they heard that the Achaeans were haſtening to its relief, pillaged it a ſecond time, and, carrying off every thing of value, had evacuated the place, and marched back to Athens, before Menalcidas appeared. This hireling protector contrived, however, to extort the ten talents

Character of the Achaean magiſtrates.

"would loſe the empire of the world." The event in ſome meaſure juſtified the prediction; Rome having loſt her conſtitution and liberties, at the very time ſhe had reached the ſummit of Grecian literature, and had made the greateſt progreſs in every kind of erudition. This, however, is not to be charged to the account of literary improvement; the cauſe is to be ſought in that irreligion, that luxury, that diſſoluteneſs and general immorality, the attendant and diſgrace of thoſe times, in which the greateſt politeneſs of taſte and refinement of living are found. Rome ceaſed to be free, not becauſe ſhe ceaſed to be rude and ignorant, but becauſe, corrupted by proſperity, ſhe ceaſed to be virtuous. The reader will readily conclude, that, defended by ſuch able advocates, the Athenian cauſe was victorious.

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from the wretched Oropians; and, to complete his baſeneſs, he defrauded Callicrates of his ſhare, under the pretence that this Achaean, who in fact had fulfilled his engagements, having failed in the performance of the ſtipulated ſervices, was entitled to no reward. The vengeance of diſappointed avarice is blind and unrelenting. As ſoon therefore as Menalcidas was out of office, Callicrates, though himſelf a traitor to his country, accuſed him before the convention of the Achaean eſtates, of having betrayed the intereſts of Achaia to the Romans, and of having labored to detach Sparta from the Achaean confederacy. And, ſo powerful was his influence, that the condemnation of Menalcidas was inevitable, had he not, with the three talents which were to have been the portion of Callicrates, bribed Diaeus of Megalopolis; his ſucceſſor in the office of chief magiſtrate; who managed the buſineſs with ſuch dexterity, that he was acquitted, in oppoſition to the general ſenſe of the aſſembly.

Attempts of Diaeus againſt the liberties of Sparta.

Theſe intrigues in the Achaean councils, which ſtrongly marked the degeneracy of Grecian manners, had ſerious conſequences. Diaeus, finding [16] that the protection given to Menalcidas had loſt him the confidence of his countrymen, became ſolicitous to reinſtate himſelf in their affections, and formed the plan of bringing the Spartans into a total ſubjection to Achaia, a meaſure moſt grateful to the Achaean people, whoſe jealouſy of Sparta

[16] Pauſan. in Achaicis.

nothing could extinguiſh. By the laſt arrangement made by the Romans, all matters of a civil nature, in which Sparta had any concern, were to be finally determined by the Achaean diet. Diaeus pretended, that by this arrangement all their criminal cauſes were likewiſe to be decided by the ſame tribunal. The admiſſion of this claim, with their former ſubjection in civil matters, inveſted Achaia with full power over the property and lives of the Spartans, and reduced them to the moſt abject ſtate of dependence. The legality of the claim was therefore denied, and Sparta would have appealed to Rome; but the Achaeans alledged, that ſuch an appeal could not conſtitutionally be made, unleſs with the concurrence of the Achaean ſtates, and immediately prepared to eſtabliſh their pretended right by force of arms. It was in vain for Sparta to attempt reſiſtance. And Diaeus, to inſure the ſucceſs of his ſchemes, imperiouſly demanded, that twenty-four of their principal citizens, who had moſt ſtrenuouſly aſſerted this *laſt* immunity of their country, ſhould be delivered into his hands. The Spartans durſt not refuſe; and to have obeyed, had been the higheſt cruelty. They took a middle courſe. The obnoxious perſons were ſuffered to eſcape, and, under color of having fled from juſtice, their eſtates were confiſcated, and the ſentence of baniſhment was pronounced againſt them. They had, however, been previouſly inſtructed to repair to Rome, in order to lay the whole matter before the ſenate; and the Achaeans, being ſoon apprized

The Spartans appeal to Rome.

BOOK VIII. of their intention, ſent alſo a deputation thither to juſtify their proceedings.

Sect. I. The artifice of the Romans.

The Romans acted on this occaſion with their uſual duplicity. They heard, and gave hopes to both parties; and at laſt, inſtead of deciding, appointed commiſſioners, whom they promiſed to ſend into Greece, to inveſtigate and determine the matter in diſpute. But theſe commiſſioners, being on various pretences artfully detained in Rome, every thing was ſtill left in ſuſpenſe; and both parties returned elated with the ſucceſs of their negotiations, without having obtained any formal deciſion. The Achaeans aſſerted, with exultation, that the ſubjection of Sparta was unqueſtionably decided: while the other party maintained, with equal confidence, that ſhe was henceforth to be conſidered a independent.

War between Achaia and Sparta.

Theſe contradictory accounts led to conſequences which were agreeable to the wiſhes of the Romans. The contending powers had recourſe to arms; the Spartans in vindication of their liberties; the Achaeans to inforce their ſubjection. A battle enſuing, the Spartans were defeated, with the loſs of above a thouſand of their beſt troops: and Sparta itſelf muſt probably have fallen, had not Damocritus, then at the head of the Achaean commonwealth, preferred plunder to the main object of the war; for which he was afterwards condemned, and fined in fifty talents. To Damocritus, Diaeus ſucceeded; who, at the requeſt of Metellus, then commanding in Macedon, granted the Lacedemonians a truce, which was merely illuſory; for

Diaeus employed the reſpite it afforded in gaining over and garriſoning all the circumjacent towns; ſo that the unſuſpecting Spartans ſoon found themſelves environed by their enemies. Irritated by theſe treacherous proceedings, they renewed the unequal war; which, from their enfeebled condition, turned out as unproſperous as before; their depopulated country could not raiſe an adequate military force [17], nor could their exhauſted treaſury afford the neceſſary ſupplies.

Roman commiſſioners come to Corinth;

After the ſtrength of Peloponneſus had thus, during more than two years, been waſted in theſe inteſtine wars, the Roman commiſſioners at length appeared, with Aurelius Oreſtes at their head, and required the attendance of the Achaean chiefs at Corinth, in order to receive the final determination of the ſenate. The Roman plan now began to unfold itſelf. The Achaeans were commanded to retire within their ancient boundaries; and thoſe ſtates, not originally of the Achaean league, but which, in the courſe of time, had been incorporated into their confederacy [18], were pronounced by the Romans to be diſſevered from it, and henceforth unconnected and independent. This was evidently no more than a prelude to future humiliations; and was probably intended by the Romans as a kind of experiment. Should the Achaeans tamely ſubmit, it was eaſy to proceed by degrees to the total diſſolution of the league; if they made reſiſt-

and decree the diſmemberment of Achaia.

[17] Pauſan. ub. ſup.

[18] Sparta, the Arcadians of Orchomenus, the people of Heracleum, near Mount Oeta, Argos, and Corinth.

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ance, that would ſerve to palliate whatever violent meaſures Rome ſhould find it neceſſary to adopt. The beſt expedient that ſeemed left to this devoted nation, was apparently to have ſubmitted for the preſent to what it was not in their power to prevent. But the republican fire was not yet extinguiſhed; and it burſt forth on this occaſion with uncommon ſpirit.

Inſurrection of the Achaeans.

The Roman envoys had not yet made an end of reading the decree, when the Achaean chiefs quitted the aſſembly in a tranſport of indignation, and ſpread the alarm among the populace, who had crowded in numbers to Corinth. The rage of the multitude was inexpreſſible; and, as if Sparta alone had been guilty, it proved fatal to every Spartan that could be found. Popular fury, as blind as it is violent, could not diſcern that Rome was the ſource of all the miſchiefs of which they had to complain, and that, under this pretended regard for Sparta, ſhe was only executing her own deſigns. The ſacred character with which the Roman miniſters were inveſted, could not, however, command reſpect admiſt this ſtorm of tumultuary violence. Their houſe was forced open, and every Spartan torn from that aſylum: nay, the envoys themſelves, ſay the Roman hiſtorians, owed their ſafety only to their flight [11].

The Romans affect gentleneſs;

It was to be expected, that the Romans would have called Achaia to a rigorous account for an outrage ſo violent. They nevertheleſs ſent a ſecond

[11] Juſt. L. xxxiv. c. 1. See alſo Polyb. Legat 143. and Florus L. ii. c. 16.

embaſſy thither, with particular inſtructions, not to animadvert with ſeverity on the inſult, but to employ only gentle expoſtulations; to conciliate, if poſſible, the minds of the Achaeans; and to leave to themſelves the detection and puniſhment of the guilty. It is not difficult to trace the reaſons of this uncommon and unexpected lenity [20]. They are diſcoverable in the ſituation of the Roman affairs at this period. The final deſtruction of Carthage,

on what account.

[20] Polybius, (Legat. 140, and 144.) willing to excuſe the Romans, pretends to believe, that their purpoſe, in thus threatening to diſmember from the Achaean commonwealth the ſtates which had been incorporated into it, was, not to carry their menaces into execution, but only to intimidate a people, whoſe high ſpirit had often been troubleſome to them, and to awe thoſe turbulent republicans into a more reſpectful obſervance of the dictates of Rome. And hence, according to him, aroſe that conciliatory temper, which they ſhowed on this occaſion. However, there were others, he himſelf acknowledges, who accounted for this lenity in a very different manner; aſcribing it, not to any regard they had for the Achaeans, but to their own apprehenſions of what the conſequence might be, ſhould they at this time have provoked Achaia to take up arms againſt them, when Carthage was not yet deſtroyed, and Spain was endeavouring to throw off the yoke. But nevertheleſs, ſays Polybius, the charge is ill-grounded: "the intentions of Rome towards "Achaia had nothing hoſtile in them; ſhe had admitted the "Achaeans into her friendſhip, and repoſed a confidence "in their faith, far greater than in that of any other of the "ſtates of Greece." — Is it poſſible to read this without amazement! And could Polybius, who knew ſo well how treacherouſly the Romans had brought humiliation on Achaia, and with what exceſs of cruelty they had treated her illuſtrious chiefs; Polybius, who was himſelf one of the number, (ſee

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alike the object of the hatred and dread of Rome, was not yet effected. The Roman arms, beſides, had lately been unſucceſsful in Spain; while new commotions, on a detail of which we are juſt about to enter, and which were not yet compoſed, had ariſen in Macedon. In theſe circumſtances, a war in Greece, an event to be expected from the preſent violence of the Achaean counſels, would have added conſiderably to the embarraſſment of the Ro-

Legat. 105, and 122.) Polybius, who was able to point out, as he fully does, the flagitious motives that engaged them in the Dalmatian war, viz. *to keep their military men in practice*, who, now the Macedonians were ſubdued, had no other nation in theſe parts, in whoſe blood they cou'd drench their weapons, (ſee Legat. 125.) Polybius, who had been himſelf a witneſs of the prevarication they had been guilty of in the caſe of Demetrius of Syria, ſon to Seleucus Philopator, and grandſon to Antiochus the Great, whom, in the view of having Syria at their diſpoſal, they endeavoured to deſpoil of his paternal throne, (ſee Legat. 114.) Polybius, who had alſo witneſſed how inſidiouſly they had drawn in, firſt the Aetolians, (ſee Legat. 13.) and afterwards the Carthaginians, (ſee Legat. 142.) *to intruſt their deareſt intereſts to the faith of the* Roman *people*; I ſay, with ſuch examples before his eyes, could Polybius be at a loſs to know, by what motives Rome was now actuated?

It is not impoſſible to diſcover what miſguided the pen of this excellent hiſtorian. He was a captive of Rome, and Scipio's friend. Either therefore his attachment to the one led him to think more favourably of the Romans than they deſerved; or his dread of the other induced him to ſuppreſs ſentiments, which he could not avow without danger. So difficult is it for the hiſtorian, who lives near the times of which he writes, to keep cloſe to the line of truth, unwarped by fear or by affection.

man affairs. The Achaeans, however, from all that now appears, might have derived important advantages from the mild and pacific aſpect which the Romans aſſumed on this occaſion. It certainly preſented them with the opportunity of ſoothing a power, which they could neither expect to ſubdue nor to reſiſt; and of obtaining more favorable terms upon the ſubverſion of their conſtitution, which, it was obvious, could not long be preſerved

Resentment of the Achaeans.

Guided, however, only by their reſentments, they acted in direct oppoſition to all ſuch prudential conſiderations. Unfortunately too for the Achaeans, their chief magiſtrate, Critolaus [21], was a man daring and precipitate. He had riſen to power by encouraging the frantic multitude in their defiance of Rome, and, of conſequence, beſides the impulſe of his natural temper, was impelled to violent meaſures by the additional inſtigations of popularity and ambition. Sextus, who was at the head of the Roman embaſſy, had, upon his arrival, demanded of him, to convene the national council, that he might lay before them his commiſſion from the ſenate [22]. Critolaus, in appearance, complied; and accordingly iſſued his ſummons; but he ſent at the ſame time private directions to the ſeveral members of the Achaean diet not to obey it; ſo that, upon the appointed day, the Roman ambaſſadors had none but Critolaus to confer with; who, as if to add to the mockery, told them, that they had only to wait the expiration of ſix

Character and imprudent conduct of Critolaus, their chief magiſtrate.

[21] See Pauſan. in Achaicis. [22] Polyb. Legat. 144.

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months, and a second diet should be convened. The consequence was, that the Romans, highly offended, returned to Italy without executing the business of their embassy; and no sooner were they departed, than Critolaus, to evince that he meant to keep no measures with Rome, assembled the national council at Corinth [11], and, notwithstanding the conciliatory interposition of Metellus, by his deputies Papirius and Scipio Africanus the younger, obtained a declaration of war against Sparta, though avowedly protected by Rome; to which mad resolution Thebes and Chalcis imprudently acceded.

Views and policy of Rome.

We have entered into a minute detail of the intrigues and contests, which appear to have agitated these petty republics during this period, in order that the insidious policy of Rome, as far as regards them, might be developed and exposed to view. We have beheld her affecting the most solicitous concern for the immunities of some particular city, that she might kindle the fire of variance and contention in the neighbouring states, and thus excite them to mutual hostilities, and mutual destruction. We have seen her bestowing her favors on the meanest nd most worthless among the Greeks, because, false to their country, they were the ready and pliant instruments of her ambitious purposes; whilst those distinguished by wisdom, authority, and temperate counsels, by whose faithful services the public ruin might have been retarded, were

[11] Polyb. Pausan. ibid.

discountenanced, oppressed, and banished. And lastly, we have seen her employing the very mischief which she herself had encouraged, the madness of an incensed populace, which her own oppressions had provoked, as an excuse for the violence and flagrant cruelty she exercised on this unfortunate people.

War in Macedon.

During these transactions in Achaia, a war had again broken out in Macedon [24]; which, from the few imperfect hints history has preserved to us, appears to have been attended with circumstances of a very extraordinary nature. Andriscus, a man of obscure extraction, say the Roman writers, originally of Adramyttium, a town of Troas, was thought to bear a strong resemblance to the late Macedonian king. Sixteen years had elapsed since the defeat of Perseus. Upon the credit, nevertheless, of this supposed resemblance, a story was fabricated, that he was son to Perseus by a concubine; that his father had directed that he should be educated in the utmost privacy, lest, if his parentage should be known, he should be involved in the same destruction with the rest of his royal house; and that he had intrusted the secret to certain persons, who had authentic vouchers to produce in support of the allegation. Andriscus first applied to Demetrius Soter, king of Syria, whose sister had been wife to Perseus; who doubting the truth of the story, or probably fearing the Romans, seized him as an impostor, and sent him to Rome.

Claims and history of Andriscus;

[24] Liv. Epitom. L. xlix. and l. Florus, L. ii. c. 14. Zonaras, Tom. 2.

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But in ſuch contempt, from his appearance and manners, was he held by the Romans, that they paid no attention to the confinement of their priſoner; who ſoon after effected his eſcape, and fled for refuge into Thrace. Here, the tale of his birth and misfortunes being eagerly liſtened to, and readily believed by this plain people, he had ſoon formed a party, and through them had introduced himſelf to their Macedonian neighbours. The ſpirit of diſcontent which, at this time, univerſally prevailed in Macedon, ſecured him a favorable reception: the nation began to feel the ſeverity of the Roman yoke; and, without ſcrupulouſly inveſtigating the claims of Andriſcus, conſidered him only as a daring adventurer, through whom they had a chance of being delivered from their oppreſſors. There is much reaſon to ſuſpect, that the Romans were not ill pleaſed at ſeeing theſe diſcontents ripen into open rebellion; and that they at firſt connived at them, in the hope of availing themſelves of the pretence with which they furniſhed them. Exhauſted and humbled as the Macedonians were, ſtill a little property, and a few privileges remained to them; and a new war would afford the Romans an excuſe for doing what they had hitherto been reſtrained from by motives of policy alone. But the deſpair of an oppreſſed people found reſources, of which the Romans were not aware; and where they expected only to find an opportunity of gratifying their deſpotiſm and rapacity, they met a war difficult and dangerous. When accounts arrived at Rome, that the

is acknowledged by the Macedonians.

insurrection in Macedon would probably become a much more serious business than had been imagined, Scipio Nasica, who, since the time he had served under Aemilius Paulus, had a considerable influence in Greece, was dispatched thither to observe the situation of affairs. His report was, that, by the assistance which he had obtained from the Achaeans and some of the cantons of Thessaly, he had with difficulty covered the northern provinces of Greece from the incursions of the enemy; but that the revolt was general throughout Macedon, where Andriscus was in possession of the throne, and had assumed the name of Philip; that most of the Thracian tribes had likewise declared for him; that several of the Grecian states were suspected of favoring the same cause; and that, unless the Romans exerted themselves speedily, and with vigor, the issue of the war was to be dreaded. In consequence of this intelligence, a considerable army was immediately ordered into Greece, under the command of the prætor Juventius Thalna. Juventius, at the same time rash and conceited, marched immediately against the usurper, with a settled contempt of this pageant-king, and in the full assurance that he durst not meet him in the field. His vanity had its reward. The Macedonian took care, by various feints, to confirm the presumption of the prætor, until at last he drew him on to an engagement, on the terms he wished, in which the Romans were totally defeated, with the slaughter of the greatest part of the army; Juventius himself falling, while he endeavoured in

meets the Romans in battle,

and defeats them.

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vain, by perſonal courage, to compenſate for his want of abilities as a general.

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The Romans alarmed;

This unfortunate event was attended with circumſtances exceedingly alarming. Theſſaly, with moſt of the northern provinces of Greece, acknowledged the claims of the victor, and took up arms in ſupport of him. And though the Achaeans had not followed their example, yet the preſent diſcontents of that people, and the manner in which their ſervices had been repaid in the beginning of the Macedonian war, afforded little hopes that they would again be active in the intereſts of Rome. Even as far as Africa did the influence of this revolution appear to have reached; and an embaſſy arrived from the Carthaginians to congratulate the new king, and to negotiate an alliance with Macedon. To guard againſt theſe impending dangers, a powerful force was levied with all poſſible expedition,

And Metellus againſt him.

and Metellus, an illuſtrious Roman, of high reputation, was appointed to conduct the war.

Cloſe of the fortunes of Andriſcus.

By this time, if the hiſtorians of Rome may be depended on, the blandiſhments of royalty were beginning to effect what the Roman arms had in vain attempted. Andriſcus, thinking himſelf eſtabliſhed upon the throne, abandoned himſelf to a viciouſneſs of diſpoſition, which he had before concealed. Not content with indulging to a ſhameful exceſs in all the gratifications of luxury, he ruled with all the wantonneſs of inſult, rapacity, and cruelty; ſo that the unhappy Macedonians, inſtead of that freedom, in hopes of which they had crowded to his banners, experienced all the

miſeries of ſlavery. This as a Roman account, eſpecially when compared with facts to be gathered from the ſame hiſtorians, ſeems liable to ſome objections. Notwithſtanding his dubious title, the Macedonians, unprovoked by all theſe alledged vices, preſerved to him an unalterable fidelity; a kind of proof, that either he was not altogether ſo diſſolute and oppreſſive as the Roman writers pretend, or that the Romans themſelves were ſuch execrable maſters, that the yoke of the moſt outrageous tyrant was deemed light, and thought preferable to theirs. And ſo far was he from being odious among his allies, that, even when overpowered by the Romans, he found a friendly and ſafe retreat in Thrace, nor was he delivered up until Roman gold, it is to be ſuſpected, proved an overmatch for Thracian honeſty. His misfortunes ſeem to have been chiefly owing to his temerity, and the contempt he entertained of his enemy. Though Metellus, who had advanced againſt him, was far ſuperior in cavalry, yet the Macedonian ventured an engagement, and obtained a complete victory. Elated with this ſucceſs, and thinking that the Romans would hardly, for ſome time, hazard a ſecond battle, he made a conſiderable detachment for the ſecurity of Theſſaly. This proved fatal to him. Metellus marked the opportunity; and, attacking him with a great ſuperiority of numbers, cut his little army to pieces, and obliged him to take refuge among the Thracians. The Thracian princes ſoon ſupplied him with freſh troops. But the Roman commander had improved

his contempt of the enemy the cauſe of his ruin.

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in ſuch a manner the advantages derived from his late victory, and was ſo well prepared for his reception, that, notwithſtanding the moſt ſpirited exertion on the part of Andriſcus, he was routed, with the loſs of the greater part of his army, and found himſelf under the neceſſity of again retiring into Thrace. The prætor could not purſue him thither; the commotions, we have before mentioned, in Achaia, which now threatened to involve all the adjacent ſtates, calling off his attention to the ſouthern provinces of Greece Mean while, it was not his purpoſe that Andriſcus ſhould eſcape. He had already entered into a negotiation with the Thracian chiefs, at whoſe court the fugitive prince had taken ſanctuary, who, for certain conſiderations eaſily to be conjectured, but which the Roman writers have not thought proper to ſpecify delivered him up to Metellus.

A ſecond adventurer aſcends the throne of Macedon;

The unhappy fate of Andriſcus, it might have been expected, would have reſtored peace to Macedon. But, ſuch now was the deplorable ſituation of the miſerable Macedonians, that they were eager to ſupport the pretenſions of every claimant, through whom they had the moſt diſtant proſpect of deliverance. No ſooner had Andriſcus periſhed, than Alexander, another pretended ſon of Perſeus, made his appearance, and met with the ſame loyal welcome from this oppreſſed and credulous people; and nearly with the ſame ſucceſs. A conſiderable party had taken up arms in ſupport of his title, but, unequal to a conteſt with Metellus, who, upon the firſt tidings of this inſurrection, had haſtened

haſtened back into Macedon, they were ſoon diſperſed; the pretended prince making his eſcape into Dardania. To the hoſpitality and incorruptible honeſty of the inhabitants of this country, he was much more indebted than the unfortunate Andriſcus had been to thoſe of Thrace. The Romans, after the ſtricteſt inquiry and the moſt laviſh offers, could never diſcover his place of concealment. And from this time, as hiſtory is ſilent, nothing more is known of this adventurer.

is overthrown, but eſcapes.

Theſe repeated inſurrections in Macedon effectually anſwered the end, which the Romans doubtleſs had in view. We have already ſeen the ſeverity of the terms impoſed on that kingdom, by the arrangement of Aemilius Paulus. Theſe terms, nevertheleſs, the Romans conſidered as the exceſs of mercy. It was thought expedient to finiſh more completely the ſubjection of the Macedonian people; which accordingly we are told was now fully accompliſhed. This event took place about twenty years after the ſettlement by Aemilius. And henceforward Macedon remained in the humiliated ſtate of a Roman province. By what arrangements the final humiliation of the Macedonians was effected, hiſtory has not exactly informed us; but of this it is eaſy to form very probable conjectures. The Macedonians had, at firſt, been allowed to have judges of their own for the deciſion of trivial matters; but even this faint ſhadow of judicial power they now loſt; and, according to the cuſtomary Roman practice with conquered nations, a general confiſcation probably took place of all the

The Romans turn theſe inſurrections to advantage.

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eſtates throughout Macedon, which were in the ſmalleſt degree objects of deſire to theſe rapacious conquerors.

In this manner did Rome eſtabliſh her dominion on the ruins of every national conſtitution. At firſt, her yoke was for the moſt part laid on with an affectation of gentleneſs; but, afterwards, repeated arbitrary and oppreſſive proceedings having provoked reſiſtance, every manly effort againſt them became an excuſe for additional exertion of power; until the ſyſtem was by degrees completed, and appeared in all the ſtern ſeverity of deſpotiſm.

A third adventurer appears in Macedon;

Some years after, there appeared a third adventurer [21], a ſecond Philip, and another pretended ſon to Perſeus; who found that Macedonian credulity was not yet exhauſted, and that their deſire of liberty was not yet at an end.

and meets with no ſucceſs.

But his career was ſoon run. Having hazarded an engagement with Tremellius Scroſa, the Roman commander, his army was totally defeated, and he himſelf was ſlain.

[21] Liv. Epitom. L. iii. Eutrop. L. iv.

BOOK VIII.

SECTION II.

CONTENTS.

The Achaeans, provoked by the perfidiouſneſs of Rome, take up Arms — Metellus marches againſt them — defeats them — is ſuperſeded by Mummius, — who continues the war — obtains a deciſive victory — takes, and burns Corinth — puts an end to the Achean Commonwealth, and to the liberties of Greece. — The principal cauſes that produced the decline and final overthrow of the Grecian ſtates.

THE Macedonian inſurrection under Andriſcus was not yet completely ſuppreſſed, when the flames of war, which the Achaeans had lighted up, were already ſpreading through the ſouthern provinces of Greece. Metellus had at firſt endeavoured, by repeated remonſtrances, to ſtop the progreſs of theſe commotions. But, finding his repreſentations to be ineffectual, he had, as ſoon as the Macedonian affairs permitted him, advanced ſouthward, to intimidate, ſince he could not perſuade; and perhaps not without the hope, that to the reduction of Macedon, he ſhould have the glory of adding the conqueſt of Peloponneſus. BOOK VIII. Sect. 2. Achaean war.

From the extraordinary ſpirit diſplayed by the Achaeans on this occaſion, and from the preci- Inducements to it.

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pitancy with which they ruſhed into this war, a judgment may be formed of the violence of their reſentment. The Roman arms, from their late ſucceſs in Macedon, were become more formidable than ever; and of all the Grecian ſtates without the Iſthmus, whatever might be their ſecret wiſh, not one had ventured to avow itſelf the confederate of Achaia; Thebes, and the people of Chalcis excepted. The Achaeans nevertheleſs, as if unconſcious of their own weakneſs, and inſenſible of the recent fate of Macedon, provoked a conteſt, which was evidently to terminate in diſcomfiture and ſervitude.

Imprudence in attempting it.

Siege of Heracleum.

The ſiege of Heracleum, near Mount Oeta, which had revolted and declared for Rome, was the commencement [1] of hoſtilities. It was inveſted and taken by Critolaus [2]; who afterwards hearing, that Metellus was on his march to attack him, endeavoured to retreat to Scarphaea [3], where, the Romans coming up with him, before he could get into the city, he was forced to engage *. The iſſue was fatal to the Achaeans. They were defeated,

Achaeans defeated by Metellus.

[1] See Pauſan. in Achaicis.

[2] OLYMP. CLVIII. 2. BEFORE CHRIST 144.

[3] A city of the Locri.

* Pauſanias (in Achaicis) blames Critolaus for his retreat to Scarphaea; and thinks that he ought rather to have ſecured the ſtraits of Thermopylae, and thus have ſtopped the progreſs of the Roman army. But the way over the mountain was no longer conſidered as impracticable; and, unleſs he had ſecured the paſſes above, for which probably his forces were not ſufficient, his being poſſeſſed of the ſtraits below had been of little ſervice.

and the greater part of their army ſlain or made priſoners. The fate of Critolaus himſelf is uncertain, his body not having been found. He is ſuppoſed to have periſhed in ſome of the moraſſes *, which then covered a great part of his country, from the Maliac bay towards the foot of Mount Oeta. In addition to the loſs ſuſtained by the Achaeans in the field, a thouſand Arcadians, who had eſcaped, were intercepted in their retreat homeward by Metellus, and all put to the ſword.

who takes Thebes;

The Roman general marched then to Thebes, which he found deſerted; moſt of the inhabitants having fled to the mountains upon his approach. To induce them to return and ſubmit, he gave orders to ſpare the city; and required only, that Pytheas the Boeotian chief, who had adviſed the league with Achaia, ſhould be put to death.

offers terms of peace to the Achaeans,

His intention now was, to enter Peloponneſus, and at once, if poſſible, to put an end to the war. However, as if averſe from the deciſion of arms, he once more endeavoured to gain the Achaeans by expoſtulation and friendly profeſſions; and even offered to conclude a peace, on the condition that Sparta, and the other ſtates they held in ſubjection, ſhould be reſtored to their ancient privileges. But, either governed by paſſion, or perhaps diſtruſting an enemy by whom they had been ſo often deceived, the Achaeans rejected his propoſals. It appears indeed from the account given by the Romans themſelves,

which are rejected.

* So ſays Pauſanias: Livy's epitomizer, (l. lii.) in contradiction to him, ſays, that he poiſoned himſelf.

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that this proffered peace was but a political expedient, in which the Achaeans would have found but little ſecurity; and that in fact, under the pretence of ſerving them, the Roman general was only conſulting the intereſts of his own ambition. For Mummius, one of the new conſuls, had been appointed his ſucceſſor; and, jealous of having the fruits of his victory wreſted from him, it might be his wiſh to ſettle the affairs of Peloponneſus on any terms, rather than allow his ſucceſſor to reap the glory of terminating the war [f].

Metellus ſuperſeded by Mummius.

Mummius ſoon after arrived, and aſſumed the command. But neither the arrival of the new general, nor the ſupplies he brought with him, occaſioned the leaſt alteration in the Achaean councils. Diaeus the Megalopolitan, a man not inferior in daring enterpriſe to Critolaus, had been appointed chief magiſtrate in his ſtead. Immediately upon his appointment, he ſummoned to the field every Achaean and Arcadian who was able to bear arms, and conſiderably augmented his forces by the manumiſſion, and inliſting of the ſlaves. With an army, amounting at moſt to twenty thouſand men, this impatient and adventurous commander prepared to diſpute the fate of Achaia with Rome.

The Achaeans prepare for a vigorous defence;

emboldened by a trifling advantage;

A trifling advantage, obtained at the beginning, emboldened him the more. Mummius, being encamped within the Iſthmus, that he might be apprized of the motions of the enemy, had poſted a body of auxiliaries at its ſouthern extremity,

[f] See Pauſan. ub. ſup.

where the ſtrait opens into Peloponneſus. The apparent remiſſneſs and ſecurity of this advanced guard, tempted the Achaeans. They attacked, and carried the poſt, after having ſlain about five hundred of the detachment. This ſucceſs to theſe vain republicans was a ſure preſage of victory. In full confidence that the defeat of Mummius might as eaſily be accompliſhed, they with the utmoſt ardor demanded to be inſtantly led againſt him; and their demand was readily complied with by the impetuous Diaeus.

Mean while Mummius, who marked the exultation and confidence of the Achaean troops, and foreſaw the conſequences, had already formed his army in order of battle; and, upon the approach of the enemy, commanded his horſe to charge the Grecian cavalry; who, thrown into confuſion by this unexpected vigor, after a ſhort reſiſtance, were broken, and put to flight. The infantry, undaunted by this misfortune, for ſome time maintained their ground with reſolution and firmneſs; but, deſerted by their cavalry, and attacked in flank by a detachment, which the conſul had kept in reſerve for that purpoſe, they were at length totally routed [a]. are totally routed.

This battle was fought within the ſtraits. And ſo well aſſured were the Achaeans of the victory, that all the hills around were covered with their women and children, whom they had brought to be ſpectators of the diſcomfiture of the Roman

[a] Pauſan. ub. ſup.

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army. The purſuit [r] was continued by the conſul, as far as Corinth, to which it was his intention to lay ſiege; but, to his great amazement, he found the gates open, and the city deſerted. The remains of the Achaean army had puſhed through it; and the bulk of the inhabitants, abandoning themſelves to deſpair, accompanied them in their flight. This extraordinary appearance, ſo different from what he expected, ſtruck the cautious Roman. A city, the pride of Greece, famous from the ſieges it had ſuſtained, and known to be of conſiderable ſtrength, forſaken, without an attempt to ſave it, induced him to apprehend a ſnare. Impreſſed with ſuſpicions, it was not until the third day, after he had encamped before it, that he ventured within the walls. On entering the city, a ſcene, the moſt ſplendid that Greece had to diſplay, was exhibited to the eyes of the Roman army. Beſide the advantages derived from the fertility of its territory, Corinth had for ages been the great emporium of both the eaſtern and weſtern worlds; and, ſince its reſtoration to freedom by Aratus, it had become the principal city of the Achaean confederacy. From theſe copious ſources, its opulence had increaſed to a wonderful degree. Whatever decorations either private wealth or public magnificence, under the direction of the moſt delicate and refined taſte, had ever beſtowed on any city, it had accordingly enjoyed. Its noble edifices, porticos, temples, and palaces, were the admiration even of the Greeks, to whom objects

Corinth abandoned.

taken;

[r] Juſt. L. xxxiv. c. 2.

of this kind were familiar; and its paintings and ſtatues, in number as well as in value, were not inferior to what Athens herſelf had to boaſt. Its elegance accordingly had paſſed into a proverb [8].

Of all this wealth Mummius became now the maſter. The poſſeſſion of Corinth, a prize of ſuch value, and ſo eaſily gained, afforded ſuch a ſtriking acknowledgment of the humiliation of Achaia, as might have diſarmed the reſentment of the victor. But the ſternneſs of Roman ſeverity was not thus to be ſoftened. The ſituation of Corinth made it formidable [9], and conſequently pointed out its deſtruction, according to the deſolating plan of Rome. The horrid ſcene began with the maſſacre of the few men found in it, and the ſale of the women and children. The Conſul having then directed his ſoldiers to remove the moſt valuable of the paintings and ſtatues, with which the temples and other public buildings were adorned, commanded the city to be ſet on fire, and all its boaſted monuments of art and genius to be conſumed. And ſuch, it is ſaid, was the quantity of curious works in gold, ſilver, and braſs, thus devoted to the flames, that, during the conflagration, the united ſtreams of theſe various metals poured along the ſtreets of this unhappy city [10], forming that famous conſolidated mixture, which obtained the name of

and burnt.

[8] Horat. Epiſt. L. i. Epiſt. xvii. v. 36.
"Non cuivis homini contingit adire Corinthum."

[9] This reaſon is aſſigned by Cicero himſelf. See Leg. Manil. 32. Offic. L. i. 11.

[10] Flor. L. ii. c. 16.

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Corinthian braſs, and which, for many ages, was held in the higheſt eſtimation. This unprovoked deſtruction many of the Romans, however, ſeem to have lamented; and the *nollem Corinthum* [11] of one of the fineſt geniuſes of Rome, is a laſting teſtimony of this opinion.

The integrity of Mummius:

To the honor of Mummius, it is nevertheleſs to be obſerved, that he ſtands altogether clear of a ſpecies of guilt, with which other Roman commanders are generally charged. To the unpoliſhed taſte of the rough ſoldier, hiſtory has, with ſome apparent reaſon, aſcribed his contempt for thoſe exquiſite productions of art, which an improved and travelled Roman would have beheld with admiration. Being preſent, we are told [12], at the ſale of ſome of theſe Corinthian paintings, when the Bacchus of Ariſtides, a piece eſteemed one of the fineſt in the world, was purchaſed for king Attalus, at the price of ſix hundred thouſand ſeſterces [13]; "it is impoſſible," cried out Mummius, "it ſhould "be of ſuch value, unleſs ſome magical power is "concealed in it; and if ſo, it muſt not be poſſeſſed "by an Aſiatic." He then commanded it to be ſet aſide. And ſo little was he acquainted with the unrivalled excellence of the great Grecian maſters, that he is ſaid to have bargained with the commanders of the veſſels, to whoſe care he intruſted the ſtatues and paintings, which he was ſending to Italy, "that, in caſe any of them were loſt, they

[11] See Cicer. de Offic. L. i. c. 11. & L. iii. c. 11.
[12] Plin. L. xxxv. c. 4. [13] L. 4843. 15s. od.

"should deliver him new ones in their ſtead [19]." However much, at the ſame time, men of taſte may lament the unrefined manners of the Roman Conſul, his diſintereſtedneſs ſtands unimpeached in hiſtory. No portion of the riches of Corinth were applied by Mummius to his own private emolument: Cicero himſelf informing us [20], that, though ſeveral of thoſe curious works of the painter and ſtatuary, which he had ſaved out of Corinth, were to be ſeen in the temples and public edifices throughout Italy, yet in the houſe of Mummius not one was to be found. And in ſuch indigence, after all his conqueſts, did he leave his daughter, an only child, that proviſion was made for her by the ſenate out of the public treaſury [21].

his motives for deſtroying Corinth.

May it not then be ſuſpected, that theſe Corinthian works owed their deſtruction rather to the virtuous and patriotic apprehenſions of the honeſt Roman, than to inelegance of mind? While the fine arts had been progreſſively carried to an uncommon degree of perfection in this part of Greece, every kind of luxury had kept pace with them. And, diſtinguiſhed by their delicacy of taſte, the Corinthians had not been leſs remarkable for their voluptuouſneſs and diſſolute manners. Hence probably the apprehenſions of Mummius, that the introduction of the ſame arts into Italy ſhould give riſe to a ſimilar degeneracy. The ſtatues and paint-

[19] See Vell. Patercul. L. i. c. 13.

[20] In Verrem. i. 21. & Offic. L. ii. 22.

[21] Front. Stratag. L. iv. c. 3. 15.

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ings he preſerved, as they appeared to him the leaſt dangerous articles of Corinthian ſplendor [17]: the reſt, he conſidered as tending only to enervate; and, in this view, he deſtroyed what he feared might prove fatal to his countrymen. To ſave Rome, he burnt Corinth [18].

Thebes and Chalcis razed to the ground.

Thebes and Chalcis, now fell the victims of their Achaean alliance. Mummius, to whom an affectation of lenity was no longer neceſſary, razed them to the ground [19]. Meanwhile Achaia remained in a ſtate of inactivity, without forming a ſingle plan, or attempting the leaſt exertion for ſelf defence. Diaeus, whoſe raſhneſs had principally contributed to bring on the preſent calamity, had fled from the field of battle to Megalopolis, and in the frenzy of deſpair, murdered his wife, and laid violent hands on himſelf. The Achaean cities were, moſt of them, forſaken by their chiefs; many of them were abandoned by numbers of their inhabitants; and all of them waited the determination of their fate with anxious and trembling ſolicitude. The

Deſpair of the Achaeans.

[17] And yet this very introduction of theſe productions of the great Grecian maſters into Italy, Salluſt, certainly an able judge, numbers among the cauſes of the corruption of the Roman people. Velleius Peterculus uſes the ſame language. *Better*, ſays he, ſpeaking of Mummius's ignorance in the arts, *that the Roman taſte had ſtill remained thus unimproved, than that it ſhould have acquired the improvement it now has, at the expenſe of the public manners.* See Vell. Paterc. L. i. c. 13.

[18] About 103 years after, it was rebuilt and colonized by Julius Caeſar.

[19] Liv. Epitom. L. lii.

demolition of three great cities, ſeeming in the mean time to have ſtayed the victor's fury, he now contented himſelf with diſmantling every place of ſtrength, and with obliging the inhabitants to ſurrender up their arms. Even this, however, was but a temporary ſuſpenſion of ſervitude and ruin. Mummius, in fact, could not proceed farther, till the arrival of commiſſioners from Rome, jointly with whom, he was to be impowered finally to ſettle the affairs of Achaia. And, accordingly, upon their arrival, the long-projected ſcheme of Roman policy was carried into execution. They began by the diſſolution of the Achaean conſtitution, and by declaring the ſeveral ſtates and cities, formerly component parts of that reſpectable league, to be henceforth entirely diſtinct and independent. All popular aſſemblies were forbiden throughout Peloponneſus, and that ſmall ſhare of the civil adminiſtration which the natives were permitted to retain, was transferred from the people, and placed in the hands of the richer few, whoſe reſponſible circumſtances the Romans conſidered as a pledge of their ſubjection. At the ſame time, leſt any individual ſhould acquire an influence that might be troubleſome to Rome, by the poſſeſſion of extenſive property, they not only took care to impoveriſh the more opulent families, by fines and ſevere taxations, but alſo enacted, that a Grecian ſhould be incapable of increaſing his poſſeſſions by the purchaſe of any lands in Greece.

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Diſſolution of the republic of Achaia.

It had, in former times, been the conſtant policy of Rome, in giving laws to the conquered, at firſt

Reaſons for the Roman ſeverity.

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to diſguiſe the ſeverity of the humiliation to which ſhe deſtined them. But now Achaia, for many years the moſt reſpectable of the Grecian ſtates, of whoſe aid Rome had frequently availed herſelf, and whoſe greateſt crime was, that ſhe had liberties, which were dear to her, ſaw herſelf doomed at once to the moſt abject vaſſalage. The reaſon is evident: in thoſe days of ſeeming gentleneſs, Syria, Macedon, and Carthage were ſtill formidable; and had Rome at once avowed her purpoſes, the mingled feelings of intereſt, indignation, and deſpair, would ſurely have united theſe nations in a cauſe, which was in reality the cauſe of them all; and Rome might have been involved in a conteſt pregnant with difficulty and danger; whereas now, neither Syria nor Macedon was in a condition to excite her apprehenſions, and the final deſtruction of Carthage by the younger Africanus, which had taken place about the ſame time with that of Corinth, enabled them to throw aſide the maſk of gentleneſs, as it left them not an enemy to fear.

The terms granted to Achaia, which we have mentioned, are recorded by Pauſanias [26]. But the particular ſeverities employed on this occaſion, he and every other hiſtorian have paſſed over in ſilence. Indeed an exact relation of all occurrences of this kind, which ſuch a revolution muſt have produced, was hardly to be expected from the writers of thoſe days; who, whether Grecian or Roman, influenced either by fear or ſhame, would avoid a minute

[26] In Achaicis.

detail of the melancholy ſtory. With what unrelenting acrimony the Romans purſued theſe wretched remains of the Grecian people, we may; however, gather from a circumſtance which Polybius [21], though in a great meaſure the advocate of Rome, has preſerved to us. The commiſſioners encouraged the preferring an accuſation againſt thoſe Achaean chiefs, who of old had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in advancing the proſperity, or vindicating the liberties of Achaia. Philopoemen and Aratus were arraigned as criminals! and even Achaeus, the ſuppoſed founder of the Achaean people, as if on this account he ought to be numbered among the enemies of Rome, was to have ſuffered by a poſthumous condemnation! A requeſt was preferred to the commiſſioners, that all the decrees which had been enacted to the honor of theſe patriots ſhould be reſcinded, and their ſtatues overthrown. But while this extraordinary trial was carrying on, and when ſentence was on the point of being pronounced, Polybius arrived in Peloponneſus, in his return from the ſiege of Carthage, whither he had accompanied his friend Scipio. Diſpoſed, as Polybius might be, from a regard to his perſonal ſafety and intereſt, and ſtill more, perhaps, from an attachment to his Roman friend, to give way to the prejudices of that all powerful people, and well apprized of the jealouſy they entertained of theſe illuſtrious citizens, the boaſt and honor of Achaia;

Extraordinary proceedings ſet on foot by the Roman commiſſioners.

[21] See Polyb. de virtut. & vitiis, p. 1483, & ſeqq. Caſaub. 8°.

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ſtill this great man could not ſuppreſs his indignation at the ungenerous attempt. Philopoemen he had perſonally known in his earlier years, and had in part been a witneſs of the exalted virtues of that excellent patriot; "and ſhall then," ſaid he, "that "integrity of conduct, which was his glory, be "now his guilt! Far from having been the inve- "terate enemy of Rome, he ſupported your cauſe, "he fought under your banners, againſt Philip, "againſt Antiochus; and if at any time he engaged "in oppoſition to you, it was only when, impelled "by the leading motive of all his actions, regard "for his country. Such as he was, ſuch were alſo "Aratus, and thoſe other Achaean chiefs, whoſe "ſtatues you are about to demoliſh; criminal, "only becauſe unalterably faithful to the intereſts "of Achaia. And will you condemn in a Grecian, "what in a Roman you would have accounted "worthy of the higheſt praiſe?"

The commiſſioners ſeemed convinced; and, probably conſcious of the infamous part they were acting, artfully gave up to Polybius what they could not have inſiſted on, without making themſelves altogether odious. They not only dropped the proſecution, but likewiſe cauſed the ſtatues of Achaeus, Aratus, and Philopoemen, which had already been tranſported out of Peloponneſus, to be brought back. They even affected to do Polybius particular honor; and orders were iſſued to preſent him with whatever portion of the confiſcated eſtates he ſhould think worthy of his acceptance; an offer which he nobly refuſed, diſdaining to grow rich by

by the ſpoils of his unhappy countrymen. His diſintereſted ſpirit raiſed him ſtill higher in the eſtimation of the Romans; and he had a commiſſion given him, to viſit the ſeveral diſtricts of Achaia, and to re-eſtabliſh tranquillity and cultivation throughout that diſtracted and deſolated country. The ability and zeal with which he acquitted himſelf in the diſcharge of this delicate office, endeared him to all. To have encouraged the Achaeans in the moſt diſtant hopes of that liberty which they were never more to enjoy, would have been the higheſt cruelty. He therefore endeavoured to reconcile them to their preſent fate; to allay the various diſcontents and perſonal animoſities which the late times of tumult and confuſion had engendered; and to induce them to acquieſce in a peaceable ſubmiſſion to thoſe laws, under which they were now deſtined to live.

his diſintereſtedneſs;

Amidſt unavailing regret for having been ſo long deprived of the preſence of a citizen, whoſe ſalutary inſtructions might poſſibly have prevented their ruin, the Achaeans gratefully acknowledged the importance of his preſent ſervices by every mark of public eſteem. Some of the ſtatues then erected in honor of this patriot, Pauſanias, who lived three hundred and twenty years after the deſtruction of Corinth, tells us, remained till his time. On one, which he ſaw in Arcadia, within the ſacred precinct of the *Deſpoina*, the moſt revered of the Arcadian deities, appeared the following honorable inſcription [22]: "Polybius, from whoſe counſels Greece

honors paid him by his countrymen.

[22] See Pauſ. in Arcadicis.

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" might have derived ſafety, had Greece ſuffered " herſelf to be guided by them; and in whom ſhe " found her only protector, in the day of her " diſtreſs."

Greece formed into a province;

The overthrow of the Achaean commonwealth finiſhed the debaſement of Greece, which ſoon after ſunk into a Roman diſtrict, under the denomination of the province of Achaia; becauſe with the overthrow of this republic was completed the final reduction of the Grecian ſtates [21]. In this province were compriſed Peloponneſus, Attica, Boeotia, Phocis, and all that part of Greece lying to the ſouth of Epire and Theſſaly. All to the north of that line, as far as the utmoſt verge of the Macedonian frontier, was the province of Macedon. Theſe two provincial governments of Macedon and Achaia, including the ancient dominions of the Macedonian princes, together with the ſeveral ſtates and republics of Greece — that once illuſtrious land! ennobled by a number of glorious achievements! the choſen ſeat of liberty, ſcience, polity, and arts! were henceforward to be conſigned to humiliation and ſervitude!

The Roman writers, however, ſpeak of Greece, and particularly of Athens, as ſtill retaining, under all the diſadvantages of this provincial eſtabliſhment, that pre-eminence in literature, by which ſhe was diſtinguiſhed in her days of freedom and glory. Accordingly, for ſome ages after, we find the Roman youth reſorting thither, in queſt of that

[21] Pauſan. in Achaicis.

improvement, or at leaſt of that reputation, which the arts and ſciences of Greece were ſuppoſed capable of beſtowing. But nevertheleſs, rather to the fame of ancient days, than to any merit ſhe from this period poſſeſſed, is the eſtimation of Rome to be aſcribed. The liberties and genius of Greece gradually declined, and at laſt expired together. For, though her philoſophical ſchools for a while maintained a reſpectable name; though, at diſtant intervals, a few writers of diſtinguiſhed merit made their appearance, eſpecially in the antiquarian and hiſtorical lines, yet did the general turn of the Grecian people ſoon become frivolous, and, in reſemblance of their fortunes, groveling and ſervile. Their walk of learning ſeldom produced any thing higher than the profeſſional rhetorician or the captious diſputant; and what abilities they poſſeſſed were meanly proſtituted in humoring the follies, or in adminiſtering to the depravity of their Roman maſters. By degrees, therefore, the very appellation of Greek, which once implied ſuperior talents and the higheſt mental improvement, came to ſignify ſomewhat exceedingly abject; and under the Roman Caeſars was frequently uſed, by the ſatiriſts [24], as a term of the utmoſt reproach. Even thoſe literary productions, which in this decline of Greece do her moſt honor, when compared with what went before, can only be conſidered as the feeble rays of the evening ſun, when contraſted with his meridian ſplendor. What praiſe

Its decline in literature after this period.

[24] See Juvenal paſſim.

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soever we may be willing to allow them, we search in vain for that originality; that just observance of nature; that richness of invention; that nervous sense; that glow and dignity of sentiment; that power of expression, which characterize her earlier poets, historians, philosophers, and orators.

Age of glory of the Grecian people;

From the days of Cimon, when Greece had attained the summit of her glory, to her final subjection to the Roman power, about three hundred and twenty years had elapsed; and from the death of Alexander the Great; when the whole Persian monarchy confessed the Grecian dominion, about one hundred and sixty. It may then be matter of useful instruction to inquire, from what causes that total alteration was brought on, which, within this period of time, appears to have taken place in the Grecian character; and whence, a people, whose civil institutions, prowess, and extensive accomplishments, seemed to lead to universal empire, should have thus declined, and with so little struggle have sunk into dependence and insignificancy.

causes of their decay and final overthrow.

Division into small, and independent principalities;

I. There was originally a principle of weakness and decay in the very constitution of the Grecian government. Greece, parcelled out into a number of small states, each enjoying an independent sovereignty, was incapable of that exertion of strength, which results from conspiring counsels, and the joint efforts of an embodied people. On the important day of Marathon, of all the Grecian states, only ten thousand Athenians, and one thousand Plataeans appeared in support of the common cause.

And though afterwards, roused by the example of Athens, other Grecian powers armed against the Persians, yet was this the armament only of a few states; formed too by most of them on a partial and confined plan, rather for the preservation of their own particular territories, than in vindication of the general liberties, and the defence of the country at large; so that, had not the artifice as well as the firmness of Themistocles been employed on this interesting occasion, it had been hardly possible to have saved Greece. The council of the Amphictyones was indeed a kind of national senate, and probably in its first institution was designed to be the centre of unity of the several states, whose representatives composed this august assembly. But this tribunal was chiefly adapted to the infant times of Greece. As particular states advanced in power, it was often too feeble to control the refractory, and at length found itself, as in the case of the second sacred war (that fatal aera, from which Greece dates her decline) under the necessity of calling in foreign assistance to render its decisions effectual.

jealousies and contests thence arising.

II. From these numerous sovereignties there arose, besides, endless jealousies and contests; the weaker states still suspecting the stronger; and the stronger by their ambitious encroachments justifying but too much the suspicions of the weaker. Scarcely had Greece recovered from the terror of the Persian invasion, when Sparta, regardless of the noble part that Athens had lately acted, could not conceal her envy at seeing this rival-city spring

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more powerful from her ruins, and endeavoured to perpetuate her desolation. Throughout all the Grecian commonwealths the same unhappy spirit of envy and dissension prevailed, which was constantly encouraged and fomented, by the policy of the several princes who sat after Xerxes on the Persian throne. Conscious of their inferiority in arms, they endeavoured to divide those whom they could not subdue, and their intrigues and treasure were but too successfully employed. "Ten "thousand archers [25] have driven me out of Asia," said Agesilaus [26], when the orators of Athens and Thebes, pensioners to the Persian king, had stirred up a war against Sparta, which obliged him to abandon his Asiatic conquests, and hasten to the defence of his own kingdom. To the like practices the Macedonian kings owed whatever advantage they obtained over Greece: And the Romans pursued the same arts with still greater effect; until, exhausted by her own domestic feuds, Greece fell an easy prey to her oppressors.

Difference in their forms of government

III. The flame of intestine animosity acquired more fierceness, and more destructive rapidity from the difference in the forms of government that subsisted in the several Grecian commonwealths. Throughout Greece the establishment, was, at least in part, democratical, but in some places, as in Athens, the power was lodged in the hands of the people at large; in some, as in Sparta, it was delegated only to a few. Where the *many* had the

[25] An archer was the impress on the Persian coin.
[26] See Plut. in Agesilao.

power, they not only were ſuſpicious of whatever ſeemed to threaten their own privileges, but wiſhed to eſtabliſh the dominion of the multitude in every ſtate around them. And, in like manner, the *few*, not content with ſecuring themſelves at home againſt the encroachments of the *many*, aimed at the introduction of their own contracted form of government, into all the neighbouring cities. Private ambition had here many tempting opportunities: the ſeeds of diſſenſion every where prevailed: in every city two parties were at all times prepared for civil broils; mutually jealous, and mutually credulous of every miſrepreſentation; and equally violent in executing their reſolves, as precipitate in forming them. So that under the ſpecious pretence, either of defending the cauſe of freedom, or of controlling the exceſſes of a licentious populace, intereſted and ambitious leaders had always numbers at their call. The powers of Aſia, of Macedon, and of Rome, in their ſucceſſive attempts on the liberties of Greece, practiſed the ſame kind of artifice; under the guiſe of friendly interpoſition, playing one party againſt the other, and thus betraying the true intereſts of the ſtate, and gradually waſting it into debility and ſubjection. At one period of time, we ſee in Diodorus, the number of exiles, whom party-violence had driven out of their native cities, amounted to twenty thouſand. In the days of Polybius, we find the ſame ſpirit of diſſenſion ſtill continued; and it was happy for the ſufferers, when this atrocious ſpirit was contented with baniſhment alone.

BOOK VIII.

Sect. 2. Difficulty of preſerving a democracy in its purity.

IV. The democratical form, which, as we have ſeen, prevailed under various modes throughout Greece, however friendly we may ſuppoſe it to liberty, was attended with inconveniences of conſiderable detriment to the national proſperity. It opened an ample field to the factious and the turbulent; to the pretended patriot and the venal orator: It frequently rendered the public councils paſſionate, inſolent, capricious, and unſtable: It baniſhed the ableſt chiefs: It gave birth to thoſe cruel and reproachful edicts, which we meet with even in the Athenian annals, againſt the Aeginetae, againſt the Samians, againſt the ten admirals: and, what is yet a ſtronger inſtance of the folly often prevalent in popular aſſemblies, it produced that abſurd Athenian law [27], which diverted to the amuſement of a giddy multitude thoſe funds, which had been originally appropriated to the moſt important department of government, "the ſupport "of their naval ſtrength." That, in a political form, of which we are apt to conceive great things, and which, it muſt be confeſſed, had often wrought the nobleſt achievements, theſe miſchiefs ſhould be found, ariſes from the very nature of that form. The *vital principle* of democracy, as a celebrated writer *juſtly* obſerves [28], is *virtue*. And therefore, whilſt invigorated by this exalting principle, democracies have reached a height of glory, which other forms of government emulate in vain. But

[27] It was made death to move for a repeal of this law.

[28] Eſprit des Loix, L. iii. c. 3.

on this very account alſo have democracies been more rapid in their declenſion than other political conſtitutions. Great opulence, and extent of empire, thoſe darling objects of human ambition, whoſe allurements are ſo ſeldom reſiſted by political wiſdom, have been always fatal to them; becauſe, ſo prone to corruption is the human heart, that it is hardly poſſible this *vital principle* ſhould preſerve its vigor, beneath the baneful influence of an opulent and wide-extended dominion. The ſage founder of the Spartan laws ſaw this, and endeavoured to provide for the ſecurity of Sparta, by excluding the purſuit of wealth and of extenſive empire. But the temptations of ſucceſsful war, and the avidity of man, defeated the purpoſes of the lawgiver [19]. In contempt of the barriers, which he had raiſed, avarice and the luſt of conqueſt made their way into Sparta, and produced their wonted effects of corruption and diſſolution. The truth of this obſervation appears yet more remarkably in the fate of Athens. The hiſtory of the Pagan world has not a more auguſt ſcene to produce than what Athens exhibited, from the third year of the ſixty-ſeventh Olympiad, the expulſion of the Piſiſtratidae, to the third year of the eighty-ſecond, the death of Cimon. During this memorable period, ſhe told the number of her heroes by that of her citizens; and every virtue, that can give ſtrength and dignity to a ſtate, was found among that illuſtrious people. But too ſoon there

[19] See Polyb. L. vi. c. 46, 47.

BOOK VIII. Sect. 2.

ſucceeded the intoxication of proſperity [10]; and that very democracy which, whilſt they continued virtuous, was a ſource of glory, now, as their degeneracy advanced, added to the public calamity. Corrupted by that exceſs of power which they enjoyed, and which made them ſupreme in the diſpenſation of rewards and puniſhments, in the diſpoſal of honors, in the deciſion of the moſt important queſtions of government; corrupted by the adulation with which their leaders and orators generally addreſſed them, the people conſidered themſelves as above control; and, in full confidence of their own ſtrength, and vain, at the ſame time, of the glory derived to them from the proweſs of their anceſtors, they looked down with contempt on other nations, and with fond credulity entertained every viſionary ſcheme of conqueſt, with which their flattering demagogues ſought to amuſe them. Athens had extended her eſtabliſhments along the coaſts of Thrace and of Aſia, and over moſt of the adjacent iſlands; yet, as if this were little, both Sicily and Egypt became the objects of her ambition; and a city, that ſcarcely muſtered twenty thouſand citizens, is ſaid to have conceived the mad project of attempting the empire of the world. Meanwhile, they had rendered their yoke inſupportable even to their Grecian neighbours; their confederates they treated as vaſſals; and the contributions which they received from them, and which they were to have adminiſ-

[10] See Polyb. L. vi. c. 42.

tered for the general good, they wantonly laviſhed on the pride and magnificence of their own city; in name the *protectors* of Greece, but in reality its *oppreſſors*. Amidſt all this inſolence and bold ſhow of enterpriſe, the Athenians nevertheleſs had nothing of their ancient vigor remaining. Employed in the buſtle of their popular aſſemblies, or in the oſtentatious diſplay of thoſe trappings of ſovereignty, with which the citizen of Athens was inveſted, they had ſubſtituted the clamor and chicane of debate to military exertion; and while they were careful of their proficiency in intrigue and cabal, they were backward to maintain a ſuperiority in arms. This debaſement was manifeſted at Chaeronea; and, as if the reproach of that defeat had only ſerved to increaſe their cowardice and abjectneſs, they ſhowed it in a manner ſtill more opprobrious at Lamia. Only two hundred Athenians, Pauſanias [21] tells us, had fallen there; and yet, as if cut off from all reſource, they tamely opened their gates, and ſubmitted, without reſerve, to Antipater. But indeed proſperity, the pride of dominion, the vacant and unwarlike eaſe of a municipal life, had produced a total change in the Athenian character. That, people, whom the devaſtation of their territories, and their city in flames, had not diſcouraged from ſupporting the liberties of Greece againſt the powers of Aſia, were now reduced to the moſt puſillanimous deſpondency, by the ſlighteſt reverſe of fortune; and,

[21] In Achaicis.

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ſtrangers to the ſpirit of their anceſtors, becauſe ſtrangers to their virtues, they reſigned themſelves to ſervitude with an abject timidity, ſcarcely to be believed of a republic, lately the haughtieſt to be found in the annals of hiſtory.

Fatal influence of irreligion.

V. But what ſeems to have had the largeſt ſhare in bringing decay and humiliation on the Grecian people, was *the fatal prevalence of Atheiſtical tenets*, which, for above a century; had been ſpreading from the Epicurean ſchool through every part of Greece. It was the wiſh of Fabricius [11], when told by Cineas of the opinions which Epicurus was then propagating, "that they might be adopted by the "enemies of Rome!" The event did honor to the wiſdom and foreſight of this virtuous Roman. The baneful doctrine completed the ruin of Grecian manners. Naturally volatile, of a ſceptical turn, and, from the arts of refinement and elegance which were familiar to them, prone to diſſipation and pleaſurable indulgences, the Greeks but too eagerly embraced a ſyſtem, that levelled all religious reſtraints, and left them without a God to inſpect human actions. The conſequence was, what in the like caſe it will ever be. We have it from Polybius [12], who was an eye-witneſs, that venality, fraud, treachery, an utter diſregard of country, of the moſt ſacred oaths, of all ties whatſoever, human and divine, crimes which indicate in the ſtrongeſt

[11] See Plut. in Pyrrho.

[12] See Polyb. L. ii. c. 45. L. vi. c. 54, 55. L. xii. c. 1. L. xiii. de virtutibus & vitiis.

manner the corruption of a nation, and are the ſureſt preſages of its ruin, ſoon became prevalent throughout moſt of the ſtates of Greece. The Achaeans ſeem to have been the only exception. Poſſibly, as they were a plainer people, and leſs converſant in philoſophical reſearches, the contagion had made leſs progreſs among them. Accordingly the Romans, who, from the vicious and enervated ſtate of the other Grecian commonwealths, had obtained an eaſy conqueſt, met here with a vigor and ſtrength of virtue, ſuch as they little expected; and, amidſt that general wreck of principle that marks thoſe degenerate days, it was the glory of Achaia, to have a number of citizens who, ſteady to the intereſts of their country, treated the temptations held out by Rome with their merited contempt, and beheld her warlike operations without diſmay. To defeat this formidable oppoſition, the Romans contrived the expedient already related. Under the pretence of tranſmitting them to Rome to prove their innocence of a charge which the Romans themſelves knew to be groundleſs, they ſeized on upwards of a thouſand of the moſt reſpectable of the Achaean nobles, and ſent them to periſh in Italy. In the mean while, taking advantage of the diſtracted councils of a people who were now abandoned to the miſrule of demagogues of equal turbulence and incapacity, they effected their long-concerted project, the final overthrow of the Achaean liberties.

Abject ſtate of Greece.

It would have been, however, ſome recompence to Greece, for the loſs of her independence, if ſhe

BOOK VIII. Sect. 2. after its ſubjection to the Roman power.

had found an effectual defence in that power, to which ſhe was thus ſubjected; and if, under the protection of her new maſters, ſhe had ſeen her tranquillity re-eſtabliſhed; but ſhe had not even this conſolation. Confounded in that maſs of nations, which formed the enormous and unwieldy body of the Roman empire, ſhe ceaſed to have any fortunes of her own; and at the ſame time, though, from her ſituation, it was forbidden to her to partake unmixed of whatever proſperity the Romans happened to enjoy, ſhe ſhared largely in moſt of their calamities; in the diſtreſſes of the Mithridatic war; in the depredations of the Cilician pirates; in the bloody conteſts between Caeſar and Pompey; between the republican party of Brutus, and the avengers of Caeſar's death; between Octavius and Mark Antony; in the various oppreſſions, of which the deſpotiſm of the emperors was afterwards productive; and, at length, in that general devaſtation which overſpread this mighty ſtate from the repeated incurſions of barbarian nations. Not to mention, how ſeverely the private vices of the Romans themſelves were often felt by this unhappy country, in the exactions and inſults which ſhe had often to ſuffer from her deſpotic governors; the common fate of all the provinces under the yoke of Rome. Until, from theſe ſeveral cauſes, Greece finally was left, as ſhe is at this day, with hardly a trace of her former glories.

A curſory view of what is moſt memorable in theſe latter events ſhall cloſe this part of our hiſtory.

BOOK VIII.

SECTION III.

CONTENTS.

Greece threatened by the Cimbri—joins Mithridates. — Character and views of that prince. — Siege and ruin of Athens by Sylla. — Sylla overthrows the armies of Mithridates — close of the fortunes o Mithridates.—Greece ravaged by the Cilician corsairs — involved in the civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey; between the republican party and the avengers of Cæsar's death; between Octavius and Mark Antony. — Abject condition of Greece under the Roman Emperors. — Irruption of the Goths. — Reigns of Constantine — Constantius — Julian — Jovian — Valentinian — Valens — Gratian — — Theodosius — Arcadius, and Honorius. — Overthrow of the Roman empire in the West. — Ruin of Greece by the Barbarians. — Decline and fall of the empire of Constantinople. — Present state of Greece.

GREECE, debilitated and exhausted, and still bleeding from the wounds of Rome, beheld, with all the terror of conscious weakness, the Cimbri [1] hovering on her northern boundaries. To complete

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Greece threatened by the Cimbri.

[1] Liv. Epitom. L. lxiii.

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her misfortunes, this impending ſtorm of war had ſcarcely blown over, when the ambitious ſchemes of Mithridates of Pontus expoſed her to new dangers, and involved her in freſh calamities.

Mithridates.

This extraordinary prince, the moſt powerful of his time, and the moſt able and enterpriſing who had ever taken up arms againſt Rome, demands particular notice [a]. He was the eighth in deſcent from that Mithridates who, fleeing from the preſence of Antigonus to the Euxine ſea, had laid the foundation of the kingdom of Pontus. The voice of flattery gave him an origin ſtill more illuſtrious, tracing his anceſtry down from the ancient line of the princes of the houſe of Cyrus.

His early fortunes.

A minor at the time of his father's death, who had periſhed by domeſtic treaſon, and himſelf expoſed to a ſimilar fate, he was driven to ſeek for ſafety in the foreſts; where, under the pretence of purſuing the chaſe, he changed his haunts night after night, taking his repoſe on the ground, like the inhabitants of the wild; and never, during ſeven years, entering into any city, nor venturing under the cover of a roof. By this means he acquired a hardineſs of body, that was proof againſt every extreme of weather, and not to be ſubdued by any toil. The danger of his ſituation ſuggeſted an additional precaution: he fortified himſelf with a certain medicine, of which he is ſaid to have been the inventor, and which is

[a] See Appian de Bello Mithridat. Plutarch. in Sylla, Lucullo, Pompeio.

reported

reported to have been an infallible antidote againſt the effects of the moſt powerful poiſon. BOOK VIII.

His father had been in friendſhip with the Romans, and had done them important ſervices in their war againſt Andronicus, the laſt of the Pergamenian kings. The ſon was too formidable to be admitted to the ſame friendly intercourſe. The Romans viewed him with jealouſy, and reſolved to accompliſh his humiliation. With this view, the ſenate judged it expedient to circumſcribe his ſovereignty within narrower limits. Provoked at the preſumption of this arbitrary attempt, Mithridates conceived the bold deſign of overthrowing the Roman empire in Aſia; a great part of which he ſoon united under his own banners. Three Roman generals marched againſt him; the proconſul Lucius Caſſius, Quintus Oppius, and Manius Aquilius, a man of conſular dignity, who had been honored with a triumph, and was at this time at the head of the Roman commiſſioners for the ſettlement of Aſia. Mithridates defeated them all, and having gotten the three commanders into his hands, regardleſs of their quality, expoſed them to ridicule and ſcorn, producing them by way of ſpectacle through the Aſiatic cities. Aquilius particularly, whom he charged with being the author of the war, was treated with the utmoſt contumely. He loaded him with chains, and mounting him on an aſs, compelled him, as he paſſed along, to inform the gazing multitude of his name, and his rank in the Roman armies [1]. To mark yet farther Sect. 3. attempts to overthrow the Roman empire in Aſia.

[1] Mithridates probably conſidered this as an act of juſtice.

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his finguinary orders.

the execration in which he held the Roman name; he iſſued orders to the Aſiatics in the ſeveral provinces throughout his dominions, on an appointed day to maſſacre * every Roman and Italian they could find among them, without regard to age, ſex, or condition; the debtor to have half the fortune of the creditor, whom he ſhould murder, and the ſlave, who had ſlain his maſter, his liberty; and forbidding them, under the pain of death, to ſave any of their lives, or, when dead, to give them burial. The atrocity of theſe orders, and, ſtill more, the horrid zeal with which they were executed, ſtrongly evince how odious the Romans muſt have been to the Aſiatic nations; eighty thouſand, by the loweſt accounts †, having periſhed in this maſſacre; neither the feelings of humanity, the claims of gratitude, the ties of friendſhip, nor the reverence of religion, ſhielding thoſe unhappy

Maſſacre of the Romans and Italians throughout Aſia.

Manius Aquilius was in fact a perſon who merited infamy: he had triumphed at the cloſe of the Pergamenian war, though, in the conduct of it he had done little ſervice; Perpenna having brought that war nearly to a concluſion; but, he dying, Aquilius ſtepped into the command, and claimed the merit of what another had achieved. A few of the Aſiatic cities ſtill remaining to be reduced, he, in violation of the laws of war, treacherouſly poiſoned the ſprings, from whence they were ſupplied with water, and thus compelled them to ſurrender. We may judge, accordingly, how the Aſiatics, who had ſuffered ſo much from his perfidiouſneſs, muſt have enjoyed his humiliation.

See Florus, L. ii. c. 20.

* Liv. Epitom. L. lxxviii. Appian. ub. ſup.

† A hundred and fifty thouſand, ſays Plutarch (in Sylla).

victims from the ſavage fury of unrelenting vengeance; even thoſe who fled for refuge to the temples, being torn from them, or ſlaughtered at the altars. The death of Manius Aquilius cloſed this ſcene of horror; Mithridates cauſing molten gold to be poured down his throat, in reproach of Roman avarice.

Mithridates forms an alliance with the Grecian ſtates.

The object of Mithridates was now to attempt an alliance with the ſtates of Greece; with their aſſiſtance to purſue his plan of hoſtilities in the neighbourhood of Italy; and, ſhould circumſtances favor him, to carry the war into the heart of the Roman empire. The conjuncture was favorable to his deſigns. The Romans, diſtreſſed at home, firſt by the Italian inſurgents or the confederate war, and afterwards by the diſſenſions which Marius and Sylla had excited, ſeemed to have withdrawn their attention from Greece. Theſe circumſtances, with the powerful arguments that Mithridates had to offer, "of the exploits already achieved by him," and "of his avowed enmity to Rome, could not fail of eſtabliſhing an intereſt with a people, in their happieſt days impatient and changeable, and at this time ſharpened to a keener ſenſe of the oppreſſions they endured, by the very remembrance of the liberties which they had enjoyed. The Athenians even prevented his wiſhes. Exaſperated by certain fines, which the Romans had lately impoſed on them, they had ſent an embaſſy to the king of Pontus, to implore his protection. Nothing could coincide more opportunely with his views. A conſiderable body of land-forces, under the command of his ſon

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Ariarathes[7], and another under that of Archelaus, with a large naval armament, were immediately ordered to their aſſiſtance. At the ſame time that his troops under Archelaus took poſſeſſion of Athens, his fleet was employed, with the moſt rapid ſucceſs, in reducing the numerous iſlands that cover the Aegean ſea; Ariarathes extended his conqueſts through Thrace and Macedon. In Greece, the Roman commander Brutius Sura oppoſed Archelaus at firſt with vigor, and in one engagement obliged him to retreat to his ſhips. But this check produced nothing deciſive. And the whole province of Achaia, from Theſſaly to the Cretan ſea, had ſoon acknowledged Mithridates; the little city of Theſpiae having been, it is ſaid, the only place, whoſe reſiſtance rendered a ſiege neceſſary.

Sylla enters Greece;

Mean while Sylla, having expelled the Marian faction, prepared to puniſh the Grecian revolt. His very name impreſſed terror and diſmay. As ſoon as his approach was known, the Grecian cities, Athens alone excepted, conſcious of guilt, ſent to deprecate his wrath, and to tender their ſubmiſſion. The other more important wars, to which his ambition was exciting him, probably ſaved them. Diſdaining to ſtoop to any mean game, he marched with rapidity to Athens, where the chief of the Mithridatic force ſeemed to be collected. His aim was, to extinguiſh at once the war in Greece, by ſtorming Athens. But this he found a taſk more difficult than he expected.

marches againſt Athens.

Athens was divided into two parts, the upper

[7] Appian calls him Arcathias.

town; and the lower. The upper, comprehending the city properly ſo called, together with the Acropolis or Athenian citadel, was incloſed within one common wall of conſiderable ſtrength. The lower, diſtant about five miles from the upper, was the great ſea-port of Athens, generally known by the name of the Piraeus, famed for its noble arſenal, for its docks, and the variety and extent of its buildings for naval purpoſes; for the number of ſeamen and artiſans with which it was crowded; and above all, for its harbour, the work of Themiſtocles, ſaid to have been large enough to afford ſhelter to a thouſand ſhips[*], and opening its capacious boſom to the trade, not only of the adjacent iſlands, but to that of Aſia and Egypt. Around it was a fortification of ſtone, raiſed by Pericles, ſixty feet in height, and of proportional thickneſs, remarkable for the maſſy ſize of the ſtones with which it was conſtructed, and yet more ſo for the compactneſs and ſolidity of their junctures. From the Piraeus to Athens there was a road, ſecured on each ſide by a ſtrong wall, which formed a communication between the port and the city.

[*] So ſays Pliny, L. vii. c. 37. Strabo, probably more exact, ſays four hundred. Spon (Voyage de la Grece, tom. ii.) ſuppoſes, that in its preſent ſtate it could hardly be capable of receiving fifty of our large ſhips. See Chandler's Travels in Greece, chap. 5. for a full account of this famed harbour. From a marble lion, of admirable workmanſhip, ten feet high, which was placed at the inmoſt extremity of this harbour, it has been known by the name of Porto Draco, or Porto Lione. The lion has been carried away by the Venetians, and is now to be ſeen before the arſenal at Venice.

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In the upper town Ariſtion poſſeſſed the command; a factious demagogue, who had riſen to power by an abject compliance with the follies and vices of the multitude; and who by profeſſion was an Epicurean philoſopher, but, like many of that dangerous ſect, concealed under this philoſophic diſguiſe the blackeſt flagitiouſneſs of mind. By intrigue he had been appointed ambaſſador to Mithridates, into whoſe favor he had inſinuated himſelf by the ſervility of his deportment, and by betraying to him the intereſts of his country. On his return, he had amuſed the Athenians with aſſurances, that the great views of Mithridates were pointed ſolely to the humiliation of Rome, with the reſtoration of the popular government, and all the ancient liberties of Greece. Having, by theſe arts, obtained by degrees the unlimited confidence of the multitude, he ſoon uſurped the ſovereign authority, and uſed it like a tyrant, exerciſing the ſevere ſcourge of arbitrary ſway on the very people who had truſted him with power, murdering or baniſhing, under pretence of having diſcovered their connexions with Rome, every man whoſe wealth could tempt his avarice, or whoſe ſtation or virtues could alarm his fears. Urged on therefore by his crimes, Ariſtion, though not truly brave, which a villain never is, was deſperate; and had embraced the reſolution to ſuffer every extremity, rather than yield to a foe, from whom, he well knew, he had no mercy to expect.

defended by Ariſtion,

In the lower town, Archelaus had the direction of the military operations, a brave and experienced officer, who was attentive to improve every advan-

and Archelaus.

tage of his ſituation. Beſide a numerous garriſon, he had a ſtrong fleet at his diſpoſal, which enabled him to command from abroad every neceſſary ſupply. And, in addition to theſe advantages, there was an army of above a hundred thouſand men in Macedon, ready to march to his aſſiſtance. BOOK VIII. Sect. 3.

Sylla, on the contrary, after ſome fruitleſs attempts to carry the place by ſtorm, ſaw himſelf beſet with difficulties. He had brought with him only five legions and a few cohorts, in all about thirty thouſand men; a force far inferior to that of the enemy. Beſides, he had neither the machines neceſſary for a ſiege, nor military ſtores of any kind, nor money to purchaſe. But in his own daring mind he found reſources for every want. He ſent Lucullus into Egypt for naval ſuccours. He prevailed on the inhabitants of Aetolia and Theſſaly, probably by way of atoning for their late defection, to ſend him a reinforcement of men, and a ſupply of arms and proviſions. He cut down all the ſacred groves round Athens, and ſpared not thoſe of the Lycaeum and Academy in the Athenian ſuburbs, in order to procure timber for his engines; and he ſeized on the holy treaſures at Epidaurus, Olympia, and Delphi. His anſwer to Caphis, a certain Phocian, whom he diſpatched on this errand to the Delphic temple; is memorable; and ſhows, that this ſtern Roman was as little embarraſſed by ſcruples of religion, as by the feelings of humanity. Juſt as Caphis was preparing to ſeize the ſacred offerings, the prieſts contrived that the lyre of Apollo ſhould be heard to ſound from the inmoſt ſanctuary; Caphis, ſtruck with a religious

Sylla's difficulties.

and reſources.

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horror, immediately desisted, and sent the Roman commander an account of the tremendous prodigy. Sylla replied jestingly, "that he was surprised "Caphis did not know, that music was the expres- "sion, not of anger but of joy. And that he might "therefore boldly take the treasures, since Apollo "gave them with such good will[f]."

He is baffled in his several attempts;

With all these aids, however, Sylla had not much to boast of. He attempted to scale the walls, and was repulsed. His warlike engines were set on fire, and destroyed in a sally of the besieged. He battered their works in vain, while a new wall instantly appeared behind every breach that had been made. He tried to proceed by mining; but the Athenians countermined his works, and slew or put to flight his miners. Thus baffled in every attempt, and winter coming on, he resolved to change the siege into a blockade, in hopes of reducing the place by famine. He had already thrown down part of the long walls, which joined the Piraeus to Athens, and had made a lodgement on the very road, which served as a communication between them, so that the former method of conveying provisions from the port to the city, was rendered almost impracticable. Difficulties, however, he still had to combat; and these arose chiefly from Archelaus, who, active and enterprising, took every opportunity, and often with success, to attack the Roman lines, and to throw relief into Athens; but the treachery of two Athenians belonging to the

forms the plan of reducing the place by famine.

[f] Plut. in Syllâ.

Piraean garriſon, at length enabled Sylla to prevent even theſe precarious and hazardous ſupplies. Expert at the ſling, they diſcharged a number of leaden bullets into the Roman camp, day after day, inſcribed with notices of whatever Archelaus was preparing to do—"to-morrow we ſhall make a ſally"—"on a "part of your lines is the attack to be"—"at ſuch "an hour the convoy ſets out"—and Sylla took his meaſures accordingly. BOOK VIII. Sect. 3.

Deprived in this manner of every reſource, Athens ſoon began to feel the utmoſt ſeverity of want. A buſhel of wheat was ſold for a thouſand drachmas [10], the people feeding not only on the herbs and roots that grew ſpontaneouſly in the citadel, but on ſodden leather and oil-bags, ſome even on human carcaſes, while the tyrant indulged in plenty and riot; and when applied to by the prieſts and chief men of Athens, who conjured him to compaſſionate the public miſery, and treat with the Romans, he commanded his guards to anſwer them with a ſhower of arrows, and drive them from his preſence. Sylla had information of all theſe proceedings; and rightly judging, that now was the favorable moment, determined once more to try whether ſtorming might not ſucceed. A part of the wall having been obſerved to be lower than the reſt, there he directed the attack to be made; and taking the opportunity of the dead hour of the night, he carried his point with little difficulty; the inhabitants, from ſurpriſe, or from their preſent feeble condition, or perhaps from the diſaf- Diſtreſs of Athens: taken by ſtorm.

[10] L. 32. 5. 10.

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fection of many to a ſervice, which terror alone had made them ſubmit to, ſcarcely attempting oppoſition. Theſe conſiderations, the laſt eſpecially, from a more merciful conqueror, might have obtained ſome degree of favor for Athens in this hour of its miſery. But of a temper naturally rigid and vindictive, and by long practice made familiar with deeds of blood Sylla had become a perfect ſtranger to all the tender feelings of humanity. He had beſides been irritated by the obſtinate reſiſtance he had met with; and ſtill more, if we are to believe Plutarch [11], by certain perſonal inſults he had received from Ariſtion, who, during the ſiege, fearleſs of the iſſue, had wantonly inſulted the Roman general as he paſſed under the walls; and Sylla poſſeſſed not that greatneſs of mind which forgives or contemns ſuch indignities.

Vindictive ſpirit of Sylla.

Eager therefore for revenge, he abandoned to his ſoldiers the plunder of the city, with expreſs orders, that all within the walls, whether citizens of ſoldiers, male or female, young or aged, ſhould be indiſcriminately put to the ſword. The ſcene that followed is one of the moſt dreadful that is recorded in the Grecian annals. Goaded on by the fierceneſs of Sylla, and, not leſs ſtrongly perhaps, by their own reſentments and avarice, the ſoldiery ruſhed furiouſly againſt this emaciated, diſpirited, defenceleſs multitude; the darkneſs of the midnight-hour, the ſound of trumpets, the blowing of horns, the clang of arms, the ſhouts of the conquerors, and the ſcreams of deſpair, all contributing to the horrors of this

[11] Ubi. ſup.

inhuman maſſacre. Unchecked by any reſiſtance, ſlaughter had ſoon made its way from quarter to quarter; many of the miſerable inhabitants, worn out with want, offering themſelves to the ſtroke of death; and ſome even before the ſword of the enemy reached them unwilling to outlive the liberties, or the exiſtence of their country, or wiſhing to prevent the violence of the brutal ſoldier, falling by their own hands. The number of the ſlain, according to Plutarch, was ſo great, that it exceeded all computation, and was only to be judged of from the quantity of blood, which is ſaid to have poured in torrents through the gates of the city.

Sated at length with carnage, Sylla yielded to the importunities of thoſe about him, and with ill-feigned mercy, conſented to ſpare what remained of this wretched people. He granted their lives, he ſaid, from the high reſpect he bore to their illuſtrious anceſtors, "forgiving the *many* on account of the *few*, the *living* for the ſake of the *dead*. [22]" His ill-feigned mercy.

Amidſt the confuſion of the night, Ariſtion and his minions had eſcaped into the citadel; but in a few days the want of water obliged them to ſurrender: the tyrant was put to death by the command of Sylla, and together with him according to Appian [23], all who had ſhared in his councils. Fate of Ariſtion.

Soon after the taking of Athens, the Piraeus was evacuated; Archelaus, who ſaw that it was no longer defenſible, now that the higher grounds were in the poſſeſſion of the enemy, drawing off his troops, and The Piraeus taken.

[22] Plut. in Sylla. [23] De bello Mithrid.

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contenting himſelf with blocking up the mouth of the harbour with his fleet. Here therefore human victims were wanting to ſatisfy the exterminating ſpirit of the conqueror; and inſtead of theſe the magnificent ſtructures, and various decorations, with which Athenian pride and genius had during three hundred years been adorning this favorite port, ſupplied freſh objects to his fury. He ſet fire to the place, and then demoliſhed whatever the flames had not deſtroyed. In the ſacking of the upper city, a conſiderable part of it had been levelled with the ground. But here Sylla reduced the whole to one diſmal maſs of ruins, not a ſingle edifice eſcaping from his more than gothic barbarity.

Deſtruction of Athens.

This was the moſt complete deſtruction that Athens had ever experienced ſince the Perſian invaſion! and it was with difficulty, and by ſlow degrees that ſhe ever roſe again to conſideration. When the devaſtations of war had ceaſed, the few Athenian families that ſurvived returned to their ruined city; and both public and private munificence were employed from time to time in repairing her breaches. But ſtill many monuments of Sylla's vengeance remained long; and it was not till the days of the emperor Hadrian, the moſt bountiful of her latter benefactors, that ſhe began to reſume ſomewhat of her former ſplendor.

The deſtruction of Athens was, however, but a part of what Greece had to ſuffer from the hands of Sylla. He had ſcarcely taken poſſeſſion of that city, when Taxiles, who had ſucceeded to the command of the army of Mithridates, on the death of Ariarathes,

the king's ſon[*], and now, by repeated ſupplies, had increaſed his forces to a hundred and twenty thouſand men, marched againſt him from Macedon; and having been joined by Archelaus, advanced into Boeotia. Sylla's numbers, with all the reinforcements he could procure, were two thirds ſhort of thoſe of the enemy. To intrench himſelf within the Athenian ruins, where it had been difficult for the Aſiatics to force him, ſeemed his only reſource. But the country of Attica being now a waſte, and his troops being in danger of periſhing by famine ſhould he attempt to remain in his preſent poſition, he determined to advance into the plain, and boldly truſt the event to Roman courage. A particular account of the action that followed, belongs to another hiſtory. It is ſufficient to ſay, that, the two armies having joined battle at Chaeronea, Sylla obtained a complete victory, with the poſſeſſion of the enemies camp, while a hundred and ten thouſand of their men were left dead upon the field, Mithridates, unappalled by misfortunes, and fruitful in reſources, immediately diſpatched Dorylaus at the head of an army of eighty thouſand men, to oppoſe Sylla. They engaged at Orchomenos in Boeotia; where, notwithſtanding the moſt ſpirited exertion on the part of the Aſiatics, which at one time had nearly proved fatal to the

Sylla defeats the armies of Mithridates;

[*] From the private papers of Mithridates, which Pompey (Plutarch in Pompeio) found in the caſtle of Caenon, it appeared, that the young prince had fallen a victim to *eaſtern jealouſy*; he was taken off by poiſon by his father's orders; whoſe envy and ſuſpicions were probably both awakened by the martial reputation he had acquired in Macedon.

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Romans[15], Sylla proved again victorious. History ſpeaks highly of his valor as well as conduct on both theſe occaſions. It is ſuſpected, however, that another cauſe contributed much to his ſucceſs Archelaus is ſaid to have been drawn into a treaſonable correſpondence with Sylla, and to have ſold his maſter. Of this Mithridates himſelf, in a letter to Arſaces, king of the Parthians[16], appears to have entertained ſtrong ſuſpicions It is certain, that Sylla ever after treated Achelaus with extraordinary regard, preſented him with a large tract of land[17], in the iſland of Euboea, and conferred on him the title of the FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE; favors, which he would never have beſtowed, had they not been purchaſed by important ſervices.

executes vengeance on the Boeotians.

The firſt uſe that Sylla made of his victories, was, to execute vengeance on the Boeotians. This unhappy people, whoſe country had been the ſcene of the late battles, had already ſuffered ſeverely by the common deſolations of war, and the inſolence and rapine of the Aſiatics[18] as well as Romans. Sylla's reſentment

[15] The Romans were retreating in confuſion, when Sylla, frantic at the ſight, leaped off his horſe, ſeized one of the enſigns, and ruſhing in among the fugitives, "here," cried he, "ſhall I die with honor: and you, Romans, when aſked, where "you betrayed your general, remember to tell, it was at "Orchomenos". Shame, and a ſenſe of honor, ſtopped their flight, and turned the fortune of the day. Plut. in Syllâ.

[16] Fragm. Salluſt L. iv. [17] Ten thouſand acres.

[18] A ſhort time before the battle of Chaeronea, the barbarians, though ſeemingly in friendſhip with the Boeotians, had in their excurſions ſacked two Boeotian cities, Panopea and Lebadea, and pillaged the oracular temple, for which the latter was famed. Plut. in Syllâ.

was not ſo eaſily to be appeaſed. Beſide the guilt of the firſt defection, in which they ſhared with the reſt of Greece, they were charged, and probably not without reaſon, with having given aſſiſtance to both the Aſiatic armies. In revenge, he abandoned Boeotia to maſſacre and devaſtation; many of the cities[19] were laid in ruins[20], and the inhabitants condemned to indiſcriminate ſlaughter. To complete the whole, he deprived the Thebans of half their territory, conſecrating it to the Pythian Apollo and the Olympian Jupiter, "to make compenſation," ſaid the pious ravager, to thoſe gods "for the treaſures that he had taken from them."

Latter fortunes of Mithridates;

As to Mithridates, though Greece had no connexion with his ſubſequent fortunes, yet here the following ſhort ſketch of them may not improperly be placed. However humbled by repeated overthrows, he ſtill roſe ſuperior to every diſaſter; continuing, through a long ſeries of wars, of victories, of defeats, of negotiations, and of conventions, the irreconcileable enemy of Rome. Though oppoſed at different periods by three of the greateſt generals of his time, Sylla, Lucullus, and Pompey, yet he was never totally ſubdued. At laſt, when ſeemingly

[19] Three of them, Anthedon, Larymna, and Alaeae, are particularly mentioned.

[20] We have from Plutarch (in Syllâ) the following anecdote, from which we may judge, with what an unfeeling ſeverity theſe wretched cities had been treated. Sylla one day in his walks meeting with ſome fiſhermen, who preſented him with a curious diſh of fiſh, inquired, whence they were; when hearing they were Aleans, "what" ſaid he, "are "any of the Alaeans alive!"

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bereaved of all his hopes, and driven into a remote and inhospitable corner of his dominions, we see him with astonishment forming the bold design of an irruption into Italy, by the very road, which some ages after the northern bands attempted and prosecuted with such fatal success. At the time he conceived this daring plan, he was drawing near his seventieth year; and yet, even thus circumstanced, Rome had probably found him a second Hannibal, had not the revolt of his son Pharnaces disconcerted his councils, and put an end to all his schemes. Of all his sons he held him dearest, considered him as the last support of his royal house, and had appointed him his successor; as from him, amidst the various treasons, which he had experienced from the rest of his children, he had always met with attachment and fidelity. Overwhelmed by this unexpected blow, the hoary monarch, in a fit of despair, at once put a period to his own misfortunes, and to the fears of Rome. How formidable he must have been to the Romans, we may judge from the intemperate joy they indulged upon receiving the tidings of his death, "as "if," says Plutarch, "ten thousand of their enemies "had been slain in Mithridates [21]."

his death.

Rise and progress of the Cilician corsairs;

To the calamities of the Mithridatic war there soon succeeded, what proved nearly as fatal to Greece the depredations of the Cilician corsairs. These lawless rovers had their original settlement among the rocks and fastnesses of the Cilician coast [22],

[21] Plutarch. in Pomp.

[22] See Strab. L. xiv. p. 459. Flor. L. iii. c. 6.

where,

where, enriched by numerous prizes, which the adjacent ſeas and iſlands afforded them, and taking advantage of the conteſts or the weakneſs of the Aſiatic princes around, in whoſe ſervice they were occaſionally employed, they acquired a degree of ſtrength, which rendered them at length the terror of all the neighbouring ſtates. In this ſituation Mithridates found them, when that enterpriſing prince was meditating the empire of Aſia. He ſaw at once the important advantage to be derived from the intrepidity and naval experience of theſe ravagers, and diſdained not to inrol them among his confederates. Emboldened by this alliance, they now adventured on expeditions more diſtant and hazardous, and had ſoon extended their excurſions from the pillars of Hercules to the ſhores of Egypt; whilſt the Romans, embarraſſed on every ſide by inteſtine commotions, and the precarious condition of many of their moſt valuable provinces, marked the gathering ſtorm, without being able to guard againſt it.

their power and ſucceſs;

Elated and aſſiſted by incidents ſo alluring and favorable, theſe ſons of rapine roſe to a degree of power, that ſeemed to promiſe nothing leſs than the ſovereignty of the Mediterranean. Not contented with attacking ſhips, they aſſailed towns and iſlands. They had in various parts their arſenals, their ports, their watch towers, all ſtrongly fortified. The number of their gallies amounted to a thouſand, which were moſt completely equipped; and the cities, of which they were in poſſeſſion, were not fewer than four hundred. Nor was there one place almoſt of note throughout the whole Mediterranean ſea, that

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had not paid them contributions, or ſuffered from their depredations. Even the legions of Italy could not ſecure her from theſe piratical invaders. They inſulted her coaſts; they even ventured upon inland incurſions plundering villas, and carrying off both plunder and people; ſo that within a certain diſtance of the ſea-ſide there was no longer any travelling with ſafety.

To theſe predatory invaſions Greece, by her ſituation, was neceſſarily much expoſed. The multitude of iſlands which ſurrounded her, and the great extent of coaſt open to the Aegean, the Cretan, and the Ionian ſeas, abounding with creeks and harbours, and preſenting to the view flouriſhing cities, rich paſturages, and various ſcenes of rural wealth, which overſpread this beautiful country, were objects too inviting to be paſſed over without a viſit from theſe rapacious ſpoilers. Accordingly, few countries appear to have ſuffered more. They plundered her ſhips; they pillaged her towns; they laid waſte her territory. And on the Peloponneſian coaſt with ſuch ſucceſs were their depredations carried on, that the promontory of Malea, the ſouth-eaſt point of this part of Greece, received from them the name of the *golden promontory* [21]. They did not ſpare even the temples of the gods. Plutarch reckons ſeven of the moſt revered temples of Greece, which, until that period, the rapacious hand of the invader had never dared to violate. But theſe now were laid in ruins; amongſt which number we find the famous temple

they ravage Greece;

[21] Florus, ubi ſup.

of Juno at Argos, and that of Aeſculapius at Epidaurus. BOOK VIII.

During a period of near forty years, theſe enemies of mankind had thus continued their outrages, when the Romans, now in ſome meaſure relieved from their late embarraſſments, reſolved to employ every effort for their extirpation. The arms of Pompey, to whom the conduct of the war was committed, were completely ſucceſsful. He deſtroyed their fleets, purſued them to their moſt ſecret haunts, and diſpoſſeſſed them of all their fortreſſes. Having at laſt reduced them to unconditional ſubmiſſion, he diſperſed them in different countries, appointing them inland ſettlements, that, having no proſpect of the ſea, they might not again be tempted to renew their naval depredations. As to Greece, from a remarkable circumſtance, recorded by Plutarch on this occaſion, we may judge what at this period was her deplorable ſtate of depopulation, in conſequence of theſe calamities It was found expedient, in order to re-people the country, to tranſplant a conſiderable body of theſe pirates into Peloponneſus. Pompey aſſigned them the territory of the Dymeans, lately one of the principal tribes of the Achaean confederacy; this whole diſtrict, as large, and formerly as fruitful as any in Achaia, being now, to uſe Plutarch's words, *widowed of inhabitants* [24]. Sect. 3. are extirpated by Pompey. Deplorable ſtate of Greece.

The guilty ſcenes, that ſoon after followed, are well known; when ambition finiſhed what corrup- The Romans loſe their liberties.

[24] Χηρεύουσαν ἀνδρῶν. In Pompeio.

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tion had begun; and when the ruin of the Roman liberties, which rapacity, venality, and diſſoluteneſs had been preparing, was completely effected by the bold and ardent ſpirit of Caeſar, the diſſipation of Antony, and the calm time-watching hypocriſy of Octavius. The ſword of civil diſcord had not long been unſheathed, when Italy poured the whole war into this unfortunate land; and by the contending factions of Rome were the plains of Pharſalia drenched in blood. Upon Caeſar's death, the conteſt was renewed; and Greece became again the field, in which the prize of empire was to be diſputed. The jealouſies of Octavius and Antony produced a third war; and ſtill was Greece, as before, the ſcene of action; on the coaſt of Epire being fought the battle that gave to Octavius the world.

The civil wars of the Romans fatal to Greece.

Without the aid of hiſtory, the mind may eaſily conceive what muſt have been the deſolations [25] of a country, the theatre of all theſe hoſtile operations,

[25] When Antony was preparing to fight Octavius, Plutarch (in Antonio) informs us, the reapers and aſs-drivers, even the very boys, throughout Greece, were forced away to man Antony's fleet. Plutarch's great grandfather, Nicarchus, was at this time at Chaeronea, his place of reſidence; and he uſed to relate, that the inhabitants of this part of the country, not having horſes, were compelled to carry the corn on their own backs to the ſea-coaſt, as far as Anticyra on the Corinthian gulph, and were driven by the ſoldiers with ſtripes, like beaſts of burden. And after the battle of Actium, in ſuch extreme indigence were the cities of Greece, having been plundered of all they had, that Caeſar, though highly diſpleaſed with

compelled to take an active part in civil broils, and thinned of its people by wars not its own; whilſt a multitude of foreign bands, many of them fierce barbarians, from Gaul, from Thrace, from Africa, from the foreſts of Germany, and from the wilds of Caucaſus, invited thither by the hopes of ſpoil, completed the diſtreſs. Yet even theſe calamities, inſeparable perhaps from convulſions ſuch as theſe, and which, it might be expected, would have terminated with the ceſſation of hoſtilities, Greece found to her ſorrow only the commencement of her ſufferings. The war being ended, whoever had not been the victor's friends, were now conſidered as his foes; vengeance and rapaciouſneſs, eaſily found out pretences againſt all, from whom plunder might be expected; and the pillage of cities, and the confiſcation of territories, were as the right and the reward of the conqueror. Caeſar himſelf, the moſt clement tyrant that ever roſe to power by the ſword, was not altogether innocent of theſe vindictive executions. The Athenians had declared againſt him; and their whole country, now beginning to recover from Sylla's deſolations, he again reduced to a ruinous waſte. The people of Sicyon, who together with the reſt of Peloponneſus, had been active in the intereſts of Pompey, he deſpoiled of the Corinthian territory, which had formerly been aſſigned to them; and, probably to humble this part of Greece, he raiſed

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them for their attachment to Antony, was induced by their diſtreſs, to order the corn, which had been provided for the uſe of the war, to be diſtributed among them.

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Corinth from its ruins, colonizing it with a body of his veterans, and a number of enfranchiſed ſlaves from Italy [29].

State of Greece under Auguſtus.

When, upon the fall of Antony, Octavius or rather Auguſtus, for ſo had flattery now named him, ſaw himſelf in the uncontrolled poſſeſſion of ſovereign power, the ſuppreſſion of the ſpirit of liberty, wherever in the courſe of the late conteſts any exertion of it had appeared, became his principal object. Greece was not forgotten. Several of her ſtates had not only inliſted under Pompey's banners, but had afterwards eſpouſed the cauſe of the conſpirators, and latterly that of Antony. The Athenians had even celebrated the death of Caeſar as the aera of the re-eſtabliſhment of freedom, and had placed the ſtatues of Brutus and Caſſius next to thoſe of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton. Auguſtus made it his ſtudy to humble theſe *inſolent* republicans. He abridged the few privileges that remained to the Athenians, and deprived them of Aegina. The Meſſenians he reduced to a ſtate of vaſſalage; and he plundered the Arcadians of their very ſtatues and the monuments of their antiquity. He obſerved a ſimilar policy towards every other Grecian ſtate. And though the Lacedaemonians had declared in his favor, he thought it expedient, in order to reduce their power, to diſmember from them twenty-four cities of Laconia, declaring them to be thenceforward independent, and diſtinguiſhing

[29] See Plutarch. in Caeſare. Pauſan. in Corinth. Strabo Caſaub. L. ix. p. 263.

them by the name of *Eleutherolacons*, or free Laconians [27].

From the days of Auguſtus the iron ſceptre of deſpotiſm has been extended over this unhappy land.

under the ſucceeding emperors.

Under the firſt Roman emperors, indeed, Greece is ſaid to have ſcarcely felt the ſeverity of her lot; and her own writers who lived in theſe times, Strabo [28] and Pauſanias [29], ſpeak largely of the proſperity ſhe derived from the Roman government. It is not difficult to account for this partiality. The latter days of Grecian liberty had been times of confuſion and inteſtine miſery. From the commencement of the war of the Triumvirs, Greece had been one continued ſcene of devaſtation and bloodſhed. In the eſtabliſhment therefore of the imperial power, which extinguiſhed all theſe conteſts, this unhappy country found relief; and without regret gave up a freedom, long ſince little more than nominal, in exchange for domeſtic peace and protection from foreign invaſion. It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that the crimes of the earlier Roman tyrants were generally confined to Italy, where the objects of their deſires or of their jealouſy were

[27] See Pauſan. in Corinthiac. Laconic. & Meſſeniacis.

[28] Μέχρι νῦν (ſays Strabo, L. ix. p. 274, ſpeaking of Athens) ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐστι καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. Strabo tells us he lived under Auguſtus and Tiberius, *during whoſe reigns*, ſays he, *Rome and her ſubject provinces enjoyed a proſperity ſuch as they had hitherto never known.* See Strab. L. vi. in fin. May not the teſtimony of ſuch a witneſs be queſtioned?

[29] See Pauſan. in Atticis, Eliacis, Achaicis.

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moſtly found; and the provinces, whether from their ſuppoſed inſignificancy, or from the policy of their Roman maſters, were often permitted to enjoy a ſecurity, which was denied to the firſt families of Rome. "I will have my ſheep ſhorn, not flayed," ſaid the unfeeling but ſubtile Tiberius to a certain governor of Egypt, who, with the view of recommending himſelf to his favor, had labored to augment the imperial revenues by mercileſs exactions [*]. He would *enjoy;* but, attentive to his own intereſt, he was unwilling to *exhauſt.* The legionary armies, beſides, afterwards the formidable controllers of the Roman world, ſeemed as yet unconſcious of their own ſtrength, and diſdained not to receive orders, which they were ſoon to impoſe. In addition to theſe conſiderations, there is much reaſon to ſuſpect, that this very repreſentation of the proſperity of Greece under the Roman Government was in a great meaſure the language of ſervitude, in order to court the favor of theſe lords of nations; and that Greece was far from poſſeſſing [**] that ſhare of happineſs, which ſome

Teſtimony of the Greek writers not to be relied on.

[*] Dion. Caſſius. Hanov. 1606. LVII. 608.

[**] It is not to be ſuppoſed, that a detail (which there were ſo many powerful reaſons for ſuppreſſing) ſhould have reached us, of all the ſufferings of Greece under the imperial deſpots of Rome; but among Pliny's letters, there is one (viii. 24.) to his friend Maximus, upon his being appointed to the government of Achaia, ſtill extant, where, from many expreſſions, and the earneſt charge he gives him, "to remember the reſpect due to this once-"illuſtrious people, whom," ſays he, "to deſpoil of that "little ſhadow and name of liberty, now left to them,

of her writers would perſuade us ſhe enjoyed. What ſtrengthens the ſuſpicion is the ſervile adulation, which Greece appears to have paid even to a Nero. Never did a more flagitious tyrant diſgrace the imperial purple. And yet has Greece inrolled him among her deliverers. Vain of his muſical and dramatic excellence, he had paſſed over thither, to exhibit himſelf on the Greek ſtage, and to diſpute the wreath of victory with the Grecian performers, who had the reputation of being the moſt excellent then exiſting. His ſucceſs in the courſe of this whimſical expedition equalled his utmoſt vanity. Wherever he appeared, and in whatſoever character, (and he attempted every character, high or low, male or female) the judges with one voice, as may well be ſuppoſed, when the lord of legions was the performer, proclaimed him victor. At the celebration of the Iſthmian games, which ſoon after followed, he expreſſed his gratitude by publicly declaring Greece free and independent. This was a grant of little value to a people, who had neither the virtue to enjoy nor the power to preſerve it, and it tended only to renew among them the fatal conteſts of their popular aſſemblies. It was a grant alſo, which Nero himſelf violated with the ſame levity with which it was beſtowed: having, at

Greece reſtored to freedom by Nero.

" it were hard, it were cruel, it were barbarous!" one is apt to conclude, that they had not been always treated with a gentle hand. Pliny's repreſentations to his friend ſeem to form a kind of contraſt between what Greece had experienced from former governors, and what Pliny required of Maximus.

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the very time he announced freedom to them, ſeized every relic of Grecian ſplendor which could be found; and having plundered the very temples of all the valuable ſtatues which had hitherto eſcaped the hand of the ſpoiler [83]. For this piece of mockery Pauſanias [84] neverthelefs is laviſh in Nero's praiſe, as if *the reſtoration of Grecian liberty* had been really his intention; and he conſiders it as a mark of "innate greatneſs of mind" in that emperor, "to "have been, with all his crimes, capable of ſo "generous a purpoſe." Certainly little of the ſpirit of ancient Greece was remaining when the pen of her hiſtorian could thus attempt to dignify the capricious follies of a madman.

This reſtoration an event of little importance.

Greece is again reduced into ſervitude by Veſpaſian.

This pretended reſtoration of freedom ended, as it was eaſy to foreſee it would. With the revival of the municipal rights of the Grecian tribes their contentions revived alſo; ſuch at leaſt is the Roman account In order therefore to re-eſtabliſh tranquillity in Greece, Veſpaſian declared it neceſſary to reduce it again to ſervitude [85].

Characters of the ſucceeding emperors, and in what manner Greece was affected by them.

In reviewing the liſt of the ſucceeding emperors, it is painful to reflect, how few of their names [86] deſerve to be recorded with honor, in compariſon of thoſe who in cruelty, and in diſſoluteneſs, were the ſcourges, and, ſtill more, the reproach of

[83] Pauſan. in Boeotia. Dion Chryſoſtom. Orat. XXXI.

[84] In Achaicis.

[85] Pauſan. ibid. Suetonius in T. Veſpaſiano.

[86] The two illuſtrious Antonines, a Trajan, a Titus, a Nerva, perhaps are all that can be mentioned with approbation.

human kind. To add to the ſeverity of the oppreſſion, theſe tyrants ſeldom roſe to the ſeat of dominion by peaceable ſucceſſion, but generally made their way to it by military force; ſo that the defeat of the unſucceſsful candidate, and the ſubſequent depoſition of the ſucceſsful one, proved fatal to all who, however innocent of their crimes, were even ſuſpected of having had any connexion with their fortunes. When Geta fell by the hand of Caracalla, "it was computed, that under the "vague appellation of the friends of Geta, above "twenty thouſand perſons of both ſexes ſuffered "death. His guards and freedmen, the miniſters "of his ſerious buſineſs, and the companions of "his looſer hours, thoſe, who by his intereſt had "been promoted to any command in the army, "or in the provinces, with the long-connected "train of their dependents, were included in the "proſcription, which endeavoured to reach every "one who had maintained the ſmalleſt correſpon-"dence with Geta, who lamented his death, or "who even mentioned his name [11]." Marked in

[11] See Gibbon's Decline of the Roman Empire, Ch. vi. With particular pleaſure I take the opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the elegant work, from which the above quotation is borrowed. I have had frequent recourſe to it in this part of my hiſtory. If I have attempted to place ſome matters in a different light from that in which this ingenious writer ſeems to have conſidered them, I ſhall hope, from the liberality of ſentiment which his writings aſſure me he poſſeſſes, that he will not diſapprove of a freedom of inquiry, always ſerviceable to the cauſe of truth.

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like manner with blood and devaſtation was every revolution, that placed a new family on the imperial throne; the removal of even the moſt guilty tyrant becoming a public calamity, from the ſanguinary and extenſive miſchiefs of which it was productive. Not only party-rage armed the military ruffian; private animoſity alſo availed itſelf of the opportunity, and under the ſemblance of loyal zeal executed its ſelfiſh and vindictive purpoſes. What vengeance did not perpetrate, avarice executed; the plundering of every wealthy individual being frequently the only reſource that remained to the tyrant of the day to ſatisfy the demands of the clamorous ſoldiery, whoſe ſedition had raiſed him to the purple. Not leſs than thirteen of theſe revolutions within the ſpace of ſeventy years, from the death of Commodus to the acceſſion of Decius, have diſgraced the Roman annals, and now excite a mixed ſenſation of pity and deteſtation in the human breaſt.

Amidſt that variety of miſery, which Greece, in common with the other Roman provinces, had to ſuffer from this fierce line of tyrants, ſhe had hitherto however been ſafe from the inroads of thoſe barbarian tribes, which for a conſiderable time had inſulted the Roman frontier; and at a diſtance from the ſcene of hoſtilities ſhe paid little attention to dangers, which ſhe fondly thought were never to reach her. The reigns of Decius, of the unhappy Valentinian and his ſon Gallienus, ſhowed her the vanity of her ſecurity. The Goths, a new race of adventurers, hitherto almoſt unknown

The Goths invade Greece.

to the Romans even by name, had iſſued from the northern extremities of Germany, and after various fortunes had proceeded to the Danube; the ſeveral tribes of barbarians that lay on their way, having either fled before them, or, by joining the invaders, added ſtrength to the increaſing hive. Againſt this irruption of ravagers, the feeble efforts of an exhauſted empire could avail little. Decius, a prince worthy of happier times, attempted to oppoſe their progreſs; but, together with his ſon, his aſſociate in the empire, he unfortunately periſhed in the attempt; and but few years had elapſed ſince their firſt appearance, when almoſt every province, from the banks of the upper Danube to the ſhores of the Euxine ſea; and along the Aſiatic coaſts, from the mouth of the Phaſis to the opening of the Helleſpont, had felt their violence, or been forced meanly to purchaſe with gold a temporary and precarious forbearance. They now entered the Archipelago, and plundered moſt of the iſlands, They advanced into Attica; and getting poſſeſſion of the once-famed Piraean port, they ſpread themſelves over the whole country. Greece, after all her ſufferings, ſtill poſſeſſed many valuable remains; and could yet diſplay various monuments of the magnificence and arts of ancient times. From a civilized conqueror, theſe noble memorials of human genius would have challenged ſome degree of reſpect; but they now ſerved only to provoke the indignation and ſcorn of barbarians accuſtomed to live in the open field, to whom the dwelling in houſes was impriſonment, and the knowledge

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of letters the badge of ſervitude. Hence the whole of this devoted country, from the eaſtern point of Sunium to the fartheſt verge of Epire, preſented one continued ſcene of deſolation. Finding it neceſſary at length to retire from the deſert, they prepared to paſs over into Italy, where the daſtardly Gallienus completed the diſgraces of the Roman name. The defence of the empire reſted on him; and he had actually aſſembled a powerful force, under pretence of covering the Italian coaſts from the inſults of theſe plunderers. But ſubdued by his fears, he declined oppoſing them in battle, and ſubmitted to accept of peace on terms at once pregnant with ignominy and with danger, "the receiving of a conſiderable body of "them among his troops," and "the inveſting one "of their chieftains with conſular honors." The remainder of theſe bold invaders filed off to the northward laden with the ſpoils of Aſia and of Europe; returning home unoppoſed, to diſplay to their countrymen what ſplendid rewards awaited the daring adventurer.

Greece enjoys a temporary relief.

Under the ſucceeding emperors, from the warlike Claudius to the bloody Diocleſian, Greece, though her coaſts were ſtill expoſed to the tumultuary deſcents of barbarian rovers, began to enjoy better days, and had little more to complain of than her ſhare in the general humiliation, the common fate of every people in ſubjection to the yoke of Rome.

The acceſſion of Conſtantine

The acceſſion of the great Conſtantine ſeemed to promiſe to the Grecian annals a new aera of

glory. Sole maſter of the Roman world by the removal of his imperial rivals, he ſaw himſelf relieved from the conſequences of that jealouſy ever incident to a divided empire, and which had often drenched the Roman provinces in blood. Of the barbarians, many of the moſt formidable had either felt and dreaded his ſtrength in war; or, having acquired an eſtabliſhment in the countries, which the fears of Rome had formerly aſſigned to them, had formed an acquaintance with the arts of peace, and aſſiſted in cultivating the lands they once had ravaged. The emperor himſelf, intelligent, enterpriſing, reſolute, and vigorous, appeared to have both the deſire and the ability to advance the proſperity of his people. The confines of Greece, alſo, he had made choice of for his place of reſidence, and the ſhores of the Thracian Boſphorus, where the Grecian colony of the Byzantines had been ſeated, were now to give a new capital to the world. Amidſt theſe intereſting events, a revolution ſtill more important took place; the gloomy ſhades of paganiſm fled before the light of the Goſpel, and inſtead of the abſurd and frequently impure fictions which had hitherto diſgraced the religion of Greece, there ſucceeded the beneficent and exalting doctrines of Chriſtianity.

why favorable to Greece.

Eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity.

The diſciples of Chriſt, from their earlieſt appearance, had to encounter the moſt obſtinate contradiction, firſt from the Jewiſh zealots, and afterwards from the pagan votaries; and ten [11] perſe-

why hitherto impeded.

[11] Sulpic. Severus (L. ii. c. 48.) ſays nine only.

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cutions had tried and atteſted the ſincerity and undaunted firmneſs of the profeſſors of the Goſpel. Their virtues, their fervent piety, their reſolute ſpirit ſuperior to reproach, to tortures, to death, had often made a deep impreſſion on their enemies; and even of thoſe, who had been the moſt inveterate perſecutors of the Chriſtian faith, many had become its moſt zealous preachers. Some of the emperors themſelves are ſaid to have beheld with admiration theſe uncommon exertions of the human mind; and to have entertained a ſtrong ſuſpicion, if nothing more, "that a faith ſo active, ſo generous, ſo much ſuperior to every worldly concern, muſt have had a divine origin." Still however the ancient ſuperſtition, ſupported by the deep-rooted bigotry of the multitude, by the illuſive pageantry of pompous rites, by the captivating decorations of painting and ſculpture, with which the temples of Greece eſpecially abounded, where the beings of fiction ſeemed to ſtart into life, and fable aſſumed a kind of reality. But, above all, by the intrigues of an intereſted, ſubtile, and numerous prieſthood, paganiſm ſtill kept its ground; and its moſt ſtrenuous advocates bore witneſs in behalf of Chriſtianity, by their alarms at every appearance of its ſucceſs, and the earneſt endeavours they employed for its ſuppreſſion.

Conſtantine's converſion.

Such, during near three hundred years, had been the ſtate of the Chriſtian church, when the great Conſtantine, in obedience to a heavenly viſion, according to ſome writers, or, according to others, inſtructed by his mother Helena, who, in

in full perſuaſion of the truth of Chriſtianity, had taught him from his early years to hold the goſpel in reverence, avowed himſelf the diſciple of Chriſt, renounced the worſhip of the gods of paganiſm, and invited the various nations, who lived beneath his imperial ſway, to embrace with him *a religion*, whoſe DIVINE OBJECT, whoſe PRECEPTS, and whoſe PROMISES, preſented to the mind whatever can alleviate, purify, and enliven, the hope of man; whatever can either adorn and bleſs private life, or give increaſe and ſecurity to public happineſs.

Greece diſappointed of the advantages expected from it, and the cauſes of this.

Every circumſtance here ſeemed to announce to Greece a proſperity which, in the times that follow we look for in vain. It may be of uſe to trace the cauſes, to which the diſappointment is principally to be aſcribed.

I. The crowd of pagan worſhippers, firmly attached, from the ſtrong dominion of ignorance, domeſtic example, and habit, to the altars of their country, ſaw with a kind of religious horror the triumphs of Chriſtianity; and employed every device [11], that prieſtly craft or popular ſuperſtition could ſuggeſt, to obſtruct its eſtabliſhment. Paganiſm had always abounded with prodigies. Theſe were now the arms employed in defence of her cauſe. Spectres were ſeen; the order of nature was inverted by monſtrous births; the hallowed grove reſounded with nocturnal voices; all omens of tremendous import, menacing the empire with the

Oppoſition to Chriſtianity.

[11] See Monteſquieu Grand. & Décad. des Romains, c. 19. See alſo Libanius & Ammian. Marcellin. paſſim.

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vengeance of its deſerted gods. At the ſame time, every public diſaſter became a convenient inſtrument, to impreſs new terror on the credulous multitude. Was any part of the Roman dominions deſolated by earthquakes, laid waſte by tempeſts, or afflicted with contagious diſeaſe? it was the indignation of Aeſculapius, the vindictive arm of Apollo, the wrath of Neptune, the anger of the capitoline Jove, that had ſent forth the judgment. Or did the barbarians ſpread again the waſte of war, and had diſcomfiture diſgraced the imperial banners? it was the goddeſs of victory who abandoned a people, by whoſe daring hands her ſtatue, once the pride of Rome, had been overthrown. Or did intemperate ſeaſons blaſt the hopes of the huſbandman? the goddeſs of harveſts was the cauſe, who, defrauded of her due honors, had reſented the impious violation.

By the ſophiſts,

With the ſame active zeal, and with ſtill greater art, the Grecian ſophiſts joined in the oppoſition. Theſe ſophiſts, the boaſted ſucceſſors of the Grecian ſages of antiquity, aſhamed of the legendary tales of paganiſm, and not honeſt enough to confeſs with the excellent Socrates, the weakneſs of human reaſon, had adopted the ſubtile but illiberal plan of diſguiſing what they could not ſupport. With them the whole pagan theogony became the myſterious repoſitory of wiſdom. Beneath the rough covering of the moſt uncouth fable ſome valuable truths, they pretended, lay concealed; and the ſeveral pagan divinities were, according to their interpretation, to be conſidered as ſubordinate

miniſters of the Sovereign of the univerſe, or as allegorical perſonages, emblems of his operations or his attributes.

ſpeciously carried on;

The attempt was ſpecious. Ancient wiſdom had frequently been employed in reducing many of the fables of heathen ſtory to the allegorical rank, which ſeems primarly to have belonged to them; and in withdrawing the reverence of the pagan world from thoſe beings of fiction, whom the ſimplicity of the timorous and ſuperſtitious villager, or the artifice of ſome deſigning impoſtor, had erected into gods.

their duplicity,

Far different were the views of the ſophiſts. By clearing away the various abſurdities, which enveloped and obſcured the pagan ſyſtem, their purpoſe was to give it a more plauſible appearance, and a permanent eſtabliſhment. For, whilſt they paid their offerings at the ſhrine of every fabulous god, and required of their diſciples a ſtrict compliance with every idolatrous and abſurd rite of the pagan worſhip, it was their artful boaſt, that to the SUPREME ORIGIN OF ALL GOOD their piety was aſcending gradually, and in HIM was ultimately to terminate.

and ſucceſs.

In ſupport of this laſt refuge of paganiſm (to which probably it had been driven by the bold attacks of the Chriſtian converts) all the various aids that Grecian literature could furniſh, and the keeneſt weapons that ſophiſtry had to wield, were inceſſantly employed [1]; with what ſucceſs, the

[1] See Julian. Epiſt. ad Athen. & Epiſt. paſſim. Ammian. Marc. L. xxi. c. 1, &c. Liban. Or. Eutrop. in Maxim.

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length of time during which the ſchools of the ſophiſts continued to flouriſh, bears ample teſtimony. Sixty years elapſed from the iſſuing of Conſtantine's edict in favor of Chriſtianity, before theſe ſons of fallacy had ſunk into the neglect and obſcurity, which they had long deſerved.

The Grecian converts too fond of abſtruſe diſputation.

II. Theſe however were not the enemies, from whom the churches of Greece had moſt to fear. In theſe days of Grecian degeneracy, verſatility of genius, an acute and ready wit, a reſtleſs inquiſitiveneſs, a fondneſs for argument and cavil, formed the principal lines of the Grecian character. This was more conſpicuouſly the characteriſtic of the Athenians. As long as their democracy had ſubſiſted, political conteſts, and the buſtle of popular aſſemblies had been their favorite occupation; after its diſſolution the captious diſputations of the ſophiſts, to whoſe direction the ſeveral ſchools of philoſophy in Athens were now intruſted, became their choſen amuſement. Many of the Greeks therefore, who embraced the Goſpel, brought with them into the Chriſtian church the practice of diſputation, with a ſtrong habitual fondneſs for curious diſquiſition and ſubtile argument. Not ſatisfied to abide within the boundaries, which the Almighty ſeems to have preſcribed to man here below, their bold fancy attempted to explore the regions of the inviſible world; and to pry into, to unfold, and to judge, the ſecret counſels of Infinite Wiſdom. Points the moſt abſtruſe, and probably not meant for human diſcuſſion, were brought into debate. The pride of ſcience begot

contention, obſtinacy, and mutual hatred. The haughty diſputant levelled his anathemas at thoſe who preſumed to queſtion his deciſions; and his opponents, not leſs abſurd, by way of vindication, retorted on him the condemnation he had dared to pronounce. Doctrine was ſet up againſt doctrine; tribunal againſt tribunal; and at the very time it was uncertain, and perhaps even of no importance, which of the two parties was in poſſeſſion of the truth, the cauſe of the higheſt importance to the happineſs of mankind, the cauſe of real religion, of brotherly affection and mercy, was deeply injured by both [**].

III. Love of fame, the imperious pride of the deciſive dogmatiſt, and impatience at being vanquiſhed in the field of argument, had almoſt in the earlieſt periods diſturbed the peace of the Grecian church: conſiderations ſtill more ſordid ſoon contributed to provoke new conteſts, and to ſpread the flame of animoſity. Conſtantine choſe to ſignalize his zeal for the Chriſtian eſtabliſhment by the favor he ſhowed to its miniſters. The ample revenues and ſumptuous offerings, with which the miſtaken piety of the early ages had enriched the temples of paganiſm, and the magnificent and oſtentatious diſplay employed in the celebration of its feſtive ſolemnities, were known to have contributed principally to the veneration of its votaries. Conſtantine

The emperor's munificence to the church;

[**] See Euſ. de vitâ Conſtant. L. iii. c. 4, 5. Supl. Sev. L. iii. c. 50. & ſqq. See alſo Fleury Hiſt. Eccl. L. x. xi. xii. &c.

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would have thought he had been wanting in what he owed to the true God, had he aſſigned a leſs reſpectable ſituation to thoſe who were more immediately engaged in his ſervice. Emoluments and honors were therefore liberally, perhaps profuſely, beſtowed [41]. The noble and weal hy emulated the example [42]; till, by a natural progreſſion, to add to the ſacred patrimony was accounted the ſureſt pledge the diſciple of the church could give of his piety, or of his repentance.

attended with dangerous conſequences.

The days of tribulation had been days of glory to the Chriſtian church [43]; ſhe was diſhonored by ſplendor and opulence. The experience of many genera ions has ſufficiently informed us, that the human heart, even within the ſanctuary of religion, is not exempted from frailty; it found here numberleſs temptations to avarice, to ambition, to inſolence, and but too often confeſſed their fatal influence With many, the ſtation more than the duties of the churchman became the object of purſuit. Religious debates multiplied, and were maintained with additional acrimony, when an epiſcopal throne, and princely treaſures were to be the rewards of victory. And within leſs than forty years after the death of Conſtantine, the prudence of a Chriſtian emperor, Valentinian [44], was exerted to conſult

[41] Euſeb. de vit. Conſtant. L. iii. c. 15. & L. iv. c. 1.

[42] For an account of the liberalities of Helena, the emperor's mother, ſee Euſeb L. iii. c. 44, 45.

[43] See Sulp. Sev. L ii. c. 47.

[44] By an edict of hi (Cod. Theod. L. xvi. tit. 2. leg. 20) addreſſed to Damaſus biſhop of Rome in 370, and publiſhed

the real intereſts of religion, by preſcribing limits to the property of the church. BOOK VIII.

IV. The unbounded munificence of the firſt Chriſtian emperors had brought reproach on the church; and the exceſs of their zeal in behalf of the purity of her doctrine proved nearly as dangerous Conſtantine himſelf had led the way Too fond of taking an active ſhare in religious controverſy, he frequently encouraged and foſtered thoſe contentions, which he ought to have repreſſed or terminated [46]. Inſtead of extending a parental, and perhaps conciliatory tenderneſs to all thoſe of his ſubjects whoſe opinions were their only crimes, he ſet up party againſt party, and by lending the ſanction of his imperial name to whatever tenets he happened to honor with his approbation, often gave ſtrength and continuance to paſſions and enmities, which it was in his power at leaſt to have ſoothed, and perhaps to have extinguiſhed. Conſtantine went too far; his ſucceſſors proceeded farther; and the diſciple of the goſpel has it to lament [47], that under Conſtantius [48], Valens, Sect. 3. His zeal in behalf of her doctrines; improperly exerted.

in the ſeveral churches on the 3d of the kalends of Auguſt, the director was no longer permitted to receive from his ſpiritual daughter any gift, legacy, or inheritance: every teſtament contrary to this edict was to be null and void. See Fleury Hiſt. Eccl. L. xvi. Mr. Gibbon (ch. xxv.) thinks, that by a ſubſequent regulation, all eccleſiaſtical perſons were rendered incapable of receiving teſtamentary gifts.

[46] See Euſeb. de vit. Conſtant. L. iii. c. 64 & 65.

[47] See Sulp. Sev. L. ii. c. 64, 65. See alſo Fleury, L. xiii. xiv. xv. & ſqq.

[48] The words of l'Abbé Fleury are worthy of notice. Il

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Gratian, Theodoſius, Juſtinian, &c. &c. the church, emboldened by the imperial protection, frequently exerted againſt the unhappy recuſant the ſame mercileſs violence, which ſhe herſelf had ſo juſtly complained of, when the ſcourge of power was exerciſed by pagan authority.

The vicinity of Conſtantinople not favorable to Greece.

V. Even the neighbourhood of Conſtantine's imperial city, whoſe riſing glories Greece beheld with conſcious pride, and fond expectation, afforded little increaſe to the Grecian happineſs. The opulence and pomp of Rome had been removed thither; but ſo had her vices. And all that Greece appears to have derived from the ſplendid vicinity of Conſtantinople was nothing more than what provinces bordering on a great city have generally to boaſt of, the fatal pre-eminence [46] of being exhauſted to ſupport her magnificence, and of being corrupted by her example.

Conſtantine dies;

diſpoſal of his dominions.

The act, that cloſed the life of Conſtantine was as injurious to the public proſperity as any that hiſtory has charged him with. His dominions he divided [47] among his three ſons, Conſtantine, Conſtantius, and Conſtans, and his two nephews,

troubla, ſays he, ſpeaking of Conſtantius, la Religion Chrétienne, ſimple d'elle même, par une ſuperſtition de vieille; & s'appliquant plus à l'examiner curieuſement qu'à la régler ſérieuſement, il excita pluſieurs diviſions, qu'il fomenta enſuite par des diſputes de mots. Hiſt. Eccléſ. L. xiv. p. 575.

[46] See Gibbon's Decline of the Roman Empire, Ch. xvii.

[47] See Gibbon, Ch. xviii.

Sect. 3. and the evils that followed;

Dalmatius and Hannibalianus [50]; bequeathing to the Roman world the melancholy legacy of inteſtine wars and defolated provinces. Scarcely was the celebration of his obſequies ended, when Dalmatius and Hannibalianus periſhed in a military inſurrection, excited by the creatures, and probably by the arts [51], of Conſtantius. The crime of theſe two young princes evidently was, that a part of the imperial dominions had been aſſigned to them; beſide this, Dalmatius ſtood alſo charged with having inherited a large ſhare of the late emperor's abilities. Such guilt was not to be expiated but with their blood. Seven other princes of the imperial houſe, uncles or couſins to the ſuſpicious Conſtantius, ſhared their unhappy fate, together with all their friends, officers, and dependents; ſome of whom had been high in the favor and confidence of Conſtantine himſelf. Two princes more, Gallus and Julian, couſins likewiſe to Conſtantius, would have ſuffered in the maſſacre, had not the policy of the tyrant ſaved them. Julian, a child only ſix years old, was too inconſiderable to be the object

[50] Conſtantine had Spain, Gaul, and the Britiſh iſles; Conſtantius Aſia, with Egypt, and all the eaſtern provinces; Conſtans Italy, Africa, Sicily, and Illyricum; Dalmatius Thrace, and all Greece; Hannibalianus Cappadocia, Armenia, and Pontus. Aurel. Victor. 7 Epiſt. Eutropius (L. x. c. 9.) makes no mention of Hannibalianus. Socrates alſo (L. ii. c. 25.) mentions only Dalmatius.

[51] *Conſtantio*, ſays Eutropius (ub. ſupra) ſpeaking of the death of Dalmatius, *ſinente potius quàm jubente.* Socrates (loc praedicto) ſpeaks ſtill plainer, Οὐ κελεύσας Κωνσταντίου τὴν φάγην, ἀλλὰ μὴ κωλύσαντος.

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of his kinſman's jealouſy: Gallus was aged twelve, but his infirm ſtate of health afforded to Conſtantius the pleaſing hope, that nature would ſoon relieve him from the neceſſity of employing againſt him the hand of the aſſaſſin.

unfortunate end of two of his ſons.

The three ſons of Conſtantine had now the whole extent of the Roman empire to divide among them. But each aſpired to the whole. Conſtantine, the eldeſt, fell by the ſword in attempting to deſpoil his brother Conſtans of his dominions. Conſtans himſelf, a prince, if hiſtory may be truſted, of the moſt diſpicable character, derived but little advantage from a victory, in which neither his proweſs nor his conduct had any part. Magnentius, one of his chief officers, tempted by his incapacity and diſſoluteneſs, conſpired againſt him, put him to death, and boldly aſſumed the imperial purple, in thoſe days of military deſpotiſm the cuſtomary reward of the ſucceſsful traitor. Of the ſons of Conſtantine the Great, Conſtantius alone now remained. Called forth by his brother's wrongs, and probably incited ſtill more powerfully by the voice of ambition, he haſtened from the eaſtern provinces, over which he reigned, to chaſtiſe the guilty uſurper. He found in this enterpriſe more difficulty than his flattering courtiers had taught him to expect. And it was not until after a deſtructive war of three years, which in two bloody fields [52] ſwept away the flower of the Roman legions,

Conſtantius reigns alone;

revenges the death of his brother Conſtans;

[52] At Murſa in Pannonia, now Eſſek in Hungary, and at Mons Seleuci, in the Cottian Alps.

that vengeance at length overtook the perfidious Magnentius [11].

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During the inteſtine commotions of the weſtern empire from the ambitious attempts of the younger Conſtantine, and the feeble adminiſtration of the diſſolute Conſtans, Conſtantius had been engaged in a doubtful and unproſperous war againſt his Perſian neighbours. Amidſt the confuſion of theſe buſy times, Gallus and Julian had been ſuffered to live. And the cautious deſpot had contented himſelf with concealing them from public notice in a lonely caſtle of Cappadocia, formerly the place of reſidence of the Cappadocian kings. Upon the murder of Conſtans, and the erection of the ſtandard of rebellion by Magnentius, the whole weight of the empire at this ſeaſon of anxiety reſted on Conſtantius. He felt the burden, and venturing to ſeek relief in the aſſiſtance of Gallus, removed him from a priſon to his court; and, under the title of Caeſar, aſſociated him to the honors and toils of the imperial ſtation; leaving him to provide for the ſecurity of the Aſiatic provinces, whilſt he himſelf advanced againſt the rebel. After the overthrow of Magnentius, and the re-eſtabliſhment of the public tranquillity, Conſtantius found himſelf at leiſure to

his treatment of Gallus and Julian;

confers on Gallus the title of Caeſar;

[11] During the revolt of Magnentius, Vetranio had aſſumed the purple in Illyricum, as co league to Magnentius, but had afterwards abdicated in favor of Conſtantius. Nepotian alſo, the nephew of Conſtantine by the princeſs Eutropia, had been ſaluted emperor at Rome, in oppoſition to Magnentius, but periſhed, after a reign of twenty-eight days. Eutrop. L. x. c. 11.

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examine more attentively into the conduct of Gallus, ſince his elevation. Gallus had faults, and he had enemies. The eunuchs, at this time the deſpicable and inſolent rulers of a luxurious court, deadly foes to whomſoever they could not govern, had placed their emiſſaries around him, who marked with jealous obſervation all his moments of pride or of paſſion. It was diſcovered, that Gallus affected an independence, which the emperor and his miniſters did not mean to allow him. And ſome unjuſtifiable acts of violence committed at Antioch againſt certain confidential ſervants of the emperor, with the connivance, if not by the orders of Gallus, had thrown a deeper ſhade on the errors of which he had been guilty. Credulous nevertheleſs of what was artfully ſuggeſted to him, that it was his intereſt to have an interview with Conſtantius, and that his preſence would diſſipate every complaint, he was prevailed on to intruſt himſelf to this inſidious court, and in a few days after his arrival in Pannonia, on his way, as he thought, to Milan, where the emperor then reſided, he was on a ſudden carried away under a ſtrong guard to Iſtria, and there beheaded privately without even the formality of a trial [*].

Is jealous of him.

Death of Gallus.

Julian's dangerous ſituation;

Julian ſtill ſurvived. For ſome time his fate hung in ſuſpenſe. And it was a queſtion, whether the enjoyment of life could ſafely be permitted to a prince, who had ſo many domeſtic and perſonal injuries to revenge. To the generous interpoſition

[*] See Ammian. Marcellin. L. xiv. c. 1. 7. 9. 11.

of the empreſs Euſebia, wife to Conſtantius, he owed his preſervation. Her lenient counſels, inforced by the multiplicity of cares with which the emperor found himſelf oppreſſed, did even more. Softened by her repreſentations, Conſtantius at laſt conſented to admit his young kinſman into his preſence, to inveſt him with the ſame imperial honors that Gallus had been graced with, and to appoint him to the important ſervice of defending the frontier of the Gallic province againſt the warlike tribes of Germany [11]. Julian executed his truſt with ſpirit and ſucceſs. Repeated accounts aſſured the emperor of the abilities and achievements of the governor of Gaul. He became alarmed. At the head of a victorious army, by whom he was adored, the Caeſar might be tempted to forget what he owed to the emperor; and the ſword of Julian, which was to have guarded the throne, might be employed to invade it. It was reſolved to ſecure his allegiance, by depriving him of the means of revolt. The Perſian bands ſtill infeſted the eaſtern borders of the empire, and often made inroads into the adjacent provinces. Orders were iſſued, that the ſtrength of the Gallic legions ſhould immediately be diſpatched to protect the Aſiatic frontier. The tidings ſpread a general conſternation. Theſe legions were moſtly compoſed of provincials, fondly attached to their native ſoil; and who, in violation of a promiſe ſaid to have

is brought to court;

created Caeſar;

appointed to the government of Gaul;

Conſtantius jealous of him.

[11] See Ammian. Marcellin. L. xx. c. 4. Eutrop. L. x. c. 14, 15. Abbé de la Bleterie. Vie de Julien; and Gibbon's Dec. of the Rom. Emp. c. xxii.

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been ſolemnly pledged to them, now ſaw themſelves torn away from their families and homes, probably never to reviſit them more. Julian, with much pretended zeal for the honor of the emperor, and a ſeeming firmneſs in requiring obedience to the imperial orders, appeared however to ſhare deeply in their affliction; and having on the eve of their departure convened them together, that he might take his laſt farewel of the beloved companions of his toils and of his victories, after a grateful recital of their gallant actions, affectionately lamented a diſtreſs, *which, bound as he was to obey, it was not in his power to relieve.* The hint was greedily caught up. "The "Caeſar, once emperor, might preſcribe the orders, "inſtead of receiving them," was the cry of numbers of the friends of Julian, who doubtleſs had been duly inſtructed; and "Long live our emperor "Julian!" inſtantly reſounded from all the ranks.

Julian's artful management;

is proclaimed emperor by his army;

It is ſcarcely poſſible to avoid remarking how much of the artifice [16] of the ſophiſt, Julian's conduct betrays on this occaſion. An apparent amazement at what he muſt have expected, and what probably his own dark arts had been laboring to accompliſh, was firſt of all aſſumed; he next anſwered their acclamations with all the ſemblance of the moſt poignant concern; he expoſtulated; he conjured, he menaced; he bewailed; he even fled from their ſolicitations, and ſhut himſelf up during the whole enſuing night;

[16] See his dream in Ammian. Marcellin. L. xx. c. 5. and his own account of another dream (Epiſt. 17.) to which, he confeſſes, he gave credit.

confirming them the more effectually, by this appearance of unambitious reluctance, in the very choice he affected to reſiſt. The farce concluded with his *ſubmiſſive* acceptance of their ſplendid offer, and his promiſing to reward their ſedition with a ſuitable gratification; the plunder of the public treaſure being, in theſe days of corruption, the uſual recompence, which the gratitude of the new emperor beſtowed on the inſtruments of his fortune.

prepares to march againſt Conſtantius;

The army of Gaul had created an emperor. Their next object was to ſupport him. And theſe very legions who, rather than encounter the inconveniences of a diſtant ſervice, had plunged into rebellion, were now impatient to brave every danger of an Aſiatic expedition, under the banners of their favorite Julian. But the death of Conſtantius ſaved the new emperor from the guilt of civil bloodſhed; he died at Mopſucrene [57] in Cilicia, on his way to diſpute the empire of the world.

Conſtantius dies.

Julian makes war on the Perſians,

Julian did not long ſurvive him. Ambitious of diſtinguiſhing himſelf in a war, which hitherto had generally baffled the Roman arms, he formed the plan of humbling the Perſian king. Some inconſiderable advantages obtained at the beginning encouraged him to penetrate into a country with which he was ill acquainted. A defeat was the conſequence of his imprudence; and in the confuſion of diſcomfiture, he was pierced by an arrow from an unknown, and probably an ignoble hand.

and falls in battle.

[57] The fountain of Mopſus. An oracle had formerly been there.

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Few princes have been more variouſly ſpoken of than Julian, few more the object of exaggerated praiſe and reproach: dignified by ſome writers with all the attributes of the hero, he is held forth by others to univerſal execration. From both parties a more temperate deciſion ought doubtleſs to have come, and would perhaps have approached nearer to the truth. In his private life he ſeems to have been deſerving of praiſe; his manners were unſtained with licentious pleaſures; his meals, his ſleep, were the frugal, ſlight refreſhments of the philoſopher; and his leiſure-hours, inſtead of being waſted in diſſipation and frivolous amuſements, were generally employed in the purſuit of knowledge, though in the road to it he was unhappily miſtaken. As *a ſoldier*, the character he bears is high; not to be deterred by difficulty, nor diſcouraged by hardſhip; firm in the hour of battle, and always among the foremoſt in the path to glory. As a general, his abilities may be called in queſtion. In his Gallic campaigns, he was ſuppoſed to have acquitted himſelf with honor; in the Perſian war, where we have a more diſtinct view of him, he appears to have been injudicious, raſh, preſumptuous; and in the action in which he fell, he diſcovered himſelf to have been animated with a valor that bordered on inſanity.

his character in private life;

as a ſoldier;

as a general;

But what ſeems chiefly to have engaged philoſophic attention in the hiſtory of Julian, is his character as a religioniſt. He had been educated in the Chriſtian faith from his early years; had profeſſed himſelf a Chriſtian; and had grown up to manhood

as a religioniſt;

manhood in that profeſſion. Yet no ſooner were his fears from Conſtantius removed, than he threw off the maſk, abjured the faith of his former days, avowed himſelf the determined enemy of the religion of Chriſt, and, with all the virulence of an enraged, but crafty adverſary, labored for its extirpation to the laſt gaſp of his life. What appears ſtill more extraordinary; an infidel with relation to the Goſpel, he became the zealous believer of the whole Grecian mythology; adopted its gods, its legends, and its ſacrifices. Even its divinations, one of the moſt dangerous illuſions that ever debaſed the human mind, of which, in the gloom of the dark ages, heathen prieſtcraft had frequently made fatal uſe, and which in a more enlightened age had been reprobated by the wiſeſt of the pagan world, he reſtored, and protected with all the credulity of the moſt abject and uninformed bigot; importuning the altars of every divinity with anxious inquiries, and oftentimes with his own eyes, and an unfeeling curioſity, ſeeking his future deſtiny in the panting entrails of the innocent victim. Could it be from principle, that he renounced Chriſtianity? If it was, how could the ſceptic, who found it difficult to believe what the Goſpel teaches, thus relax from the ſturdineſs of unbelief, and embrace with ſo eaſy a faith, all the abſurdities of pagan fable? Or ſhall we ſay, with certain inſidious advocates, that whatever might be his profeſſion, Chriſtianity or Paganiſm, the liberal-minded Julian was of both equally an unbeliever; a Chriſtian by conſtraint, a Pagan from policy?

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The various revolutions of fortune which he experienced may perhaps, when more attentively conſidered, throw ſome light on this dark part of Julian's hiſtory.

what induced him to leave the Chriſtian Church,

He was a child, when the arm of violence deprived him of his father, and robbed him of his liberty. To the ſtern officers of a jealous tyrant was his education of courſe intruſted; and under the impreſſions of terror, natural in ſuch a ſituation, he received the rudiments of Chriſtianity. The truths of the Goſpel, conveyed to the young diſciple by inſtructors of this kind, inſtead of conciliating his affections, had all the ſtubborn prepoſſeſſions of diſlike, of ſuſpicion, of reſentment, to contend with. Theſe prepoſſeſſions, deeply rooted in the heart, grew up with his years, and ſtrengthened with his ſtrength. When he was firſt permitted to approach the imperial court, new and more powerful prejudices took place in his breaſt. He ſaw in Conſtantius the mercileſs aſſaſſin of his family. And Conſtantius was *a Chriſtian*. The crowd of eunuchs, and fawning ſycophants with which the throne was ſurrounded, the counſellors or miniſters of the tyrant's crimes, and who in their treatment of Julian meaſured the reſpect they were to ſhow to him by the degree of regard paid him by Conſtantius, were alſo *Chriſtians*. How many objections to the religion they profeſſed muſt have ariſen here in the ſuſceptible mind of Julian, irritated by paſt wrongs, and inflamed by preſent contempt! And is it a matter of wonder, that he ſhould have been led to confound a *religion*, which they diſgraced,

with the *principles* which ſeemed to actuate their conduct?

Sect. 3. and to embrace paganiſm.

The votaries of paganiſm were ſtill numerous; and, though humbled, were powerful. Suſpicious of Conſtantius and his miniſters, they exulted in the thought, that in Julian their party might find a friend and protector. They marked, and ſtrengthened, the impreſſions he had received. They courted his confidence. The moſt plauſible and ſeducing of their ſophiſts were employed to inſinuate themſelves into his intimacy. Julian's attachment to Chriſtianity, if he had any remaining, was ſlight and wavering. A total rejection of all religion is a ſtate ill ſuited to the human mind. Even the boldeſt pretender to infidelity will have his ſcruples, his moments of irreſolution, diffidence, and anxiety. Julian felt, that a religion was wanting to him; this the heathen ſophiſts were ready to ſupply. They offered him a religion, the religion ſaid they, of his forefathers, under whoſe propitious auſpices Greece had reached the ſummit of human glory, and Rome had triumphed over a ſubjected world; a religion now purified by philoſophy, and ſet free from thoſe abſurd diſguiſes that a pious ignorance had caſt over it. A multiplicity of gods, indeed, crowded their temples, but in doing honor to theſe, they were in fact paying homage to the perfections of the Supreme Father of the univerſe, of which theſe emblematical perſonages were repreſentations; or expreſſing their gratitude to thoſe intermediate intelligences appointed by the great Firſt Cauſe to miniſter unto man. Neither were theſe intelligences

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the airy creation of an enthuſiaſtic fancy; their exiſtence had been aſcertained by the ſtrongeſt proofs, by the oracles, the dreams, the monitory omens, which they had repeatedly addreſſed to faithful votaries. They had even been known to aſſume a viſible form, and perſonally to inſtruct or protect the humble ſuppliant in his hour of difficulty. And the all-powerful evocations and holy rites, of which the guardian of the ſacred myſteries was in poſſeſſion, could ſummon them from their aerial or ſubterranean abodes, and force them to reveal the dark ſecrets of futury.

To this artful repreſentation Julian liſtened with pleaſure. His mind ſeems to have been prediſpoſed to meet it with approbation. Homer was his favorite [11], and there appeared a wonderful agreement between the poet's mythology and the ſophiſt's ſyſtem. Probably, the *one* was a tranſcript of the *other*. What rendered theſe tales of deceit the more captivating to Julian was a ſpecies of flattery well adapted to his hopes. They perſuaded him that the oracular voice of all the gods, and the promiſe of every victim, announced to him the ſpeedy poſſeſſion of the imperial throne [12]. Julian was not ungrateful. He ſteadily adhered to the altars

[11] He appears to have had moſt of his works by heart.

[12] The dreams, and viſions, which Julian's hiſtorians (Zoſimus, L. iii. p. 155. Ammianus, L. xx. c. 5. Libanius paſſim) tell us he had, and which he himſelf avowed (Epiſt. xvii. ad Oribaſium) ſpeak him, if not an artful impoſtor, certainly a confirmed enthuſiaſt. The latter probably is the truth. And in a mind ſo diſpoſed, the fond perſuaſion,

of thoſe gods, of whoſe veracity he had received ſuch a *convincing* proof; and here perhaps it is not unjuſt to rank him among the moſt ſuperſtitious of the pagan zealots.

The people of Athens active in miſleading Julian's mind.

It is the reproach of Athens, that ſhe had a principal ſhare in miſleading the mind of Julian. Some time before he was inveſted with the honors of the Caeſar, he obtained permiſſion from Conſtantius to purſue his ſtudies in that city. His paſſionate attachment to paganiſm has its date from that period; before the friend of that religion, here he became a bigot to it. Thoſe pretended philoſophers, alſo, who were afterwards moſt aſſiduous in faſtening their bandage of illuſion on this unhappy prince, were moſtly from the Athenian ſchool, in thoſe days the great ſtore-houſe of heathen ſuperſtition. In a ſucceeding reign we have a ſtrong proof of the powerful dominion of ſuperſtition over that infatuated people. They petitioned the emperor Valentinian to permit the celebration of the Eleuſinian myſteries; which, upon the re eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, had been ſuppreſſed; and to reſtore to Athens a ſolemnity on which depended her glory and happineſs. So little had the city of Socrates profited by a LIGHT, which that venerable ſage would have beheld with rapture!

Summary of Julian's character.

From this delineation of Julian's character, however we may be induced to pronounce leſs ſeverely againſt him, and to behold him even with com-

that he was the peculiar care of the gods, and by them deſtined to the empire of the world, might eaſily find admittance.

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paſſionate indulgence, as a *deſerter of the Goſpel*, yet either as a *hero*, or a *philoſopher*, the candid hiſtorian can afford him little praiſe. The oppreſſions of Conſtantius, and the manners of a ſervile court, may have driven him from the Chriſtian church; but vanity, credulity, the curioſity of an ambitious mind, fixed him a pagan. How he has deſerved the exalted name, which certain writers have been pleaſed to beſtow on him, it is not for us to determine. Some perhaps will be apt to ſuſpect, that his panegyriſts would have been fewer, had he not inliſted among the enemies of Chriſtianity.

The family of Conſtantine extinct.

In Julian ended the houſe of Conſtantine. From the death of the latter to that of Julian, about twenty ſix years had elapſed **. At the time of Conſtantine's death the imperial family was in the moſt flouriſhing condition; hiſtory numbers no leſs than thirteen princes, brothers, ſons, nephews, to the deceaſed emperor, the ornament and ſtrength of the imperial houſe. In this ſhort period of time they had all periſhed, two only by the ſtroke of ſickneſs, and one in war againſt a foreign foe, all the reſt by the ſword of diſcord or domeſtic treachery. Such, in thoſe ages of arbitrary power was the precarious tenure even of imperial greatneſs.

Succeſſors of Julian;

The emperors, who ſucceeded Julian, reſtored the religion of the Goſpel, but without being able to re-eſtabliſh the public proſperity; of which a general profligacy of manners, and the fierce deſ-

** Conſtantine died in the year of Chriſt 337, Julian in 363.

ſpotiſm of a military government, had been long before preparing the ruin. To theſe internal evils were added the terrors of hoſtile invaſion. An enemy, provoked by a wanton war, and now fluſhed with victory, threatened the eaſtern boundaries. And Jovian, whom Julian's army had called to the vacant throne, ſignalized his acceſſion by yielding to the Perſian monarch a conſiderable territory, to atone for his predeceſſor's raſh attempt. Similar dangers ſurrounded the empire on every ſide. In Britain, the Roman rampart oppoſed but a feeble and impotent barrier to the impetuous valor of the warriors of the north, and even the legionary troops had been found unable to withſtand the onſet of the Caledonian ravagers. In Gaul, the defenceleſs condition of the frontier, moſt of whoſe braveſt protectors had followed the banners of Julian, had encouraged the German tribes to renew their hoſtilities. Africa was in rebellion; and, among the barbarian tribes of the Danube, there were ſtrong indications of a ſpirit of commotion.

BOOK VIII. Sect. 3. their ſituation,

What rendered this ſituation of things the more formidable, theſe ſeveral inſurrections, and forebodings of war had been excited by repeated cruelties and oppreſſions. Moſt of the nations that bordered on the empire had revered the name of Conſtantine, but they could not continue their reſpect for a line of princes, of whoſe follies, incapacity, or crimes, they were inceſſantly the witneſſes, often the victims. The meaſures purſued by the imperial court to defeat theſe impending

and characters.

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dangers, fully ſhow the guilty policy by which it was governed; and have left an indelible ſtain on the miniſters that could adviſe, and the princes that could adopt, them. The following inſtances are a ſufficient illuſtration of this truth. Two princes, a king of Armenia, and a king of [a] the Quadi, were both, within a few years of each other, under the vague pretence that their fidelity was ſuſpected, murdered at interviews to which they had been treacherouſly invited; and, in both caſes, was the unguarded hour of the hoſpitable banquet choſen for the perpetration of this work of blood. Valentinian the ſucceſſor of Jovian, is accuſed of the one; his brother Valens, to whom he had reſigned the eaſtern throne, ſtands charged with the guilt of the other.

The Huns attack the Gothic ſettlements.

Valens ſoon after received the merited reward of his perfidious counſels. The Huns, a new tribe of Barbarians [b], from the north-eaſt extremities of Aſia, in manners and aſpect more horrid than any that had hitherto appeared on the Roman frontier, attacked the Gothic ſettlements on the further ſide of the Danube. The affrighted Goths implored the protection of Valens, and were permitted to take refuge within his dominions. The peaceful habits of a ſettled home had already conſiderably diminiſhed the native ferocity of theſe Gothic tribes; and under the mild government of equal laws, and in poſſeſſion of an eſtabliſhed property, they might without much difficulty have

[a] A Gothic nation. [b] Ammian. Marc. L. xxix.

been improved into uſeful ſubjects. Valens had not the wiſdom to avail himſelf of this valuable increaſe of population. Seduced by the fears of his miniſters, and perhaps not leſs by his own, he repented of what he had done; he had promiſed theſe ſtrangers a ſupply of proviſions, and he violated his promiſe. They complained; their complaints were diſregarded; neglect was aggravated by inſult; inſult by violence. The Goths, naturally haughty and impatient, were exaſperated; they flew to arms; and a long, fierce, and deſtructive war enſued, which in the courſe of it proved fatal to Valens himſelf. After having ſeen the total diſcomfiture of his army under the walls of Hadrianople, he was burned alive in a cottage, where he had taken refuge from the victorious and purſuing enemy [11].

Valens's perfidious treatment of the Goths;

his defeat and death.

The calamities of the times raiſed Theodoſius to the imperial throne. Gratian, the ſon and ſucceſſor of Valentinian, the nephew and now the heir to Valens, was ill able to ſuſtain the weight of two empires, one of them over-run by a revengeful and victorious enemy: he therefore conſigned the precarious empire of the eaſt to the valor of Theodoſius; in whoſe hiſtory is ſeen one of thoſe ſignal revolutions, that is ſometimes to be met with in the fortunes of this world. His father, of the ſame name, was of all Valentinian's generals the ableſt and moſt faithful. In Britain he had checked the inroads of the Caledonians; he had repulſed the

Gratian in poſſeſſion of the whole empire;

ſhares it with Theodoſius.

[11] See Ammian. Marc. L. xxxi. c. 12, 13.

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Germans from the Gallic frontier; and he had reduced the inſurgents of Africa. Theſe ſeveral exploits had raiſed him in the eyes of a ſordid court to a dangerous pre-eminence. Valentinian was dead, and his ſon Gratian, as yet a youth, was under the control of a vicious miniſtry, who pretended that Theodoſius entertained ambitious views, and ſacrificed his life to their ſuſpicious jealouſy. For ſome years the young Theodoſius had ſerved with glory under his illuſtrious father, and had ſhown himſelf already emulous of his noble example. But every aſpiring hope being thus blaſted by his father's death, he withdrew from a court which he muſt have held in abhorrence, and was cultivating the virtues of retirement on his paternal eſtate, in an obſcure corner of Galicia, when the commands of Gratian called him forth to the public ſervice.

Theodoſius's domeſtic hiſtory,

Theodoſius, with conſiderable abilities, had alſo many amiable qualities. But the licentiouſneſs of a diſſolute age often diſappointed the *one*; and the baneful influence of deſpotic power ſometimes contributed to obſcure the *other*. No ſooner was he placed at the head of the armies of the eaſt, than he diſcovered, with equal amazement and regret, that the boaſted ſtrength of the Roman legions had ceaſed to exiſt. Corrupted by the example of the times, by the inſolent dominion they had uſurped over the throne, by the profuſe donatives they extorted from the tranſient objects of their favor, by the indulgences they obtained from the fears or the ambition of their leaders, the

character,

and difficulties;

legionary troops had become ſtrangers to that frugal life, that patience of toil, and obſervance of diſcipline, which had triumphed over the ſucceſſors of Alexander, and had laid Carthage in the duſt. The ponderous helmet and maſſy ſhield were caſt aſide; and the effeminate ſoldier choſe rather to expoſe himſelf defenceleſs to the weapons of the foe, than to ſubmit to the oppreſſive weight of an armour, which his gallant anceſtor deemed his ornament Even the neceſſary work of intrenching a camp, which the companions of Caeſar, and the partners of his glory, did not diſdain to execute with their own hands, had become the ſcorn of a delicate and indolent ſoldiery [**]. One reſource remained to Theodoſius, and he adopted it. Thoſe Goths, whom, after a four-years war, and many a bloody conflict, he found it impracticable to exterminate, he reſolved to tempt with offers of amity and confidence; he received them into the imperial ſervice, intruſted their leaders with important commands, and aſſigned them emoluments, honors, poſſeſſions; flattering himſelf that he ſhould thus convert enemies into friends, and that the late ravagers of the Roman territories would now become the defenders of a country in which they had acquired rank and property. This expedient, the reſult probably not of choice but of neceſſity, proved however a ruinous meaſure. Acquainted with the legionary arms, and inſtructed in the Roman diſcipline, the Goths no longer felt that

dangerous expedient he had recourſe to.

[**] See Veget. de re militari, L. i. c. 20.

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feriority in war, which was owing to the want of military ſcience; they ſaw, and deſpiſed, a weakneſs, which they were called to protect; the Danube, no longer guarded by a reſpectable barrier, ſupplied them with continual recruits from that variety of barbarian tribes, which, though divided againſt each other by internal feuds, yet always ſhowed the utmoſt cordiality in their attacks upon the Roman empire; and theſe new confederates of Theodoſius ſoon learned to control a government, whoſe exiſtence or diſſolution was totally in their power.

dreadful inſtance of his vindictive ſpirit.

But if all the ruinous conſequences of this fatal expedient are not to be imputed to Theodoſius, he muſt ſurely bear the whole guilt of the maſſacre at Theſſalonica [65]. An inſurrection had broken out in this part of Greece; and in the madneſs of popular fury an imperial officer had been torn in pieces. Such an inſult to ſovereign power was not, it ſeems, to be expiated but with the extermination of the Theſſalonians. A body of troops marched into Theſſalonica, with orders to put all the inhabitants to the ſword, without diſtinction of guilt or innocence, of age, ſex, or condition. Theſe orders were executed in their fulleſt extent. And to cruelty was added perfidiouſneſs. Care was taken to remove all apprehenſion of danger from theſe devoted victims; and when the whole city, fully aſſured of the emperor's clemency, had aſſembled in the circus to enjoy a feſtive ſpectacle,

[65] Soz. L. vii. c. 25. Ru. Hiſ. c. 18. See Gibbon, c. 27.

theſe military ruſſians were let looſe on the unſuſpecting multitude. According to ſome writers, upwards of fifteen thouſand perſons periſhed in this maſſacre. Such a violation of all the laws of juſtice and humanity would at one time have armed more than one half of Greece againſt the tyrant that duſt attempt it; but, ſuch is the ſubduing power of deſpotiſm, it now ſerved only to add to the terrors, and confirm the ſervitude of this abject people; and the epiſcopal reproof of Ambroſe biſhop of Milan was the only oppoſition Theodoſius had to encounter. A penance of eight months, to which the emperor piouſly ſubmitted, was ſuppoſed to have atoned for all this bloodſhed. At the time Theodoſius reigned in the eaſt, Gratian held his imperial ſeat at Treves; Gaul, Spain, and the Britiſh iſles were ſubject to his ſway, while Valentinian, the youngeſt ſon of the late emperor Valentinian the ſecond, reigned in Italy. But Maximus of Britain having revolted againſt Gratian, and deprived him of empire and life, and Valentinian having fallen by domeſtic treachery, Theodoſius, after revenging both their deaths, remained in poſſeſſion of all the Roman dominions.

gets poſſeſſion of the whole empire;

From the abilities and perſonal valor of Theodoſius, the empire, during his reign, maintained an appearance of vigor; the reign of his ſons revealed the fatal ſecret of the public debility. Warped by the fond partiality of a parent, he divided his dominions between them; to the eldeſt, Arcadius, a youth of eighteen, he bequeathed the throne of the eaſt; to the youngeſt, Honorius, aged only eleven, the

divides it between his two ſons, Arcadius and Honorius;

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western empire [a]: an appointment as unhappy to themselves, as it was unfortunate to their people. With a natural imbecillity of mind, in which their ripening years made little alteration, and brought up in the bosom of a luxurious palace, they both sunk into a slothful inactivity, the easy dupes of every minister, who had the boldness or the art to seize the reins of government, which fell from their feeble hands. The fatal partition of the imperial dominions brought on an increase of calamities. The empire was weak before; divided, it was weaker. A longer line of frontier was now to be defended; and the means of defence were lessened. Instead of the whole strength of the empire acting in concert, an opposition of interests and councils took place. Jealous of the sovereign of the west, the court of Constantinople saw with unconcern, and even with pleasure, the bordering nations pour the war on the western provinces, and enjoyed a distress, in which their own territories were soon to be involved, whilst the barbarian leaders, seated in the heart of the empire, many of them invested with offices of trust and dignity, and in full possession of the opportunity of marking and encouraging every internal mischief, profited by the follies of these nominal princes, and on the ruins of the imperial power planned an empire of their own. A detail of the disastrous events that ensued, belongs to another history. Here it is sufficient to observe, that the Roman empire in the west closed with the ignoble reign of Honorius. In less than twenty-five

consequences of this appointment.

[a] A. D. 395.

years after the death of Theodoſius, Alaric, the Gothic chief, who in the days of that emperor deemed it his glory to follow the imperial banners, after having ſpread the ravages of war throughout Italy, compelled Rome to ſubmit to his victorious arms, and ſaw himſelf the uncontrolled arbiter of the throne of the Caeſars.

Rome taken by the Goths under the command of Alaric.

Rome, long the haughty tyrant of the world, was now made to feel, what ſhe had often impoſed, the humiliation of ſervitude. The eaſtern empire, mean while, had not eſcaped. Previous to his irruption into Italy, Alaric, at the head of his fierce bands, had attempted the dominions of the eaſt, and Greece, which ſeldom failed to ſhare largely in the adverſe fortunes of her imperial maſters, was again made the ſcene of devaſtation [77]. Hiſtory has charged Rufinus, by whom the councils of Arcadius were then directed, with the guilt of having opened Greece to the ravagers; for, if we are to believe the united teſtimony of all the writers of thoſe days, never did a more flagitious miniſter diſgrace the confidence of his ſovereign. It may however be a queſtion, whether the abandoning of Greece to the barbarians was not rather his policy than his crime. Had this impetuous torrent of war ruſhed with unſpent fury againſt the capital of the empire, the iſſue might have been doubtful. And it was poſſibly to ſave Conſtantinople, that Rufinus gave up Greece.

Alaric invades Greece.

A calamity ſo great completed the deſolation of this unhappy country. Whatever the cruelty, the

[77] A. D. 369.

BOOK VIII. Sect. 3. State of Greece from this period.

avarice, the luſt, of an inſolent and brutal conqueror could inflict, Greece now experienced. Her magnificent cities became a maſs of ruins, her numerous towns were levelled with the ground, and thoſe monuments of her glory, which had hitherto been preſerved from violation, were all defaced and overthrown; while the inhabitants, either ſlaughtered by the barbarian ſword, or dragged from their homes to a life of ſlavery, left this once-populous and well-cultivated country a lonely waſte. Where every ſcience and every art had, during a long ſucceſſion of ages, eſtabliſhed their abode, there now reigned a melancholy ſilence; the voice of the rural pipe was no longer heard on the hills of Arcadia; and of all the noble ſtructures, which the piety, the gratitude, or the pride of ancient ages had erected, only mouldering palaces, deſolated temples, defaced inſcriptions, and mutilated ſtatues, remained, at once the objects of regret and of admiration. In this humbled ſtate, with very little variation, Greece continued from the Gothic invaſion to the final overthrow of the throne of Conſtantine's ſucceſſors; her principal inhabitants being the few families, who having eſcaped to the mountains during the late inundation of the barbarians, had afterwards taken up their dwelling amidſt theſe ſequeſtered ruins, and whoſe only wealth was the produce of their hives and of the ſilk-worm [*]. Some of the emperors ſeem indeed

[*] The ſilk-worm is ſaid to have been brought from India to Conſtantinople about the year 550. The artificers, who introduced the culture of ſilk into Sicily, from whence it to

to have remembered what Greece had been, and to have wiſhed to raiſe her again to a happier fortune. But the embarraſſments of a declining empire ſtill defeated the viſionary plan. Conſtantinople herſelf, during the greater part of this gloomy period, retained little more than a faint ſhadow of imperial greatneſs. Governed moſtly by weak or oppreſſive princes, diſtracted by domeſtic factions, and, what is worſe, by endleſs controverſies, which were diſgraced by all the virulence of religious diſputation, this empreſs-city ſunk by degrees into contempt with every people around her. Having neither ſecurity at home, nor ſtrength abroad, ſhe was often compelled to purchaſe, at the price of her faireſt poſſeſſions, a temporary peace from the barbarian tribes by whom ſhe was encompaſſed; who, making uſe of the very conceſſions they extorted from the fears of one prince to exact larger conceſſions from his ſucceſſor, reduced at length the extenſive dominions of this mighty empire to the narrow compaſs of a few provinces. At the ſame time, a general profligacy of manners had prevailed. Private luxury and magnificence advancing as the public fortune declined, the people, with an unfeeling levity, indulged in all the gay diſſipations of the higheſt proſperity, in the midſt of the miſeries of their

Decline of Conſtantinople;

paſſed into Italy, were brought from Greece by Roger the firſt king of Sicily, in 1130. The ſlow progreſs of this art may ſerve as a proof of the low ſtate of induſtry, and the difficulties of intercourſe and communication during that period.

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country. In addition to these menacing appearances, the throne itself, always insecure when founded in despotism, was become more precarious than ever, stained not unfrequently with the blood of the short-lived possessor, and but too often the reward of the successful crime of the rebel, the traitor, the ruffian; so that Porphyrogeneta, *of imperial birth* [11], came to be the distinguishing appellation of those few emperors, who could boast so illustrious a parentage. Such is the melancholy summary of the Byzantine history, till, in the year 1453, the Othman arms put an end to this phantom of an empire.

taken by the Othmans.

Of the shock of the various revolutions, which, during this bloody period, began, advanced, and at length effected the final overthrow of the imperial throne, Greece however appears to have felt little, probably from the obscurity of her condition. Too insignificant to be the object of ambition, those who had in view the dismembering of the eastern empire, passed her by; beholding with indifference a land without inhabitants or cultivation; and leaving the possession of it to any of the rovers of those days, who were inclined to attempt a temporary settlement in that desolated country. For some centuries Greece even seems to have been altogether forgotten; or if remembered, was only considered as overspread with heaps of ruins, in which human industry might in vain seek to trace any of those venerable scenes

Greece neglected and forgotten;

[11] See Grandeur & Décadence des Romains, Ch. 21.

recorded in ancient ſtory. The tale of the traveller, who talked of having diſcovered the ſite of Athens, and made his way to the remains of that illuſtrious city, was heard at firſt with amazement, if not with incredulity. The report, that amidſt this rubbiſh of ages many veſtiges of the arts of ancient Greece were ſtill to be deſcried, induced others to viſit this long-neglected tract; and numbers of adventurers from different countries, but eſpecially from the Italian cities, formed eſtabliſhments on various parts of the Grecian coaſt.

is viſited by different adventurers;

By degrees the modern Conſtantinople, now the capital of the Turkiſh empire, has once more re-aſſumed a dominion over the Grecian territory. Muſtapha the ſecond colonized anew ſeveral diſtricts of it. And at this day Greece, with her adjacent iſles, acknowledges ſubjection to the throne of the Othmans.

now ſubject to the throne of the Othmans;

The preſent Greeks appear to be a mixed race, of whom few, if any, are of the ancient Grecian lineage. Moſt of them have been tranſplanted into this country from different parts, and at different periods, by thoſe who were attracted by curioſity, or views of gain. In addition to theſe partial colonizations, the Othman princes have, from their firſt invaſion of Greece, at different times thrown in a conſiderable increaſe of inhabitants. Theſe coloniſts, of every deſcription, the Turks only excepted, have long ſince coaleſced into one people, who, unmindful of their original extraction, ſeem to regard Greece as their parent-ſoil. And it is worthy of remark, that the Greeks of this day,

her preſent inhabitants.

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whether from the influence of climate, or from having fallen into an early imitation of the manners, which on their arrival they found here eſtabliſhed, bear in ſeveral particulars a ſtriking reſemblance to the ancient inhabitants. Even now, inſtruments of muſic are to be met with in every hamlet, and ſong and daoce are ſtill the delight of the Grecian peaſant. The Boeotians are remarked for credulity and ignorance. And among the Greeks of Attica, low as their ſtate of literature now is, we find a conſiderable ſhare of that vivacity and acuteneſs, by which the Athenians of ancient times were peculiarly diſtinguiſhed. More ſtrongly ſtill does their ſpeech exhibit this affinity to the Greeks of old, of whoſe language the modern Greek is a manifeſt corruption. The Turks ſtill remain diſtinguiſhed from the other inhabitants, perſevering with a lordly inflexibility in their national dreſs, language, and mode of living; in obedience poſſibly to the law of their Koran, but more probably from a contempt for the manners of a people whom they equally deſpiſe and oppreſs.

The ſtate of Chriſtianity in Greece.

The Goſpel was known early in Greece. Before the middle of the firſt century, Athens, Corinth, with moſt of Achaia, and many parts of Macedon, Theſſalonica, Beroea, Philippi, had been enlightened by the labors of the great Apoſtle of the Gentiles. A ſpecies of Chriſtianity [70] Greece ſtill retains, but ſuch as would move the indignatioo

[70] See Spon. Voy. de la Grèce; Tournefort Voyage du Levant, Lettre iii; and Dr. Chandler's Travels into Greece, ch. 28.

of that excellent Apoſtle [71], not leſs than did formerly the ſuperſtitious exceſſes of idolatrous Athens. A number of abſurd obſervances, a paltry diſplay of the figures of ſaints and martyrs in their places of worſhip, a profound reverence for the Panagia or *mother of God*, as they ſtill blaſphemouſly ſtyle the Bleſſed Virgin, an obſtinate adherence to every opinion ſaid to have been held by their Chriſtian anceſtors, and a loquacious zeal in defending theſe opinions, as far as their ſcanty portion of learning will permit them, make up nearly the whole of what is dignified with the name of Chriſtianity by this ignorant and degraded people.

The preſent Greeks groſsly ignorant.

In the ſeveral arts, once the boaſt of Greece, they are equally uninſtructed; and, for the moſt part, ſeem hardly conſcious of the former glories of their country. What a Solon taught, or a Themiſtocles achieved, Athens herſelf has long ſince ceaſed to remember. And thoſe precious monuments of the power and wiſdom of ancient days, which might enrich the cabinets of princes, are now ſuffered to be ſpurned by the inſolent foot of the illiterate Janizary, or perhaps employed, like vulgar materials, in fencing an incloſure, or in repairing the dwelling of ſome turbaned exactor. The cunning and intereſted Greek may ſometimes be found to ſet a high value on the ſculptured fragment he poſſeſſes; but what taſte might be ſuppoſed to do in another, is in him the effect of avarice; he only ſeeks to enhance the price of what he wiſhes to part with; and, from the earneſtneſs

[71] See Acts of the Ap. xvii. 16.

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of the curious traveller, he judges of that which he would otherwiſe want the ſkill to eſtimate.

Sect. 3. Remarkable revolution in the hiſtory of mankind.

Of how uncertain a tenure are even the advantages of human genius! Greece, famed for arts and arms, from whoſe horizon beamed forth thoſe rays of ſcience, which have gradually illumined our European world, now ſtands in need of the inſtruction ſhe was wont to give. From thoſe nations, whom ſhe held moſt in contempt, ſhe is at this day to learn what Greece once was. And were it not for the learned reſearches of the deſcendants of theſe very barbarians, whom in her age of glory ſhe had deemed it a reproach to have numbered among her denizens, the fierce German, the unlettered Caledonian, the barbarous Briton, the rude Gaul[72], many of her moſt highly-valued marble records had remained unread, and ſome of her nobleſt memorials had been buried in oblivion.

[72] It were ſuperfluous, and indeed ſcarcely poſſible, to mention here all the illuſtrious perſonages of theſe nations, to whoſe munificence and labors theſe later ages owe the many inſtructive monuments we poſſeſs of the achievements and arts of ancient days. To Britain's glory be it however remembered, that among her ſons ancient literature has found a greater number of bountiful patrons, than any other country has to boaſt of; and that at this very time there exiſts in the midſt of her a ſociety of perſons, not leſs diſtinguiſhed by their taſte and public ſpirit, than by their opulence and noble birth, (The Dilettanti) who are employed in the generous plan of animating the ſtudies and promoting the information of the riſing generation. See Chandler's Travels, and the Ionian Antiquities, for which we are indebted to this reſpectable Society.

THE END.

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